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Measuring the Size and Development of the Informal Economy in 
the Countries of the Balkan Peninsula using Structural Equation 
Modelling approach 
Abstract 
 
This thesis presents estimates and analysis of the informal economy for ten countries in the 
Balkan Peninsula region. It is the first attempt to study the size and development of the 
informal economy in these southeastern European countries from 1996 to 2014 using a 
special case of the Structural Equation modelling, which is the MIMIC model. There is 
currently a gap in the literature focusing on measuring the size of the informal economy in 
the Balkan countries especially after social, economic, political and judiciary reforms that the 
region has undergone. Such reforms are likely to influence the trend of the informal economy, 
and hence it is important to study the development of the informal economy. Different from 
existing literature, this research uses policy-driven indicators as well as macroeconomic 
variables in the model to estimate the size of the informal economy in this part of the world. 
The estimates indicate that there is a declining trend in the size of the informal economy in 
most of these countries. The yearly average size of the informal economy in these ten 
countries started from around 31 percent in 1996 and dropped to around 26 percent in 2014. 
However, the overall average size of the informal economy in these Balkan countries remains 
high relative to GDP, and it is just over 30 percent. The results indicate that countries, where 
the overall average size of the informal economy is found to be the highest as a proportion to 
their GDP, are FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Turkey with 38.4 percent, 
33.3 percent, 33.0 percent, and 32.1 percent, respectively. Countries with the lowest informal 
economy, on the other hand, are Slovenia and Greece, with 25 percent and 26.9 percent, 
respectively. The average size of the informal economy in Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Croatia approximates to slightly under or slightly over 30 percent. The analysis also reveals 
that the key driving causes of the informal economy in these countries are the regulation 
burden, level of corruption, the dominance of the agriculture sector, degree of urbanisation, 
macroeconomic developments and the size of the government. This research concludes with 
some recommendations.  
 
Keywords: Informal economy, MIMIC model, Balkan countries, Structural Equation 
Modelling, policy indicators, government effectiveness, regulation burden, the rule of law, 
policy recommendations 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The subject of informal economy has been of great interest to many scholars, regarding its 
development, causes and the impact it has on the overall economy of a country. The concept 
of informal economy is defined in some ways, from a broader definition to a narrower one. 
This thesis will adopt the narrower definition of the informal economy which is mainly about 
tax evasion. The broader definition of the informal economy is described as an economic 
sector that does not comply with any of the government regulations, norms or laws in the 
country (Hart, 2008a; Ihrig & Moe, 2004). It can involve illegal and legal activities from a 
monetary and non-monetary transactions point of view. The illegal activities involve those 
activities from trading of goods that were stolen, the production smuggling and dealing of 
drugs, as well as from prostitution to trafficking (Mirus & Smith, 1997). The legal but informal 
activities, according to Mirus & Smith (1997), can be characterised by tax evasion and tax 
avoidance categories from a monetary and non-monetary perspective. Tax evasion refers to 
the unreported income from different sources, while tax avoidance can refer to different 
employee discounts and fringe benefits from a monetary perspective, to all do-it-yourself and 
neighbour help activities from the non-monetary perspective1. 
The narrower definition of the informal economy that this thesis will follow is that suggested 
by Pedersen (2003) and Kazemier (2003). They refer to the informal economy as “…all market-
based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public 
                                                          
1 See table 2.2.1. 
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authorities…” for tax evasion and avoidance reasons (Smith, 1994; p. 18). The informal 
economy is a fact of life in almost all countries worldwide (Schneider, 2000). It is an integral 
part of the economy and it does affect the development of a country in different ways 
dependant on their level of economic development (Nikopour et al., 2008).  
Measuring the size of the informal economy in a country can be a challenging task since the 
very agents involved in informal economic activities are purposefully hiding from being 
identified (Gerxhani, 2004a, 2004b; Buehn & Schneider, 2011). Agents engaged in informal 
economic activities try to stay undetected from authorities to avoid paying taxes and 
operating by the rules and regulations imposed by governments (Medina & Schneider 2017). 
The existence of the informal economy, however, is known. The main evidence of the 
existence of the informal economy in a country in most cases comes from surveys of leading 
international organisations, such as the World Bank and International Labour Organisation. 
Their accuracy, however, is questionable, because surveys tend to produce biased results. 
Those engaged in informal economic activities will not be willing to answer all the questions 
that the survey may want to ask (Gerxhani, 2004b).  
Since the size of the informal economy can distort the true state of the overall economy or 
the formal economy2, their inaccurate statistics could potentially lead to inappropriate 
policies being implemented which may lead to misallocation and misuse of resources (Arby 
et al., 2012). Therefore, many indirect, direct and model approaches have been developed by 
economists to measure the size of the informal economy (Schneider & Enste 2000; Dell’Anno 
& Schneider, 2003)3.    
                                                          
2 Terms of Overall, Formal or Official Economy are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. This is the 
economy its economic agents fully operate within the norms, rules and government regulations.  
3 See section 2.5 and table 2.5.1. 
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Controlling economic informality is also a challenging task (Schneider & Enste, 2000). Most 
countries attempt to control economic informality through punitive measures rather than 
reforms in their tax systems, regulation, the rule of law and other bureaucracies involved with 
operating in the formal economy. Agents involved in the informal economy consider it as an 
opportunity cost in operating in the formal economy as opposed to the informal economy. 
Punitive measures such as punishments and prosecution may not be the appropriate 
measures to control informal economic activities (Frey & Schneider, 2000). Some countries 
try to use education to educate people not to engage in the informal economy, highlighting 
the punitive measures involved (la Porta & Schleifer, 2014). 
Effective policies to control the informal economy in a country are essential. Such effective 
policies can be achieved if governments have consistent and reliable statistics to control and 
reduce the size of the informal economy. A growing size of the informal economy can be seen 
as a reaction of popular mistrust on the institutions and the government, as individuals may 
feel overburdened and may decide to engage in the informal economy, rather than raise their 
voices against the system which could result in reforms (Schneider & Enste, 2000). A sizeable 
informal economy may also compete with the formal economy. Firms who operate in the 
formal economy may find themselves in the unfair competitive environment (la Portes et al., 
1989, p.11). However, according to Schneider & Enste (2000), the existence of the informal 
economy can have positive effects on the formal economy as most of the income earned from 
informal economic activities is spent immediately on the formal or official economy4.  
Effective government policies to control the size of the informal economy are particularly 
important for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula for the reasons discussed above. The size 
                                                          
4 Advantages and disadvantages of informal economy are discussed in chapter two, and Appendix 2.2.1. 
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of the informal economy in the Balkan countries is high (Schneider et al., 2013). Providing 
estimates for the size and development of the informal economy in this region accompanied 
with some analytical discussion and policy recommendations are, in a nutshell, the 
contribution of this thesis. 
1.2. Context and Aim of the research 
This thesis will contribute to the literature of informal economy by providing estimates for 
the size and development of the informal economy in ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula. 
It will also provide analysis and discussion on the main drivers of economic informality in 
these countries. The main aim of this research is to explore the impact of the informal 
economy in the countries of the Balkan Peninsula5 and analyse the main causes and 
consequences leading to relatively large informal economies relative to real GDP in these 
countries. In doing this, the primary objective is to provide some estimates of the informal 
economy in these countries using the model approach and a sample with only Balkan 
countries. In estimating the size of the informal economy in this region, this research will 
make use of the model approach (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model6), which 
is a particular case of the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM hereafter). 
The economies of the Balkan countries are characterised by informal activities typically in the 
form of tax evasion, unreported income and informal employment. Some other important 
factors drive economic informality in this region such as the level of regulation and 
bureaucracies for running a business, the cost of running a business formally, the rule of law, 
                                                          
5 These are countries whose geographical territory is entirely within the Balkan Peninsula and those that are 
mostly or partially located within this region. Please refer to section 1.6 in chapter one of this document. 
6 The MIMIC model is part of the Structural Equation Modelling. 
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size of the government, high levels of corruption, the level of unemployment and inflation 
and the level of government integrity and effectiveness.  
Data was gathered on the basis of the methodology that will be used in estimating the size of 
the informal economy.  Panel data spanning from 1996 to the latest available data7 for ten 
Balkan countries will be used to generate results for this part of the region. Earlier set of data 
for this part of the world is either incomplete, not found, or does not exist, as most of the 
countries part of this region have experienced severe political conflicts, wars and political 
turmoil in the past, and as such, data is unavailable8 or unofficial.  
Countries which are geographically part of the Balkan Peninsula include Serbia, Romania, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, FYR of 
Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. Part of this research will be all the countries indicated above 
except Kosovo and Montenegro9, where most data does not exist as these two countries 
became independent in the last decade. Including all these countries, the data to be used is 
heterogeneous due to the differing characteristics of each of the above countries, yet with 
similarities regarding culture, ways in conducting economic activities, past conflicts and 
aspirations for European Union integration. 
The economic informality in these ten Balkan countries is significant, often reaching levels of 
over 30 percent of their GDP (Gerxhani, 2004b; Schneider et al., 2010; Alm & Embaye, 2013; 
Hassan & Schneider, 2016a). The growth of the informal, underground, shadow or the illegal 
                                                          
7 Currently full data without any missing values is available up to 2014. There are some missing values for some 
countries after 2014. 
8 In cases where data is available, there are many missing values. 
9 Kosovo and Montenegro are newly created countries from former Yugoslavia. Montenegro declared 
independence on 3rd of June 2006, whereas Kosovo declared independence on the 17th of February 2008. 
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economy or any other name10 that is used, is a global phenomenon. Recent studies 
(Schneider, 2006, 2007a; Dell’Anno 2007; Torgler & Schneider, 2007; Schneider et al., 2010; 
Alm & Embaye, 2013; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a,) indicate that the size of the informal 
economy is higher than many economists thought. These studies, however, do not look into 
one particular region of the world and include the factors that are specifically relevant to 
those regions, but instead, they look at a large number of countries, often without any 
connections and at different stages of development. However, for countries at different levels 
of development different drivers can be attributed to the large size of the informal economy. 
This raises the question as to what would happen to the estimates of the size of the informal 
economy if we were to take one region or different countries but at a similar level of 
development at a time and estimate the size of the informal economy. Would the same 
drivers be as significant in this case or would different drivers of economic informality be 
more important? Furthermore, most studies concentrate on the use of Tax Rates as the main 
causal variable influencing informality. Balkan countries tend to have low tax rates in the first 
place. So this raises the question of what are some of the other factors, other than tax, as 
main causes of the large informal sector in this region. Thus, this research will concentrate on 
the ten Balkan countries, as most of them are found in similar levels of development11.  
The informal economy was not the centre of the attention of economists for research 
purposes until early seventies. In 1972, the International Labour Organization (ILO, hereafter) 
published a study12 which draw the attention of researchers to the subject. The informal 
                                                          
10 Other terminologies for the informal economies are discussed in detail in chapter two. 
11 A rationale for choosing Balkan countries for this research is provided below in section 1.6 of this chapter. 
12 This is the study by ILO on “Employment, incomes and equality: A strategy for increasing productive 
employment in Kenya” (published in Geneva, 1972). This as per ILO’s website available at 
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/dw4sd/themes/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm (last accessed 
16/12/2018) 
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economy is considered being of larger magnitude and size in developing and transitioning 
countries (Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003; Schneider, 2007a, 2007b; Schneider et al., 2010; 
Buehn and Schneider 2012; Alm and Embaye, 2013; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a; Schneider & 
Buehn, 2016). The majority of countries, part of this research, are considered to be either in 
transition, developing or new EU countries (with the exception of Greece) (Bartlett, 2009; 
Penev, 2012), who are also considered countries with large informal economic sectors when 
compared to other European countries (Novkovska, 2008; Macias & Cazzavillan, 2009; 
Garvanlieva et al., 2012; Krstić & Stanišić, 2013; Boka & Torluccio, 2013; Manolas et al., 2013). 
The size of a country’s informal economy is strongly correlated with low levels of economic 
development and low GDP per capita (Schneider, 2002, 2007a). Many studies suggest that 
the informal economy is associated with less development and transition economies 
(Schneider & Enste, 2000; Gërxhani, 2004; Williams, 2005; Dell’Anno, 2007; Andrei et al., 
2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Schneider, 2014; la Porta & Shleifer, 2014). 
This region too has been hit by the last global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone 
debt crisis13. Their formal economy indicators highlight the impact of this financial crisis on 
the levels of output, increased unemployment and worsening of the balance of payments. 
While in some countries the impact was felt mildly (Albania, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, 
Montenegro), other Balkan countries experienced greater negative impacts on their economy 
(Greece, Croatia, and Serbia) (Bartlett, 2009; Micevska, 2004; Penev, 2012). It is recognised 
that economic crisis in general (and financial crisis in particular) can lead to a slowdown in the 
economic activity of a country, thus exacerbating poverty levels and income distribution. 
Moreover, labour market theories suggest that there will be an increase in informal activities 
                                                          
13 Past financial crisis since 1996 have also had an impact on the region (Bartlett, 2009; Micevska, 2004; Penev, 
2012). 
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as a result of economic crisis and hence increase the levels of informal economy (Hassan & 
Schneider, 2016a). As a consequence of economic crisis (particularly the financial crisis), it is 
expected that the unemployment rate in a country will increase as jobs will be lost during a 
recession or an economic downturn. The informal employment, on the other hand, is 
expected to increase as there will be new entrants into the informal economy for various 
economic, survival and social reasons (Finnegan & Singh 2004). It is assumed that the informal 
economy can act as a refuge in coping with the economic crisis which affects the formal 
economy directly (Cunningham & Maloney 2000; Cling et al. 2010).  
If the informal economy was of significant size before the financial crisis of 2008, it is 
interesting to estimate the size of the informal economy some years after this crisis in an 
attempt to see the development of such economy in the ten Balkan countries. Different 
studies mentioned above and reviewed thoroughly in the literature review, have indicated a 
declining trend in the level of informal economy for some Balkan countries, due to a 
strengthening of the formal economy and reforms. However, with the severe impact of the 
financial crisis of 2008 on the formal economies of the Balkan countries, it would be 
interesting to see if this declining trend has continued after the crisis. 
In general, the above aim can be divided into three main areas of research. The first aim is to 
explore the leading causes and consequences of the informal economy in Balkan countries by 
reviewing the existing literature on the field and by assessing and critically examining the 
theories of the informal economy.  The second aim is to estimate the size and the 
development of the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries using a Structural Equation 
Modelling approach (MIMIC Model) for the period from 1996 to 2014 and evaluating the 
primary drivers of informality in these countries. Finally, the third aim is to analyse the impact 
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of such informality for the formal or official economies of these countries and provide some 
policy recommendations for their governments. 
1.3. Objectives of the study 
This research intends to address a number of objectives triggering some research questions. 
The first of these objectives is to critically review the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between the informal economy, the formal economy and 
economic development from 1996 to 2014 for the ten Balkan countries. The second objective 
is to obtain a clear understanding of how informality is present in the economies of these 
countries in question. The analysis will indicate the main causes or drivers of economic 
informality in these Balkan countries and will provide estimates of the size of their informal 
economies. The third objective is to assess the significance of informality and the significance 
of the causes and effects of such informality in these Balkan countries.  
The next objective is to propose ways of reducing informality in these countries, considering 
the effects of that reduction in their national economies. Most of these countries have mainly 
concentrated on the use of punitive measures to control the size of the informal economy. 
Recommending effective policy measures to control the development of the informal 
economy in these countries may benefit these governments to be more efficient in controlling 
economic informality. Moreover, the final objective is to understand the different dynamics 
of the Balkan economies based on their economic and political trajectory (such as European 
Union Integrations and Post conflicts). 
1.4. Research Questions 
The above aims and objectives of this thesis introduce a number of research questions. This 
thesis will seek to answer the following research questions: 
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• What is the size of the informal economy in the ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula?  
Typically, the size of the informal economy is given as a percentage of the official or 
formal real GDP. In the methodology chapter, the model used for the estimation 
procedure will be outlined along with a rationale for its use. The model used for 
estimating the size of the informal economy is the MIMIC model followed by a 
benchmarking procedure to calibrate the size of the informal economy and visualise 
its trend and development (Schneider, 2000; Schneider & Enste, 2000; Dell’Anno & 
Schneider, 2003). 
• What are the main drivers contributing to the size of the informal economy in the 
countries of the Balkans?  
Based on the causes, we will be able to measure the size of the informal economy and 
analyse the primary drivers behind informality. The model analysis using the MIMIC 
will be able to indicate how significant each of the causes of the informal economy is. 
The literature reviewed empirically showed and analysed a number of causes as the 
primary drivers of the informal economy. These main drivers tend to vary depending 
on the level of development a country finds itself. The main drivers of economic 
informality are often noted to be the level of taxation rate, government regulation 
and effectiveness, the rule of law, ease of doing business formally, the dominance of 
the agriculture sector, the strength of the formal economy or the macroeconomic 
indicators, and the overall regulatory quality in the country (Schneider, 2000; 
Dell’Anno, 2007; Schneider et al., 2010; Schneider & Enste, 2013; Alm & Embaye, 
2013; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a). 
• How has the size of the informal economy developed since 1996 to 2014 in the ten 
Balkan countries? To my knowledge, there has not been any research to estimate the 
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size of the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries from the period of 1996. 
After estimating the size of the informal economy for each of the ten countries, we 
will be able to see the trend and development of the informal economy over the years. 
Given the recent social, political and economic developments and reforms in this 
region, as a result of European integration (Anastasakis, 2013), and given the impact 
of the financial crisis of 2008 (Arvai et al., 2009; Bartlett & Monastiriotis, 2010; 
Stamatović & Zakić, 2010; Bartlett & Prica, 2013; Geshkov, 2014; Sadiku et al. 2014), 
this makes the region and interesting area for research and an important contribution 
to see how the trend and development of the informal economy has evolved from 
1996 to 2014. Some studies that have attempted to estimate the size of the informal 
economy in the ten Balkan countries will be analysed and compared with the results 
of this study. 
1.5. Contribution to knowledge and rationale for this research 
For a long time, economic researchers condemned the existence of a significant informal 
economic sector, and have viewed it as a deterrent to investment, economic growth and 
development. However, this view has been confronted with strong criticism particularly in 
developing countries where formal unemployment is rapidly growing and poverty widely 
spreading. This, in turn, is leading to an expanding informal economy. Hence, alternative 
schools of thought that view the informal economy as a source of livelihood for people 
unemployed and from poorer background have subsequently been developed (Misati, 2007).  
The concept of the informal economy worldwide has been widely researched by many 
scholars (such as Frey & Pommerehne, 1984; Feige, 1989a, 1989b; Thomas, 1999; Fleming et 
al., 2000; Pedersen, 2003; Del’Anno & Schneider, 2004; Ihrig & Moe 2004; Dell’Anno 2006, 
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2007; Feige, 2007; Schneider, 2007a, 2007b; Hart, 2008a; Buehn & Schneider, 2007; Schneider 
et al., 2010, Schneider, 2014). The above authors have also offered ways in measuring the 
informal economy in a country using the three main methodologies such as the direct, indirect 
and model approaches – discussed in more details in the theoretical background chapter. 
Studies have also tried to analyse empirically and theoretically the impact of the informal 
economy on economic growth and development of a country (such as Becker, 2004; Levy, 
2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Chen, 2012).  
Contribution to the literature on the size of the informal economy has been given by a number 
of studies on individual country basis, such as Schneider & Enste (2000), Pommerehne & 
Schneider (1985), Chen (2004) and more recent studies of Breusch (2005a, 2006), Andersdale 
et al. (2006), Dell’Anno et al. (2007), Buehn et al. (2009), Amendola & Dell’Anno (2010), 
Heinemann & Schneider (2011), Buehn & Schneider (2012), Hassan & Schneider (2016a, 
2016b) and Medina & Schneider (2017). 
There is a widespread assumption that informal economy has low productivity and, therefore, 
contributes to low growth and development (Levy 2007, 2008). Many studies suggest that the 
informal economy is associated with less development and transition economies (Schneider 
& Enste 2000; Gërxhani, 2004; Williams, 2005; Dell’Anno, 2007; Andrei et al., 2010; Schneider, 
2014; la Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Furthermore, as a consequence of financial crisis, it is 
expected that the level of unemployment will increase, as jobs are lost in the formal economy, 
and at the same time the informal employment will increase as there will be new entrants 
into the informal economy for various economic, survival and social reasons (Cunningham & 
Maloney, 2000).  
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Other studies have looked at the relationship between the financial crises and the informal 
economy (such as Finnegan & Singh, 2004; Jutting & Laiglesia, 2009; Mehrotra, 2009; Cling et 
al., 2010; Horn, 2011; Garvanlieva et al., 2012; Blunch, 2015; Colombo et al., 2016). They 
suggest that at times of financial crisis and economic downturns people tend to turn to 
informal employment. However, informal employment is one factor of the overall informal 
economic activities. Other factors such as the level of public sector spending, equity and 
quality in the services provided by government at times of financial crisis and downturns as 
well as increasing trend of the informal economy are just as important. A study by Colombo 
et al. (2016) investigates the response of the informal economy to banking crises14 suggesting 
that the informal sector is a powerful buffer, expanding at times of banking crises and 
absorbing a large proportion of the fall in the official output. 
From the existing literature, it is evident that there has been much research about the 
informal economy. Research has been carried out in many areas relating to the informal 
economy, but with a special focus on the methods, the informal economy can be measured 
or estimated. The existing literature has also focused on the theory of informal economy, 
analysing the key drivers of economic informality and the leading indicators where that 
informality is manifested. However, having said this, there has not been any research 
regarding the informal economy of the countries of Balkan Peninsula. Balkan countries are 
characterised by a high degree of informality and as such more research and empirical 
analysis needs to be carried out. There is no literature which tries to estimate and critically 
examine the size and development, as well as the main driving forces behind the level of 
                                                          
14 While crisis in general can be characterized into either economic or financial crisis, according to Reinhart & 
Rogoff (2009), Claessens & Kose (2013) and Carlin & Soskice (2015) there are four broad verities of financial 
crisis; inflation crisis, currency crisis, sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis. 
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economic informality in the Balkan countries. Different studies investigate the estimation of 
the informal economy worldwide using ‘one size fits all’ causes and indicators for the informal 
economy. However, it is difficult to measure the size and analyse the development of the 
informal economy for many countries especially if they are in different stages of development 
and in different parts of the world where cultures can play a role in their economic activities. 
The focus should be to estimate the size of the informal economy for a region at a time, in an 
attempt to capture the most important and key drivers of economic informality which are 
relevant to a particular region. To date, there is no research for the ten countries of Balkan 
Peninsula using a panel data and a MIMIC methodology. 
The lack of such research has been the main rationale for the undertaking of this research, 
with emphasis on this region. Such analysis is also lacking for other parts of the world as well; 
but, the main contribution of this research would be for the region of the Balkan Peninsula. 
However, the methodologies applied in this research can contribute to other studies being 
undertaken for other parts of the world, or another block of countries worldwide. Indeed, in 
order to check the robustness of the results, this study will apply similar MIMIC model for 
another block of countries. 
A further rationale for undertaking this research relates to the methodologies being applied 
to measure the size and development of the informal economy in the countries of the Balkans. 
There seems to be a lack of appropriate indirect methodologies for measuring the informal 
economy, such as the use of MIMIC model from the Structural Equation Modelling approach 
(SEM hereafter). In this research, the MIMIC model will be applied and the results generated 
will be analysed and tested for robustness. The use of MIMIC model rather than other models 
is as a result of the disadvantages that the other models have and the advantages that the 
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MIMIC model has. A rationale for using MIMIC model has been provided in the methodology 
chapter. A thorough discussion of all the methods to measure the informal economy has been 
provided in the theoretical background chapter. 
With this rationale, this research will make a number of contributions to the existing literature 
on the informal economy. The contribution of this research is linked with the research 
questions identified above in this chapter. Even though the contribution of this research will 
be highlighted throughout this thesis, and more so in the Results and Analysis chapter, 
typically contributions to knowledge from research can be generalised to be conceptual, 
empirical and methodological. This research encompasses all three contributions to 
knowledge in the field of informal economy.  
The first contribution of this research is a conceptual or theoretical one. This research 
contributes to the growing literature on informal economy for the countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Previous research that investigated all Balkan countries as a sample within one 
dataset has not been done to date. Furthermore, a critical and extensive review of all the 
literature referring to the informal economy and Balkan countries has also not been done to 
date. Therefore, this research will contribute to the literature by providing some insight into 
the level of the economic informality in these ten Balkan countries and will analyse in detail 
the main drivers of such informality for the Balkan countries. A further rationale and 
contribution for choosing Balkan countries as an area of research for this thesis has been 
provided in section 1.6.  
The second contribution of this thesis is a methodological one. It has been argued several 
times that when it comes to measuring the informal economy is a complicated process 
(Schneider, 2002, 2014) and that estimating the size of the informal economy one has to 
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consider many factors (Dell’Anno, 2007; Schneider, 2007a, 2007b; Buehn & Schneider, 2012). 
The use of the model approach is justified in the literature, and this is the MIMIC model15. 
However, in the existing literature, the use of the model has mainly focused on 
macroeconomic indicators rather than policy indicators. The MIMIC model applied in this 
research uses both macroeconomic and policy variables to derive an estimate for the informal 
economy. From the literature review and the methodology chapter, it is evident to notice the 
difference between the model applied in this research (albeit with rationale and justification) 
and the models applied in other existing literature. The use of government effectiveness, the 
rule of law, level of corruption, regulatory quality and the ease of doing business variables are 
just as important as the macroeconomic variables in acting as causes of the informal 
economy.  
This is a region that has a particular problem with policy indicators and the rule of law (Balfour 
& Stratulat, 2011; Anastasakis, 2013; Bartlett & Uvalic, 2013), which are considered to be the 
roots of the problems caused in the overall economy from which the macroeconomic 
indicators suffer as well. Furthermore, there seems to be a popular mistrust in the 
government institutions in these countries due to a high level of corruption (Bartlett, 2009; 
Penev, 2012; Anastasakis, 2013). This popular mistrust on the state coupled with high level of 
corruption, weak government effectiveness and the rule of law, can lead to a high level of 
informality. Thus, it is important to consider policy indicators as key causes to be used in the 
MIMIC model rather than relying only on macroeconomic indicators. 
                                                          
15 The MIMIC model has been used extensively by Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Giles et al. (2002), Breusch 
(2005a, 2005b), Bajada & Schneider (2005a), (2005b),  Dell’Anno (2003, 2007), Schneider (2005, 2006, 2007), 
Pickhardt & Sarda-Pous (2006), and by Pickhardt & Sarda-Pous (2006). 
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The empirical contribution of this thesis is to provide estimates on the size of the informal 
economy for the ten Balkan countries for the most prolonged period compared with existing 
literature. This study will provide estimates on the size of the informal economy over a period 
of 19 years – which has not been done before. The estimates from this study will be analysed 
with specific reference for each country, and compared with the estimates provided by 
Schneider (2007b, 2009), Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn and Schneider (2012), Schneider et 
al. (2013), Alm and Embaye (2013), Boka and Torluccio (2013), Hassan and Schneider (2016a) 
and Bitzenis et al. (2016)16. 
The final contribution of this thesis is to provide some policy recommendation to the 
governments of the ten Balkan countries considering the research carried out. Even though 
most of these ten Balkan countries have undergone some reforms influenced mainly by the 
European Union (as discussed in chapter 5), there is still much more to be done regarding 
reduction in corruption, level of economic informality and other reforms in the economy and 
judiciary sectors. 
The research will be divided into several chapters as presented in section 1.7, and each of 
these chapters will have its rationale and subsections. In general, the study intends to 
understand and analyse the size and development of the informal economy in the Balkan 
countries. In doing so, this research will provide analysis of the leading causes and effects of 
economic informality in this region and provide some policy recommendations that might 
potentially be suitable and effective in controlling the level of the informal economy. 
                                                          
16 Majority of these studies, however, uses a worldwide sample, not a sample which is specific to the region of 
Balkan Peninsula. 
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1.6. Rationale for choosing Balkan countries for this research 
The Balkan Peninsula is an interesting area of the world for research, with its unique cultural 
development and ethnic diversity, which may have contributed to a series of conflicts and 
political unrest for decades.  The countries of Balkan Peninsula experienced a dramatic shift 
from a region of wars, conflicts and continuous social and political unrest (Micevska, 2004). 
This is a region that has a history of bloodshed and conflicts, perhaps due to its cultural 
diversity with fundamental differences in culture, religion, political theories, and social 
structures that have often been the cause of armed conflicts. In this, both the ethnic and 
cultural diversity of the region and the geographical location have contributed to long periods 
of destabilised governments that have served poorly to protect innocent people residing in 
this region. Often this can lead to mistrust of citizens in their governments and often leads to 
people trying to avoid dealing with the state (Bartlett, 2009; Penev, 2012). 
This is a region that recently started to understand the benefits of cooperation in ensuring 
economic prosperity for their citizens. This political and economic cooperation between the 
countries was essential in ensuring that the region could escape the levels of poverty, 
collapsed infrastructure from the wars and conflicts as well as ruined economies (Bartlett, 
2009; Penev, 2012).  Since the early 1990s, the region of South East Europe (SEE hereafter) 
and in particular countries in the Balkan Peninsula (including Turkey), have experienced 
dramatic transformation in their economies. The transformation from command to market 
economy produced remarkable changes in the social, political and economic infrastructure of 
SEE countries (Micevska, 2004). 
This political and necessary change in the region was followed by increases in their GDP 
growth, and almost all other macroeconomic indicators were heading towards a direction 
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which benefited the people and economies of the Balkan countries. However, this 
momentum of growth and prosperity was interfered by the financial crises and the 
subsequent Eurozone debt crisis. Since 1996 this prosperity and economic growth were also 
interrupted by internal political conflicts and political instabilities. It was no coincidence that 
during early-2009 (albeit with delay), all of a sudden almost all the countries in the Balkan 
region experienced reduction in GDP growth, reduction in inward FDI reduction in incoming 
remittances, further disequilibrium of their balance of payments, less international trade, 
increases in the non-performing loans and other misbalances in the banking sector, etc. 
(World Bank Data, last accessed 20.06.2017).  
Literature also classifies this region with a high degree of economic informality. The informal 
economy tends to be of more critical relevance to the countries in transition and developing 
or less developing economies. This is because of its size relative to the GDP (de Soto, 1989, 
2000; Heintz & Pollin 2003; Williams, 2005; Ishengoma & Kappel, 2006; Levy, 2007, 2008; la 
Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Most of the Balkan countries are considered as either transition, 
emerging or peripheral economies in comparison to the rest of the European continent. 
Countries of the Balkan Peninsula are characterised by a high degree of informality – partly 
due to the lack of economic and development policies, lack of reforms, and cultural attributes. 
In almost all countries of the Balkan Peninsula, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR 
Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Turkey, and less for Slovenia, Greece and 
Croatia - tax evasion, market distortion, large number of bureaucracies, regulation burden, 
unfair competition, high level corruption and informal employment are some of the factors 
that constitute the informal economy (Novkovska, 2008; Macias & Cazzavillan, 2009; 
Garvanlieva et al., 2012; Krstić & Stanišić, 2013; Boka & Torluccio, 2013; Manolas et al., 2013). 
 20 
 
Therefore, the main justification or reasons for choosing this part of the world for this 
research are many. One of the reasons, which are also discussed in the above paragraphs, is 
that this is a region where the informal economy is considered to be of significant size, but 
yet studies produce different results as indicated in the literature review chapter.  Majority 
of these studies also use direct, indirect or model approaches usually with time series data. 
The lack of historical data for this part of the world creates problems in measuring or 
estimating the informal economy with a small number of observations and thus can lead to 
biased results.  
According to Pichler & Wallace (2004), most of the post-communist and transition household 
economies rely on more than one form of economic activity. The households tend to develop 
a “portfolio of economies” at the micro-level, combining either formal economic activities 
with informal activities or combining different informal economic activities to get by. This 
makes the informal economic activities as a norm for survival reasons in these countries and 
therefore an important region to study and understand the size and development of the 
informal economy. 
The other reason is that most of the Balkan countries and their economies are in the process 
of EU integration and they can be classified as part of the EU (Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania), EU candidate or potential candidate members (all other countries 
part of the investigation). In the process of EU integrations, these countries are continually 
reforming policies to combat corruption and informality in an attempt to fulfil the joining 
criteria set out by the European Commission. Understanding the primary drivers of the 
economic informality in most of these countries could help draft policy recommendations in 
tackling it.  
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Finally, another reason for selecting this region for research is that there is a general lack of 
studies exploring the concept of economic informality in the post-Yugoslav countries, as well 
as the new EU member countries part of the Balkan Peninsula. Many scholars and researchers 
tend to avoid this region for research due to incomplete historical datasets available. 
However, one has to contribute in this area with the data that is available. Reference to the 
main reasons for selecting this part of the world for this research is made throughout this 
thesis. 
1.7. Outline of the thesis 
The outline for this thesis follows a standard format for research of this type and consults on 
the style guide published by the university. The main sections of this thesis are divided into 
chapters with the most essential chapters being the Literature Review, Methodology and the 
Results and Analysis chapters. Each chapter of the thesis has a brief introduction, or an outline 
of the chapter followed by subsections reflecting the main objectives of the research. This 
thesis comprises a total of seven chapters. First two chapters introduce the problem and 
provide a theoretical background to the informal economy, followed then by six other 
chapters for the literature review, methodology, social, political and economic developments 
in the Balkan countries, results and analysis and finally a chapter on conclusion and 
recommendations. 
The first chapter will introduce the central research questions and objectives of the thesis. It 
will provide a rationale for undertaking this research and highlight the contribution of this 
research. It has to be taken into account that the contribution of this research will be 
highlighted throughout the thesis. A rationale behind the chosen geographical area for this 
study will also be provided in this chapter. 
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Before moving on to the literature review, it is important to provide some theoretical 
background to the topic addressed in a thesis. Therefore, the second chapter of this research 
will investigate the theoretical background of the informal economy. The chapter will start by 
introducing and defining the concept and looking into the leading causes and effects of 
economic informality from a theoretical point of view. It will look at the theory of the public 
sector and taxation as the leading cause and effect of informality. According to Schneider et 
al. (2010), the growth of the informal economy17 can result in a decline in government 
revenues, which consequently reduces the provision and quality of public goods and services. 
Eventually, this will result in higher tax rates for economic agents operating formally or 
officially in the economy. There is also the potential that the porovision, quality and 
administration of pulic goods and services is deteriorated, resulting in stronger incentives for 
individuals or households and economic agents18 to participate in the informal economy 
(Schneider et al., 2010). Other important factors such as the rule of law, government 
effectiveness and regulation or bureaucracies when it comes to the ease of doing business, 
the dominance of the agriculture sector, size of the government and electric consumption are 
also important factors and will be included in the model and described in this chapter. This 
chapter will also discuss in detail the main ways to measure the informal economy using 
empiric or econometric models and methodologies, highlighting the advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach or model in measuring the size of the informal economy, and 
at the same time providing a rationale for using the model approach for measuring the 
informal economy as opposed to other approaches available. 
                                                          
17 Throughout this research only the term Informal Economy will be used, as opposed to existing literature 
which refers to the informal economy with other terminologies discussed in section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
18 This is referring to Firms, Companies or any other for-profit organisation, including self-employment. 
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After establishing a theoretical background on the subject, the third chapter will turn the 
focus on the literature review. The literature review chapter is one of the most important 
parts of any research of this type. Hence, there is a need to give a brief overview of the main 
sub-sections composing the literature review. This chapter will begin by reviewing the existing 
literature on the informal economy, on the impact of the informal economy for development 
and the impact of financial crisis on the informal and formal sector worldwide with a focus in 
the Balkan countries part of the sample. It will also review the existing literature in measuring 
the informal economies worldwide, with emphasis on the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. 
This chapter will include a review of the main methodologies applied in measuring the 
informal economies and will focus on the model approach in measuring the informal 
economy. Two of the most extensively used methods to measure the informal economy are 
the Multiple Indicators Multiple causes model (MIMIC hereafter) and the Currency Demand 
Approach model (CDA hereafter) (Hassan & Schneider 2016a, 2016b)19, and this is very 
evident from the literature. Therefore, this chapter will discuss in detail the use of these two 
models in the literature in separate subsections.  
The fourth chapter contains the methodology applied in this research. Along with the 
previous chapter, this is also a very crucial part of the thesis, and therefore it is important to 
discuss all the sections and subsections of this chapter briefly. The methodology and data 
chapter will introduce the problem and discuss the research philosophy to be employed in 
this research. It will discuss the previous methodologies applied to measure the size and 
                                                          
19 However, the most commonly used method is one that should encompass various indicators and causes that 
impact the informal economy in terms of its size and development. MIMIC (Multiple Indicators, Multiple 
causes) is such a model which can include various causal and indicator variables (Buehn and Schneider, 2012). 
This model has been used extensively by Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Giles et al. (2002), Breusch (2005a, 
2005b), Bajada & Schneider (2005a), (2005b), Dell’Anno (2003, 2007), Schneider (2005, 2006, 2007), 
Pickhardt & Sarda-Pous (2006), and by Pickhardt & Sarda-Pous (2006). 
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development of the informal economy, and in light of this, provide a rationale for model 
selection for this research. The chapters then moves on to discuss the data and countries part 
of the sample and provide a rationale for the use of panel data with the methodology applied 
in this research. The model applied in this research is the MIMIC model, and it is based on a 
number of causes (as the primary drivers of informality) and indicators (effects of informality). 
Hence, it is essential to discuss in detail the use of main causes and indicators in a separate 
section in this chapter. An explicit discussion of all variables used in this research is provided 
along with the econometric and theoretical model applied. A graphical presentation of the 
model and different model specifications are provided in this chapter. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion about the ethical considerations, as suggested by the university style guide. 
On the fifth chapter, this research will review the social, political and economic developments 
in the Balkan countries in the last two decades with a focus on the importance of these 
developments for the formal and informal economies. It will focus on reviewing and analysing 
the main reforms and developments in this region. This analysis is crucial as it can be used in 
the results and conclusion chapters.  
The sixth chapter with the results and analysis is the most important chapter of this research. 
This chapter will be presenting all the results and analysis generated from the methodology 
applied in estimating the size of the informal economy in ten countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula. These results will be analysed and discussed in detail providing critical analysis. 
Post-estimation tests along with testing parameters for model fit statistics will be analysed to 
ensure that the model selection is justifiable and that the regression results presented are 
statistically significant. The impact of informal economy will be analysed on the economies of 
 25 
 
the Balkan countries, as well as the effect of a possibly reduced informality on the economies 
of these countries will be evaluated.  
The seventh, and final chapter, will provide the conclusion and the policy recommendations. 
These policy recommendations will be made based on the research and the analysis of the 
results. The discussion, in conclusion, will address the objectives, the research questions and 
the hypothesis of this thesis. This chapter will also provide direction for future research in this 
field. 
1.8. Conclusion 
Defining, measuring and controlling the size of the informal economy in a country is important 
for all governments to have a clear understanding of how their scarce resources are being 
allocated. Having reliable statistics and estimates of the size of the informal economy is the 
cornerstone of designing and implementing effective policy measures to control economic 
informality and address the mistrust of individuals on their governments.  
Because of the impact the informal economy has on the official economy; there has been a 
growing interest in the literature to measure and study the informal economy worldwide. 
Several methods have been developed to measure the size of the informal economy from 
direct and indirect approaches to the model approach adopted from quantitative methods 
for social research, which is the Structural Equation Modelling with particular reference to 
the Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model which allows for greater flexibility in 
measuring the relationship between the observed and latent (unobserved) variables. The 
unobserved variable in this case if the informal economy, since it is considered that the size 
of the informal economy is challenging to measure and surveys, as well as other methods, can 
result in biased results. This thesis will only make use of the MIMIC model, because of the 
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advantages of this model and the disadvantages of the other models. A rationale for the use 
of MIMIC model has been provided in a separate section within the Methodology chapter. 
It is of particular interest to measure the size of the informal economy in the Balkan countries 
and to see its development through the years. The size of the informal economy in these 
transition economies (except Greece) is high. Cultural, political, social and economic factors 
are to blame for a relatively large size of the informal economy in these countries which is 
estimated to be on average of around 30 percent. This region has undergone several changes 
over the past decade, and some social, economic and judicial reforms have taken place, partly 
influenced by the European Union. Majority of these countries have also had the most 
prolonged relative political stability over the years and have undergone significant democratic 
reforms. It is the first attempt to measure the size and the development of the informal 
economy for the Balkan countries as one sample, and therefore be able to see the effects 
such reforms, if any, had on the size and developing trend of the informal economy in the 
region. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical background 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates and reviews the theoretical literature of the informal economy by 
analysing the main theories underlying the informal economy. The chapter introduces and 
defines the concept of informal economy and analyses the main causes and effects of 
economic informality from a theoretical point of view. It will look at the theory of the public 
sector and taxation as the leading cause and effects of informality, considering the 
assumption that a growing informal economy reduces the government revenues which will 
have a negative impact on the provision and quality of public goods and services, and thus in 
turn exacerbating the incentives for economic agents to continue operating informally 
(Schneider et al., 2010). Other important factors such as the rule of law, government 
effectiveness and regulation or bureaucracies when it comes to the ease of doing business, 
the dominance of the agriculture sector, size of the government, level of corruption, and 
electric consumption are also important factors and will be included in the model and 
described in this chapter.  
This chapter will also discuss in detail the main ways to measure the informal economy, using 
econometric models and methodologies, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of 
each model in measuring the size of the informal economy.  At the same time, this chapter 
provides a rationale for using the model approach (MIMIC model) for measuring the informal 
economy as opposed to other approaches available.  
The size of the informal economy is higher in developing and transition economies, but it also 
exists in more advanced economies (Schneider, 2007; Schneider & Buehn, 2012; Hassan & 
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Schneider, 2016a). Its consequences, however, reflect in different countries with different 
intensity. The adverse effects resulting from a growing informal sector are plentiful and multi-
layered; therefore, it is imperative for them to be identified and minimised (Schneider & 
Enste, 2000, Schneider, 2014). However, at times the informal economy, at controllable 
levels, can act as a cushion for survival for many people around the world (Finnegan & Singh’s 
2004; Chen, 2004, 2007, 2012). When the informal economy was first ‘discovered’ in the early 
1970s, many observers argued in the notion that the informal economy was marginal, 
peripheral and not related or linked to the official economy of modern capitalist development 
(Becker, 2004). Today, however, as significant proportion of the global economy and 
workforce is informal, the topic of informal economy has received a lof of research interest 
around the world (Chen, 2012). 
With the existence of the informal activities around the world, most countries worldwide 
invest in efforts to control such activities through various measures like punishment, 
prosecution, education or economic growth which tends to create more opportunities in the 
formal economy (Chen, 2012). It is understood that there is a negative relationship between 
the level of economic development or economic growth and informal economy (Schneider et 
al., 2010). As the economy grows, job opportunities grow, and as such people can get jobs in 
the formal rather than informal sector of the economy.  
Collecting information about the size and the extent of the informal economy, the agents 
involved in informal activities, as well as the frequencies with which these activities are 
occurring is highly important in designing policies which are both efficient and effective in 
allocating a country’s resources in dealing with informality (Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003). 
However, getting accurate information about the size and extent of informal activities in a 
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country can be very challenging, and as such measuring the informal economy can be a 
challenging task because all those that are involved in such activities do not wish to be 
identified (Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003).  
In developing and transition countries, the poor and even the middle classes often produce 
and satisfy most of their financial and economic needs from the informal economy (Chen, 
2012). Although informal economic activities present an alternative form of employment and 
production for many, they too impose considerable costs for the economy. Tax evasion, 
informal employment, disrespects for the rule of law, and unfair competition, among others, 
impose a big challenge for governments to face (Losby et al., 2002; Chen, 2012; Williams & 
Martinez, 2014). The nature and the characteristics of the informal economy have been 
debated both in policy and academic circles as discussed in some detail in the literature 
review chapter. There is no unique definition of the informal economy in the literature, and 
many terms have been used to define it. 
2.2. Defining the informal economy 
Defining the informal economy has posed to be a challenge for many scholars because its 
definition will affect how one measures it. Further to its definition, different terminology is 
used in different studies by different authors. When reviewing the literature, several terms 
are seen being commonly used to define what this thesis will refer to as the informal 
economy, such as the shadow economy, underground economy, black economy, grey 
economy, the non-observed economy, bazaar economy, the hidden economy etc. Schneider, 
for example, in almost all his studies, refers to the informal economy as the “shadow 
economy”. The term informal economy will be used in this thesis, in light of its definition 
provided by Fiege (1990, p.10) and described below. The term informal economy mainly 
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relates to the scope of this thesis in analysing the impact of state burdens from taxation, social 
security contributions, regulation, the rule of law and administrative bureaucracies’ 
perspectives in influencing individuals to engage in activities which do not comply with 
aforementioned burdens (Schneider, 2007). 
Hart (2008a) has defined the informal economy as economic activities which are performed 
away from the bureaucracy of establishments. Similarly, Ihrig & Moe (2004) also define the 
informal sector, as a sector that does not comply with legal normal and regulations set out by 
the government, but it is a sector that produces legal goods and services. Another frequently 
used definition is that all informal economic activities are those that are unregistered 
economic activities which contribute to the national account identity (Fiege, 1989; Frey & 
Pommerehne, 1984; Schneider, 2007). The definition by Smith (1994) is that the informal 
economy is all "market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that 
escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP” (Smith, 1994: p.18). A broader definition is 
provided by Fleming et al. (2000, p. 389), where they define it as…"those economic activities 
and the income derived from them that circumvent or otherwise avoid government regulation, 
taxation or observation". 
A narrower definition of the informal economy has been provided by Pedersen (2003, p.13-
19). According to them, the informal economy includes: 
“…all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately 
concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: to avoid payment of 
income, value added or other taxes, and as such tax evasion; to avoid payment of social 
security contributions and as such informal employment; to avoid having to meet 
certain legal labour market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working 
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hours, safety standards, etc.; and to avoid complying with certain administrative 
procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative 
forms” (Pedersen, 2003: p.13-19).  
Similarly, Feige (1990, p.10) states that: 
“…the informal economy implies those economic activities that circumvent the costs 
and are excluded from the benefits and rights incorporated in the laws and 
administrative rules covering property relationships, labour contracts, financial credit, 
social security systems, etc” (Feige, 1990; p.10).  
A study by Lippert and Walker (1997) explains the definition of informal economy by referring 
to it as the underground economy and argues that this is a “…reasonable consensus definition 
of the overall underground economy” (Lippert and Walker, 1997: p.5). According to the 
“taxonomy of types of underground economic activities” (Lippert and Walker, 1997: p.5), the 
underground economy can involve illegal and legal activities from a monetary and non-
monetary transactions perspective. The illegal activities involve those activities such as 
trading of stolen goods, drug dealing, manufacturing and smuggling as well as prostitution 
and trafficking (Lippert & Walker, 1997; Mirus & Smith, 1997). The legal but informal activities 
according to Mirus & Smith (1997) can be characterised by tax evasion and tax avoidance20 
categories from a monetary and non-monetary perspective.  
 
 
                                                          
20 The tax evasion refers to the unreported income from different sources, while tax avoidance can refer to 
different employee discounts and fringe benefits from a monetary perspective, to all do-it-yourself and 
neighbour help activities from the non-monetary perspective. 
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Table 2.2. 1 - A Taxonomy of Informal Economic Activities, Source: Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) 
 
In most of the studies, the authors exclude illegal informal activities that are of the nature of 
serious crimes like drug dealing and trafficking, robbery and burglary, etc. Majority of studies 
also “…exclude the informal household economy which consists of all household services and 
production and do-it-yourself services” (Schneider and Buehn, 2009; p. 2). In most of the work 
the term “informal economy” is preferred more than the term “informal sector” because 
workers and enterprises in question do not belong to a single sector of economic activity but 
to many sectors (De Soto, 1989; Rauch, 1991). This thesis will, therefore, concentrate on the 
narrower definition provided by Pedersen (2003, p.13-19) and will consider the new 
institutional economics classification of the informal economy described in Fiege (1990).  
2.3. Theory of the informal economy 
Estimates of the size of the informal economy vary depending on its definition and the 
characteristics of different countries worldwide. Hence, there is growing literature in 
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analysing the theories and debates regarding the informal economy. According to Gibson & 
Kelley (1994), the underlying principles about the informal sector are that it arises from the 
capital-limited nature of the economy. If the capital was not in short supply, the authors argue 
that all economic activity would be formal. 
How the Informal Economy arises? 
 
There are different schools of thoughts regarding the informal economy. There are the 
dualists’ views, the structuralists, the legalists and the voluntarists (Chen, 2012). Each of these 
schools of thought describes a different theory of how the informal economy arises. The 
dualists tend to argue in the lines that the informal agents are excluded from new economic 
opportunities as a result of “….imbalances between the population growth rates and modern 
industrial employment” (Chen, 2012; p.5), and “…because of a mismatch between people’s 
skills and the structure of modern economic opportunities” (Chen, 2012; p.5).  
The structuralists, on the other hand, argue that the tendency for capitalist growth can 
encourage and drive informality in countries. Chen (2012), describes this view in terms of the 
attempts made by formal firms to increase their profitability in capitalism;  
“…by trying to reduce labour costs and increase competitiveness; and the reaction of 
formal firms to the power of organised labour, state regulation of the economy 
(notably, taxes and social legislation); to global competition;” Chen (2012; p.5-8) and 
“…to the process of industrialization…” Chen (2012; p.5-8). 
From the legalists’ perspective, however, it is argued that a hostile legal system tends to drive 
people to work as self-employed and in doing so operate within the informal economy in their 
own terms and norms (Chen, 2012). Likewise, the voluntarists claim that the informal agents 
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choose to operate informally because they see that the costs associated with formality might 
be higher than the costs associated with informality (Chen, 2012).  
The relationship between formal and informal economy 
 
These four leading schools of thought about the theory of the informal sector have different 
perspectives regarding the linkages between the informal economy and the official or formal 
economy. For example, the dualists defend the notion that informal agents and their activities 
do not have many linkages or relationships with the formal economy but, instead, they tend 
to “operate as a distinct” and “separate sector of the economy” and that the workforce 
involved in informal activities who tend to be self-employed in most cases, comprise the “less 
advantaged sector of a dualistic or segmented labour market” (Chen, 2012: p.5). For dualists, 
the link between tax burden, burden of regulation and the informal economy is of less 
concern. They argue that it is the responisbility of governments to create new jobs and 
provide financial and professional support as well as the needed infrastructure and social 
services to informal agents and their families (Chen, 2012; la Porta & Schleifer, 2014).  
Contrary to dualists, the structuralists regard the informal and formal economies as inherently 
linked. They argue that informal agents (firms and workers) are regarded as subordinates or 
inferior to the interests of capitalism, and that their existence is merely there for the provision 
of cheap services and production of goods at lower prices (De Soto, 1989; Chen, 2012). 
Structuralists maintain the view that “…governments should address the unequal relationship 
between ‘big business’ and subordinated producers and workers by regulating both 
commercial and employment relationships” (Chen, 2012: p.5-8).  
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The primary focus of legalists is on “…the formal regulatory environment to the relative 
neglect of informal wage workers and the formal economy per se” (Chen, 2012: p.5-8). They 
recognise that formal firms tend to collude with government to set the bureaucratic 
regulation in making it harder for new entrants, and at times creating barriers to entry and 
driving informality (De Soto, 1989; Chen, 2012). The Legalists… 
“…argue that governments should introduce simplified bureaucratic procedures to 
encourage informal enterprises to register and extend legal property rights for the 
assets held by informal operators in order to unleash their productive potential and 
convert their assets into real capital” (Chen, 2012: p.5-8).  
The voluntarists, on the other hand, tend to subscribe to the belief that formal agents find it 
difficult to compete with informal agents as the latter avoid formal regulations, taxes, and 
other costs of production, thereby creating unfair competition (Chen, 2012). The voluntarists 
believe that informal agents should somehow be  made to operate under the formal 
regulations and norms in order for the government to increase the tax revenue and reduce 
the unfair competition for formal agents (Chen, 2012). 
Factors driving informality 
 
Several other theories describe how the informal economy arises and what comprises it. 
According to Maloney (2004) the informal economy is made up of informal entrepreneurs 
who would either choose to work informally or would volunteer. While other researchers in 
this field argue that during economic crises or downturns the size of the informal employment 
increases, adding necessity and survival as the leading causes for informality (Chen, 2004, 
2007, 2012; Finnegan & Singh’s, 2004; Schneider, 2002, 2007; Cling et al., 2010). Other 
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studies, on the contrary, argue that informal employment and informality in general, are 
features of modern global economy and that the number of hired informal workers by formal 
firms is growing worldwide (Finnegan & Singh’s, 2004; Cling et al., 2010). There is a growing 
acknowledgement that the informal economy is driven by many different factors, and 
therefore many scholars use MIMIC models to measure the informal economy (Schneider, 
2002, 2007, 2014). 
A number of developments have been done with regards to different methodologies that try 
to capture most of the theoretical factors that either drive or are affected by informality. 
Perry (2007) proposed model with regards to the composition and drivers of informality in 
which three economic agents were specified – such as the firms, micro-firms and the workers 
they employed.  For the main causes or drivers of informality, Perry (2007) indicated that 
different factors affected informality differently depending whether it is a voluntary 
involuntary informality. Kanbur (2009), on the other hand, proposed a theoretical framework 
which differentiates between different types of how economic agents react to regulation, 
emphasising the importance of regulation in general, bureaucratic rules and norms and 
taxation in determining the size of the informality in developing countries, where informality 
is of significant size (Chen, 2012).  
The importance of understanding the informal economy and its primary drivers is significant 
in combating, controlling and perhaps formalising it. The effects of the informal economy into 
the formal economy have been analysed to be significant.  Loayza (1996) finds that the size 
of the informal economy and the activities within are positively correlated with the level of 
taxation, inefficient government institutions and labour market restrictions. In reaching this 
conclusion, Loayza (1996) has analysed data from Latin American countries. This is a 
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theoretical and empirical view that has been tested by many such as Loayza (1996) and 
Friedman et al. (2000). Friedman et al. (2000) on the other hand, find that costs of 
bureaucracy and the level of corruptive practices, rather than tax rates, are the main factors 
encouraging the existence of an informal sector. Friedman et al. (2000) claim that producers 
in the informal sector escape much of the burden or taxation and regulations, but contrary to 
formal producers, they will receive less or no assistance from public services and the 
government. Informal agents would have to take the risk of producing or operating without 
the protection of their property rights by the security forces and the judiciary system. 
Furthermore, public utilities, such as road infrastructure, sewages, clean water, and electricity 
might also be of lower quantity and quality (Friedman et al., 2000). 
Azuma and Grossman (2002) investigate what drives producers into the informal sector, 
suggesting that high taxation burden, bribes, and the regulation burden are the leading cause. 
Using two different “…models of the state (one assuming that the state is proprietary…” 
(Azuma & Grossman, 2002: p.3) – that is a state as the instrument of the ruling elite which 
appropriates the net revenues of the state, after spending for public services; and the “…other 
model considers a hypothetical benevolent state that would maximise the total net incomes 
of all producers)” they show that… 
“the existence of a large informal sector can be attributed to the fact that productive 
endowments contain important unobservable components, the state cannot adjust the 
amounts that it extracts from producers in the formal sector according to each 
producers endowment” (Azuma & Grossman, 2002: p.3).  
The informal economy has been considered as an exploitation of workers, with lower pay, 
and no rights or insurance involved in fraudulent and illegal activities by some authors such 
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as Williams (2005), while others have shown that some workers and producers choose 
informality rather than being forced into it (Williams & Renooy, 2008). For example, Williams 
& Renooy (2008) show that most of the undeclared work in 27 EU countries is conducted on 
a voluntary basis. Therefore, is the view of the authors is that the informal economy consists 
of many heterogeneous markets with different groups of agents engaged in a variety of 
informal activities, for various reasons and income levels (Andrews et al., 2011). Thus, 
designing effective policies, one needs to fully understand the precise nature and 
characteristics of informality in different markets, as this is likely to affect the shaping of such 
policies.  
Main agents involved in informal economy 
 
The informal economy is understood to be mainly housing the three types of actors or agents 
within it, who are involved in informal economic activities and are the primary drivers of the 
informal economy in general (Andrews et al., 2011). First, we have the informal workers 
employed by both the formal and informal firms. This would include jobs that re not declared 
to tax authorities, as well as those jobs for which employment regulations are either not 
applied or enforced. It typically includes illegal immigrant or migrant workers (this is more 
typical in developed countries), those individuals that are forced to work in the informal 
economy for the lack of opportunities in the formal economy (this is typical in developing 
countries), as well as those who are satisfied with conditions of informal employment (again 
this is more typical in developing countries). 
Secondly, we have the workers who are self-employed who are mainly those self-employed 
workers without employees that tend to operate almost entirely informally (Andrews et al., 
2011). It could also include self-employed workers who generate a portion of their earnings 
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from undeclared (usually cash-in-hand) work with the main purpose of avoiding paying any 
direct or indirect tax. Third and final group of agents driving the informal economy are the 
firms and their informal production. This type of economic informality is made up of formal 
or informal firms (with employees) generating or producing all or a portion of their business 
“off-the-books”; with the sole purpose to avoid paying VAT, under-report their earnings and 
profits and employ informal workers to avoid paying for any pension arrangements or 
contributions (Andrews et al., 2011).  
From a behavioural point of view, participation in the informal economy by different actors 
(outlined above) is a decision mainly driven by cost-benefit analysis. There are a number of 
factors which can influence the decision of the above-mentioned agents to participate in 
informal economic activities, such as individual and firm characteristics, the market structure 
a firm or producers is in, social norms, institutional and policy establishment and the 
regulatory environment (Andrews et al., 2011).  
Impact of the informal economy 
 
The volume of informal activities and the size of the informal sector can generate externalities 
affecting actors within the informal economy but also in the formal economy. According to 
Enste (2010), a large overall informal sector can mean that formal firms and workers would 
have to contribute more in taxes to maintain a reasonable level of public services, which in 
turn reinforces the attractiveness of the informal sector and increases the opportunity cost 
of operating formally. Essentially this means that the government must rely more on formal 
firms and workers, and as such imposing them with higher taxation. Furthermore, large 
informal economy can reduce the popular trust in government institutions and services 
leading to social norms where tax evasion and therefore free-riding on public services is 
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acceptable. This, in turn, can further increase informality and externalities (Andrews et al., 
2011; Enste, 2010). Because of these mechanisms, countries might find themselves stuck in 
an equilibrium with either low or high level of informal employment (Bovi & Dell’Anno, 2010).  
However, “…for countries in between the two extremes, measures reducing the extent of 
informality may have a multiplier effect, leading to improved finances and lower corruption, 
which triggers a further reduction in informality.” (Andrews et al., 2011: p.30-33). This 
enforces the view that the informal sector can have an impact on the level of economic 
growth and productivity (Andrews et al., 2011). Loayza, (1996) estimates the impact of 
informality on economic growth and find a negative cross-country correlation between the 
level of GDP per capita and informality. However, this relationship may not be causal because 
the higher the level of economic development in a country is the better the quality of 
institutions and as a result the lower the extent of informality (Andrews et al., 2011).  
From the social benefits and costs point of view as well as public sector theory perspective, 
all informal market participants benefit from the informal economy. By working informally 
and avoiding paying taxes, individuals will end up receiving higher net incomes and can 
purchase goods and services at lower prices. Firms can produce at lower costs by avoiding 
time- and sometimes resource-intensive interaction with government officials and tax 
authorities and can generate higher net profits as a result of tax evasion. Corrupted 
government officials and politicians could end up receiving additional incomes (in the form of 
bribes) in exchange for accommodating favours for those participating and profiting from the 
informal economy (Olters, 2003). On the other hand, the costs associated with this tend to be 
public in nature which includes the reduction or deterioration of government revenues which 
consequently means lower expenditures on the provision of the quantity and quality of public 
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goods and services such as schools, healthcare, infrastructure, and essential utilities (Olters, 
2003).  
All economic agents and the government recognise that fact that everyone would be better 
off from a more formalised economic setting, with a minimal degree of tax evasion, and higher 
quality and quantity of public goods and services. However, economic agents participating in 
the informal economy are not genuinely going to voluntarily formalise their economic 
activities due to the conflict between private benefits and public costs (Olters, 2003). The 
potential reduced private benefits as a result of formalising the informal activities might be 
higher than the potential and yet uncertain expectation for improvements in the provision of 
public goods and services (Olters, 2003; Alesina, 1999). Thus, economies with a relatively large 
informal sector could be trapped in a ‘vicious cycle’ (Alesina, 1999), where high level of 
economic informality makes the task of the government to efficiently collect revenues 
challanging. Lower tax revenues could be translated into low expenditures for important 
public goods and services, impacting the quality and quantity of such goods and services. This 
will have a negative impact on the taxpayer discipline and weakens tax morality in the 
country, resulting in an economic fiscal trap (Alesina, 1999).  
Different studies (de Soto, 1989; Neck et al., 1989; Asea, 1996; Loayza, 1997; Alesina, 1999; 
Abed & Gupta, 2002; Schneider & Enste, 2000; and Olters, 2003) tend to represent an 
economic fiscal trap by refering to a dual equilibrium model. Aneconomy “…without credible, 
coordinated and efficient actions by all market participants will not be able to automatically 
find a path towards an outcome with high-quality public goods and services and a high degree 
of tax morale” (Olters, 2003: p.5-7). Even in competitive market economies, the only actor 
capable of initiating and coordinating necessary measures is the government. As such, a 
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country with large informal sector and inadequate policies can be trapped in an equilibrium 
where the large size of the informal sector remains, thetax administration weakens, resulting 
in lower tax revenues and less public goods and services. This in turn strengthens the 
incentives for market participants to continue to operate informally or for new agents to 
enter the informal sector (Tanzi & Tsibouris, 2000; Olters, 2003).  
Neck et al. (1989) and Schneider & Enste (2000) suggest that the existing incentive structure 
in countries with relatively large size of informal economy tend to resemble the prisoners 
dilemma discussed in game theory. This prevents economic agents to change their conduct, 
for a simple political-economic argument. As market participants in the informal economy is 
also a consumer, worker, voter, or taxpayer, who could benefit from the status-quo as much 
as firms or producers benefit from relatively lower labour costs, less regulations, and less tax 
obligations. Hence, the politicians elected from the economic agents indicated above  have 
no incentive to reforming and proposing significant changes, because that could reduce their 
voter's economic advantages impacting negatively their own election results. This goes back 
to the leading causes of the informal economy discussed in an earlier part of this chapter, 
which was discussed to be as not only economic, legal and administrative but also as social 
and political ones. 
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Figure 2.3. 1 - The stylized Dual Economy adopted from Olters (2003) 
 
Figure 2.3. 2 - Vicious Cycle, adopted from Alesina (1999) and Olters (2003) 
 
In general, there is already a common consent that the informal economy constitutes a 
significant part of the overall economy. The influence of the informal economy on the overall 
economy a country can be either positive or negative, however. There are a number of 
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advantages and disadvantages of the informal economy from three different perspectives; 
economic, social and political adopted from Harding & Jenkins (1989), Frey (1989), la Portes 
et al., (1989) and Gerxhani (2004b). According to Harding & Jenkins (1989) the informal 
activities may bring growth if supported and encouraged and will provide lower prices for 
goods and services as a result of lower labour costs, while la Portes et al., (1989) claim that 
despite various advantages, no development strategy and growth is expected from the 
informal sector as the informal sector can cause distortions in some leading economic 
indicators such as the unemployment rate, inflation rate, and growth rate. A full list of 
advantages and disadvantages of the informal economy is provided in a table format in 
appendix 2.2.1. 
2.4. Reflection on different schools of thoughts 
 
The general views of the different schools of thoughts have been discussed in the previous 
section. This research will take the stance on the views that the level of informal economy 
affects more significantly the level of formal economy rather than vice versa. In the countries 
of the Balkan Peninsula the level of informality is having a significant impact on the level of 
formal economy and hindering the much-needed economic development and prosperity in 
these countries. The view by dualists that the informal and formal economies are two 
separate entities does not hold very much for the countries part of this research. The agents 
involved in informal economic activities tend to engage often with those involved in formal 
economic activities. Schneider & Enste (2000) argue that the existence of the informal 
economy can have positive effects on the formal economy because most of the income 
earned from informal economic activities is spent immediately on the formal economy. 
However, it can also significantly impact the potential economic development of the country 
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in terms of its potential spending in public services and capital spending on ensuring popular 
trust in those governments.  
The dualists also pay little attention to the linkages of the level of informality and government 
regulations, taxation burden and the rule of law. Different studies suggest that there is a clear 
link between the quality of institutions and rule of law as well as the level of regulations and 
the informality. Tax burden was also one important driver in many economies and was used 
as a causal variable in most studies. However, tax burden tends to be more of a driver in 
developed and high tax economies rather than less developed countries. To attract foreign 
direct investment and reduce unemployment, majority of less developed and transition 
economies tend apply fiscal policies which favours low taxation regimes, and yet the level of 
informality is significantly higher on these countries, despite the low level of taxation. 
Majority of Balkan economies are low tax economies and yet compared to other European 
countries, the level of informality is amongst the highest. This suggests that tax burden is not 
the main cause of informality for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. But rather, other 
factors are more important, such as the legal system and level of regulations or bureaucracies, 
and people’s trust in their institutions. When calculating the level of economic informality, 
specific factors relating to the country or group of countries should also be considered.  
On the other hand, the structuralists who claim that the very nature of capitalism and struggle 
for growth can encourage and drive informality, and the legalists’ perspective which argues 
that a hostile legal system tends to drive people to work as self-employed and engage in 
informal economic activities within their informal legal norms - are more in line with the 
stance of this research. This research will develop a theory which will suggest and test that 
the regulation burden and bureaucracies, trust in institutions, the structure of the economy 
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and its sectors (e.g. dominance of the agriculture sector), the level of corruption or 
government integrity, the size of the government and the stability of prices as well as the 
government effectiveness in providing public services are more important exogenous causal 
variables than the level of taxation.  
In light of this, the narrow definition of the informal economy provided by Pedersen (2003), 
Kazemier (2003), which is mainly based on the level of tax evasion and administrative 
bureaucracies, should be expanded to include other important factors discussed above. 
Popular trust on governmental institutions and the quality of public services is also an 
important factor that forces many agents to engage in the informal economy. A potential 
belief that a government is not fit for purpose, is corrupt and it is not effective and efficient 
in providing qualitative public services for all citizens is makes paying taxes and obeying norms 
and regulations very undesirable.  
2.5. Causes of the Informal Economy 
According to Schneider and Enste (2000), Schneider (2014), Sarac and Basar (2014), there are 
a number of causes behind the existence of informal economy in many countries of the world. 
First, there are the general economic causes regarding the unjust distribution of income, high 
inflation or high unemployment levels, the taxation system and the existence of intense 
regulation and administrative bureaucracies. In the following pages the leading causes of the 
informal economy will be discussed. 
Fiscal Policies 
 
Fiscal policies are important causes of the informal economy in a country. High tax rates, 
deficiency in auditing, insufficient accounting services etc., are just some of the main factors 
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facilitating the size of the informal economy (Azuma and Grossman 2002 and Loayza 1996). 
Complicated regulations and unclear laws, frequent changes in laws and regulations and 
degeneration in the unitary structure are the legal causes of informality.  
Schneider (2014) and Sarac & Basar (2014) also argue that there are administrative, social and 
political causes of informality. Regarding administrative causes, the organisation of tax 
authorities, technical structures and auditing mechanisms are the main causes of informality. 
While regarding social causes, the tax ethics and morale, taxpayer psychology and historical 
causes can trigger informal agents to undergo informal economic actives. In some cases, 
causes such as elections, government reforms, corruption, etc., are considered as the main 
political causes of informality. 
According to Thomas (1992); Schneider (1994, 1997, 2003, 2005); Pozo (1996); Johnson et al. 
(1998); Giles (1997, 1999); Giles et al. (2002), Del’Anno (2003) the possible causes and the 
leading indicators of the informal economy are the burdens of direct and indirect taxation, 
both actual and perceived. A higher tax burden increases the incentive to work in the informal 
economy. Furthermore, increases in the level and bureaucracy of regulation increases the 
incentive to enter the informal economy (Friedman et al., 2000). Additionally,  
“the ‘tax morality’ (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readiness 
of individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and enter the informal 
economy: it is assumed that a declining tax morality tends to increase the size of the 
informal economy” (Schneider, 2006: p.49).  
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Public Sector Services 
 
The provision and the quality of public sector services is also an important cause of the 
informal economy. The level of public sector services and their quality highly depend on the 
level of government revenues (Schneider et al., 2010; Schneider & Buehn, 2012). The larger 
the size of the informal economy is, the higher the level of tax evasion and avoidance will be 
- leading to a reduction in government revenues. This reduction in government revenues is 
likely to affect the provision and the quality of public sector services (Johnson et al. 1998). 
This could lead to higher tax rates which are likely to provide further incentives for firms and 
individuals to engage in the informal economic activities to avoid higher taxes. 
Overall Economic wellbeing 
 
The overall economic well-being and business cycles in a country are also crucial determinants 
of the level of the informality. Various studies suggest that during a recession people tend to 
engage in informal economic activities to compensate any income losses from the formal 
economy (Bajada & Schneider, 2005; Dell’Anno, 2007; Vuletin, 2008; Hassan & Schneider, 
2016a). Thus, the level of unemployment can be considered as a cause of the informal 
economy. The level of GDP is also an important determinant. It indicates the level of overall 
economic well-being in a country and the availability of opportunities to work in the formal 
economy (Schneider et al., 2010).  
According to Alm & Embaye (2013), the level of inflation also plays a vital role in providing an 
incentive to people to engage in informal economic activities. Inflation tends to reduce the 
real income firms and individuals can generate from the formal economy. This reduction in 
their real income is likely to incentivise some individuals to undertake additional economic 
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activities which might be informal in an attempt to compensate any reduction in their 
purchasing power (Vuletin, 2008; Elshamy, 2015). 
Administrative Bureaucracies and Regulation burden 
 
The level of regulatory burden and the level of administrative bureaucracies is another main 
driver of the level of informal economy (Gerxhani, 2004a; Schneider & Enste, 2000). There is 
significant empirical evidence that strict labour regulations can increase the size of the 
informal economy (Johnson et al., 1998; Schneider et al., 2010). Strict labour regulations in a 
country can fuel incentives for individuals to work in the informal economy since such 
regulations significantly increase labour costs which are shifted to employees from firms. 
Johnson et al. (1997), Friedman et al. (2000), Hassan & Schneider (2016) find significant 
empirical evidence that a country with a greater intensity of regulation tends to have a higher 
size of the informal economy relative to their GDP.   
Effects of the informal economy 
 
On the other hand, a change in the size of the informal economy may be reflected in some 
important effects or indicators (Schneider, 2005; Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003). Such effects 
can be seen in monetary indicators. This is because if informal economic activities increase, 
there will be a requirement for additional monetary transactions (Schneider & Buehn, 2009).  
Development or changes in the labour market can also indicate how large will the size of the 
informal economy be. An increased participation of workers informally results in a decrease 
of workers’ participation in the formal economy. 
Developments in the production market can also indicate the level of informality in a country. 
Factors of production might be displaced from formal to informal economy as size of the latter 
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grows which could have a negative impact on the official growth rate of the economy 
(Dell’Anno, 2003; Chaudhuri et al., 2006; Dell’Anno et al., 2007; Dell’Anno, 2007; Schneider 
et al., 2010; Feld & Schneider, 2010; Buehn & Schneider, 2012; Barbosa et al., 2013; Nchor & 
Adamec, 2015).  
The level of the official economy is also an important indicator of the informal economy. The 
level of GDP growth or the GDP per capita can be negatively affected by the size of the 
informal economy, and therefore, the impact of the informal economy will be reflected in the 
formal GDP (Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003; Schneider, 2007; Schneider & Savasan, 2007; Feld 
& Schneider, 2010; Abdih & Medina, 2013; Vo & Ly, 2014; Nchor & Adamec, 2015). A further 
impact of the informal economy can be reflected in the Electric power consumption.  The 
hypothesis here is that, the larger the size of the informal economy, the higher the electric 
consumption per capita, ceteris paribus. Assuming the unitary elasticity, the growth in 
electricity consumption is equal to the growth in the total real GDP (Schneider & Enste, 2000; 
Arby et al., 2012) 
These are just some of the causes and effects of the informal economy, which underline the 
main theories in understanding the informal economy. Theories of informal economy are 
generated from the leading causes and effects of the informal economy. 
2.6. Measuring the informal economy 
It has been established in many studies that when it comes to measuring the size of the 
informal economy can be a very challenging task (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2014). 
More so, when different methodologies applied to measure the size of the informal economy 
can provide different results which can have a marginal error of about +/- 10 to 15 percent 
(Schneider, 2014). Nevertheless, once some studies define the informal economy, they 
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pursue to measure the size of the informal economy based on three main approaches. The 
use of a precise definition of the informal economy will help to assess or estimate its size 
because it will evade potential arising ambiguities and controversies (Schneider, 2014). 
Indeed, many studies (which have been identified in the literature review chapter of this 
thesis) have measured or estimated the size of the informal economy for many countries 
worldwide. The three main approaches for measuring the size of the informal economy in a 
country are distinguished between the direct or indirect approaches or the statistical 
modelling approach which estimates the informal economy as an unobserved variable. 
The table below lists different methods currently being used to measure the size of the 
economy using different models under each of the three methods described above.  
Table 2.5. 1 - Main approaches and their methods for measuring the Informal Economy 
Approaches Methods available 
Direct Approach • Survey method 
• Tax Auditing method 
Indirect Approach • The Discrepancy between National Expenditure and 
Income Statistics 
• The Discrepancy between official and actual Labour 
Statistics (Labour market analysis) 
• The Transactions method 
• The Currency Demand method 
• The Physical Input (Electricity Consumption) Method 
o The Kaufmann – Kaliberda Method 
o The Lackó Method 
Modelling Approach • The MIMIC (multiple indicators multiple causes) model  
 
2.6.1.  Direct Approach and methods available 
Under the direct approach in measuring the size of the informal economy are the survey and 
tax auditing methods. In both methods, the results can generate biased outcomes (Schneider 
& Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2007, 2014).  
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Survey Method 
The Survey method employs surveys which encompass some multiple-choice questions, 
open-ended questions and yes or no questions. These surveys have to be designed in a way 
that respondents are willing to answer the questions in it. Designed surveys to estimate the 
informal economy are widely used in a number of countries around the world and the 
majority of the countries they have the sample Labour Force Surveys which are performed 
every year (Schneider, 2006, 2007; Abdih & Medina, 2013; Vuletin, 2008). The central 
principle of these surveys is in selecting a representative sample of households and, in these 
selected households, to identify those own-account workers and employers who are thought 
to belong to the informal sector (Wallace et al., 2004). The main advantage of this, therefore, 
is that, if successful, information and data are derived from sources and as such can be very 
valuable for analysis (Kazemier, 2005).  
However, an important disadvantage of this method, is that the results depend largely on the 
individual’s willingness to participate. Thus, it usually is challenging to determine the level of 
undeclared work and other informal activities from a direct questionnaire as most 
participants in these questionnaire might be reluctant to admit to a potential fraudulent 
behaviour or provide any accurate information which would indicate such a behaviour 
(Schneider, 2007), , thus making it difficult to assess a real estimate of the extent of 
undeclared work or other informal activities (Schneider, 2007).  Therefore, the results from 
these kinds of surveys are susceptible to the way the questionnaire is formulated (Mogensen 
et al., 1995; Pedersen, 2003; Feld & Larsen, 2005; and Kazemier, 2005). Furthermore, surveys 
only offer a snapshot hints relating to the level of informal economic activity, thus relying on 
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them makes it harder to extrapolate trends regarding its size over time (Schneider, 2002; 
Alderslade et al., 2006). 
Tax Auditing Method 
The estimation of the informal economy using the Tax auditing methodology is primarily 
based on the discrepancy between the level of taxable income declared and the level of 
income measured by random or selective checks by the tax administrative authorities 
(Thomas, 1992; Alderslade et al., 2006; Schneider, 2007). Software programs for auditing tax 
returns have been beneficial in recent years in measuring the amount of undeclared taxable 
income in many countries (Alderslade et al., 2006); however, there are some disadvantages 
of this method as well. Just like in a survey, using tax compliance data is equivalent to using a 
sample of the population which could be generating biased results.  
Typically taxpayer selection for audits is not made based on random selection procedures, 
but rather it is based on submitted tax returns which indicate a certain likelihood of possible 
fraud. Usually, the tax returns are either filled by the accountants or the self-employed 
individual (Schneider, 2006, 2007, 2014; Aldersdale et al., 2006). As such, the estimates about 
the informal activities can be inaccurate and subject to be biased. Furthermore, using this 
method, one should be able to measure only a small fraction the informal economy which is 
successfully discovered by tax authorities (Aldersdale et al., 2006), which is caused by many 
other activities. If one should analyse the trends and development of the informal economy 
in a country over a longer period, then both methods explained above are unable to provide 
such estimates for analysis. 
2.6.2. Indirect Approach and methods available 
The indirect approaches sometimes referred as ‘indicator’ approaches use different 
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economic, social and other indicators which contain information about the development of 
the informal economy over a period (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2007; Abdih & 
Medina, 2013). As indicated above there are five primary methods for measuring the informal 
economy indirectly.  
The Discrepancy between National Expenditure and Income Statistics 
One of these methods is based on the discrepancies between the estimates using the income 
and expenditure approaches when measuring GDP. In general, according to national 
accounting terms and macroeconomic theory, the GDP of a country can be measured based 
on three main methods: the expenditure method; the income method; and the production 
method. Three methods of measuring GDP should result in the same number, with some 
possible differences caused by statistical and rounding differences (Carlin & Soskice, 2015). 
The three methods of measuring the GDP of a country are all identities, and each holds at 
each point in time. Therefore, the total income in the economy should be equal to the total 
expenditure because for every transaction there is both a buyer and a seller. What would be 
an expense for a buyer; it would be income for the seller. In practice, the size of the GDP using 
the three methods can differ (Carlin and Soskice, 2015, p.5). As such, the gap between the 
expenditure measure and the income measure of the GDP of a country can be used as an 
indicator of the extent of the informal economy (Thomas, 1992).  
The advantage of this method is that “…if all the components of the expenditure method are 
measured without errors…” (Schneider, 2006; p. 40), then this approach would generate a 
reasonable “…estimate of the scale of the informal economy”. But, often “…this is not the 
case” (Schneider, 2006; p. 40). The disadvantage of this method is that the discrepancy 
between expenditure and income reflects “all omissions and errors everywhere in the national 
 55 
 
accounts statistics as well as the informal economic activity” (Schneider, 2006; p. 40). These 
estimates might, therefore, provide results that are not reliable (Schneider, 2007). 
The Discrepancy between Official and Actual labour force statistics 
The second method classified under the indirect approaches is the analysis of the labour 
market or the discrepancy between the official employment rate and the actual labour force 
of a country. Labour market analysis can provide strong indications regarding the size and 
composition of the informal economy workforce (Aldersdale et al., 2006). The declining 
labour force participation rate in the formal economy can be seen as an indication of 
increased activity in the informal economy (Schneider, 2006, 2007, 2014). According to 
Schneider & Enste (2000, p.93) and Schneider (2014, p.13), the hypothesis is that if the labour 
force participation ratio was assumed to be constant, any decrease in its official rate could 
potentially indicate an increase in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the 
discrepancies between the recorded total employment and a total number of jobs reported 
by employers could also be an indication of possible informal employment.  
Aldersdale et al., (2006; p.21) highlight one advantage of this method as it can…  
“….be tracked to identify trends in causes, size and composition of the informal labour 
force, which is useful when considering and developing policy interventions” 
(Aldersdale et al., 2006; p.21).  
The immediate disadvantage of this method is that it fails to consider other causes that could 
lead to a reduction in the official employment participation from the total labour force 
(Schneider, 2007; Thomas, 1992). In addition to this, this method has the risk of double 
counting, as workers may be working in both the formal and informal economies (Aldersdale 
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et al., 2006; Thomas 1992). 
The Transactions method 
The third method under the indirect approach is the Transactions method. This method was 
first developed by the Feige (1996) on the assumption that over time there is a constant 
relationship between the official GDP of a country and the volume of transactions. This is 
summarised by the Fisher (1991, cited in Friedman, 1971) quantity equation of: 
M*V = p*T                                                                    (2.5.2.1)21 
This method holds on the assumptions on the “…velocity of money and the relationships 
between the value of total transactions (p*T) and total nominal GDP…” (Schneider, 2006; p. 
41), as well as on the assumptions made about a base year in which there is no informal 
economy.  
The disadvantage of this method lies with the assumptions that are made for it to yield results 
(Frey & Pommerehne, 1984; Tanzi, 1982; Thomas, 1999; Giles, 1999a; Pederson, 2003; 
Breusch, 2005a, 2006; Schneider, 2007; and Schneider & Enste, 2000). Moreover, accurate 
data about the level of total transactions should be available which might prove to be difficult 
for cash transactions. A further assumption that this method makes is that the ratio between 
the total value of transactions and the formal GDP are due to the informal economy, which 
means that a significant amount of data will be required to differentiate between formal and 
informal financial transactions. Therefore, despite that this method might look as providing a 
theoretically accurate account of the size of the informal economy, it might not be very 
plausible because the requirements in estimating the size of the informal economy 
empirically might be difficult to achieve (Schneider, 2007). 
                                                          
21 (Where ‘M’ stands for money, ‘V’ is the velocity of money, ‘p’ are the prices, and ‘T’ are the total transactions). 
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The Currency Demand Method 
The other method for generating estimations about the size of the informal economy is the 
CDA. This model assumes that transactions in the informal economy are typically made in 
cash (Cagan, 1958; Aldersdale et al., 2006). Tanzi (1980, 1983), estimated the currency 
demand function for the United States using data for the period of 1929 to 1980 which was 
then used to estimate the size of the informal economy. The main hypothesis under this 
method is that as the size of the informal economy increases so would the demand for 
currency (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2007). 
Tanzi (1983) proposed the following regression model for the currency demand which 
controls for “…factors such as the development of income, payment habits, interest rates,” 
(Schneider, 2006; p.42), and includes variables such as the tax level (both direct and indirect), 
regulation and the complexity of the taxation system: 
“Ln (C / M2)t = βO + β1 ln (1 + TW)t + β2 ln (WS / Y)t + β3 ln RT + β4 ln (Y / N)t +ut “  
(Schneider, 2006; p.42) (2.5.2.2) 
“With β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0, and β4 > 0” 
(Schneider, 2006; p.42) (2.5.2.3)22 
Estimates about the size of the informal economy “…can be calculated by comparing the 
difference between the development of currency when direct and indirect tax rates (and 
government regulations) are kept at its lowest value, and the development of currency with 
the current tax rates…” and government regulations (Schneider, 2006; p. 42). Although this 
                                                          
22 (As per Tanzi (1983) where: “‘Ln’ is the natural logarithms, ‘C / M2’ is the ratio of cash holdings to current 
and deposit accounts, ‘TW’ is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the informal economy), 
‘WS / Y’ is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment and money 
holding patterns), ‘R’ is the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash), ‘t’ 
represents the years, Y / N is the income per capita, and ‘u’ is the error term” (Schneider, 2006; p. 42). 
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method has been used extensively by many, there are also criticisms of this method. The main 
criticism is that not all transactions are made in cash (Schneider, 2007a) and that the other 
factors, except the tax burden, are not considered. Factors such as the tax morality, the trust 
of taxpayers on the state or the government, the impact of regulations, other government 
incentives etc., are not considered by this method and are essential factors. According to 
Blades (1982) and Feige (1986, 1996), the regression model proposed by Tanzi (1983) should 
have controlled for the use of US dollars, since they are accepted internationally and, in many 
countries, worldwide they are held as foreign reserve. 
Physical input or the Electricity Consumption method 
The final method under the indirect approaches is the Physical input or the Electricity 
Consumption method. This method has been developed in two ways by Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) and by Lackó (1996, 1998, 1999, and 2000). According to Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996), electric-power consumption can be considered as the best physical 
indicator of the overall economic activity. In general, this method looks at the relationship 
between electric power consumption and the level of GDP since both share the same 
elasticity. Any difference between the electric power usage and the growth rate of GDP can 
be attributed to the informal economy (Schneider, 2007; and Aldersdale et al., 2006). 
Electricity consumption is regarded to be one of the essential physical indicators of overall 
economic activity with a unit-elasticity between the two (with one as the coefficient of 
elasticity between electricity and GDP). Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) derive this proxy 
measurement for the overall economy and then subtract the official GDP from it, resulting in 
the unofficial GDP, which is an indication of the informal economy. Based on this, it can be 
seen as a very simple and straightforward method in deriving some measurement for the size 
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of the informal economy.  
However, the main criticism of this method is that it does not offer an overall measure of the 
informal economy, as different informal economic activities may not require electricity at all, 
or could be using a different source of energy (Aldersdale et al., 2006; Lackó, 1998; Johnson 
et al., 1997; Gerxhani, 2004b). In 1999, Lackó worked out a new method, and named it as the 
household electricity approach in an attempt to avoid the inconsistencies of the method 
developed by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). This modified method assumes that part of 
informality is directly linked with the household consumption of electricity. As the informal 
economy is present in all sectors of the economy, including households. Lackó (1998, 1999) 
derives an econometric two model process (by substituting equation (2.5.2.5) into (2.5.2.4) 
as follows: 
“Ln Ei =α1 ln Ci + α2 ln PRi + α3 Gi + α4 Qi + α5 Hi + ui   (2.5.2.4)23 
With α1> 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0, α4 < 0, and α5> 0 
Hi = β1Ti + β2 (Si – Ti) + β3 Di      (2.5.2.5) 
With β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 >0” (Lackó, 1998: p.133; Schneider, 2004: p.38). 
 
Using United States and a value of 10.5 percent of GDP as the reference, this econometric 
estimation was used to identify countries’ use of electricity by their respective informal 
                                                          
23 Where: “‘i’ is the number assigned to the country; ‘Ei’ is per capita household electricity consumption in 
country ‘i’ in Mtoe; ‘Ci’  is per capita real consumption of households without the consumption of electricity in 
country ‘i’ in US dollars (at purchasing power parity); ‘PRi’- the real price of consumption of 1 kWh of residential 
electricity in US dollars (at purchasing power parity), ‘Gi’ is the relative frequency of months with the need of 
heating in houses in country ‘i’; ‘Qi’ is the ratio of energy sources other than electrical energy to all energy 
sources in household energy consumption; ‘Hi’ is the per capita output of the hidden economy; ‘Ti’ is the ratio of 
the sum of personal income, corporate profit and taxes on goods and services to GDP; ‘S i’ is the ratio of public 
social welfare expenditures to GDP; and ‘Di’ is the sum dependants over 14 years of age and of inactive earners, 
both per 100 active earners” (Lackó, 1998: p.133; Schneider, 2004: p.38). 
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economies, in order to calculate the level of GDP produced from one unit of electricity in the 
informal economy of each country (Schneider, 2007). However, even this method has been 
criticised because it is not only in the household sector that the informal economic activities 
take place, and even then, informal economic activities might not require a large use of 
electricity, as other sources of energy can be used (Schneider, 2007). 
2.6.3. Modelling Approach 
Because of the disadvantages and criticisms of the above five indirect approaches, a model 
approach has been established. The model approach has now been widely used in many 
studies for many countries –refer to literature review chapter. The effects of the informal 
economy tend to be manifested instantaneously in many areas, such as the labour market, 
production of goods and services, as well as the money markets and money supply, and as 
such are not simply a single indicator and one cause which in many cases is the tax regime of 
a country (Dell’Anno, 2006; Schneider, 2007). Therefore, the model approach considers 
multiple causes driving the existence and development of the informal economy, and multiple 
indicators of the informal economy over a period of time – known as a MIMIC method. 
MIMIC method 
This method is based on Structural Equation Models (SEM), representing statistical 
relationships among latent (unobserved) and manifest (observed) variables (Dell’Anno, 2006; 
Schneider, 2007). The Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC hereafter) Model 
received its name from Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975), albeit it had previously been 
discussed by Zellner (1970)24, Jöreskog (1970) and Hauser & Goldberger (1971). 
                                                          
24 Cited in Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975) 
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The MIMIC model considers the informal economy as a latent or unobserved variable linked, 
to a number of observable indicators (reflecting movements of informal economy) and to a 
set of observed causal variables, which are regarded as some key drivers of informality. The 
MIMIC model, therefore, explains the relationship between observed variables and the latent 
or the unobserved variable by minimising the distance between the sample covariance matrix 
and the covariance matrix predicted by the model (Dell’Anno, 2006; Buehn & Schneider, 
2008). The observable variables are divided into the causes of the latent variable and its 
indicators.  
The MIMIC model consists of two parts: the structural equation model and the measurement 
model (Schneider et al., 2010). A mathematical presentation of the MIMIC model is provided 
in many different studies such as Dell’Anno (2006, 2007), Schneider (2006, 2007), Buehn and 
Schneider (2008), Schneider et al., (2010), and Hassan and Schneider (2016a). The 
mathematical equation will depend on the causes and indicators one would argue to use in a 
country. The econometric theory relating to the MIMIC model has been provided in the 
methodology chapter. 
MIMIC models can be applied to time series data as well as panel data to derive estimates on 
the size and development of the informal economy over time. A MIMIC model which uses 
first differences from their variables is known as the DYMIMIC25 model (Aigner et al., 1988). 
Using the variables in first differences in the DYMIMIC model, however, the long-run 
information from data can be lost although they are co-integrated. The MIMIC model is the 
central method applied in this research. Therefore, more about the MIMIC model and the 
                                                          
25 This stands for Dynamic MIMIC model. 
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rationale for the use of this model will be provided on the following pages. 
2.7. Conclusion 
The impact of the informal economy on the overall economy can be seen from different 
perspectives. There are different schools of thought in describing how the informal economy 
arises.  There are the dualists’ views, the structuralists’, the legalists’ and the voluntarists’ 
schools of thought. This chapter discusses all four of these schools of thoughts underlying the 
leading theories of the informal economy.  
Understanding how the informal economy arises in a country, and as to which factors are the 
main drivers of that informality is key in developing effective policies to control it. It is also 
important to understand the size and development of the informal economy. In order to 
estimate the size of the informal economy, several methods have been developed and tested. 
These models have been discussed in detail in this chapter, highlighting their advantages and 
disadvantages. Theory agrees that measuring the size of the informal economy is a difficult 
task, and often the estimates are very vulnerable to the method and the data used for 
estimation. However, estimation of the size of the informal economy can lead to some 
understanding of the level of economic informality in a country and can result in policy 
decision making which addresses it. Whether these policies are effective or not, then further 
estimation would be able to highlight the development trend of the informal economy.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction  
After reviewing the theoretical literature and the leading theories of informal economy, this 
chapter turns its focus on the empirical literature. The empirical literature relates to the 
methods applied in measuring the informal economy worldwide, and in the countries of the 
Balkan Peninsula in particular. Particular attention has also been paid to the impact of the 
informal economy on the development of a country, and how such economic informality 
affects countries worldwide depending on their level of development based on empirical 
findings from the literature. A detailed analysis of the primary studies in measuring the 
informal economy has been provided in the following pages along with a discussion of the 
empirical results. 
3.2. The informal economy around the world 
There have been numerous studies providing insight into the nature, characteristics and size 
of the informal economy around the world and in particular for developing and the transition 
countries (Schneider & Enste, 2000). However, the informal economy was also investigated 
to a great extent for the developed countries of the world, but the main purpose of this was 
for comparative reasons – such as comparing the size of the informal economy in the 
developed world with the less developed world (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Gerxhani, 2004b; 
Dell’Anno, 2007; Andrei et al., 2010; Schneider, 2011; Schneider, 2014; la Porta & Shleifer, 
2014; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a). 
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In earlier literature, the informal activities became increasingly recognised, and research was 
done by various scholars such as Blau & Scott (1963), and Hart (1970, 1973). Different scholars 
refer differently to the informal economy regarding its terminology. Some refer to it as the 
Shadow Economy (Shneider 2000, 2014; Herwartz et al., 2009), others refer to it as the 
underground economy, grey economy (Marcelli, 2004) or black market (Smithies, 1984), or 
some of the earlier work refer to the informal economy as the ‘bazaar economy’ (Geertz, 
1963).  
The literature seems to address some disagreements between the scholars on the definition 
of the informal economy (Frey & Pommerehne, 1984; Feige 1989, 1994; Gërxhani, 2004; 
Schneider, 2014). The importance of defining the informal economy is linked directly with all 
the methodologies in measuring the size and the impact of the informal economy in a country.  
The definitions provided by the literature are based on three main criteria which describe the 
“institutional patterns with which the society shapes the informal sector” (Gerxhani (2004b; 
p.267) – and these are “political, economic and social” (adopted from Harding and Jerkins 
(1989) by Gerxhani (2004b26). These general criteria then have their sub-criteria for defining 
the informal economy. The political criteria are comprised of the government regulation and 
illegal activities outside the rule of law. The economic criteria, on the other hand, comprises 
of the labour market or the status of labour, tax evasion or unreported income, the size of 
activity, professional status (such as self-employed, family worker, etc.), regulation or the 
registration of the activity and national statistics such as the GNP. The social criteria, on the 
other hand, comprises of the social networks and the ease of entry, survival, and autonomy 
and flexibility (Gerxhani, 2004b). Thus, the focus of this part of the research review will be 
                                                          
26 Gërxhani, K. Public Choice (2004) 120: 267. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000044287.88147.5e  
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based on the majority of the sub-criteria identified under the general economic criteria for 
defining the informal economy27. 
Nature, size, causes and consequences of informality may vary for different countries, but a 
handful of comparisons can be made.  As mentioned above the informal economy can have 
different effects on the formal economy of a country depending on the characteristics of that 
country. In developing countries, many people depend on the informal economy for their 
livelihood (Mehrotra, 2009; Cling et al., 2010; Blades et al., 2011; Schneider & Enste, 2000, 
2013; la Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Also, the informal firms account for almost half of the 
economic activity (la Porta & Shleifer, 2014), even though measuring the informal activities in 
these countries can be a massive task due to the lack of data. Further to this gathering 
information about the informal economic activities can be difficult as nobody wants to be 
identified (Shneider & Enste, 2000), and therefore even survey results can be hard to be 
collected. These data are crucially essential for the governments to make adequate economic 
policy decisions. 
In most studies, the central hypothesis is that the lower the country’s level of development, 
the higher is the size and importance of the informal economy. However, the level of informal 
economy can also be found in transition economies as well as previously centrally planned or 
command economies (Schneider, 1997). The majority of then centrally planned economies 
are now either transition, mixed or market economies – such as the ten Balkan countries part 
of this research – and where the informal economy is of a large scale and importance as a 
                                                          
27 This literature review will touch base on all three criteria; however, emphasis will be paid to the economic 
and to some extent to the political criteria. This literature will not review the illegal activities such as drug 
manufacturing and dealing, human trafficking, robbery, burglary, etc. 
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contribution to GDP (Novkovska, 2008; Macias & Cazzavillan, 2009; Garvanlieva et al., 2012; 
Krstić & Stanišić, 2013; Boka & Torluccio, 2013; Manolas et al., 2013).  
Most developing countries have sizeable informal employment according to some studies. 
For example, recent estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO) suggest that the 
share of informal employment in Latin American and Caribbean countries reaches up to 75.1 
percent in non-agricultural activities in countries such as Bolivia. While in many African 
countries the share of informal employment can reach up to 82 percent in countries like Mali 
and about 76 percent in Tanzania. The report also shows that most North African and Middle 
East countries also report a high portion of informal employment ranging from 30 to 70 
percent, (ILO28, 2015). The situation in East Asia is similar, where a substantial share of 
employment is considered to be of informal nature. Of the most important characteristics of 
the informal economy from an economic standpoint are the informal employment and tax 
evasion.  
Informality can be a significant cause of poverty as most informal workers are insufficiently 
protected from illness or health problems, unsafe working conditions and possible loss of 
earnings due to sudden dismissal (Gërxhani, 2004; Parlevliet et al., 2008). Informal workers 
earn less, and their fundamental rights are more vulnerable and difficult to defend. This is 
particularly important for the poor; whose labour is their most significant asset. Persistently 
high levels of informal employment, as well as tax evasion, also reduce fiscal revenues and 
the state’s ability to develop social security systems (Jütting & Laiglesia, 2009). 
                                                          
28 International Labour Organisation report, available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms_234413.pdf, and http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_222979.pdf (last accessed on: 10/10/2017) 
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The informal economy also exists in developed countries, but its impact is much lower than 
in underdeveloped countries (Williams, 2005).  The size of the informal economy is also 
provided by various ILO reports and various other authors, not just for the developing 
countries but also for other country groups. A study by Schneider et al. (2010) estimates the 
size and development of the informal economy as a percentage of the GDP for various country 
groups during the years 1999, 2003 and 2007 using the weighted average of official GDP of 
2005. According to their results, in all country groups, there has been a decrease in the level 
of the informal economy. 
Contribution to the literature on the size of the informal economy has been given by a number 
of other studies on individual country basis, such as Pommerehne & Schneider (1985), 
Schneider et al., (1989), Schneider & Neck (1993), Schneider & Enste (2000), and more recent 
studies of Chen (2004), Andersdale et al. (2006), Dell’Anno (2003, 2007), Buehn et al. (2009), 
Bovi & Dell’Anno (2010), Dell’Anno & Halicioglu (2010), Schneider et al., (2010), Buehn & 
Schneider (2012), Alm & Embaye (2013), Hassan & Schneider (2016a), and Medina and 
Schneider (2017). A detailed table highlighting selected literature has been provided in 
appendix 3.5.1. This table lists some important studies which employ different methods for 
different samples and countries in estimating the size of the informal economy.  
3.3. The informal economy in the Balkan countries 
 
Since the 1990s, the region of South East Europe (SEE) and countries in the Balkan Peninsula 
(including Turkey), have experienced dramatic transformation in their economies. The 
transformation from command to market economy produced remarkable changes in the 
social, political and economic infrastructure of SEE countries (Micevska, 2004). These 
countries, especially the ones that suffer from the transition period in most cases are faced 
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with a higher level of corruption, organised crime and tax evasion29.. All these factors can 
contribute to the size of the informal economy in this part of the world. Other factors, such 
as informal employment and inward remittances from abroad play a role in the economies of 
the Balkan countries.  
Schneider et al. (2010) estimate the informal economy of different samples of 162 countries 
worldwide using a MIMIC model. Their estimates also capture the countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Their study and estimates (the most cited and known paper) indicate that the size 
of the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries part of this research between 1999 and 
2007 is on average about 30 percent relative to their GDPs. This study shows that Albania had 
an informal economy of 35.7 percent in 1999 and it decreased to about 32.9 percent in 2007; 
Bulgaria’s informal economy amounted to 37.3 percent of GDP in 1999 and then followed a 
declining trend and decreased to 32.7 percent in 2007; the informal economy in Greece was 
estimated to be below 30 percent, with 28.5 percent and 26.5 percent in 1999 and 2007, 
respectively; Bosnia and Herzegovina’s size of the informal economy was estimated to be 
between 34.3 percent in 1999 and 32.8 in 2007; the informal economy in Croatia was 
estimated to be between 33.8 percent in 1999 to 30.4 percent in 2007; FYR Macedonia’s 
informal economy followed a declining trend from 1999 to 2007, although was amongst the 
highest in Europe with 39 percent in 1999 and 34.9 percent in 2007; the informal economy in 
Romania was estimated using the MIMIC model to be around 34.3 percent in 1999 and 30.2 
percent in 2007; Turkey’s informal economy was estimated to be on average of 31.3 percent 
between 1999 and 2007, with 32.7 percent in 1999 and 29.1 percent in 2007; the informal 
                                                          
29 As tax evasion is illegal by law, it is therefore difficult to precisely estimate its size in the overall economy. 
Although, Tanzi (1983), Giles (1999), and Faal (2003) conduct some estimates for the size of tax evasion in 
various countries based on their estimates of the size of the informal economy by assuming that the informal 
economic activities would have been taxed at the same rates as the official economic activities. 
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economy in Slovenia was estimated to be the lowest amongst all the Balkan countries, with 
an average of 26.2 percent between the years of 1999 to 2007, with values of 27.3 percent in 
1999 and 24.7 percent in 2007. The informal economy in Serbia was not measured in this 
study.  
Other studies also measure the informal economy worldwide including countries of the 
Balkan Peninsula, such as Schneider (2007a)30; Schneider (2009)31; Buehn and Schneider 
(2012)32; Schneider et al. (2013)33; Alm and Embaye (2013)34; Hassan and Schneider (2016a)35; 
Bitzenis et al., (2016)36; and Medina and Schneider (2017)37. Figure 3.3.1 below shows the size 
and development of the informal economy measured by various studies using the MIMIC, 
CDA or other methods. The estimates from these empirical studies are then compared with 
the estimates of this research in section 6.12. 
 
 
                                                          
30 Schneider (2007a) measures the size of the informal economy between 1999 and 2005 for 145 countries 
worldwide. 
31 Schneider (2009) estimates the size of the informal economy from 2000 to 2006/07 for 25 transition countries. 
32 Buehn and Schneider (2010) estimate the size of the informal economy from 1999 to 2007 for 162 countries 
worldwide. 
33 Schneider et al. (2013) measure the size and development of the informal economy from 2001 to 2010 for 
Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and several other East European countries. 
34 Alm and Embaye (2013) measure the size of the informal economy for 111 countries worldwide (but 
excluding some Balkan countries such as FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Romania) 
between 1984 and 2006. However, due to data availability they do not provide estimates from 1984 to 2006 for 
all countries. 
35 Hassan and Schneider (2016a) is a recent study which estimates the size of the informal economy in 157 
countries from 1999 to 2013. 
36 Bitzenis et al. (2016) focus mainly on estimating the size of the informal economy for Greece, but in their 
MIMIC regression and then benchmark estimation they estimate the size of the informal economy for 36 
countries in Europe and North America. 
37 Medina and Schneider (2017) this is the most recent working paper which attempts to measure the size of the 
informal economy in 158 countries worldwide between 1991 and 2015. This study is the first to investigate the 
informal economy since 1991 in 158 countries using the MIMIC model. They do not yet however provide the 
whole table with results and estimates in their working paper. They only show the averages. They do not 
estimate the informal economy in FYR Macedonia and Serbia. 
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Figure 3.3. 1 - The size and development of the informal economy measured by various studies 
using the MIMIC, CDA or other methods. 
 
In the following pages, this thesis reviews the main empirical studies to measure the size of 
the informal economy in each of the ten Balkan countries. 
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Romania 
A study by Andrei et al. (2010) showed that the size of the informal economy and the 
arrangements in its activities differ from one country to another and that the transition from 
the economies of the former socialist countries has led to an increase in the size of the 
informal economy. They investigated the informal economy for Romania and found out that 
it accounts for about 30 percent of GDP. They evaluate this by analysing the cash outside the 
banking sector. However, different studies, depending on the use of methodology or model 
for measuring the size of the informal economy, can provide different results. This is 
particularly the case for transition economies, where the quality of data can be an issue 
(Andrei et al., 2010). For example, in Romania’s case, the size of the informal economy as a 
share of its GDP is around 20 percent when estimated using the energy consumption method 
(Schneider & Enste, 2000), whereas using the monetary approaches the size of the GDP is 
around 45percent (French et al., 1999). Even though different methodologies for the same 
country can generate different results for the countries in transition, of which most of the 
Balkan countries could be considered as part of, one can still conclude its size and its role in 
the economy of a country. 
Romania’s informal economy has also been analysed by Albu (2004). The author uses 
household surveys to analyse the households’ income structure and estimate the size of the 
informal economy. Albu (2004) finds that the main participants in the informal economy are 
the poor or the working class, concluding that the survival motive is one important driver of 
economic informality in Romania. Therefore, subsistence was the main determinant of poor 
people’s involvement in the informal economy. However, this study also revealed that the 
middle class and the rich were also involved in the informal economy to exploit the legislative 
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incoherence. According to Albu (2004), the share of income from informal economy 
accounted for as much as 25 percent of the total household income. The author does find an 
increasing trend in in the size of the informal economy from 1995 to the end of 2002. The 
author concludes that taxation is the leading cause of the informal economy in Romania. 
Alexandru (2013) and Alexandru et al. (2015) also measure the size of the informal economy 
in Romania using the simple currency ratio method between the years of 2000 to 2014. Their 
empirical results indicate that the size of the informal economy in Romania has followed a 
decreasing trend from 2000 to 2008, and then an increasing trend from 2008 onwards. Their 
estimates show that the size of the informal economy in Romania was about 19 percent of 
GDP in 2000 to 13 percent in 2014. The authors, however, do not provide any explanation as 
to why this trend of the informal economy in Romania persists. Their results also vary with 
other studies, as this study tends to underestimate the size of the informal economy relative 
to other studies such as Albu (2004), Alexandru and Dobre (2013) or Schneider et al. (2010). 
Alexandru and Dobre (2013) find that the size of the informal economy has decreased in 
Romania, but from 36.5 percent in 2000 to 31.5 percent of real GDP in 2010. This study seems 
to be in line with other studies that measured the informal economy as indicated in the figure 
above. Romania’s informal economy has also been estimated as part of a larger panel data 
set by various other authors, which have been presented below in figure 3.3.2.  
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Figure 3.3. 2 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Romania from various 
sources 
 
Serbia 
Blunch (2015) analyses the informal economy in Serbia. According to the author, the informal 
sector in Serbia is quite ‘pervasive’ which employs about a quarter of the private sector in the 
country. Several other studies indicate that the informal economy is significant in Serbia and 
the region as a whole – such as Kogan (2011), Koettl (2010), Krstić et al. (2010), Sanfey (2010) 
and Macias & Cazzavillan (2009). According to the October 2008 LFS38, around 650,000 people 
worked informally. That means that about 10 percent of the Serbian working-age 
population—aged 15 or older—were working informally. According to this survey and the 
data from World Bank, 2.2 million people were formally employed (which constitutes about 
                                                          
38 The Serbian Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
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34 percent of the working-age population) while 3.1 million were inactive (this is equivalent 
to 49 percent) and 460,000 were unemployed (just 7 percent). It also means that 23percent, 
which is almost a quarter of all employed people in Serbia work informally (Koettl, 2010).  
According to a USAID report by Schneider et al. (2013), the size of the informal economy in 
Serbia decreased from just over 33 percent in 2001 to around 30 percent of GDP nine years 
later in 2010. Their results  indicate that Serbia’s informal economy decreased during the 
period of economic growth, but it remained almost unaffected from the beginning of the 
financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn. However, according to the same 
report (Schneider et al., 2013); the three methods applied to measure the size of the informal 
economy generated different results. The above results were generated using the MIMIC 
approach. However, using the Household Tax Compliance model and Surveys, the informal 
economy in Serbia accounted for 23.6 percent in 2010 and 21 percent in 2012, respectively.  
This extensive report highlights that the declining informal economy in Serbia could improve 
public revenues and with that the provision of qualitative and more public goods and services. 
They estimate that public revenues will increase between 0.8 percent and 1.1 percent of GDP 
within three years and up to two percent of GDP within seven years. The report also offers 
some recommendations for government institutions such as labour market reforms and social 
security reforms. 
Several other authors, indicated in the figure below, have estimated the size of the informal 
economy in Serbia. Figure 3.3.3 below compares these estimates which use a much larger 
panel datasets comprising of various countries. 
 
 75 
 
Figure 3.3. 3 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Serbia from various 
sources 
 
FYR Macedonia 
According to the results presented in a paper by Garvanlieva, Andonov and Nikolov (2012) 
the relative size of the informal economy in FYR Macedonia has decreased over the last 
decade (2000-2010) from 34 percent of GDP in 2000 to 24 percent of GDP in 2010. These 
estimates have been provided by the authors using the Electricity Consumption Method. 
However, they also employ the MIMIC approach in their analysis, and it shows an increase of 
the informal economy to 52 percent in 2007 and then reduces to 47 percent in 2011. This 
undoubtedly is a significantly high informal economic activity. The main characteristics of the 
informal economy in this country are taxes, unemployment, regulation intensity, bureaucracy 
and social transfers paid by the government (Garvanlieva et al. 2012, Novkovska 2008, and 
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Dzhekova et al. 2014). The authors indicated above provide some conclusions and 
recommendations in tackling the informal economy in this country. The problem of the 
informal economy is exacerbated even further by the existence of a significant degree of 
corruption in the country (Novkovska 2008).  
FYR Macedonia has a problem with informal employment also. According to Novkovska 
(2008), the estimates of formal and informal employment for this country show that the total 
formal employment is 72.3percent of total employment and 27.7percent is the participation 
of informal employment. Some widely cited international measurements that cover FYR 
Macedonia find that the share of its informal economy is larger than in all EU countries, 
estimated at around 35percent of GDP in 2007 (Schneider et al., 2010). Also, data from the 
most recent national Labour Force Survey suggests that in 2012 around 22.5percent of the 
workforce was engaged in undeclared work, and therefore was not covered by any social or 
legal protection (Dzhekova et al. 2014).  
The informal economy in FYR Macedonia has been measured by Schneider (2007a), Schneider 
(2009), Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn and Schneider (2012) and Hassan and Schneider 
(2016a). The estimates from the above studies, which in their regression uses panel datasets 
of various other countries, have been presented in the figure below. 
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Figure 3.3. 4  – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in FYR Macedonia from 
various sources 
 
Albania 
Albania’s economy is characterised by a considerable degree of informality. Boka & Torluccio 
(2013) have shown a high percentage of the informal economy relative to GDP, reaching the 
highest informality in the years of conflict and country’s financial sector crises 1997-1999, 
although it has followed a decreasing trend. Using the national accounts discrepancies 
method, the informal economy was 36.2 percent of GDP on average over the period from 
1996 to 2012 (Boka & Torluccio, 2013). Boka & Torluccio (2013) in their study of the informal 
economy of Albania use some methods to measure the size of the informal economy. In all 
the methods they find a significant size of the informal economy (on average exceeding 
30percent of GDP).  
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Numerous studies attempted to measure the size of informality and informal employment in 
Albania, generating differing results where the range of 30 to 60 percent of total employment 
was of informal character (Jütting and Laiglesia 2009, Sisevic 2008, Baliu 2008, Kamenicy 
2009, Pfau-Effinger et al. 2009). Even though, according to Gërxhani (2003) the informal 
sector helped the Albanian economy during the first years of transition by providing 
households with employment and supplementary income in the absence of other 
opportunities – the level of the informal employment is significant forcing the Albania 
government to introduce a detailed action plan in 2004 in an attempt to reduce informal 
employment and encoruage informal workers to go formal (Mihes, 2011).  
 The informal economy in Albania is quite significant, and this has been indicated in various 
studies where the size of the informal economy in Albania has been measured as part of a 
larger sample of countries or where its size has been measured by either direct or indirect 
methodology. Muceku and Muca (2014) investigate the costs associated with the informal 
economy and economic development in Albania. They conclude that the large size of the 
informal economy should be considered as a threat to the overall economic development in 
Albania and recommend some reforms mainly in the rule of law and legislative stability. Bello 
et al. (2011) also arrived at similar conclusions. Both studies did not measure the size of the 
informal economy in Albania.  
Olters (2003) provides a detailed discussion of the informal economy in Albania. Although 
Olters (2003) does not provide any calculations or estimations of the size of the informal 
economy, this study provided a detailed analysis of the existing empirical literature on the 
size and development of the informal economy in Albania. He argues that in the case of 
Albania it is not the tax rate that drivers agents to engage in informal economic activities, but 
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instead it is the ”…ineffectual and discretionary application of tax laws and governmental 
regulations that create conditions under…” which the size of the informal economy in Albania 
has grown (Olters, 2003, p. 12). Hence, Olters (2003), Bello et al. (2011) and Muceku and Muca 
(2014) argue for reforms and government effectiveness. Figure 3.3.5 below shows other 
measures of the size of the informal economy in Albania. These studies have measured the 
informal economy in Albania using a more extensive panel sample of countries, except Boka 
and Torluccio (2013) who used time series data and the discrepancy between National 
Expenditure and Income Statistics method. 
Figure 3.3. 5 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Albania from various 
sources 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The informal economy is quite significant and pervasive in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Research 
undertaken by various authors indicate that the informal employment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina comprises around one-third of all employment (Rosas, Corbanese, O`Higgins, 
Roland, and Tanovic, 2009). In a study by Krstić et al. (2006, 2007) a significant informal sector 
remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina — representing nearly 43 percent of total employment in 
2004, although its size as a percentage of total employment has fallen between 2001 and 
2004.  
The informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina has received further attention from 
Dell’Anno and Piirisild (2004). Their estimates of the size of the informal economy using 
MIMIC model showed a fluctuation from 57.74 percent to 52.6 percent between 2001 and 
2003, respectively. There is no other specific study which provides empirical results for the 
size of the informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other studies that have empirically 
measured the size of the informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina using a larger panel 
sample with many other countries have been included in figure 3.3.6 below. 
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Figure 3.3. 6 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from various sources 
 
Turkey 
In Turkey, it is well known that the informal economy is very high. Regarding its reasons, it is 
classified into four groups as economic, financial, political and administrative, moral and 
psychological (Ela 2003). Economic reasons that lead to the informal economy are specific to 
Turkey. Since 1970, there is a high inflationary trend in Turkey, and so it increases informal 
economy (Ela 2003). Because of high inflation, producer and consumer’s fictive profit is taxed, 
and therefore they choose activities in the informal economy. According to a paper by Oviedo 
(2009) economic informality, by various definitions, is widespread in Turkey. The author 
computes the results from the data taken from Loayza and Rigolini (2006) using 
methodologies from Schneider (2004) and derives and estimate of 33.2 percent of the 
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informal economy relative to GDP. According to this study, independent and informal sector 
workers comprise between 24 and 44 percent of all the labour force in the country. The level 
of self-employment was relatively constant in Turkey of around 25 percent for the past 
decade (Oviedo, 2009). Other authors such as Ela (2003) also investigate the link between the 
level of informal economy and informal employment with the educational level in the 
country. According to Ela (2003), increased educational attainment and provision of 
contemporary educational programs should be considered as important factors to reduce the 
size and negative impact of the informal economy. Increased educational attainment should 
also contribute to the resolution of such social problems as economic growth and unfair 
income distribution in the country. 
Turkey’s informal economy has also been investigated by some other studies. Gunes et al. 
(2013) estimate the size of the informal economy in Turkey using monetary and expenditures 
approach. They find that the informal economy in Turkey is between 41 percent in 2003 to 35 
percent in 2006. According to a study by Schneider & Savasan (2007), the size of Turkey’s 
informal economy was 31.1 percent (of official GDP) in 1999 and rose to 35.1 percent in 2005. 
Ogunc and Yilmaz (2000) also report different estimates on the size of the informal economy 
for Turkey. They estimate the size of the informal economy to be above 30 percent using the 
transactions approach, while below 20 percent using the simple currency ratio method. Yildiz 
(2013) estimates of Turkey’s informal economy using the currency demand approach, on the 
other hand, show a low size of the informal economy, with less than 5 percent from 2001 to 
2012. The informal economy in Turkey was estimated in other studies as well, which used a 
panel data of many other countries to estimate the size of their informal economy. These 
estimates have been presented in figure 3.3.7 below. 
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Figure 3.3. 7 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Turkey from various 
sources 
 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria is often recognised as having one of the largest undeclared economies when 
compared to other South-East European countries (Bogdanov & Stanchev, 2010; Schneider, 
2013; Williams et al., 2014; Elgin & Öztunali, 2014). Kyle et al. (2001) estimate the size of the 
informal economy, its structure, the incentives for its development and its effect on the 
economic growth and the competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy. According to their 
estimates, in the size of the informal economy in Bulgaria in 1998 was 22 percent of GDP. The 
most substantial size of the informal economy relative to GDP was observed in 1990 (with 
just over 32 percent) and 1996 (with just over 34 percent), and then declining after that.  The 
latest analysis and estimates take the Bulgarian informal economy to around 35.3 percent for 
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2012 (Murphy, 2012), while according to Schneider (2013) the size of the informal economy 
was reduced to 31.2 percent of GDP.  
Bulgaria’s informal economy has also been estimated as part of a larger panel data sample by 
other authors, which have been presented in figure 3.3.8 below, and indicate fluctuating 
results depending on the model and the number of observations used. Alm and Embaye’s 
(2013) results show that the size of the informal economy jumped in 1997 to 58.1 percent 
from 34.1 percent in 1996, then went back down to 33.2 percent in 1998. The authors do not 
offer any explanation for such significant jump. 
Figure 3.3. 8 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Bulgaria from various 
sources 
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Greece, Slovenia and Croatia 
Schneider (2013) (in a VISA Europe and ATKearney report) has estimated that the informal 
economy in 2013 was 28.4 percent of GDP in Croatia, 23.6 percent in Greece and 23.1 percent 
in Slovenia. Meanwhile, Williams (2014) estimates that the share of employment which is in 
the undeclared economy in 2013 as 22.7 percent in Croatia, 19.6 percent in Slovenia, and 15.0 
percent in Greece. From this analysis, we can see that the level of the informal economy is 
slightly lower in the countries of Slovenia, Croatia, and Greece than the other seven countries 
part of this study.  
Greece, compared to the countries mentioned above, presents a lower percentage in the 
informal sector. This percentage of the informal economy due to the economic crisis, 
increased initially (up from 24.3percent of the recorded GDP in 2008 to 25.2percent in 2010) 
(Manolas et al., 2013), and currently, has reduced to around 23.6percent in 2013 (Schneider, 
2013). Despite the facts, that compared to other Balkan countries Greece has a higher GDP 
per capita, and a higher standard of living has shown a considerable high percentage in the 
informal economy. 
The informal economy in Greece has also been estimated by Bitzenis et al. (2016). Using a 
MIMIC model, the author estimates that the informal economy decreased from 28.2 percent 
in 2003 to 24.3 percent of GDP in 2011. The author indicates that the most important 
determinants of Greece’s informal economy are factors related to macroeconomic 
conditions, namely the unemployment rate and GDP growth, and institutional factors, such 
as tax morale and the rule of law. 
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Croatia’s informal economy was studied in a number of studies. The level of informal 
economy in Croatia has negatively impacted on the economic development of the country 
(Madžarevic-Šujster, 2002; Bejakovic, 2004). Klaric (2011) estimates the size of the informal 
economy using a MIMIC model for the period of 1998 to 2009. The estimates from this study 
indicate that the size of the informal economy in Croatia between 1998 and 2009 is about 15 
percent and 12 percent, respectively. Although this is on the low side of estimates compared 
to the other studies outlined above, such as that from Schneider et al. (2010). Madžarevic-
Šujster, (2002), Bejakovic (2004) and Klaric (2011) blame the inefficient taxation system in the 
country for the existence of informal economy. 
Slovenia’s informal economy according to Nastav and Bojnec (2005) is lower than in other 
Balkan countries. According to Nastav and Bojnec (2005), the informal economy in Slovenia 
fluctuates between 10 and 21 percent of GDP. Using labour market analysis or the 
discrepancy between the Official and Actual Labour Force approach, they estimate the size of 
the informal economy and indicate that it had increased from 10 percent in 1993 to about 21 
percent in 2014. There are some studies that have measured the size of the informal economy 
in Slovenia using a large sample of countries such as that by Schneider et al. (2010) or the 
study by Hassan and Schneider (2016a). 
The size of the informal economy for Slovenia, Greece and Croatia has been analysed by other 
authors as well, some of which discussed above. These studies have been presented in figures 
3.3.9, 3.3.10, and 3.3.11 below. 
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Figure 3.3. 9 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Croatia from various 
sources 
 
Figure 3.3. 10 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Greece from various 
sources 
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Figure 3.3. 11 – Empirical studies and the size of the informal economy in Slovenia from various 
sources 
 
 
The existence of informal economy in a country is highly influenced and correlated by factors 
such as the historical background specific to one country, the level of development a country 
is in,  cultural characteristics, as well as the economic system and the overall political and 
social environment (Williams et al., 2014). There has been growing acknowledgement that 
the informal economy is a significant component of South-East European economies, and in 
particular, the countries of the Balkan Peninsula (Williams et al., 2014). Informal economies 
of this magnitude have significant implications for governments and societies. 
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3.4. Economic Informality and Development 
 
There is a shared assumption among the literature that the informal economy is associated 
with low productivity levels and therefore, contributes to slow economic growth and 
economic development in a country (Levy 2007, 2008). The low productivity is an important 
issue because it sets a limit on a country’s or individual’s living standards. Usually when one 
refers to the informal economy, immediately one can think of developing or less developed 
countries, as well as those countries in transition. However, the informal economic activities 
(although at different levels and volumes) can be found in all countries worldwide (Schneider, 
2007a).  
 In developing countries, informal firms and informal economic activities account for up to 
half of overall economic activity, and they provide a livelihood for millions of people (la Porta 
& Shleifer, 2014). However, the role of the informal economy in economic development 
remains controversial among scholars. According to De Soto (1989, 2000), informal firms are 
“untapped reservoir of entrepreneurial energy, held back by government regulations”. As 
such, unleashing this energy by reducing entry regulations or improving property rights would 
fuel growth and development. De Soto (1989) has argued that informal firms would like to 
become formal but are held back by corruption and government regulation. Others, such as 
Rauch (1991), Farrell (2004) and Levy (2008), see informality as a by-product of poverty and 
something that should be suppressed, not unleashed. 
Heintz and Pollin (2003) analysed the relationship between the level of informality and the 
level of economic growth for two time periods in twenty developing countries. They found 
that most developing countries from their sample (around 70 percent) experienced some 
economic growth in a situation of informality; Four experienced a decline in economic growth, 
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while the other two experienced no change in the rate of growth. The level of informality 
increased in three countries of their sample which had good economic growth rates per capita 
(above two percent increase), while declining in two countries with low growth per capita 
(about less than one percent) (Heintz and Pollin, 2003).  
Galli and Kucera (2003) conducted a similar study for 14 Latin American countries and found 
both countercyclical and pro-cyclical characteristics of informality (survival and subordinated 
activities and independent and subordinated activities, respectively). Galli and Kucera (2003) 
conclude that the nature of informality during business cycles tends to change where often 
the informal economy is heavely saturated during recessions and has a limited capacity to 
absorb any losses in the formal economy. 
Loayza and Rigolini (2006) assessed the relationship between informality and economic 
growth and development for 42 countries (of which 18 were developing and 24 developed 
countries). Their results indicate that the informal economy tends to expand during economic 
recessions and adjusts during high tax regimes. Loayza and Rigolini (2006) find that the 
informal economy is much higher in countries where the GDP per capita is low, there are 
significant opportunity costs of operating formally because of strict and often bureocratic 
employment and business regulations, and weak monitoring of informality which are 
associated with weak policy and judicial systems. 
While in some parts of the world the size of the informal economy has been increasing relative 
to the formal economy, the size of it has been reducing in Europe over the past decade, but 
still, its size as of 2013 is estimated to be at around €2.15 trillion. On average this constitutes 
as much as 18.5 percent of economic activity across Europe (according to a report by 
Schneider (2013) for Visa Europe and ATKearney). This report shows that almost two-thirds 
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of the informal economy is concentrated in Europe’s largest countries such as Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and UK, however, in countries of Eastern Europe the size of the informal 
economy relative to the formal economy is much higher than in Western Europe. According 
to the same source, the informal economy accounts for as much as 30 percent in countries 
such as Croatia and Bulgaria, and far more in other Balkan countries. From these results, one 
could conclude that the size of the informal economy in a country is negatively correlated 
with the economic development in that country.  
Even though in general terms the size of the informal economy reduced slowly in the 
continent of Europe over the past decade, the Mediterranean countries still experience a 
growing informal sector. Many companies still operate under the informal economy where 
they can avoid some taxes, misreport employment, ignore safety regulation and product 
quality standards, violate copyright and intellectual property laws, as well as avoid 
registration as legal entities (Ishengoma & Kappel, 2006). This problem is particularly worse 
in countries with less economic development, in transition and the developing countries. 
Informal economic activities and informal companies tend to be of larger volume and number, 
respectively, in countries where there is a lack of development or where there is poverty 
(Ishengoma & Kappel, 2006). However, in turn, the author argues that it is the informal sector 
that causes further underdevelopment and poverty. It is therefore understood by 
governments that formalisation rather than informality is more beneficial for an economy 
attempting to increase economic growth and reducing poverty. 
As an agent’s engagement in informal economic activities violates the legal norm (Olters, 
2003), these activities are usually supplemented by higher levels of public corruption, where 
bribes are accepted from government officials in exchange for favours at the disadvantage of 
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the state (Tanzi, 1998). There is a growing literature which shows that, in a a corrupt system, 
there is a distortion of economic incentives, resulting in lower state revenues lower private 
investments, and increased poverty and inequality (Gupta et al., 2002; Olters, 2003). Most of 
the above studies confirm the presence of a negative correlation between the informal 
economy and corruption in one hand and growth as well as development on the other, 
thereby highlighting the importance of effective and efficient governance as a crucial element 
of successfully tackling informal economic activities in a country through various reforms.  
According to Singh et al. (2012), a large size of the informal economy will limit the capacity of 
the state to bring about strong institutions with effective governance capabilities for many 
developing and less developed countries worldwide, which in turn is likely to discourage the 
involvement of individuals and businesses in a formal economy where legal norm is fully 
respected. Singh et al. (2012), analyse the main factors influencing the growing size of the 
informal economy by emphasising the role of institutions and the rule of law. The authors 
argue that when individuals and businesses are faced with higher regulation burden, and a 
corruptive environment, as well as inefficient enforcement, they have an incentive to hide 
their economic activities. Singh et al. (2012), argue that institutions are imperative 
determinants that influence the size of the informal economy, by more than tax rates.  
However, in turn, the development and the effectiveness of government institutions will 
depend on the ability of governments to collect revenues, which in a country with high level 
of informal economy can be challenging. Therefore, countries with a large informal sector are 
faced with the risk of being stuck in a ‘vicious cycle’ (Alesina, 1999), where the large   size of 
the informal sector is more likely to complicate revenue collection from government 
authorities leading to relatively poor provision of qualitative public goods and services 
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(Alesina, 1999). Such inefficient public sector will reduce taxpayer discipline and tax morale, 
directing the economy towards a fiscal or informality trap (Naylor, 2002). 
Wallace et al. (2004) investigate the informal economy in East and Central Europe between 
1991 and 1998. They find that the informal economy was an essential part of the former 
countries of the Communist block of Central and Eastern Europe throughout their transition 
period. They consider the size and development of the informal economy in these countries 
during their transition period, the forms of participation in the informal economy and its role 
in economic and political developments in the region.  
Wallace et al. (2004) also investigate whether the informal economy in East and Central 
Europe can undermine economic growth and development in those countries. By using 
annual growth as a dependent variable, the authors use first bivariate analysis and then 
multivariate OLS-regression to measure the consequences of different kinds of economies 
and different kinds of social capital on economic growth. They find a positive correlation 
between the level of GDP per capita and those employed in the formal economy. They also 
find a robust negative correlation between the economic growth and informal economy. As 
per their results, the informal economy is, therefore, most associated with lack of growth in 
the household economy as economic growth is associated with increasing formalisation. 
Some argue that granting access to formal credit markets to potential entrepreneurs, by 
improving public institutions and specific regulations, is an essential condition for economic 
development (De Soto 1990, 2000). In particular, reforms allowing economic agents to 
formalise and thus better collateralise their assets should naturally lead them to invest more, 
increase their productivity, and ultimately the benefit of higher overall growth and 
development would follow. However, these views were questioned by Massenot & Straub 
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(2011), where they argue that this conclusion may not hold in countries with a where financial 
openness is low and financial sector is concentrated. With the growth of the formal sector in 
those countries, more entrepreneurs and individuals might become creditworthy, which 
result in interest rate due to higher demand for credit, and this in turn is likely to reduce future 
accumulation of capital (Massenot & Straub, 2011). 
In a study by Nikopour et al. (2008) the correlation between the degree of economic 
development and the size of the informal economy is investigated. In their study, they analyse 
the Kuznets curve39 of the informal economy for a panel of 21 OECD countries across 11 years 
(from 1995 to 2006). Their results indicate that the cubic functional (N shaped) form of the 
Kuznets curve justifies the relationship between the level of economic growth and 
development and the size of the informal economy better than the inverted (U shaped) curve. 
The authors also indicate that the level of the informal economy in a country has a relatively 
positive effect on the formal economy in the initial phases of the development and has a 
negative impact on economic growth on later stages of development. Bhattacharya (2011), 
Elgin and Oztunali (2014a, 2014b) agrees with such conclusions about the informal sector and 
economic development. Figure 3.4.1 below highlights the impact of the informality on 
economic growth at different stages of development. 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Kuznets (1955) developed the so called Kuznets curve, which is also known as the inverse U-shaped pattern 
of inequality. Using cross-country and time series data Kuznets (1955) concluded that as countries developed, 
income inequality first increased, peaked and then decreased. More about the Kuznets curve is found at 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002). 
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Figure 3.4. 1 – Kuznets Curve of Informal Economy. Source: Biau (2011, p.8) adopted from 
Environment degradation Kuznets curve, and Inequality Kuznets curve as suggested by Kuznets 
(1955) 
 
The relationship between the informal economy and the level of economic growth at different 
stages of a country’s development can be summarised in figure 3.4.2 below taken from 
Nikopour et al. (2008). From a neoclassical point of view, Nikopour et al. (2008) argue that 
the existence of the informal sector in a country can lead to higher competition and efficiency. 
Asea (1996) argues on the same lines, suggesting that the informal sector may also lead new 
markets being created, increased capital and financial resources, and a transformation of the 
socio-economic and legal institutions. Therefore, the authors argue that a positive 
relationship can exist between the informal sector and the economic growth for a country 
which finds itself at a lower level of development40. 
                                                          
40 Other authors tend to agree on the positive relationship of the informal economy on the official economy, 
such as Adam and Ginsburgh (1985), Schneider (1998), Giles et al. (2002), Gillman and Cziraky (2004), 
Schneider (2004), Schneider and Hametner (2007), and Bhattacharya (2011) 
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However, there are also those that indicate that a high level of economic informality can have 
a negative impact on the level of economic growth. For example, Loayza (1996) argues that a 
high level of informal economy will impact the provision of public services for everyone 
negatively. Furthermore, Keefer & Knack (1997) also agree with such conclusion that the level 
of informal economy will adversely affect the level of economic growth as government’s tax 
revenues are reduced and as such the quantity and quality of public services and 
infrastructure will be affected negatively. Therefore, there are two views about the 
relationship of the informal economy and economic growth. One argues that the relationship 
between the informal and the official economy is negative, while the other view emphasises 
that is positive. These two views are summarised in the figure below. 
Figure 3.4. 2 - Views on the relationship between the informal economy and economic growth, 
Source: Nikopour et al. (2008, p.6) 
 
3.5. Estimation of the informal economy using different approaches 
 
This section will provide a detailed review of the existing literature on estimating the size and 
development of the informal economy using different approaches. It must be said that the 
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main approaches used in the literature are the MIMIC and the CDA model. Hence, this review 
of the literature will be mainly focused on these two methods. 
The available approaches or models to estimate the size of the informal economy described 
in the theoretical background chapter, together with their primary methods are designed to 
calculate the size of the informal economy by considering only one indicator, which usually is 
the general economic output. This indicator must capture all the effects of the informal 
economy in a country. However, the effects of the informal economy tend to show up 
simultaneously in other areas of the economy such as production, labour markets, and money 
supply (Schneider, 2006, 2007b). The direct and indirect approaches described in the earlier 
chapters have shortcomings in that they do not foresee multiple factors impacting the size of 
the informal economy. Furthermore, one of the main disadvantages of using the direct 
approach methods is that they are unable to estimate the development of the informal 
economy over a longer period.  
There are also some other obstacles to these methods. Those who are associated with the 
informal economy in any way may not be willing to share any information, and thus achieving 
results will strictly depend on the formulation of questionnaires or it could be impossible 
altogether. Further to this, a number of questionnaires will need to be formulated to capture 
information about different characteristics of the informal economy (Schneider, 2002, 2014). 
Another substantial criticism of the direct and indirect approaches is that the the main factors 
or causes that can potentially have an impact on the size of the informal economy are only 
taken into account in the monetary approach methodologies, and even here mainly one 
cause, the burden of taxation is considered  but not multiple causes that could potentially 
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lead to the movements in the size and developments of the informal economy (Dell’Anno, 
2007; Schneider, 2007). 
The use of the MIMIC Model 
 
The most commonly used method is one that should indicate various indicators and causes 
that impact the informal economy regarding its size and development. Such model is the 
MIMIC. This model has been used extensively by Giles et al. (2002); Dell’Anno (2003, 2007); 
Breusch (2005); Bajada & Schneider (2005a), (2005b); Pickhardt & Sarda-Pous (2006); 
Schneider (2005, 2006, 2007b). The literature also makes good use of the CDA model. 
Although these methods are similar in their fundamentals, they can be used with different 
specifications (Buehn & Schneider, 2012). Both these methods can be used with longitudinal 
or panel data (Buehn & Schneider, 2012; Alm & Embaye 2013).  
The MIMIC model has been used for the first time by Zellner (1970)41 and Goldberger (1972), 
and later by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) are considered the pioneers on the application 
of the MIMIC model who used it to evaluate the relative size of the informal economy in 
seventeen OECD countries. Basic idea of this model is to consider the informal economy as a 
latent variable or index that has caused noticeable effects, but that cannot be measured 
directly.  
The MIMIC model has a number of components, such as Cash in circulation, Real GDP and 
Real private consumption. A major assumption in most studies of the informal economy is 
that a considerable portion of informal transactions is carried out in cash so that to prevent 
detection, i.e. the money supply is a potential accurate indicator of the informal economy. 
                                                          
41 Cited in Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975) 
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The money in circulation is a variable which is typically calculated through the levels, and 
dynamic patterns of the money aggregate M0, M1, M2 and M3. Within the framework of the 
currency board arrangements, the central bank does not have powers to control the money 
supply and the growth of money aggregates and therefore any increase can be correlated 
only to the real money demand in the country (Dell’Anno 2003, 2007; Schneider, 2006, 2007b, 
2014). Furthermore, a reference variable is needed in estimating the informal economy so 
that to set a measurement scale. As the real GDP is adjusted for inflation, it reports the actual 
volume of overall formal economic activity performance. Real private consumption, on the 
other hand, is considered as an essential component of the informal economy. Working in the 
informal sector of the economy generates income for people. Following the conventional 
economic theory of the positive relationship between income and consumption, an increase 
in the size of the informal economy will be reflected in a proportional increase in real 
consumption. 
Thomas (1992), Pozo (1996), Giles (1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b), Johnson et al. (1998), Giles 
et al. (2002), Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno and Schneider (2004) and Schneider (2003, 2005, 
2006 and 2007b), indicate that there are a number of multiple causes and indicators which 
can potentially influence or be influenced by the informal economy, from which three main 
types of causes are defined. One is the actual level of taxation burden from direct and indirect 
taxes. A rising burden of taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the informal economy. 
According to Djankov et al. (2003), all informal activity has one common feature, and that is 
that those operating in the informal economy perceive that the benefits of doing so, outweigh 
the costs of operating within the legal norms and regulations. 
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Secondly, the burden of regulation is considered as an important cause of informality where 
a positive correlation is assumed, meaning that as the level of regulations intensifies, and the 
burden increases there will be solid incentive for individuals and businesses to enter the 
informal economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Further recent studies agree with this cause 
and have outlined some motives why some economic activities are performed informally. Key 
factors are the  the costly, time consuming and  bureocracy of government regulations and 
taxation system (Johnson et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
A third driver which can affect the size of the informal economy and its development over 
time, are the attitudes of citizens towards their state. This has been termed as the "tax 
morality", and it describes the willingness of individuals and businesses to leave their formal 
activities and enter the informal economy. The assumption is that as tax morality declines  
there will be an increase in the size of the informal economy (Schneider, 2006 and 2007b).  
Other causes such as economic downturns, as a result of various forms or types of financial 
crises, can affect the informal economy. Many studies suggest that at times of economic crisis 
people turn to their informal networks of family and friends for support, as well as the level 
of employment increases in the informal sector at times of economic uncertainty and crisis 
(Cunningham & Maloney 2000; Finnegan & Singh’s, 2004; Mehrotra, 2009; Cling et al. 2010). 
A study by Colombo et al. (2013) suggests that the informal sector is a powerful buffer, which 
expands at times of banking crises and absorbs a large proportion of the fall in official output. 
Economic and financial crises, in general, can result in higher official unemployment levels as 
jobs in the formal economy are lost and as new entrants into the informal economy increase 
(Schneider, 2002). As such the government’s public expenditure can be affected and this 
could further exacerbate the crisis. The government will receive fewer revenues from taxes 
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and has to support a growing number of people out of work with social benefits. The 
underlying assumption here is that as people lose jobs in the formal sector of the economy 
they can move to informal sector as the latter can cope better and adjusts quicker with 
business cycle shocks as a result of economic downturns or crises (Cunningham & Maloney, 
2000). The size of a country’s informal economy is therefore strongly correlated with low 
levels of economic development and low GDP per capita (Schneider, 2002, 2007b). 
Many studies also suggest that the informal economy is associated with less development 
and transition economies (Schneider & Enste 2000; Gërxhani, 2004; Williams, 2005; 
Dell’Anno, 2007; Andrei et al., 2010; Schneider, 2011; Schneider, 2014; la Porta & Shleifer 
2014). Most of the Balkan countries are either post-communist or transitioning countries. 
These countries experienced a dramatic shift from a region of wars, conflicts and continuous 
social and political unrest to a region which started to understand the benefits of cooperation 
and working together to ensure economic prosperity for their societies (Bartlett, 2010; Penev, 
2012).  As such, as part of the causes of informality for the countries of Balkan, it is important 
to consider the political climate and account for conflicts and wars in the regions when 
addressing the size and the development of the informal economy. 
From a public sector services perspective, a growing size of the informal economy can reduce 
government tax revenues, which usually leads to a reduction in the quality and in most cases 
the quantity of goods and services publicly provided by the state (Alesina, 1999; Azuma & 
Grossman, 2002; Enste, 2010; Andrews et al., 2011). Consequently, this could result in higher 
taxes for firms and individuals operating in line with legal norms and regulations in the formal 
sector of the economy. This is also often combined with a deterioration of the publicly 
provided goods and services and their administration (such as public infrastructure, 
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healthcare, etc.), resulting in lower tax morality and stronger incentives to enter the informal 
sector.  
Johnson et al., (1998) present a simple model of the relationship between public services, tax 
rates and the informal economy. Their results indicate that countries with lower tax rates, 
fewer laws and bureocratic regulations, as well as less corruption, tend to achieve higher tax 
revenues, and therefore find themselves with asmaller informal sector. Balkan countries on 
the other hand, as mentioned previously, experience a higher informal economy than most 
of other European countries, which can be partially blamed on the above mentioned causes. 
Countries with strong and effective rule of law, which is mainly financed by the government 
revenues from taxes, also tend to have a lower size of the informal economy (Schneider, 2006, 
2007b). According to Johnson et al., (1998) and Schneider (2007a), countries which are in the 
process of transition have a greater number of procedures and regulations which are 
discretionary, followed by higher effective tax rates - resulting in higher instances where 
bribes and other corruptive behaviour takes place to bypass complex tax regime, regulations 
and procedures which, consequently results in an even higher informal sector. Johnson et al., 
(1998; p. 1) conclusion is that:  
”…wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern Europe, find themselves 
in the ‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue 
mobilization, the good rule of law and corruption control, and a relatively small 
informal economy. By contrast, a number of countries in South America and the former 
Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and 
regulatory discretion and burden on the firm are high, there is a weak rule of law, and 
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a high incidence of bribery leading to a high share of the informal economy” (Johnson 
et al., 1998; p. 1).  
Quality of public goods and services offered by the state can also be an important and crucial 
casual variable indicating whether people want to work or not in the informal economy. 
Accounting for this effect, Schneider (2007a) uses a variable called the Government 
Effectiveness Index from World Bank Governance Indicators.  
“This index captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political interference, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies”(World Bank Governance Indicators, Online42: p.1).  
This will be an important variable for the Balkan countries as perceptions about the rule of 
law, and the degree of institutional independence from political pressure, as well as 
corruption, are very high.  
On the other hand, the size and development of the informal economy are usually determined 
by three main indicators. One of these indicators is the change in monetary indicators. With 
a rise in the economic activities in the informal economy, it is expected that the monetary 
transactions will also increase (Schneider, 2007a). Changes in the labour market are also 
important indicators of the size and development of the informal economy (Dell’Anno, 2007; 
Schneider, 2007a). If more and more people are working in the informal sector of the 
economy, this can result in a decrease in the number of those working in the formally. 
Moreover, if informal activities increase, this affects the working hours in the formal 
                                                          
42 Available from https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf (Last accessed on 21.12.2018) 
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economy. The number of self-employed is another crucial factor to be considered here as 
pointed out by Dell’Anno (2007). Changes or developments in the production market are also 
important indicators of the informal economy. If the informal economy increases, this means 
that the inputs move out of the official economy into the informal economy and this 
movement could potentially have a negative impact on the growth rate of the official 
economy. 
In studies by Bajada and Schneider (2005), Schneider and Enste (2006), Feld and Schneider 
(2009), the developments and the business cycle of the formal economy is also significant in 
people’s decision to work or not in the informal economy. If the formal economy is 
experiencing a boom, people have many opportunities to earn a good salary in it. Conversely, 
for many people, this is not the case if the formal economy is in recession or heading towards 
it, as more people will try to recompense their income losses from the formal economy by 
taking additional work informally (Feld and Schneider, 2009). However, Taylor (1996) provides 
empirical evidence arguing that people’s movements into the informal economy are pro-
cyclical. Following the work of Schneider & Enste (2000), this research in its MIMIC model will 
use variables such as the GDP per capita, GDP per capita as per Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
and the labour force participation ratio in capturing such effects. 
Empirical studies with MIMIC models 
 
Hassan & Schneider (2016a) use a panel data of 157 countries worldwide to calculate the size 
of the informal economy using a MIMIC model from 1999 to 2013 on an annual basis. For the 
cause variables, they use tax burden, regulation burden, Unemployment rate, self-
employment rate, economic freedom index and business freedom index, whereas for the 
indicator variables they use GDP growth, currency in circulation and labour force participation 
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ratio. They find that higher tax and regulatory burden, unemployment and self-employment 
rates are the main drivers of the informal economy, meaning that an increase in these causal 
variables increases the informal economy. Our result also confirms previous findings from 
Schneider et al. (2010). The estimated average of the informality of 157 countries around the 
world, including developing, East European, central Asian and high-income OECD countries 
averaged over 1999 to 2013 is 33.77percent of official GDP. Calculating the informal economy 
using a sample of 157 countries, could pose the risk of using similar causes and indicators for 
countries at different stages of development and countries with different political, social and 
economic systems. This could produce some biased results. 
Another study by Hassan & Schneider (2016b) estimate and analyse the size of the informal 
economy for Egypt using a MIMIC. They use time series data from 1976 to 2013. In their 
estimation, they use variables specific to the Egyptian economy in the MIMIC regression, such 
as the dominance of the agriculture sector in the economy and the level of institutional 
quality. Other variables used include the tax burden, unemployment rate and the self-
employment in one side as the causes while using real GDP, total employment and money in 
circulation as indicators.  
Elshamy (2015) also uses MIMIC model to estimate the size of the informal economy for Egypt 
over a time series data from 1980 to 2012. In this study the author is using the following 
causes; average of corporate and personal marginal income tax rate, the importance of 
agriculture sector to GDP and the inflation rate; while using the following indicators; gross 
enrolment ratio for secondary school and the labour force contribution to the social security 
system. The results indicate an increasing trend of the informal economy in Egypt. The results 
show that the informal economy increased from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 37.4 percent in 2012. 
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Elshamy (2015) blames a strict tax system, high inflation, and relatively large agriculture 
sector as the leading causal factors driving the size of the informal economy. Elshamy (2015) 
also provides empirical evidence which suggest that a large informal sector is likely to reduce 
contributions for social security systems, and negatively impacts on the education enrolment 
rates in Egypt. This agrees with Vuletin (2008) and his conclusion for another study about 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Schneider (2007a) estimates the size of the informal economy for 145 countries worldwide 
using panel data and MIMIC as the main methodology over a period of 6 years – from 1999 
to 2005. These countries include developing, transition economies as well as highly developed 
OECD countries. Schneider (2007a) uses direct taxation, indirect taxation, regulation burden 
index, unemployment quota, quality of institutions, tax morality, average working time per 
week as the leading causes for informality in all his MIMIC specifications, whereas uses GDP 
per capita, Employment rate, annual rate of GDP, and change of currency per capita as the 
leading indicators of the informal economy and controls GDP per capita in the regression. The 
results show the average size of the informal economy relative to the GDP in 2004/05 in 96 
developing countries to be around 37percent, in 25 transition countries at 39percent while in 
21 highly developed OECD countries to be around 15percent. The regression results indicate 
that tax and social security burdens, as well as  complex labour market regulations are key 
forces driving informality. 
Using a 5-1-3 MIMIC specification, Schneider (2009) also estimates the size of the informal 
economy for 25 central and eastern European countries. For the indicator variables, 
Schneider (2009) uses GDP growth rate, employment to population ratio, change in currency 
in circulation per capita and controls for the GDP growth rate, by restricting the coefficient to 
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-1. For the causes variables, this paper uses the level of direct and indirect taxation, state 
regulation burden, GDP per capita and the unemployment rate. In this study, the author 
reaches some conclusions. The first conclusion comes from the estimates on the size of the 
informal economy (where Schneider in all his studies refers mainly to as the shadow 
economy). The estimates show that for the countries part of this investigation the informal 
economy over the period of 6 years (from 1999 to 2006/2007) reached a significant size where 
the average informal economy of these transition countries was just over 38 percent of the 
GDP in year 1999/2000, rising to around41percent in 2004/2005. As a result of growing official 
economy in 2006 and 2007 the size of the informal economy decreased to just under 40 
percent. The second conclusion is that the level of taxation and regulation burden was the 
most significant factors affecting the informality in these countries. The study argues that the 
governments wanting to reduce the level of informality must be very careful in their policy 
making because of the links of the informal economy with the formal or official economy. The 
study goes on to argue that the informal economy can raise living standards in these countries 
because of the income that different economic agents gain from the informal economy. 
Furthermore, with people’s engagement in the informal economy, they will have less time to 
express their popular discontent or mistrust in the state institutions and go to streets for 
protests. 
Schneider et al. (2010) and Buehn & Schneider (2012) using same variables for causes and 
indicators estimate the size of the informal economy for 162 countries worldwide. Using 
various specifications of the MIMIC model they estimate the size of the informal economy for 
the panel of 98 developing countries, 88 developing countries, 21 transition countries, 25 
high-income OECD countries, 151 countries worldwide and for a sample of 120 countries. 
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Over a period of 6 years (from 1999 to 2006/7), they estimate that the weighted average size 
of the informal economy (as a percentage of GDP) in Sub-Saharan Africa is around 38percent, 
in Europe and Central Asia (mostly transition countries) just over 36percent and in high-
income OECD countries just over 13percent. Their studies argued the that most essential 
drivers of the informality were the level of direct and indirect taxation, labour market 
regulations, the provision of qualitative public goods and services as well as the level of the 
formal economy, such as the unemployment level and the GDP per capita (Schneider et al., 
2010; Buehn & Schneider, 2012). In their different MIMIC specifications, they use causes such 
as the size of government, total tax burden, direct taxation, indirect taxation, fiscal freedom 
index, business freedom index, economic freedom index, unemployment rate, GDP per 
capita, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, openness and the inflation rate. 
Whereas for the indicators they use GDP per capita growth rate, GDP per capita, Labour force 
participation ratio, the growth rate of the labour force and currency in circulation. 
Schneider et al. (2013) calculate the size of the informal economy for Serbia using a MIMIC 
model. They use the following causes and indicators for the model: direct and indirect 
taxation, marginal income tax burden, effective income tax rate, regulatory effectiveness 
index, the rule of law index, corruption index, self-employment and the unemployment rate. 
For the indicators, they use cash per capita growth rate, employment rate and GDP per capita. 
In an attempt to increase the degrees of freedom and number of observations their analysis 
includes a panel data of 11 countries from Balkan, central Europe and Baltic countries. Their 
estimates are calculated from 2001 to 2010 and show that the informal economy in Serbia on 
average over the period of the study is about 31.5percent. It also showed a declining trend 
from 2001 at 33percent to 30percent in 2010. The most significant causes of the informal 
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economy were the level of corruption, level of indirect taxation, income tax and the level of 
unemployment. 
In another study, the size of the informal economy is measured using a MIMIC model with 
panel data. This study by Dell’Anno & Schneider (2008) estimate the informal economy for 
151 countries worldwide using the size of the government, share of direct taxation, fiscal and 
business freedom, rate of unemployment, government effectiveness index and sub-national 
government employment as the leading causes for the MIMIC regression, while using 
currency in circulation, GDP per capita and labour force participation ratio as the primary 
indicators. In their study, they also demonstrate some advantaged and disadvantages in 
measuring the informal economy using the MIMIC modelling approach. 
Arby et al. (2012) also measure the size of the informal economy for Pakistan using three main 
models: the CDA model, the MIMIC model and the Electricity Consumption Approach (which 
is also known as the physical input model). For the MIMIC model, Arby et al. (2012) apply 
regime durability as a potential cause to informality in Pakistan, as well as tax to GDP ratio 
and M2 to GDP ratio. For the indicators, they use currency in circulation as a ratio of M2 and 
electricity consumption for the regression. This is the first time that the regime durability43 
variable has been used from the Polity IV project. The authors are also introducing the use of 
electricity consumption variable as an indicator of the informal economy for Pakistan as 
suggested by Aldersdale et al. (2006), Kaliberda (1996), Lackó (1996, 1998, 1999, and 2000), 
and Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). The authors use data from 1973 for the MIMIC 
                                                          
43 Regime Durability from Polity IV Project – This is defined as: “The number of years since the most recent 
regime change (defined by a three point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the 
end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority 
score)” (SystemicPeace.org, 2016, p.17) available at: https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf 
(last accessed: 21.12.2018). 
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regression. Their results indicate an average of around 30 percent of informal economy 
relative to the formal GDP and show a declining trend in the years beginning of 2000s. 
However, there does seem to be differences of about 10 to 15percent between the results 
depending which model is used.  
Buehn & Schneider (2009) investigate the relationship between corruption and the level of 
informal economy for 51 countries worldwide using panel data and MIMIC methodology. 
Their MIMIC model involves two latent variables – one is the informal economy and the other 
is the corruption. For the informal economy, the authors use Business regulation, 
unemployment rate, transfers and subsidies and government consumption as causes while 
using GDP growth, labour force participation ratio and the ratio of M0 to M1 as indicators. 
For the latent variable of corruption, the authors use Government effectiveness, Fiscal 
freedom, the rule of law and bureaucracy costs for causes, while they use Real GDP per capita, 
bribes and judicial independence as indicators. Their results provide empirical evidence of a 
positive relationship between the informal economy and the level of corruption. Their results 
also indicated that the informal economy influences corruption more than the other way 
around. 
A study by Vuletin (2008) measures the size and development of the informal economy for 
almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries during early 2000s. Vuletin (2008) uses a 
MIMIC model for regression analysis and find that rigorous tax system, relatively intensive 
regulatory framework, combined with high or volatile inflation rate as well as the dominant 
agriculture sector are the leading and most significant drivers of the informal economy. He 
uses three specification models for the MIMIC, 4-1-3, 4-1-3 and 5-1-3. His results show that 
Fiji, Nicaragua and Paraguay have the highest level of the informal economy. In the MIMIC 
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regression analysis, Vuletin (2008) uses labour Rigidity index, Burden of Taxation (Tax rates), 
Percentage of the agriculture sector relative to other sectors, inflation and the strength of 
enforcement system as causes; and for indicators, this study uses workers social security 
contributions, the degree of unionisation and gross enrolment ratio at secondary schools. 
The MIMIC methodology in measuring the size of the informal economy has been applied by 
Vo & Ly (2014) for the South East Asian countries44 with emphasis on Vietnam. For the cause 
variables, the authors use the tax rate, Fiscal freedom index, business freedom index, labour 
freedom index, government spending index and the unemployment rate, while for indicators 
in the model they use a ratio of M0 to M1, labour market index, tax revenue and GDP per 
capita. The findings from this study indicate that the informal economy for Vietnam lies 
between 25 percent and 30 percent of the official economy for the period from 1995 to 2014. 
Other countries (part of the study) experience a lower informal economy, below 20 percent 
on average, according to this paper and the regression applied. Findings from this study also 
present evidence that tax rate, labour freedom, and business freedom have provided a 
significant effect on the informal economy of the south-east Asian countries.  
Dell’Anno & Schneider (2006) critically address the issues whether it is reliable to use MIMIC 
model for measuring or estimating the size of the informal economy. Their study is a response 
to Breusch (2005).  Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006) conclude that the MIMIC model is still one 
of the best approaches to this purpose. Breusch (2005) main critique is with regards to the 
use of the benchmarking model. However, Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006) address this issue 
                                                          
44 All countries part of the ASEAN including Vietnam. 
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by proposing an alternative benchmarking methodology which provides better reliability of 
results.  
Nchor & Adamec (2015) apply the use of the MIMIC model to estimate the size of the informal 
economy for four African countries: Kenya, Namibia, Ghana and Nigeria. The model involves 
two sets of variables: the observed variables and the indicator variables, which are used to 
estimate the latent variable – the informal economy. For the causes the authors use the 
relative size of government, total taxation rates (which include direct and indirect taxation 
rates), regulatory framework for business operations, the level of interest rates on deposits, 
GDP per capita, the rate of unemployment, and a proxy for the quality of public services. The 
indicator variables included in the MIMIC analysis are the labour force participation ratio in 
the formal economy, cash held outside banks, and the GDP per capita growth rate. The results 
indicate that the size of the informal economy in Kenya, Namibia, Ghana and Nigeria on 
average is 33.7 percent, 29.1 percent, 36 percent and 47 percent, respectively. 
Barbosa et al. (2013) following the work of Dell’Anno (2007) analyse the development of the 
informal economy from 1977 to 2011 using the MIMIC model for Portugal. For the Causes the 
authors use Government employment relative to the labour force, tax burden as a percentage 
of GDP, subsidies as a percentage to GDP, social benefits paid by the government relative to 
GDP, self-employment as a percentage of the labour force and the unemployment rate. 
Whereas for the indicators they use Index of real GDP and the Labour force participation ratio. 
The authors find that the rate of unemployment and the provision of grants as subsidies to 
enterprises are the main contributing factors to the size and development of the informal 
economy in Portugal. According to the authors, there were many fluctuations in the size of 
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the informal economy, and since 2001 the informal economy increased, accentuating its 
growth rate after 2007, and it reached a peak of 24.2percent of the GDP in 2011. 
Abdih & Medina (2013) use a MIMIC model for the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. 
They estimate the size of the informal economy in these countries for 2008 using as cause 
variables the tax burden, labour rigidity index, institutional quality, regulatory burden in 
financial and product markets, control of corruption, the rule of law and government 
effectiveness index, while use as indicator variables self-employment, M0 over M1 and GDP 
per capita. They find that a burdensome tax system, rigid labour market, inadequate 
institutional quality, excessive regulation in markets are leading factors in explaining the size 
of the informal economy, which ranges from 26 percent of GDP in the Kyrgyz Republic to 
around 35 percent of GDP in Armenia.  
Trebicka (2014) is the first author to use MIMIC model for a time series data for Albania. She 
estimates the informal economy in Albania using a 6-1-2 MIMIC model specification which is 
made up of the following causes and indicators: Causes: Government employment relative to 
the labour force, tax burden, subsidies relative to the GDP, Social benefits paid by the 
government as a ratio to GDP, self-employment as a ratio of GDP and the unemployment rate. 
Indicators: Index of Real GDP and Labour force participation ratio. She does not use the 
benchmarking procedure to estimate the size of the informal economy but does highlight that 
the level of unemployment, regulation and government spending regarding subsidies are the 
main drivers of the informal in Albania according to her model. 
Dell’Anno (2003) investigates the size of the informal economy for Italy using a MIMIC model. 
The author uses the following causes: Government employment relative to the labour force, 
Tax burden, Subsidies relative to the GDP, Social benefits paid by the government as a ratio 
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to GDP, self-employment as a ratio of GDP, Unemployment rate; and the following Indicators: 
Index of Real GDP, Labour force participation ratio. His results indicate a declining trend in 
the Italian informal economy for the years of the study period. Similarly, Dell’Anno et al. 
(2007) offer estimations of the development of the informal economy for France, Spain and 
Greece. They use a MIMIC model similar to that established by Giles (1995), which includes 
the tax burden, a proxy of regulatory burden, the unemployment rate and self-employment 
as causes of the informal economy and the GDP growth rate, the labour force participation 
ratio and the currency ratio as indicators of the informal economy. The results generated 
conﬁrm that the unemployment rate, the ﬁscal burden and self-employment rate can be 
attributed as the leading causes of the informal economy in the countries part of this study.  
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) use data from all states in India and estimate the size of the informal 
economy from 1974 to 1996.Using a MIMIC model their results indicate that the size of the 
informal economy has gradually decreased since 1991/1992 when the government decided 
to liberalise the economy. This study is among the first to analyse the impact of the political 
economy on the level of the informal economy. Their results indicate that during election 
years the informal economy tends to reduce by as much as 4 percent, compared with all other 
years. Furthermore, the results indicate that the growth of the informal economy is much 
lower in states where there is a coalition government in power. A significant improvement in 
the media sector, especially for the printed media and the increased level of literacy rates 
influence individuals to participate less in the informal economic activities. 
The use of CDA model 
 
The CDA model has been widely used to measure the informal economy worldwide. However, 
most cases, except Alm and Embaye (2013), have estimated the informal economy with the 
 115 
 
CDA model using time series data. Alm and Embaye (2013), on the other hand, use a panel 
data to estimate the informal economy for 111 countries worldwide from 1984 to 2006 using 
the General Method of Moments (GMM hereafter) as suggested by Arellano and Bover 
(1995). To date, there is no evidence in the literature that one has estimated the informal 
economy for the countries of Balkan using this methodology with panel data. Furthermore, 
there is no evidence that there has been a comparative analysis between the estimates of the 
informal economy generated using the MIMIC model as described above and the CDA model 
based on the GMM. 
The CDA model is a macro model and has been first used by Cagan (1958) where he measured 
main determinants for currency ratio to M2 for the USA, and found that the main driving 
factors in the demand for currency were the level of interest rates, tax rates, and the level of 
per capita income. Based on such assumptions more research about the informal economy 
followed based on the assumption that the higher the rate of taxation in an economy the 
higher the incentive to hold currency (Alm and Embaye, 2013). Extensive research about the 
CDA has been done since the first use of the model such as the work by Tanzi (1980, 1983), 
Klovland (1984) for Norway and Sweden, Bhattacharyya (1999) for the United Kingdom, 
Bajada (1999) for Australia, Giles (1999b, 1999c) for New Zealand, Schneider (1997, 2002) and 
Johnson et al. (1998) for OECD countries, Dell’Anno and Schneider (2008, 2009) and  Alm and 
Embaye (2013) for a large number of countries worldwide, Williams and Windebank (1995) 
for EU countries, and Giles et al. (2002) for Canada, etc. Along with the MIMIC model, the CDA 
model has been the most widely used method to estimate the size of the informal economy. 
The first important factor in the calculation of the informal economy using the CDA model is 
the total tax rate. Some papers use indirect plus direct tax rates (Alm and Embaye, 2013; 
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Hassan and Schneider, 2016), while others use total tax rate (Yin and Jiangsu, 2009; 
Hernandez, 2009; Asiedu and Stengos, 2014) and others use total government revenues as a 
percentage of GDP (Vo and Ly, 2014; Gamal and Dahalan, 2015, 2016). Whichever variable is 
used it is expected that there is a positive relationship between the tax rate and the currency 
ratio. It is argued that a higher tax rate will increase the potential gain from tax evasion as 
individuals who wish to evade taxes will use more currency and less demand deposits (Ahmed 
and Hussain, 2008; Ahumada et al., 2004; Andrei et al., 2010; Arby et al., 2012; Alm and 
Embaye, 2013; Asiedu and Stengos, 2014; Hassan and Schneider, 2016a). Since currency 
provides anonymity, it is expected that a higher tax rate will increase the currency ratio and 
hence the informal economy, ceteris paribus. As part of this study, the total government 
revenues as a percentage of GDP will be used in the estimation and simulation procedure 
under this model. It is argued that this variable captures all taxes (direct and indirect), 
contributions and trade tariffs, and therefore is a better measure of the tax regime in a 
country (Buehn & Schneider, 2012; Schneider & Buehn, 2016).  
Inflation is another factor that affects the currency ratio and is used in the CDA model. 
Inflation is thought to have either a positive or a negative impact on the currency ratio. 
Inflation tends to encourage individuals to evade paying taxes and engage in informal 
economic activities because inflation tends to wear down the real value of disposable income. 
It also tends to increase the tax liabilities of taxpayers by distorting the real value of their 
income, thus reducing the purchasing power of individuals (Ahmed & Hussain, 2008; 
Hernandez, 2009; Alm & Embaye 2013; Elshamy, 2015). However, the level of inflation can 
also have a negative impact on the currency ratio if individuals substitute currency holdings 
 117 
 
for assets which are interest-bearing, in an attempt to prevent the inflationary erosion of the 
purchasing power of their wealth by inflation.  
In the same line, it is also argued that interest rates are also an important factor. The rate of 
interest is the opportunity cost of holding currency rather than interest-bearing assets. 
Therefore, there is a negative relationship between the currency ratio and the level of interest 
rates. Many studies use interest rates in their regression either time series or panel data 
(Hernandez, 2009; Hassan & Schneider, 2016b). Some studies use deposit interest rates 
(Ahmed and Hussain 2008; Ahumada et al., 2004; Nhavira, 2016), while others use either 
nominal or real interest rates (Gamal & Dahalan, 2015; 2016). In this study, the rate of real 
interest rates will be used in the estimation. However, the level of interest rates is not 
considered to be a significant causal factor for the informal economy. Instead, they are an 
important factor in estimating the demand for currency. 
A further important factor is the level of income per capita in a country. The higher the GDP 
per capita is in a country and the higher the economic development is then there will be a 
greater need for currency as households can afford to engage in more transactions. Similar to 
the rate of interest, GDP per capita is not the main factor which encourages or discourages 
people from informality. Hence, many studies do not use this variable for simulating the 
estimated for the informal economy (Schneider & Savasan, 2007; Feld & Schneider, 2010). 
Instead, they use this variable for parity in the equation. 
The other important factor is the government bureaucracy and the enforcement strength of 
the tax administration. In other words, the higher the government regulations and more 
bureaucratic tax administrative regulations there is the higher could be the tax evasion and 
hence the higher the level of the informal economy. In the majority of the cases, index 
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variables are used which measure the level of government regulations and the level of 
bureaucratic administrative procedures (Buehn & Schneider, 2009). For currency this variable 
is also important as it is expected that the more government bureaucracy and the higher the 
government regulations are, the more currency will be demanded in informal economic 
activity, as some individuals will prefer to avoid autocracy and thus save on transaction costs 
(Buehn & Schneider, 2009). 
The size and dominance of the agriculture sector play an important role in the size of the 
informal economy in many countries worldwide (Chen, 2007; Vuletin, 2008; and more 
recently Hassan & Schneider 2016b). Chen (2007) argues that most of the informal economic 
activities take place in the agriculture sector, especially in the developing or transitional 
countries. Vuletin (2008) on the other hand argues that the agricultural sector is difficult to 
regulate by governments which indicates that the higher the importance of this sector, the 
larger is the informal economy, ceteris paribus. It has been proven by some studies (such as 
Vuletin (2008) for South American countries, Elshamy (2015) and Hassan & Schneider (2016b) 
for Egypt) that there is a positive relationship between the size of the agriculture sector and 
the informal economy. The size of the agriculture sector in Europe is not as large as in many 
other countries around the world; however, it is quite substantial in many of the Balkan 
countries (World Bank, 2014). Majority of the people working in the agriculture sector 
worldwide are either self-employed or are employed by family, which makes it difficult to 
regulate (Vuletin, 2008).  
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Empirical studies with CDA models 
 
Using panel data regression techniques such as the GMM45, Alm and Embaye (2013) estimate 
the size of the informal economy for 111 countries worldwide from 1984 to 2006 based on 
the CDA model as suggested by Tanzi (1983). Using independent variables such as tax rate, 
enforcement variable, per capita Income, inflation rate, interest rate and degree of 
urbanisation, they estimate the regression on the dependent variable of Currency ratio to M2 
and find that the informal economy ranges from 10percent to 86percent on average for the 
111 countries worldwide. Their results indicate that the size of the informal economy varies 
significantly between countries depending on the income group – with the higher level of 
informality being found in low-income countries. 
Using the currency demand approach Schneider (2013) and Schneider & Hemetner (2013) 
estimate the size of informal economy in Columbia. Their results indicate that the level of 
informality in Columbia varies between 27 and 56 percent of GDP over the period of 1980 to 
2012. Key drivers of such informality according to the authors are indirect taxation and the 
high unemployment rate in the country. The authors find that the average GDP growth rate 
is around 1.86 percent for the period analysed, which would have been slightly higher had 
the informal economy been much lower. 
Nhavira (2016) estimates the size of the informal economy for the country of Tanzania using 
a CDA model as suggested by Tanzi (1980, 1983) for the period from 1996 to 2013. The results 
show that the size of the informal economy has increased as a proportion of GDP from 10.3 
percent in 1996 to 15.5 percent of GDP in 2013, followed by an increase in the amount of tax 
                                                          
45 GMM stands for Generalised Method of Moments. More about this model can be found from Roodman 
(2009) and Alm and Embaye (2013).  
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evasion. In the OLS regression model Nhavira (2016) uses currency holdings ratio as the 
dependent variable, while uses real GDP per capita growth rate, Government expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP, Real interest rate, and deposit interest rate as independent variables. 
Andrei et al. (2010) use the CDA model to measure the size of the informal economy for 
Romania. They use as the independent variable Cash outside the banking system, whereas as 
the dependent variables they use the total government expenses, Real GDP, short-term 
interest rate, inflation rate as per CPI and taxes on products. Their results indicate that the 
informal economy in Romania accounts on average for approximately 30percent of the GDP 
from 2000 to 2009. 
Yin & Jiangsu (2009) use CDA model to measure the size of the informal economy in China 
over a period of 5 years, from 2002 to 2006. Their results indicate an increasing trend of the 
informal economy and recommend that the government develops a sound public service 
department and a fair and reasonable tax system. This study makes use of the following 
variables in his CDA model regression: currency in circulation, Money supply M2, the rate of 
taxation, interest rates on deposits, net income and consumption level per capita at the 
national level. However, the number of observations used in this study is minimal, which can 
severely affect the reliability of the results. 
Ahumada et al. (2004) follow the work by Cagan (1958) to provide a possible new measure of 
the informal economy for various countries worldwide using the CDA model. The authors 
provide a formal aggregation framework and highlight the main steps to follow in the process 
of measuring the size of the informal economy using the CDA model. They also analyse the 
main assumptions of the model and demonstrate that the method has been used implicitly 
assuming that the income-elasticity of currency demand is one, even for such cases when it 
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is not one (Ahumada et al., 2004). The authors also show that when a dependant lagged 
variable in the regression is included; there is a need to a known initial condition, for which 
the authors assume that this initial condition is the period in history in which no hidden 
transactions took place. 
Asiedu & Stengos (2014) estimate the size of the informal economy in Ghana from 1983 to 
2003 using the CDA model. As the dependent variable, they use the ratio of currency in 
circulation to M2, while for the independent variables they use the average tax rate, of the 
level of wages to national income, the average rate of return on deposits and the GDP per 
capita. According to the authors’ calculations, the estimated size of the informal economy as 
a percentage of GDP for Ghana over the sample period is 40 percent on average. Over the 
period, there has been a declining trend in the size of the informal economy in Ghana. The 
level of the informal economy is found to vary from a high of 54percent in 1985 to low size of 
25 percent in 1999. 
Gamal & Dahalan (2015) measure the size of the informal economy in UAE, while Gamal & 
Dahalan (2016) measure the size of the informal economy for Saudi Arabia. Both studies use 
a similar model, which is the CDA and time series data. Gamal & Dahalan (2015) estimate the 
size of the informal economy and tax evasion in the UAE from 1991 to 2010 on a quarterly 
basis. The same authors one year later (Gamal & Dahalan, 2016) estimate the size of the 
informal economy in Saudi Arabia from 1980 to 2010 on an annual basis. The results of Gamal 
& Dahalan (2015) indicate that the size of the informal economy (to which the authors refer 
to as the underground economy) in the UAE increased significantly on average of 
10.34percent of the GDP over the sample period. Tax evasion on the non-oil tax revenues 
reached, on average, 10.34 percent over the study period. The estimated results of Gamal & 
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Dahalan (2016) indicate that the size of the informal economy in Saudi Arabia is about 47.07 
percent of the official GDP. The authors blame high levels of public expenditure for this high 
level of informality. They recommend that the Saudi government should restrict the 
expansion of its public expenditure policy. 
Using the CDA model Hernandez (2009) estimates the size of the informal economy in Peru 
from 1979 to 2005 based on time series annual data. The variables that they use, apart from 
the dependent variable which is the currency in circulation as a ratio to M2, are Interest rates, 
inflation rate, real GDP and the tax rate. The results from this study indicate that the share of 
the informal economy in Peru has varied between 44 and 50 percent of total GDP. 
Ahmed & Hussain (2008) also use the CDA model to estimate the size of the informal 
economy. They use Pakistan as the country to estimate the development of its informal sector 
from 1960 to 2003. Their estimates indicate that the size of the informal economy in Pakistan 
from 1960 to 2003 has decreased from over 60 percent to just over 27 percent of the GDP, 
respectively. For this decrease, the authors attribute the merits to the tax and tariff reforms 
in the country during the 1990s. 
The study by Hassan & Schneider (2016b) estimates and analyse the size of the informal 
economy for Egypt using a CDA model as well. They use time series data from 1976 to 2013. 
In their estimation, they use variables such as tax burden, interest rates, public employment, 
real income and self-employment as independent variables while for the dependent variable 
they use real currency outside a bank in their regression. They find a declining trend in the 
Egyptian economy over the years in both estimates of the informal economy.   
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Empirical studies with other models and approaches 
 
Boka & Torluccio (2013) estimate the size of the informal sector of the economy in Albania by 
using indirect approaches such as the national accounts discrepancies, simple currency ratio, 
electrical energy consumption and some evidence by the labour market developments. Their 
results indicate that on average there is a declining trend in the size of the informal economy 
relative to GDP over the period 1996 – 2012. They attribute this decline to the reforms that 
the government has done over the last decade – reforms driven by the EU integration process. 
However, other studies such as that of Hassan and Schneider (2016), Alm & Embaye (2013), 
or that of Schneider et al. (2010) show higher figures for the informal economy for Albania 
using the MIMIC or the CDA model. The results obtained using the national accounts 
discrepancies method are somehow similar to those obtained from the electricity 
consumption method, and both of them are reliable compared to Schneider et al. (2010). 
However, the results using the simple CDA method indicate a much lower informal economy 
ratio to GDP. 
Ogunc & Yilmaz (2000) use three indirect approaches to measure the informal economy and 
its development in Turkey. They use time series data from 1980 to 1998 to estimate the 
informal economy using the National Accounts discrepancies method, the Employment 
method and the CDA model. The results generated in this study do differ significantly with 
one another, and hence the authors state that the results generated are not to be taken as 
precise measurements to the informal economy in Turkey. 
Arby et al. (2012) also estimate the size of the informal economy for Pakistan using the 
Electricity Consumption method as well (which is also known as the physical input model). 
Using Electricity consumption, GDP growth, real GDP as the main variables from 1975, the 
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authors estimate the size of the informal economy. Their results show that the size of the 
informal economy is on average around 30 percent of the formal GDP and show a declining 
trend in the years 2000s. However, there does seem to be differences of about 10 to 15 
percent between the results depending which model they used – since they used CDA and 
MIMIC as well in their study. The electricity model did understate the informal economy in 
the earlier years, before the 2000s, while the CDA model understated the informal economy 
after 2000s when compared with the MIMIC results. The MIMIC results, on the other hand, 
returned more stable and balanced results throughout the years of the sample. 
3.6. Conclusion 
From the above review of the existing literature, it can bee see that there is a lack of a study 
that has investigated and estimated the size and development of the informal economy in the 
countries of the Balkan Peninsula in one sample, considering the leading causes and indicators 
suited to these countries. To date, there has not been any report or study published about 
the informal economy using the MIMIC model with a sample of Balkan countries from 1996 
to 2014. Therefore, this thesis will be able to contribute to the literature of the use of the 
MIMIC model to measure the informal economy in the Balkan countries. It will be able to 
highlight the leading causes of the informal economy and based on that offer some policy 
recommendations. The use of MIMIC and CDA model has been applied for Balkan countries 
but in a broader sample context, where many other countries from all over the world and at 
different stages of development, as well as with different social, political and cultural 
characteristics have been used in the same regression analysis. The MIMIC to be applied in 
this thesis will be using only the main factors that in theory can drive and affect the size of 
the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries part of this study. 
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From the empirical literature, it is clear that this thesis will contribute to the literature by 
concentrating their focus on the Balkan countries. The methodology used in this thesis follows 
that of the existing literature but uses more enforcement, the rule of law and government 
effectiveness indicators in the regression analysis. This thesis also looks at a great time frame 
for analysis which will show not only the size of the informal economy in this region, but it 
will also show its development over the years. There have been several reforms and 
developments in the region and in particular in the ten countries part of this research. In light 
of these social, political and economic reforms and developments, it is of interest to see how 
the informal economy has been developing over the years, since 1996 to 2014.  
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Chapter 4: Political, Social and Economic 
developments in the Balkan countries 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter briefly introduces the political and economic development in the Balkan region 
for the ten countries part of this research46. It will focus briefly on the political developments 
that happened in the Balkan countries since the 1980s onwards. It will then analyse at the 
developments of the macroeconomic indicators in the Balkan countries over the years and 
analyse the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, followed by the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis and the Greek debt crisis. The political, social and economic developments, reforms and 
changes over the years, make this region an interesting topic to be studied. As mentioned in 
the previous chapters, these countries are faced with a significant degree of informality and 
corruption, coupled with popular discontent and mistrust in the state institutions, which can 
significantly influence the size of the informal economy.  
4.2. Political developments and reforms in the Balkan countries 
The major political developments and reforms in the Balkan countries can be summarised 
into two main periods, the period pre-2000 and post 2000. Similarly, the main features of the 
political crisis in the Balkans after 1990 can be categorised into two underlying issues. The 
first being the history of communism in the former Soviet Union and the creation of new 
blocs, and the second is the collapse of nationalism and tendencies for independence and the 
collapse of the former Yugoslav federation. Some authors refer to the developments and 
                                                          
46 A rationale for selecting Balkan countries has been provided in section 1.6 of the introduction chapter. 
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reforms in the Balkans as post-communism and post-conflict transition (Kostovicova & 
Dzelilovic, 2006).  
The collapse of communism and the disintegration of communism in the Balkan countries 
were followed by a movement for democracy, which naturally emerged from the former USSR 
republics, while in the former Yugoslav Republics the transition was followed by the outbreak 
of nationalism that caused wars of devastating proportions that were not seen since the 
Second World War (Anastasakis, 2013). The transformation from socialism or communism to 
democracy and market economy in some Balkan countries was straightforward, while for 
others it was difficult leading to an explosion of violence. Albania is the most typical example 
where the transition from Communism to capitalism included explosions of violence, which 
took many human lives. Even Romania did not escape without violence in the streets which 
led to the execution of their president. After World War II, states reached a significant 
economic development. The problems of the wartime period along with the low development 
were reduced, except some countries such as Albania and FYR Macedonia and even Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Balfour & Stratulat, 2011; Anastasakis, 2013). 
The consumer dissatisfaction (measured by Western standards) played a significant role in 
the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and even in Hungary; in the Balkans, only Greece with 
its ties to the West survived the revolution. However, it can be argued from many points of 
view that political rather than economic issues caused a crisis, revolution and war in the 
Balkans (Bartlett & Uvalic, 2013). Differences in the Balkan political systems can rarely be 
translated into socioeconomic differences that are in contrast or differ from neighbouring 
countries, at least briefly (Balfour & Stratulat, 2011). The communist history of the Balkans 
has caused various types of national communism. The transition is classified as a… 
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“…historical sequence of political events, usually associated with the latest phases of 
autocratic/totalitarian regimes through to the introduction of a more liberal, pluralist 
or democratic system” (Anastasakis, 2013: p.92-93). 
Each Balkan country had developed its own national brand of communism, “…from Albania 
to nationalist Romania, to Bulgarian Orthodox communism, and to Yugoslavia that seemed 
more open to the West and more liberal” (Anastasakis, 2013; p.94). Thus, the moment of 
revolution in 1989 was, an experience of its own for each country - with violence and anarchy 
in some countries, and relatively peaceful in some other countries. 
Yugoslavia can be considered as a type of sui-generis experiment. This was a socialist but non-
Soviet state, a state that had avoided the centralised economy by applying self-government; 
which had characterized the so-called "brotherhood and union" of peoples, which had allowed 
free movement of citizens abroad, etc., but which had never been able to remove from the 
ego itself, the tendencies of the creation of independent states, which also happened with 
the outbreak of war first in Slovenia, then Croatia, followed by Bosnia & Herzegovina and 
which ended with the war of Kosovo (in 1999) and its independence in 2008 (Bartlett & Uvalic, 
2013). 
The trends of the establishment of Greater Serbia and Croatia were embraced by extreme 
nationalist agendas, the consequences of which are still present in these territories. These 
nationalist agendas also aroused the historical memory of the crimes that had occurred during 
World War II, attributed to the Chetnik Movement in Serbia and the Ustase Movement in 
Croatia and fuelled the conflicts within Yugoslavia which led to wars and many lives being lost. 
The result was a creation of new countries in the Balkan which declared independence from 
Yugoslavia (Balfour & Stratulat, 2011). 
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The post-2000 period can be characterized as the backdrop of the normalization of political 
pluralism, peaceful change of powers, the reformation of nationalist parties, the appearance 
of new political elites, pro-European consensus and perhaps even more modern politics 
(Glenny, 2000; Balfour & Stratulat, 2011; Anastasakis, 2013; Stiks & Horvat, 2014). This 
involved almost all the elites of the national communist political system to reform themselves 
and their political discourse to a more moderate and democratic thinking ideologies 
(Anastasakis, 2013). 
The EU as the most influential actor from the outside, engaging in constructive engagement, 
made Bulgaria and Romania join in, which continued with the further implementation of the 
Stabilization and Association Process for the remaining Balkan countries from which Slovenia 
and Croatia joined the EU in 2004 and 2013, respectively (Europa.eu, last accessed on 
04.11.2017).  
This period from the “…political extremism of the years 1990 to a political moderation…” was 
referred to as the period of “the second transition” by Bunce (2003; p.50). This second 
transition phase has also been characterised with political parties having a more open and 
democratic relationship with the media, showing more respect for human rights and 
advocating the rights of different minorities. However, this period of transition was 
”…accompanied by a consolidation of democratic deficits and dysfunctional practices and 
attitudes…” (Anastasakis, 2013; p. 107), with origins from the years of transition and can be 
found even today in five main ways such as personal feuds, nationalist and ethnic agendas, a 
high level of corruption, citizens' discontent and mistrust (Anastasakis, 2013; p. 107).  
To some extent, informality is also an important legacy of this transition phase. High levels of 
corruption, popular discontent and mistrust in the institutions can lead to significant 
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economic informality (Schneider et al., 2010). This makes Balkan countries an interesting area 
to research as one can be able to see the developments of the size of the economy over the 
years and attribute any changes in the size of the informal economy to changes and transition 
reforms in these countries. 
Turkey too has experienced dramatic changes and reforms in their political system. They had 
to make significant democratic and political reforms to attain EU candidacy in the second half 
of the 1990s. However, the EU does not quite know yet what to do precisely with the potential 
membership of Turkey into EU (Müftüler-Baç, 1998). Müftüler-Baç (2009) analyses the 
political reforms in Turkey in the light of EU membership and argues that Turkey's 
Europeanization is substantially motivated by the EU. However, the very recent political 
developments in Turkey have only distanced the potential membership of Turkey into the EU.  
Greece, on the other hand, has been a member of the EU since 1981. They joined the 
Eurozone in 2001 along with other countries. Greece’s entry into the EU raised a lot of 
scepticism among then France (who was worried about the potential impact it would have on 
their farmers), Germany (who worried about the cheap migrant labour) and other members 
who worried about the potential involvements in the Greek and Turkish disputes (Rankin, 
2015). Greece was also characterised by a high degree of corruption which was higher than 
the average in other European members, and by the inability of the government to collect 
taxes. However, Greece’s entry into the EU was a way to ensure democracy and stability in the 
Balkans and beyond at the height of the cold war (Rankin, 2015). Later, Greece was 
significantly affected by the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis 
that followed. It received two major bailouts in 2010 and 2012, and the economy decreased 
by around a quarter, and the youth unemployment has increased significantly. 
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Despite all the reforms and the transition period, the Balkan countries remain a volatile region 
compared to other regions of Europe, in political and economic terms. While some countries 
are more stable than the others (e.g. Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria), others 
still face legitimacy problems (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Kosovo), and 
then others are still struggling with ethnic politics (e.g. FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). There are also countries that have been severely affected by the 
financial crisis of 2008 (e.g. Greece), and those countries that are coping with external fragility 
such as terrorism (e.g. Turkey).  
Figure 4.2. 1 - Political Stability Index for the 10 Balkan countries. Source: World Bank Governance 
Indicators. 
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World Bank in their World Governance Indicators database provides an index47 to capture the 
fragility of countries and the perceptions of possible politically motivated conflicts. Although 
the index does indicate some improvements over the years, especially post 2000, the index is 
still wary of the political stability in the region. The development of this index has been 
provided in figure 4.2.1 above. 
Thus, the region is influenced by the inner factors, and their fragility depends on the factors 
within. For example, some countries have their political problems challenging to overcome, 
especially when considering separatist tendencies, such as the Serb part of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. On the other hand, the crisis in the Balkans is also kept from the outside, as we 
still notice the trends of a ‘cold war’ divided between Russia and the West, where Russian 
influence, especially on Serbian politics, continues to be quite sensitive. All these fragilities 
and transition reforms will have an impact on the size of the informal economy in these 
countries. 
4.3. Social and Economic Reforms in Balkan countries 
Reforms in the countries of Balkan Peninsula can be attributed to the EU. The EU’s policy for 
enlargement has influenced the Balkan countries to undergo reforms in the judiciary system 
and have intensified the fight against corruption (EU, 2013). Some of the Balkan countries 
have made significant progress in this regard and are all in various stages of dialogue 
concerning future membership in the EU. Those that have made significant progress in their 
reforms have received full membership into the EU, such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
                                                          
47 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism “…measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimates give the country's score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.” 
(World Bank, Online at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/political-stability-and-absence-violenceterrorism-
estimate, last accessed on 21.12.2018) 
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Croatia. Greece was already a member of the EU. Other countries such as Turkey, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and FYR Macedonia are either candidates, potential 
candidate or will be applying to become potential candidate countries to join the EU. 
The main reforms that Balkan countries have worked towards were the enforcement of the 
rule of law, through the reforms they have achieved in the judiciary systems, fight against 
corruption and organised crime, fiscal reforms and cross-border cooperation (EU, 2013). EU 
has supported the Balkan countries financially to undergo reforms and has supported them 
throughout to undertake their reforms. Balkan countries’ aspirations to become members of 
the EU have resulted in improved indicators with regards to the fight against corruption, 
effective rule of law, and government effectiveness. 
With regards to the rule of law, according to the data from World Bank Governance 
Indicators48, almost all countries of the Balkans have achieved some progress. In this context, 
significant progress was seen from Serbia and Albania. Both Serbia and Albania, with the 
support of the EU funding, have undergone reforms in the judiciary independence, training 
of judges and prosecutors, judiciary transparency, adoption of the reforms as suggested by 
the Copenhagen criteria from the EU, etc. (Mehmetaj, 2014). FYR Macedonia, on the other 
hand, has not seen significant progress when it comes to enforcing the rule of law in practice, 
despite efforts from the civil sector. Even though in theory, the country has undergone a 
process of reforming the legal framework in various sectors. In general, as figure 4.3.1 below 
highlights, almost all Balkan countries (except Greece) have experienced some improvements 
                                                          
48 Rule of Law index “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a 
standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.” (World Bank, online at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, last accessed on 21.12.2018) 
 134 
 
in the enforcement of the rule of law. Majority of the countries find themselves on a similar 
level on this index, apart from Slovenia, which has the highest Rule of Law index, indicating a 
well-established and the enforced rule of law in the country. This index has been presented 
below in figure 4.3.1. 
Figure 4.3. 1 - Rule of Law Index. Source: World Bank Governance Indicators. 
 
Fiege and Ott (1999) argues that in transition countries with potentially weak institutional 
ability, framework and structure to support market economic activity, the presence of 
informal economy to a high degree relative to the GDP of that country, poses a grave danger 
in terms of undermining the establishment of the rule of law, which is considered to be a 
crucial component in transition economies for a successful transition (Fleming et al., 2000).  
Reforms in the rule of law in the Balkan countries are essential for another reason. Without 
the adequately established judicial system, and a well-functioning rule of law, the level of 
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Foreign Direct Investments, as well as access to capital will be limited. This would also result 
in further popular discontent and mistrust in the state institutions. This could exacerbate the 
level of informality in a country (Loayza, 1996; Fleming et al., 2000). Seeing some 
improvements in the rule of law reforms in the Balkan countries, one could assume that the 
estimates for the informal economy will indicate a declining trend, ceteris paribus.  
These improvements across Balkan countries have been achieved in the areas of; 
improvements in transparency in the judicial system, accountability of state institutions, fair 
hearing and witness protection programmes, less political interference into the prosecution 
and judicial systems, fair and democratic local and national elections, adoption of EU laws on 
several sectors, administrative reforms in the criminal justice by reforming criminal laws, 
improvements in the provision of continues education and training for all the stakeholders  
etc (Milosevic & Muk, 2016).  
However, even though the progress with regards to the efficiency of the judiciary system has 
taken place, in most Balkan countries no significant progress has been made when it comes 
to the independence of the judiciary system from political pressure. The Effective rule of law 
and anti-corruption efforts by the governments are also captured by the Government 
Effectiveness Index and the Control of Corruption index from the World Bank Governance 
Indicators, shown in figures 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 below. An equivalent index to capture the efforts 
of governments to control corruption is also provided by the Heritage Foundation and is called 
the Freedom from Corruption Index and the Government Integrity Index. 
Even though there has been some progress in the fight against corruption in most of the 
Balkan countries, there is still lack of final convictions of high-profile cases which have been 
accused of corruption and misuse of public finances. Most of these high-profile corruption 
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cases (e.g. in Serbia, Croatia, Albania, and FYR Macedonia) involve highly ranked current or 
past government officials. The inability of the judicial system to finalise convictions on these 
cases causes mistrust and discontent among the people, often resulting in protests and riots 
(e.g. the case of FYR Macedonia and Albania) (Buscaglia 2003, 2008; European Commission 
Report, 201249; Mehmetaj, 2014; Areizaga, 2017).  
Figure 4.3. 2 - Government Effectiveness Index. Source: World Bank Governance Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Available from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/evaluation/2012_final_report_lot_2.pdf, last accessed 
on 12.11.2017) 
-1
.5
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t 
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
n
e
s
s
 I
n
d
e
x
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Years
Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria Croatia
Greece Macedonia, FYR
Romania Serbia
Slovenia Turkey
 137 
 
Figure 4.3. 3 - Control of Corruption. Source: World Bank Governance Indicators. 
 
The enforcement of the rule of law, judicial reforms and control of corruption efforts by the 
governments is also captured by the Regulatory Quality Index50 from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators. Figure 4.3.4 below shows the development of this index over the 
years for the ten Balkan countries part of this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 Regulatory Quality “captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's score 
on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 
2.5.” (World Bank, online at: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf, last accessed on 
21.12.2018) 
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Figure 4.3. 4 - Regulatory Quality. Source: World Bank Governance Indicators. 
 
When it comes to doing business and the ease of doing business, the Balkan countries have 
achieved some progress according to the Heritage Foundation indexes, such as the Business 
Freedom Index51 (shown in figure 4.3.5 below) and the World Bank’s Doing Business reports 
over the years. The relaxation of different bureaucratic procedures to register a business, 
reduction in the number of forms to complete and submit in registering businesses, a 
transparent and improved process of applying and setting up a business, a relaxation of 
procedures to close a business, digitised administrative procedures and an attempt by 
governments to enforce that all businesses use fiscal tills52 to prevent tax evasion and create 
                                                          
51 The business freedom index “measures the extent to which the regulatory and infrastructure environments 
constrain the efficient operation of businesses. The quantitative score is derived from an array of factors that 
affect the ease of starting, operating, and closing a business. The business freedom score for each country is a 
number between 0 and 100, with 100 indicating the freest business environment. The score is based on 13 sub-
factors, all of which are weighted equally, using data from the World Bank’s Doing Business report” (The 
Heritage Foundation: Online at https://www.heritage.org/index/business-freedom, last accessed on 22.12.2018) 
52 Also known as Fiscal Cash Registers or Electronic Fiscal Devices 
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a free and fair competitive market for all businesses, have been just some of the backbone of 
the reforms in the countries of the Balkans, according to World Bank Doing Business reports, 
Heritage Foundation reports. 
This improvement in doing business in the Balkan countries has been made as a result of 
countries competing with each other in an attempt to attract inward foreign direct 
investments and increase the investment component. In almost all Balkan countries, one can 
conclude that there is a positive trend in the number of registered businesses according to 
country reports available from the Ministry of Finance in each of the Balkan countries.  
Reducing the regulatory burden for businesses and the bureaucratic procedures for business 
to operate formally, will mean that the opportunity cost of conducting economic activities 
formally rather than informally is reduced and hence the tendency of business to operate 
informally is demotivated. This should result in a lower size of the informal economy relative 
to the GDP, ceteris paribus (Schneider, 2000; Dell’Anno, 2007; Schneider et al., 2010; Buehn 
& Schneider, 2010). 
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Figure 4.3. 5 - Business Freedom Index. Source: The Heritage Foundation 
 
Another important indicator which can show potential progress regarding economic reforms 
and less government intervention in a free market is the monetary freedom Index53 (shown 
in figure 4.3.6 below) from the Heritage Foundation. This index also shows an improvement 
for most of the Balkan countries. In relation to the informal economy, the more stable and 
less volatile prices are, and the less government intervention in a free and competitive market 
system there is, the lower will be the size of the informal sector, ceteris paribus. Therefore, 
one would expect to see a declining trend in the estimates of the informal economy over the 
years, ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                          
53 Monetary freedom is a “…measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Both inflation and 
price controls distort market activity. Price stability without sector-specific government intervention is the ideal 
state for the free market.” (The Heritage Foundation, online at: https://www.heritage.org/index/monetary-
freedom, last accessed on 22.12.2018) 
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Figure 4.3. 6 - Monetary Freedom Index. Source: The Heritage Foundation 
 
Balkan countries have somehow remained the same over the years when it comes to the 
burden levied by the government spending on the budget, which includes the state 
expenditure on transfer payments related to various social and welfare schemes (Bartlett & 
Prica, 2013). This is captured by the government spending index (shown in figure 4.3.7 below), 
available from the Heritage Foundation. A higher burden from government expenditure 
translated in the form of higher tax rates and social security contributions could increase the 
opportunity cost of operating formally and drives businesses and people to enter the informal 
economy (Schneider & Enste, 2000). Most of the governments of the Balkan countries rely 
heavily on taxation and tariff income and to a minimal degree on the ability for them to create 
income from production and exports (Bartlett & Prica, 2013). 
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Figure 4.3. 7 - Government Spending Index. Source: The Heritage Foundation 
 
 
4.4. Economic developments in the Balkan countries 
In this section, a review of the recent macroeconomic developments in the Balkan countries 
will be analysed. Countries of the Balkan Peninsula were not immune to the global financial 
crisis and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis (Bartlett & Prica, 2013). Although the impact 
of the crisis was direct and indirect, the indirect impact of both crises was more significant for 
the countries of the Balkans. The global financial crisis of 2008 has been transmitted to the 
real economies of developed, developing and emerging countries as both an internal and 
external shock, thus affecting the economic activity mainly through channels of trade, 
finance, employment and production (Wincoop, 2011). 
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Arvai et al. (2009), Bartlett and Monastiriotis (2010), Stamatović et al. (2010), Bartlett & Prica 
(2013), Geshkov (2014), and Sadiku et al. (2014) investigate the impact of global financial crisis 
and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis for all countries of the Balkan Peninsula. Geshkov 
(2014) provides a comparative analysis and empirically tests the theoretical findings of the 
impact of the recent financial crisis on the business environment in the Eastern European 
countries with a primary emphasis on the countries of the Balkan region by using the data on 
GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and inflation rate before and after the crisis. Greece 
undoubtedly is one of the countries in the Balkan region that has been most affected by the 
recent financial crisis. However, according to Gezhkov (2014), Bosnia and Herzegovina also 
show significant signs of recession during the 2009 to 2012 period. 
All economies of the Balkan countries (Greece, Turkey, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania) 
reported adverse effects on macroeconomic indicators as a consequence of the financial crisis 
and the subsequent global recession, some more than others. Even though some countries 
such as Albania, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Bulgaria showed signs of stable 
economies during 2009 to 2012 as presented by Greshkov (2014), they too reported a delayed 
negative impact by the recent financial crisis. 
In a study by Bartlett and Prica (2013) it is argued that Balkan countries make up the so-called 
‘super-periphery’ of Europe, and as a result, this area is a highly vulnerable to the effects of 
the Eurozone debt crisis as well. Despite this fact, of the Balkan countries investigated by 
Bartlett and Prica (2013) only Croatia is part of the EU, although most of the other countries 
are either potential candidates or candidates for membership, and yet they lack support from 
the EU bailout funds and policy instruments that are available to ease the negative impact of 
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either the financial crisis or the Eurozone crises to the ‘peripheral’ EU Member States. The 
financial and Eurozone crisis has been transmitted to the Balkan countries via a number of 
channels including exports and trade with the EU, inward remittances, foreign direct 
investment and bank credit flows. Bartlett and Prica (2013) investigate the impact of the 
Eurozone crisis on the region in a comparative perspective, considering the crisis effects in six 
countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia). Their paper 
questions whether the EU accession process continues to offer hope of economic prosperity 
in the future or whether the countries of the ‘super-periphery’ should rely purely on their 
resources, macroeconomic policies, new strategic alliances, and an ever-increasing need for 
integrated regional cooperation to support future economic growth and unemployment 
reduction (Bartlett and Prica, 2013).  
Figure 4.4. 1 - Economic Growth in the region from 1996 to 2014, Source: World Bank Data 
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Figure 4.4.1 shows the GDP growth rates for the Balkan countries and the Eurozone area. The 
GDP for this region declined in 2009, which marked the end to a steady economic growth for 
almost a decade (although Albania and Kosovo experienced some GDP growth in 2009; albeit 
the growth reported was mild and heading towards a slowdown in its momentum). As 
expected the data indicated that Greece was amongst the most affected countries from the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent debt crisis, whose GDP fell drastically from 2008 
all the way to 2013, recovering in 2014. All countries part of the study experienced a recession 
in 2009 (except Kosovo and Albania), with Greece, Croatia, and Romania experiencing 
recessing in the following years as well. 
Figure 4.4. 2 - Unemployment, total (percentage of the total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate), 
from 1996 to 2014. Source: World Bank Data.  
 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
R
a
te
, 
IL
O
 m
o
d
e
lle
d
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Years
Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria Croatia
Greece Macedonia, FYR
Romania Serbia
Slovenia Turkey
 146 
 
The recent financial crisis had a delayed impact on the level of unemployment in the countries 
of Balkan. Unemployment in the recent years has been starting to grow as it can be seen in 
figure 4.4.2. This growth in unemployment levels in the region can be attributed to the 
reduction in capital inflows, inward FDI, reduction in international trade etc. Again, Greece 
was the most affected by unemployment figures progressively increasing each year since 
2008. Almost all countries experienced some rise in unemployment rate in either 2009 or 
2010 from the 2008 level.  
In all the countries part of this research, the unemployment figures currently exceed 25 
percentage points (World Bank, 2014). Youth unemployment is even worse. This vast youth 
unemployment has many other social and economic costs for the countries in the region, 
including social and ethnic unrests (for example Kosovo recent protests, illegal immigration 
from Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo to the EU member states, and anti-government 
protests and other social unrests in FYR Macedonia). Countries in the super-periphery are 
especially exposed to the negative effects of the Eurozone debt crisis because of increasing 
cooperation and engagement with rest of the Eurozone countries and through the process of 
EU integrations, which is particularly pronounced in the Balkan countries. In Serbia, for 
example, more than 80 percent of all private sector loans are denominated in a foreign 
currency (EBRD, 201054). 
The inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI hereafter) was also adversely affected by the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis. 
 
                                                          
54 Available www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0120.pdf (accessed 06.12.2016) 
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Figure 4.4. 3 - Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), Source: World Bank 
Databank 2005-2013. 
 
Figure 4.4.3 above shows a decline in the FDI inflows in the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010. FDI 
inflows started to pick up again after 2010 but not at the previous levels for most of the 
countries of the region. The regional average FDI in the Balkan countries was significantly 
affected with almost half of the value of investments declining from around $27.8 billion in 
2007/ 2008 to around $14.3 billion in 2009 (World Bank Databank, 2005-2013). 
Financial crisis of 2008 has also affected the volume of inward remittances, causing them to 
decline during this and later years. The diaspora has been crucial as a remitter and as investor 
to many economies and the welfare of its citizens of the region especially to the economies 
mentioned above. Some research has shown that most remittances are spent for domestic 
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privatisation of previously owned enterprises (Llorca & Redžepagić, 2009; Burgess & Körner 
2012). 
The effect on remittances and other macroeconomic factors for some countries in the region 
deteriorated further with the Eurozone debt crisis, and with the Greek crisis. Although the 
Greek economy is small compared with other major Eurozone economies, it can significantly 
affect other Balkan economies as there are hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in 
Greece from the region (Burgess & Körner, 2012). Figure 4.4.4 best illustrates the importance 
of remittances for the countries of the region and their percentage of GDP. The level of 
remittances has been slightly declining for the countries heavily reliant on remittances.  
 
Figure 4.4. 4 - Personal remittances, received (percentage of GDP), from 1996 to 2014. Source: 
World Bank Databank 
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Although the effects of the crisis in the region are not as severe as in other parts of the EU 
such as Greece and other countries of the EU periphery, the region is relatively uncertain 
about their economic future. The economic difficulties for the region have not been due to 
the recent global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis on its own, although the effects of 
the latter have exacerbated the situation. The economics of the Balkan countries would have 
been hit harder had there not been support and effective policy response with the help of 
institutions such as the IMF, the EBRD and the World Bank (Bartlett and Monastiriotis, 2010; 
Bartlett and Uvalic, 2013). These international institutions helped by coordinating 
agreements for continued lending to the region and helped secure bank deposits (Bartlett 
and Prica, 2013). 
4.5. Conclusion 
Political, social and economic developments and reforms can affect the level of formal and 
informal economy in countries. The developments in the Balkan countries have been of 
transitionary nature in most part leaving positive and negative legacies behind. This can in 
turn influence the level of informal economy in a country. Balkan countries are particularly 
appealing to research to analyse how such transition period and the political, social, judicial 
and economic reforms affected the size and development of the informal economy. 
While financial crisis has common elements, they can occur in different forms, but often 
financial crisis is associated with the; substantial changes to the volume of credit and assets 
prices; severe disruptions in the function of financial institutions as intermediaries in 
supplying credit to economic agents, such as helping firms with balance sheet 
problemslending to other financial intermediaries and sovereign government; followed by 
extensive provision of liquidity funding to economic agents by governments (Claessens & 
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Kose, 2013). This makes financial crisis multidimensional and as such challenging to 
characterise using a single indicator. However, events leading to a financial crisis and 
developments in the financial system can easily be identified and chronologically explained. 
High level of unemployment, a fall in FDI and remittances, and general economic conditions 
experienced in almost all countries part of this research can contribute to the high level of 
informal economy in the Balkan region. Moreover, if the financial crisis can exacerbate the 
economic problems these countries face, then this, in turn, could mean that the size of the 
informal economy increases further. Thus, the macroeconomic indicators have all 
experienced significant changes in the last two decades in this region. Social factors have also 
experienced changes in almost all countries part of this sample have experienced 
improvements in their rule of law, government effectiveness in the reduction of corruption 
and informality and improvements in doing business. These improvements in the social 
factors could lead to a reduction in the size of the informal economy in the region.  
In light of the above, it is interesting to estimate the size of the informal economy and analyse 
its development over the years. The research contributes significantly to see whether the 
social and economic reforms, as well as law enforcement policies and reforms, have impacted 
or contributed towards a declining trend of the informal economic activities in the Balkan 
countries. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology and Data 
5.1. Introduction 
The definition of the informal economy provided by Pedersen (2003), Kazemier (2003), and 
Schneider (2007, 2014) and described in section 2.2 of chapter two, will be used in this 
research. This topic has been widely and extensively researched in the literature using 
different methodologies. These methodologies have been discussed in detail in chapter two 
and three. 
This chapter will provide some theoretical considerations with regards to the methodology 
and the model to be applied in measuring the size and development of the informal economy. 
All variables to be used in the model will be explained, and data sources will be highlighted. 
In this chapter, the methodological framework of the model has been provided along with a 
discussion of the main steps to be taken when using the model and data for regressions. The 
model is mathematically and graphically presented following the identification of the leading 
causes and indicators of the informal economy for the Balkan countries. The methodological 
process for estimating the size of the informal economy using the MIMIC model has been 
presented in diagram 5.10 in this chapter. 
5.2. Research Philosophy 
Measuring the size and development of the informal economy and empirically assessing the 
primary drivers of it, is a process that has usually been undertaken from positivist 
epistemological philosophy55. Studies that try to understand the causes of the informal 
                                                          
55 More about research philosophy has been provided in Appendix 5.2.1. 
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economy directly from the agents involved in it using direct approaches (such as surveys) use 
pragmatism research philosophies combining both the positivist and interpretivist research 
methods. This research, however, is based on only the positivist philosophy since it is using 
indirect approaches to measure the size of the informal economy and impacts on it. It is based 
on the positivism philosophy using a deductive research approach and a quantitative research 
strategy.  
The positivist philosophy and the deductive approaches are prevalent in literature. 
“Positivism has a long and rich historical tradition. It is so embedded in our society that 
knowledge claims not grounded in positivist thought are simply dismissed as a scientific and 
therefore invalid” (Hirschheim, 1985, p.33). Alavi and Carlson (1992) support this view who 
argue that most empirical studies follow a positivist approach. Alavi and Carlson (1992) also 
defend the notion that positivism has been successfully associated with those empirical 
studies that make use of econometrics. 
After discussing the philosophical research assumptions of the approach adopted in this 
research, the focus now turns to a review of the model specifications and the justification for 
using the Structural Equation Modelling (in particular the MIMIC model) in measuring the size 
and development of the informal economy in the Balkan countries. 
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5.3. Rationale for model selection 
In measuring the size of the informal economy in a country or for a group of countries, one 
model must account for multiple causes of the informal economy. The informal economy as 
discussed in the previous chapters cannot be measured directly. Instead, it is a phenomenon 
that is caused by a number of other variables and which produces effects. This thesis is 
attempting to understand the main factors driving the informal economy and measuring the 
size of it in the countries of the Balkan Peninsula.  
The approaches described in the theoretical background chapter56 and their methods are 
designed to calculate the size of the informal economy by considering predominantly a single 
indicator or a cause which must consider all the factors that drive and effect informality in a 
country. However, as many studies suggest (Schneider, 2006, 2007b) the informal economy 
effects show up concurrently in the labour markets, production of goods and services, the use 
of electricity and money markets (Schneider, 2006) as well as many causes can affect it or can 
influence agents to enter the informal economy. The direct and the indirect approaches 
described in chapter two have shortcomings in that they do not foresee multiple factors 
impacting the size and development of the informal economy.  
The main disadvantage of using the direct approach methods is that it cannot provide 
estimates of the development of the informal economy over lengthy period (Schneider, 2014, 
2002). Additionally, those who are associated with the informal economy in any way may not 
be willing to share any information, and thus achieving results will strictly depend on the 
formulation of questionnaires57 or it could be impossible altogether. Another important 
                                                          
56 Section 2.5 in chapter two 
57 Thus, several questionnaires will need to be formulated to capture information about different characteristics 
of the informal economy (Schneider, 2002; 2014). 
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criticism of the direct and indirect approaches is that the very causes that drive informality 
are only taken into account in a few studies that make use of the monetary approach model 
and usually consider one cause of informality – typically the tax rate or tax burden, but fail to 
consider multiple causes that could potentially drive movements in the size and development 
of the informal economy (Dell’Anno, 2007; Schneider, 2007a). 
The use of data in conjunction with the methodology is also an important factor to consider. 
Both direct and indirect approaches and their models described in detail in chapter two 
mainly rely on time series data usually spanning over many years. Models such as the 
Currency Demand Approach, the Physical Input model, and the Transactions approach almost 
all require time series data58, measuring the size of the informal economy for one individual 
country at a time (Buehn & Schneider, 2012).  
The availability of data for most of the Balkan countries is available only for a short period of 
time, as many of the countries part of this sample are new countries formed after the breaking 
of Yugoslavia. Moreover, political instability in some of the countries of the Balkan Peninsula 
has affected the reporting of the data, and essential macroeconomic and social data is 
missing. With a low number of observations and as a result low degrees of freedom research 
based on other models will produce biased results (Schneider & Enste, 2000).  
The other models such as the Survey method and the Tax Auditing method require much time 
to gather the data, and even then, the data can be highly biased and understated as it relies 
on the willingness of the respondents to provide trustworthy answers (Schneider, 2000, 
2007b, 2014). Furthermore, these models will not provide any evidence of the main factors 
                                                          
58 An explanation of these models has been provided in section 2.5 of chapter two. 
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that drive or motivate households and other economic agents to engage in informal activities. 
The CDA model can use panel data methodologies such as Fixed Effects, or the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM hereafter) model (Alm & Embaye, 2013) but the ability to include 
many factors which are considered as main drivers of the informal economy can somehow be 
restrictive to a few of them. In majority of the cases this model is applied to time series data 
with a large number of overall observations (Frey & Weck, 1983; Schneider, 1986; Schneider 
& Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2005; Ahumada et al., 2004; Hernandez, 2009; Ardizzi et al., 2013; 
Schneider & Enste, 2013; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a, 2016b). 
Other models also require the absence of multicollinearity59 in the sample amongst the 
independent variables to be used in a multiple regression. Some variables to be used in the 
estimation of the informal economy have the problem of multicollinearity as shown in the 
correlation and covariance table in appendix 6.3.3. Therefore, the use of other models, other 
than Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) approach (from which the MIMIC model is 
developed) can deliver biased results. The primary purpose of SEM is to test hypotheses from 
correlational data allowing for formal specification of the model and the use of latent 
variables60.  
Therefore, the most commonly used method is the one that should encompass various 
effects61 and causes that impact the informal economy regarding its size and development. 
Such model is the MIMIC. The MIMIC model can be used with panel data, thus increasing the 
                                                          
59 Multicollinearity is a situation where there is a high degree of correlation between several independent 
variables and can occur mainly when many independent variables are incorporated into a regression model 
(Belsley et al. 2005) 
60 A discussion to treat potential multicollinearity and stationarity in variables is included in section 5.12 and 
6.3.1. 
61 Will be referred to as Indicators of the informal economy hereafter 
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number of observations and degrees of freedom. This model can consider several other 
factors that the other direct or indirect models are unable to account for in the same 
regression.  
In general, the MIMIC model provides a wider approach than most other methods discussed 
in section 2.6, as it allows the use of multiple indicators and causes into consideration 
simultaneously (Giles et al., 2002). The MIMIC model allows for flexibility when choosing 
variables for causes and indicators in accordance with the economic characteristics of the 
countries under investigation, as well as the availability of data and the size of the sample 
(Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003). This method is flexible in its application, allowing it to derive 
robust estimation results and overcoming some of the problems and disadvantages of other 
models discussed in section 2.6 (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Cassar, 2001). According to 
Thomas (1992), the MIMIC model does not need any strict assumptions – significant enough 
to limit the models use in its analysis (with the exception of the benchmarking procedure) 
where the only limitation of this model is not its conceptual structure, but the selection of 
causal and indicator variables. 
Thus, the primary justification or the rationale for the use of this model lies with the 
shortcomings that the other methods and approaches have when compared to the MIMIC, as 
well as the advantages the model has. The MIMIC model is better equipped than the other 
methods as various observed causes and indicators are considered simultaneously with 
regards to the  multifaceted nature of the informal economy (Dell’Anno, 2007; Buehn & 
Schneider, 2012; Schneider, 2014; Medina & Schneider, 2017). 
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5.4. Countries and Data 
The research is about the ten Balkan countries outlined in previous sections, for which a 
rationale for their selection has been provided in chapter one. The research will be carried 
out using panel data spanning from 1996 to 2014 on an annual basis for the above ten Balkan 
countries. Countries which are part of the Balkan Peninsula but are being excluded from this 
study for the reason of data unavailability are Kosovo and Montenegro. 
This research will be based on secondary data sets comprised from various sources, such as 
the World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank Governance Indicators, Central banks 
from the Balkan countries, the Heritage Foundation, and advanced datasets provided by 
IMF62, EBRD63, ECB64, and Polity. The model presented in the following pages is reached in 
accordance with the leading causes and indicators of the informal economy and the paper by 
Breusch (2005) who critically evaluates the application of the MIMIC model and the ways it 
was applied by Giles et al. (2002), Dell’Anno & Schneider (2003), Bajada & Schneider (2005a), 
(2005b), Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn & Schneider (2012) and Dell’Anno (2007). The leading 
causes and indicators for the latent variable in this MIMIC model are comprised of different 
enforcement factors and the rule of law. 
5.5. Rationale for the use of Panel data 
There are a number of advantages for using panel data rather than cross-sectional or time 
series. The first rationale can be classified as empirical one, while the other rationales for 
using panel data are theoretical. The first rationale for the use of panel data in this study 
relates to the fact that there is lack of research which makes use of panel data for the MIMIC 
                                                          
62 International Monetary Fund 
63 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
64 European Central Bank 
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regressions to estimate the size of the informal economy in the countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula. There has been researching in the past regarding the estimation of the informal 
economy using MIMIC model, but this research was done mainly for the developed countries 
or other groups of countries such as the work by Tanzi (1980, 1983); Bajada (1999); Giles 
(1999); Schneider (2002, 2003); Giles et al. (2002), or more recent studies by Vuletin (2008), 
Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn & Schneider (2012), Alm & Embaye (2013), and Hassan and 
Schneider (2016), but never has there been an analysis of the informal economy using the 
countries of the Balkans as a panel dataset. 
Secondly, for many of the countries part of the Balkan Peninsula, data spanning back an 
extended period of time are simply not available, as many of these countries were either part 
of a confederation of states (e.g. Yugoslavia) or experienced dramatic wars and civil conflicts. 
The lack of data prevents one from applying robust time-series models in analysing the 
informal economy and its dynamics over time on a country by country basis, thus 
incorporating all the necessary country-specific factors. However, the use of panel data – 
whether it is static or dynamic, helps to overcome this problem of data availability spanning 
back a long period of time, by providing additional degrees of freedom for the MIMIC model. 
Hsiao (2003) argue that the use of panel data improves the efficiency of econometric 
estimates, as panel data tend to encompass more degrees of freedom and sample variation 
than the time series and the cross-sectional data, reducing collinearity amongst explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge, 2001). At the same time, by considering the heterogeneity of Balkan 
countries with the use of panel data, both developed (in this case Greece, Slovenia and 
Croatia) and developing countries or transitioning economies (such as Albania, FYR 
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Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) are included in the same regression, which 
will again increase the degrees of freedom. 
The third advantage on the use of panel data, is that it allows for the inclusion of additional 
variables to the regression of the Structural Equation Model for the MIMIC, which would have 
not been available with time-series data modelling because such variables would not have 
much cross-country variation over time, meaning that it could lead to misspecification bias. 
The use of panel data overcomes this problem by incorporating cross-sectional variation 
(Wooldrige, 2009, p. 484-582). With panel data, we can construct and test the more 
complicated hypothesis and can control the impact of any omitted variables (Hsiao, 2003; 
Baltagi, 2008, p.6). 
Fourthly, with panel data, we are able to use more variables and proxy variables to capture 
different factors that could potentially affect the size of the informal economy using a MIMIC 
model, such as institutional quality or government effectiveness, the rule of law, corruption, 
size of the agriculture sector, and all other potential causes discusses in section 5.6 below. 
Furthermore, the latent variable for the MIMIC model better accounts for the persistence and 
the development over time with the use of panel data. Therefore, the use of MIMIC model 
allows for the calculation of various sets of estimates of the size of informal economy for 
various countries and sample sizes.  
Finally, using panel data can simplify the calculation and statistical inference (Hsiao, 2003, 
2007). The use of panel data involves two dimensions - that of a cross-section N, and of time-
series T. One could assume that the calculation of panel data estimators is more complex than 
the calculation of a cross-sectional data alone or time series alone. In some cases, however, 
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it is argued (Hsiao, 2003, 2007) that the availability of panel data can result in a simpler 
computation and less statistical inference. 
5.6. Causes and Indicators for the MIMIC model 
The MIMIC model generally comprises two parts - a measurement model which links the 
observed and measurable indicator variables with the unobserved variable, and the structural 
equation model which links the causal relationships among the observed variables and the 
one latent or unobserved variable. In this case there is one latent variable and that is the size 
of the informal economy. The size of such unobserved variable is presumed to be influenced 
by a the indicator variables and “…that the interaction over time between the causes 𝑥𝑖𝑡(𝑖 =
1,2,3, … , 𝑘) the size of the informal economy 𝜂𝑡in time 𝑡 and the indicators 𝑦𝑖𝑡(𝑖 =
1,2,3, … , 𝑘)…”can be mathematically expressed and empirically measured (Schneider, 2006; 
p.48). It is important to note here that the observable causes are exogenous, while the 
observable indicators are endogenous. 
Before providing the econometric theory behind the model to be used, the research must 
consider the leading causes and indicators for the latent variable. The main causes included 
in the MIMIC model for estimating the informal economy are listed below, while a detailed 
explanation and description of the variables associated with the causes and indicators is 
presented in table 5.7.1 in section 5.7. 
5.6.1. Causes 
 
I. The burden of direct and indirect taxation  provides a strong incentive to work in the 
informal economy. Social security burden is also an important factor at this point. For 
this research, two variables will be used as a proxy to capture the social security and 
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taxation burden: Government Revenues as a percentage of GDP, Government 
Spending Index and the Fiscal Freedom Index. Majority of studies use the tax rate such 
as Thomas (1992), Schneider (2006, 2007), Pozo (1996), Johnson et al. (1998), Giles 
(1997a, 1999a), Giles et al. (2002) and Del’Anno (2003, 2007). Other studies use 
government revenues, government spending and the Fiscal Freedom Index such as 
Buehn & Schneider (2012). The use of government revenues as a percentage of GDP, 
government spending and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, rather than the tax 
rates is justified by existing literature and because data for some Balkan countries for 
taxation rates is missing from 1996. Only recent official data for such a variable is 
available. This study will make use of the tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, as this 
variable does not have any missing values for the time period of this study. 
II. The burden of regulation will provide a strong incentives for economic agents to enter 
the informal economy. The high intensity of legal and administrative regulations has 
been analysed to be a leading cause of informality in many countries (Dell’Anno, 
2007). The higher the degree of regulations such requirements for registering a 
business, getting a license or permit, restrictions relating to the labour market, trade 
barriers, etc. the higher the motive for operating informally. Different studies also 
suggest that the rule of law, not just the intensity of regulations, may be the main 
cause for this. To capture this Business Freedom Index from Heritage Foundation has 
been used. Such variable to capture the burden of regulation has also been used and 
justified by Schneider (2007a), Dell’Anno (2007), and Vo & Ly (2014). 
III. The ‘tax morality’ - which is the willingness of individuals and businesses to leave their 
formal activities and enter the informal economy. The assumption is that as tax 
morality declines there will be an increase in the size of the informal economy 
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(Schneider, 2000; Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2006 and 2007b).  However, 
obtaining reliable data for this variable is difficult and such data is not available for 
Balkan countries. Therefore, this study will make use of Government Spending Index, 
and the Government Effectiveness Index as a proxy to capture this potential driver of 
economic informality.  
IV. Institutional and government effectiveness is an important cause of informality in 
many countries (Schneider, 2007a; Buehn & Schneider 2012; Aydin, 2017; Medina & 
Schneider, 2017). The quality of public services and the ability of a government to fight 
corruption as well as provide the necessary protection to those in the formal sector is 
an important cause of informality. This will be reflected in the Government 
Effectiveness Index variable from the World Bank World Governance Indicators.  
V. According to Giles (1999) and later Vuletin (2008), Hernandez (2009), Alm & Embaye 
(2013) and Elshamy (2015), the level of Inflation is also an important cause of 
informality. Inflation tends to alter income distribution, which could induce disrespect 
for tax law. The hypothesis is that the higher the rate of inflation is, the higher the 
informal sector. This is captured by an Inflation, GDP deflator (annual percentage) 
variable or the Monetary Freedom Index from the Heritage Foundation. 
VI. The political climate is another important factor or cause of the informal economy. 
The region has experienced dramatic political changes in the past decades. In most 
cases, these changes have been brought about by internal conflicts, revolutions, civil 
wars or wars. As such, uncertainty and unstable government institutions can impact 
the economic development of a country and can potentially affect the size and 
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development of the informal economic activities (Teobaldelli & Schneider, 2012)65. 
This could be captured by the Political Stability and Absence of Violence /Terrorism 
variable from the World Bank World Governance Indicators, but also from the Rule of 
Law Index from the same source. This study will make use of Rule of Law Index and 
the Government Integrity Index as proxies for this potential driver of informality. 
VII. Institutional trust is another important cause of informality in the region of Balkan 
Peninsula. Most of Balkan countries perform very poorly when it comes to people 
trusting their governments. Corruption is usually high in most of these countries and 
it usually includes the court system, complex legislation, and bureaucratic procedures. 
This is a particular problem for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. This is measured 
by the Government Integrity Index, Rule of Law Index, Control of Corruption Index or 
Regulatory Quality variables (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Buehn & Schneider, 2012). 
VIII. The size of the agriculture sector in an economy is an important determinant of the 
level of informality in an economy (Vuletin, 2008; Elshamy, 2015; Hassan & Schneider, 
2016a, 2016b). The more dominant the agriculture sector is, the larger the size of the 
informal economy would be, ceteris paribus. Agriculture value added (percentage of 
GDP) will be used from the WBDI to capture the size of the agriculture sector. 
IX. According to Alm & Embaye (2013), the degree of urbanisation in a country could also 
potentially drive the level of informality in an economy. The higher the size of the 
urban population relative to rural population, the smaller the size of the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus (Alm & Embaye, 2013). To capture this, urban population as 
a percentage of total population from World Bank Development Indicators will be 
                                                          
65 Teobaldelli & Schneider (2012) have found that there is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between direct democracy and the size of the informal economy. 
 164 
 
used in the regression. 
X. The level of Unemployment in a country has been a significant driver of economic 
informality in a country. It is argued that the higher the rate of unemployment is in a 
country, the higher the potential for individuals to engage or enter the informal 
economy (Feld & Schneider, 2010; Buehn & Schneider, 2012; Schneider & Williams, 
2013; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a). Furthermore, various studies suggest that during 
a recession people tend to engage in informal economic activities to compensate any 
income losses from the formal economy (Bajada & Schneider, 2005; Dell’Anno, 2007; 
Vuletin, 2008; Hassan & Schneider, 2016a). Thus, the level of unemployment can be 
considered as a cause of the informal economy. In capturing this, this study makes use 
of unemployment rate from the International Labour Organisation. It also makes use 
of the Employment to Population Ratio from World Bank, in order to capture the 
opposite effect. While for the Unemployment rate the relationship with the informal 
economy is positive, it is expected that the relationship between the employment to 
population ratio and the level of the informal economy is negative. People who are 
showing in the official statistics as employed and paying taxes accordingly, may not be 
involved in the informal economy at the same time (Schneider & Enste, 2000). Using 
one or the other variable can be justified on the basis of ensuring robustness. 
5.6.2. Indicators 
 
A change in the size and development of the informal economy within a country can also be 
reflected in the following indicators: 
I. The currency in circulation. If activities in the informal economy rise, then there is a 
need for additional monetary transactions in the form of cash. As such developments 
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of the monetary indicators are important to be considered (Schneider, 2007a; 
Dell’Anno, 2003, 2007; Schneider et al. 2010; Buehn & Schneider, 2012). This is usually 
captured by the Money and quasi-money (M2) as a percentage of GDP variable, the 
ratio of M1 to M2, or Cash in circulation (M0) (Buehn & Schneider, 2012). This study 
will make use of M166 and/or M2 components as data for M0 is currently either 
unavailable for most of the countries part of this research or there are many missing 
values. Previous studies that have used M1 and M2 components instead of M0 are 
many (discussed and listed in Appendix 3.5.1 and section 3.5, which justify their use 
in this study. 
II. Labour market activities and developments in the employment rate can be an 
important indicator (Schneider, 2007; Dell’Anno, 2003, 2007; Schneider et al. 2010; 
Buehn & Schneider, 2012). An increase in the workers’ participation in the informal 
sector could decrease the participation of workers in the formal economy. This has 
usually been captured by the Labour force participation ratio. 
III. Developments in the production market are considered as an important indicator by 
Schneider (2007a), Dell’Anno (2007), Schneider et al. (2010); and Buehn & Schneider, 
(2012). An increase in the size of the informal economy will displace key inputs from 
formal into informal economy, thus affectinbg the level of official economic growth. 
This will be captured by the GDP Growth rate or the GDP per capita. 
IV. According to Kaufmann & Kaliberda (1996), electricity consumption is an important 
physical indicator of total economic activities in a country. In general, this method 
looks at the relationship between electric consumption and GDP, since they have the 
                                                          
66 Money components of M0 and M1, include notes and coins in circulation and other instant liquid assets. M2, 
on the other hand, includes the M1 and other time deposits with banks. 
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same elasticity. The difference in GDP growth and the use of electricity can be ascribed 
to the informal economy (Schneider 2007, 2006, and Aldersdale et al., 2006). 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) derive this proxy measurement for the overall 
economy and then subtract the official GDP from it, resulting in the unofficial GDP, 
which is an indication of the informal economy. Based on this, it can be seen as a very 
simple and straightforward method for deriving some measurement for the size of the 
informal economy. This has been used as an indicator in the MIMIC model approach 
in the past by Arby et al. (2012); and it is also a separate measurement of the informal 
economy that has been widely used by many scholars (Kaliberda 1996; Lackó 1996, 
1998, 1999, and 2000; Schneider, 2007a; Aldersdale et al., 2006) and has been 
considered to be an important indicator of the informal economy particularly in 
transition and developing countries. To capture this indicator the Electric power 
consumption (kWh per capita) from World Bank Development Indicators will be used. 
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5.7. Description of Variables and Data sources 
Description of variables is provided below along with an explanation for each one of them and the data source. A rationale for the use of each 
of these variables was provided in the above section.  
Table 5.7. 1 - Description of variables and data sources 
Causal Variables Description/Explanation67 Source Literature68 
Business Freedom index 
 
 
 
 
“Business freedom Index is an indicator measuring 
the degree to which the government is efficient in 
regulating businesses. It has a number between 0 
and 100, with 100 equalling the freest business 
environment”. 
Heritage Foundation 
data (HFD hereafter) 
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2008), Schneider 
et al. (2010), Buehn and Schneider (2012), 
Vo & Ly (2014), Hassan and Schneider 
(2016a) 
 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 
 
“Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the 
central government for public purposes. Certain 
compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and 
most social security contributions are excluded. 
Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax 
revenue are treated as negative revenue”. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (WBDI 
hereafter) 
Thomas (1992), Giles (1999a), Tanzi (1999), 
Schneider (2003, 2005), Dell’Anno (2007), 
Dell’Anno et al. (2007), Arby et al. (2012), 
Alm and Embaye 2013 
Government spending Index 
 
 
“The government spending component captures the 
burden imposed by government expenditures, which 
includes consumption by the state and all transfer 
payments related to various entitlement programs”. 
HFD Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn and 
Schneider (2012), Barbosa et al. (2013), Vo 
and Ly (2014), Trebicka (2014), Nchor and 
Adamec (2015), 
                                                          
67 Definition and explanation of the variables has been used exactly as indicated by the respective sources of it. For HFD, explanation of variables is taken from 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology. For WBDI variables have been defined and explained using https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators, and for WGI variables are explained using http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.  
68 Only a selected literature has been provided here. Chapters two and three provide in-depth analysis of literature. 
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Government Effectiveness 
Index  
 
 
“Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. The 
estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, 
i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5”. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI 
hereafter) 
Johnson et al. (1998), Losby et al. (2002), 
Dreher & Schneider (2010), Schneider et al. 
(2010), Teobaldelli (2011), Buehn & 
Schneider (2012), Teobaldelli & Schneider 
(2012), Amendola & Dell’Anno (2010), Abdih 
an&d Medina (2013), Hassan & Schneider 
(2016a) 
Rule of Law Index  
 
 
“Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. The estimate gives the country's score on 
the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard 
normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately 
-2.5 to 2.5”. 
WGI Johnson et al. (1998), Losby et al. (2002), 
Dreher & Schneider (2010), Schneider et al. 
(2010), Teobaldelli (2011), Buehn & 
Schneider (2012), Teobaldelli & Schneider 
(2012), Amendola & Dell’Anno (2010), Abdih 
an&d Medina (2013), Hassan & Schneider 
(2016a) 
Control of Corruption  
 
 
“Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. The estimate gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units 
of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5”. 
WGI Buehn and Schneider (2009), Abdih and 
Medina (2013), Schneider et al. (2013), 
Dreher et al. (2009) 
Government Integrity index 
 
 
“Corruption erodes economic freedom by 
introducing insecurity and uncertainty into 
economic relations. Of greatest concern is the 
HFD Schneider (2002), Dreher & Schneider 
(2010), Schneider et al. (2010), Teobaldelli 
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systemic corruption of government institutions such 
practices as bribery, extortion, nepotism, cronyism, 
patronage, embezzlement, and graft. The lack of 
government integrity caused by such practices 
reduces economic vitality by increasing costs and 
shifting resources into unproductive activities”. 
(2011), Buehn & Schneider (2012), 
Teobaldelli & Schneider (2012) 
Unemployment Rate  
 
 
“Unemployment refers to the share of the labour 
force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment”. 
WBDI Feld and Schneider (2010), Buehn and 
Schneider (2012), Schneider and Williams 
(2013), Hassan and Schneider (2016a, 
20016b) 
Employment to Population 
Ratio 
 
 
“Employment to population ratio is the proportion 
of a country's population that is employed. Ages 15 
and older are generally considered the working-age 
population”. 
WBDI Feld and Schneider (2010), Buehn and 
Schneider (2012), Schneider and Williams 
(2013), Hassan and Schneider (2016a, 
20016b) 
Monetary Freedom Index 
 
 
“Monetary freedom combines a measure of price 
stability with an assessment of price controls. Both 
inflation and price controls distort market activity. 
Price stability without sector-specific government 
intervention is the ideal state for the free market”. 
HFD Vuletin (2008), Schneider et al. (2010), 
Elshamy (2015),  
Financial Freedom Index 
 
 
“Financial freedom is an indicator of banking 
efficiency as well as a measure of independence 
from government control and interference in the 
financial sector. State ownership of banks and other 
financial institutions such as insurers and capital 
markets reduces competition and generally lowers 
the level of access to credit”. 
HFD Buehn and Schneider (2012) 
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Agriculture Sector 
Dominance (percentage of 
GDP)  
 
 
“Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and 
includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as 
cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value 
added is the net output of a sector after adding up 
all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is 
calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources”.  
WBDI Hassan and Schneider (2016b), Elshamy 
(2015), Vuletin (2008) 
Degree of Urbanisation 
 
 
“Urban population refers to people living in urban 
areas as defined by national statistical offices. The 
data are collected and smoothed by United Nations 
Population Division”. 
WBDI Alm and Embaye (2013) 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
 
 
“Inflation, as measured by the annual growth rate 
of the GDP implicit deflator, shows the rate of price 
change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit 
deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency 
to GDP in constant local currency”. 
WBDI Giles (1999), Vuletin (2008), Hernandez 
(2009), Alm & Embaye (2013) and Elshamy 
(2015), 
Indicator Variables Description/Explanation69 Source Literature 
GDP per Capita, PPP70  
 
 
“GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power 
parity rates. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the 
WBDI Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006), Schneider 
and Savasan (2007), Schneider et al. (2010), 
Feld and Schneider (2010), Buehn and 
Schneider (2012), Abdih and Medina (2013), 
Vo and Ly (2014), Nchor and Adamec (2015),  
                                                          
69 Definition and explanation of the variables has been used exactly as indicated by the respective sources of it. For HFD, explanation of variables is taken from 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology. For WBDI variables have been defined and explained using https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators, and for WGI variables are explained using http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. 
70 Based on Purchasing Power Parity 
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economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products”. 
Labour Force Participation 
ratio  
 
 
“Labour force participation rate is the proportion of 
the population ages 15 and older that is 
economically active: all people who supply labour to 
produce goods and services during a specified 
period”. 
WBDI Chaudhuri et al (2006), Dell’Anno and 
Schneider (2006), Schneider and Savasan 
(2007), Schneider et al. (2010), Feld and 
Schneider (2010), Buehn and Schneider 
(2012), Abdih and Medina (2013), Barbosa 
et al (2013), Vo and Ly (2014), Nchor and 
Adamec (2015),  
Money and quasi money 
(M2) growth rate  
 
 
“Money and quasi-money comprise of the sum of 
currency outside banks, demand deposits other than 
those of the central government, and the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central government. This 
definition of money supply is frequently called M2”. 
WBDI Schneider and Enste (2000), Dell’Anno and 
Schneider (2006), Yin and Jiangsu (2009), 
Buehn and Schneider (2009, 2012), Arby et 
al. (2012), Schneider (2015), Hassan and 
Schneider (2016a, 2016b) 
Electric power consumption 
(kWh per capita)  
 
 
“Electric power consumption measures the 
production of power plants and combined heat and 
power plants less transmission, distribution, and 
transformation losses and own use by heat and 
power plants”. 
WBDI Schneider and Enste (2000), Arby et al. 
(2012),  
Ratio of M1 over M2 
 
 
“M1 over M2 money components” WBDI Schneider and Enste (2000), Dell’Anno and 
Schneider (2006), Yin and Jiangsu (2009), 
Buehn and Schneider (2009, 2012), Arby et 
al. (2012), Schneider (2015), Hassan and 
Schneider (2016a, 2016b) 
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5.8. Econometric Model 
Having identified the main causes and indicators and discussed them above, we can now 
capture them by a model, which is presented below. The starting point is the SEM which gives 
us the necessary empirical equation of a latent variable and examines the interrelationship 
with other variables with covariance structures. The structural equation model consists of two 
parts: The Structural Equation Model and the Measurement Model. The specification of the 
SEM model has been provided initially from Jöreskog and Goldberg (1975)71. This specification 
considers a latent variable 𝜂 that is linearly determined, and is subject to a disturbance𝜉, by 
a set of observable exogenous causes 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘: 
𝜂 =  𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑥1 + ⋯+ 𝛾𝑘𝑥𝑘 + ⋯+ 𝜉     (Eq. 5.1) 
In estimating the informal economy in the countries of the Balkans, the model starts with a 
6-1-2 MIMIC72 model (that is six causes, one latent variable, and two indicators identified 
above in the causes and indicators of the informal economy). The variables which are not 
significant are gradually omitted until the best fitting model is reached. The informal economy 
is considered by the latent variable in this model.  
Initially, the SEM to be estimated presents the relationship between the latent variable 
(informal economy) and its causes, includes the causes of the informal economy as indicated 
in the equation in (5.1). The MIMIC model is described in Giles et al. (2002, chapter 6) as a 
relationship between a vector y (p×1) of indicator variables and another vector x (q×1) of 
                                                          
71 The MIMIC model has been used for the first time by Goldberger (1972) and Zellner (1970). Frey and Weck-
Hanneman (1984), who are considered the pioneers on the application of this model, have used the model to 
evaluate the relative size of the informal economy in 17 OECD countries. The idea of this model is to represent 
the informal economy as a latent variable or index that has caused noticeable effects, but that cannot be 
measured directly. 
72 All the fourteen variables will be tested to see their significance in the overall fit model. They will be removed 
gradually as results are performed to get the maximum model fit. 
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causal variables. They are connected by an unobserved latent variable 𝜂 (sometimes referred 
to as scaler) (Breusch, 2005a). 
The equation of the model showing the relationships between the latent variable 𝜂 (informal 
economy) and the Xq (causes of informality) (with the 𝑖, 𝑡 subscripts are used for countries 
and time, respectively) following SEM classification is: 
𝜂𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑡𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑡𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑡𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑖𝑡𝑥4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑖𝑡𝑥5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑖𝑡𝑥6𝑖𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝜉𝑖𝑡 
           (Eq. 5.2) 
The equations system (Dell’Anno, 2007) that links the two indicators and the unobservable 
variable (𝜂) is the Measurement Model:   
    𝑌1 = 𝛿1 + 𝜆1𝜂 + 𝜀1          (Eq. 5.3) 
𝑌2 = 𝛿2 + 𝜆2𝜂 + 𝜀2              (Eq. 5.4) 
Where Y1 and Y2 represent the possible observable indicators of the informal economy 
(identified in section 5.6 of this chapter) and η is the latent variable (the informal economy). 
The expression of ε is the random error term, and finally λ are the structural parameters of 
the measurement model. The equations above can be generalised as follows: 
𝜂𝑝 =  𝛼 + ∑𝛾𝑝𝑥𝑝 +𝜉𝑝    (Eq. 5.5) 
𝑌𝑝 = 𝛿𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝𝜂𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝     (Eq. 5.6) 
In this case errors and disturbances are assumed to be independent between each other, 
where, E (ξε’) =0’, E (ξ2) = σ2 and E (εε’) = θ. The term of θ stands for the covariance matrix 
along its diagonal of the measurement errors. Subscript ′𝑝′ represents the 𝑖, 𝑡 described 
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above. To solve the model, equation (5.5) can be substituted into equation (5.6) to obtain a 
function of observable variables, that is: 
𝑌𝑝 = 𝛿𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝(𝛼 + ∑𝛾𝑝𝑥𝑝 +𝜉𝑝) + 𝜀𝑝    (Eq. 5.7) 
Where γ(p×1) and λ(p×1) are the unknown parameter vectors. The error terms ε(p×1) and ξt 
(scalar) are assumed to have zero means, variances Θ = diag (θ1,...,θp) and ψ, and to be 
uncorrelated with each other. The model in equation (5.2) cannot determine the scale of all 
the parameters, so a “…normalisation condition is required” (Tahmasebi, 2015; p. 190-191). 
Even though there are many options for a “normalization condition” (ibid), Giles et al. (2002) 
apply a condition by setting the first element of λ to be unity, as λ1 =1 in order to quantify the 
impact of another indicator. The parameters of this model can be estimated using the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML hereafter) methodology73. Following the work and methodology of 
Buehn and Schneider (2008), the model (5.2) can be expressed in terms of covariance matrix 
as follows: 
∑ =[
𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝛾𝑝) 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝛾𝑝, 𝑥𝑝)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑥𝑝, 𝛾𝑝) 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑥𝑝)
] = 𝐸 [[
𝛾𝑝
𝑥𝑝
] [
𝛾𝑝
𝑥𝑝
]]   (Eq. 5.8) 
𝐸 (𝛾𝑝, 𝛾
′
𝑝) =λ (γ
′θγ +Ψ )λ′ + 𝛩𝑝   
 (Eq. 5.9) 
𝐸 (𝑥𝑝, 𝛾
′
𝑝) =θγλ
′
 
𝐸(𝛾𝑝, 𝑥𝑝) = 𝜆𝛾′θ 
                                                          
73 The ML method will be applied in accordance with Jöreskog and Goldberg (1975), Hayduk (1987), and Breusch 
(2005a). 
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𝐸(𝑥𝑝, 𝑥
′
𝑝) =θ 
Therefore, we have: ∑ = [
λ (γ′θγ+Ψ )λ′ + 𝛩𝑝 𝜆𝛾′θ
θγλ′ θ
]  (Eq. 5.10) 
It is essential to estimate γ, λ, and covariances that produce the estimate of Σ that is as close 
as possible to the sample cov (Y, X). In equation (5.9), 𝛩𝑞 represents the “covariance matrix 
of the error terms in the measurement model, 𝛹 represents the variance of the error term in 
the structural equation and 𝜃 is the covariance matrix of the causal variables” (Buehn and 
Schneider, 2008; p. 24).  
The structural part of the equation as indicated in equation (5.5) and the measurement part 
of the equation presented in equation (5.6) above can also be expressed in the following way: 
Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 = [𝛾1𝑖𝑡 , 𝛾2𝑖𝑡 , 𝛾3𝑖𝑡 , 𝛾4𝑖𝑡 , 𝛾5𝑖𝑡 , 𝛾6𝑖𝑡 , . . . 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡]
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑤
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
−
−
−
−
𝑒𝑡𝑐. ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+  𝜉𝑖𝑡  
(Eq. 5.11) 
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Part 2: The Measurement Equation model: 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
−
−
−
𝑒𝑡𝑐 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−1
𝜆 2𝑖𝑡
𝜆3𝑖𝑡
𝜆4𝑖𝑡
−
−
−
𝜆𝑝 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (Eq. 5.12) 
Specifically, the MIMIC model can be mathematically expressed for each MIMIC specification 
used, as shown in the following section (5.9). 
5.9. Graphical presentation of the MIMIC Model 
Irrespective of the specification of the MIMIC model itself, one can generalise a graphical 
presentation of the MIMIC model in general terms which follows an SEM structure with one 
latent variable, a number of causal variables, and the indicators to the right. Each of the casual 
variables and indicators has been described in detail (including their descriptive statistics) as 
well as their corresponding hypothesis. Mathematically this has been expressed in equations 
5.11 and 5.12 above. A general graphical presentation of a MIMIC model is presented below: 
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Figure 5.9. 1 - Generalised graphical presentation of the MIMIC Model with one latent variable, 
Source: Author’s presentation 
 
The MIMIC specifications can be graphically presented depending on the number of causes 
and indicators. The following diagrams show graphical presentation for a 6-1-2, 5-1-2, and 4-
1-2 MIMIC specifications for the countries of Balkans to be used in MIMIC regression analysis 
along with the expected causality for the coefficients. Here we present only some of the 
specifications from the Results and Analysis Chapter. They correspond to MIMIC Specification 
2, MIMIC Specification 5 and MIMIC Specification 4. To calculate the size of the informal 
economy, this study will make use of the 6-1-2 MIMIC model, which included more causes, 
and therefore able to offer better estimates for the latent variable (Joreskog & Goldberger, 
1975; Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003). 
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6-1-2 MIMIC Model  
Figure 5.9. 2 - Graphical presentation of the 6-1-2 MIMIC Model, Source: Author’s presentation 
 
A mathematical presentation of this particular MIMIC model specification is expressed as 
follows: 
6-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 = [𝛾
1𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
2𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
3𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
4𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
5𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
6𝑖𝑡
]
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ]
 
 
 
 
 
+  𝜉
𝑖𝑡
 
(Eq. 5.13) 
6-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 2: The Measurement Equation model: 
[
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
] =  [
−1
𝜆2𝑖𝑡
]  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (Eq. 5.14) 
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5-1-2 MIMIC Model  
Figure 5.9. 3- Graphical presentation of the 5-1-2 MIMIC Model, Source: Author’s presentation 
 
A mathematical presentation of this particular MIMIC model specification is expressed as 
follows: 
5-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 = [𝛾
1𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
2𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
3𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
4𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
5𝑖𝑡
]
[
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 ]
 
 
 
 
+  𝜉
𝑖𝑡
 
(Eq. 5.15) 
5-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 2: The Measurement Equation model: 
 [
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
] =  [
−1
𝜆2𝑖𝑡
]  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (Eq. 5.16) 
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4-1-2 MIMIC Model  
Figure 5.9. 4 - Graphical presentation of the 4-1-2 MIMIC Model, Source: Author’s presentation 
 
A mathematical presentation of this MIMIC model specification is  expressed as follows: 
4-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 = [𝛾
1𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
2𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
3𝑖𝑡
, 𝛾
4𝑖𝑡
] [
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
] +  𝜉
𝑖𝑡
 
(Eq. 5.17) 
4-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 2: The Measurement Equation model: 
 [
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎
𝑀2 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
] =  [
−1
𝜆2𝑖𝑡
]  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (Eq. 5.18) 
 
The estimations using the MIMIC approach will be able to show what the average size of the 
informal economy is in the countries of Balkans individually as a percentage of the overall 
official GDP following the MIMIC model estimation procedures as shown in figure 5.10.1 
below. Equipped with this econometric theory, this research will apply a number of 
specifications to the MIMIC model for measuring the informal economy in the countries of 
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the Balkan Peninsula. These specifications refer to the casual variables and indicators to be 
used. Since there are a number of casual variables one could use, then a number of 
specifications can generate good model fit analysis. For example, Dell’Anno and Schneider 
(2008), Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn & Schneider (2012), Hassan and Schneider (2016a), and 
Medina and Schneider (2017) use different MIMIC model specifications – that is different 
types of casual variables to achieve model fit results for the SEM and then using a benchmark 
procedure to calibrate the informal economy estimates for each year. They demonstrate the 
use of their specifications for the MIMIC model dependant on the country’s or countries’ 
specific characteristics theoretically. To date, different MIMIC model specifications which are 
relevant to the countries of Balkan Peninsula have not been employed and tested. 
5.10. Benchmarking procedures for the MIMIC model 
After the MIMIC regression has been completed, one must use those results to calibrate the 
size of the informal economy using a benchmarking procedure. There are a number of 
benchmarking procedures that use an exogenous value of the informal economy as the base 
year and calibrates the index values generated from the MIMIC results into absolute values 
of the informal economy converted into percentages. It is preferred that the exogenous base 
value of the informal economy is taken from the first year of the dataset, in order to 
understand and capture the dynamics and development of the informal economy across the 
periods in the dataset (Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003; Schneider et al., 2010; Buehn & 
Schneider, 2012). 
One benchmarking procedure was initially developed and applied by Giles et al. (2002): 
(
η
GDP
)
t
final
=  μ (
η
GDP
)
t
ordinal
     (Eq. 5.19) 
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Where (
η
GDP
)
t
ordinal
 is the value of the MIMIC index of the informal economy per GDP 
estimated at time t by using SEM expressed in general terms in (equation 5.7), and where  
μ =
(
η
GDP
)
T̅
∗
(
η
GDP
)
T̅
ordinal  is constant, while T̅ is used to indicate the base period chosen where there is 
the exogenous value of the informal economy. (
η
GDP
)
T̅
∗
 is the size of the informal economy 
expressed in percentage of the formal GDP estimated by an auxiliary method at the base-
period T̅, which usually is the currency demand method. 
The second benchmarking procedure is proposed by Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) by 
applying an additive constant. Firstly, they estimate the index of the informal economy 
ηt
ordinal by a structural equation of  ∆ηt
ordinal = γ̂′∆xt. By applying the additive constant of τ, 
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) meet the condition in which the estimated value of the 
informal economy is equal to the informal economy as a percentage of GDP in the base year 
as follows: 
(
η
GDP
)
T̅
∗
= 
ηT̅
ordinal+ τ
GDPT̅
= 
η0
ordinal+ τ+γ̂′(xT−x0) 
GDPT̅
     (Eq. 5.20) 
Where γ̂′ is the “vector (of dimension q) of structural coefficients as estimated by the MIMIC 
model while  𝑥𝑡  is the vector of the q-causes observed at time 𝑡, GDP is the reference indicator” 
(Dell’Anno and Schneider, 2003; p.6-9). Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) define τ̃ = (τ +
η0
ordinal) from which the absolute value of the informal economy is then calculated using 
ηt = τ̃ + γ̂
′(xt − x0)     (Eq. 5.21) 
The third benchmarking procedure was developed by Bajada and Schneider (2005). They 
estimate the absolute values of the informal economy using the following calibration method: 
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gt
final = g T̅
∗ + γ̂′∆xt      (Eq. 5.22) 
Where Bajada and Schneider (2005) choose g T̅
∗  to meet the condition of gT̅
final = g T̅
∗ + γ̂′∆xT. 
While gt
final represents the growth rate of the informal economy, gT̅
final is the growth value of 
the informal economy in the base year that is estimated from a secondary source or auxiliary 
method. 
The fourth model was developed and proposed by Dell’Anno (2007). This benchmark 
procedure involves transforming the reference indicator variable (which is the formal or 
official GDP of a country) from absolute to an index value of GDPt/GDPT̅. Following an 
identification rule of λ1 = −1, the index of the informal economy expressed as a percentage 
of GDP in the base year is linked to the index of Real GDP using a measurement equation of 
(Dell’Anno, 2007): 
GDPt−GDPt−1
GDPT̅
= −
η̂t−η̂t−1
GDPT̅
      (Eq. 5.23) 
While the estimates from the structural equation model are utilised in obtaining the ordinal 
index values for the latent variable (the informal economy) as follows: 
η̂t
GDPT̅
= γ̂′xt      (Eq. 5.24) 
A further step to this is the following calculation to generate the size of the informal 
economy as a percentage of GDP: 
ηt
GDPt
=
η̂t
GDPT̅
 [
ηT̅
∗
GDPT̅
GDPT̅
η̂T̅
]
GDPT̅
GDPt
     (Eq. 5.25) 
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Where 
η̂t
GDPT̅
 is the index calculated from equation (5.24), 
ηT̅
∗
GDPT̅
 is the exogenous size of the 
informal economy at the base year  T̅,   
GDPT̅
GDPt
 converts the index of changes to the base year 
into a ratio between the informal economy and a country’s GDP, and finally the  
ηt
GDPt
 
indicated the informal economy as a percentage of a country’s GDP at a given period of time 
t. 
The fifth or the latest benchmarking procedure is developed by Schneider et al. (2010) and 
later applied and finalised by Buehn and Schneider (2012). This procedure is applied to 
calibrate the ordinal estimates into cardinal values and convert this index to percentage units. 
This procedure, therefore, requires that a prior estimation of a country’s informal economy 
be calculated. The formula is as follows:  
ηit = 
η̃it
η̃i,the base year
 ηi,the base year
∗     (Eq. 5.26) 
Where η̃t denotes the value of the MIMIC index at time t according to SEM expressed in 
general terms in (equation 5.7), η̃i,the base year is the value of the MIMIC index in the base year 
selected for calibration procedure, ηi,the base year
∗  is the exogenous value of the informal 
economy based on a base year and usually this either is taken as a secondary value from 
existing literature, or it can be calculated using the currency demand method, and then a base 
year value used as the benchmark for calculations (Buehn and Schneider 2012, Hassan and 
Schneider 2016). The subscript of ′i′ used in the equation represents individual countries. The 
application of the method described in equation (5.26) can be used to calculate the absolute 
values of the informal economy in a given period for a given country. 
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Currently, there does not seem to be any clear consensus in the literature as to which of the 
above benchmarking procedures, or sometimes referred to as calibration methods, to use in 
order to calculate the absolute values of the informal economy from the MIMIC results 
(Buehn and Schneider, 2012). However, the most widely used method is the benchmarking 
procedure proposed by Buehn and Schneider (2012) following the work by Schneider et al. 
(2010). Later Hassan and Schneider (2016) also confirm the use of the first benchmarking 
model as the one that is most widely used in literature because it overcomes the criticism by 
Breusch (2005) in assigning a monetary unit value from the reference indicator to the 
unobserved or the latent variable.  
Dell’Anno & Schneider (2008) argue that standardisation of any of the benchmark procedures 
does require thorough experimentation, different comparisons and debate among academics 
to get a clear understanding of which of the benchmarking methodologies is the most 
adequate or most reliable to use. One method which has been widely used and less criticised 
is the one presented by Schneider et al. (2010) and later applied and finalised by Buehn and 
Schneider (2012) – which has been mathematically expressed in equation (5.26) above. This 
study will make use of this calibration procedure as presented in equation (5.26). 
Whichever model is applied, there are two main estimation and calibration procedures. The 
first one is that the MIMIC model index of the informal economy has to be calculated using 
the structural equation, presented and discussed in section 5.8 of this chapter. This is done 
by multiplying the coefficients of the significant causal variables with the respective time 
series for each country (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider et al., 2010; Buehn & Schneider, 
2012). The second estimation of the calibration procedure is to convert the index into 
absolute values of the informal economy. In doing so, one has to take a base value for a 
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particular year (Buehn & Schneider, 2012). Usually, this base value is taken externally from 
another source, and then the index values are calibrated following the external value and the 
chosen method. This study will make use of the most cited and known work on the informal 
economy by Schneider et al., (2010) and Buehn & Schneider, (2012). In diagram 5.10 below, 
a generalised process for the MIMIC model has been presented.  
Figure 5.10. 1 - A generalised process for the MIMIC model. Source: Own work 
 
 
 
5.11. MIMIC post-estimation analysis: Testing parameters and model fit statistics 
To understand how the model fits the data and by what accuracy of prediction one should 
test how well the observed covariance matrix for the variables in the MIMIC model matches 
that which we would expect if the model was an accurate representation of the data. The 
most basic fit statistic for any path analysis model, SEM analysis model or the MIMIC analysis 
model is the chi-square statistic (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hu & Bentler, 1998, 1999; Byrne, 
2011). This is applied in a wide range of statistical test scenarios in order to test whether the 
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observed variables depart from what is expected under the proposed model. If the chi-square 
statistic is significant, then this would indicate that the relationships between the variables in 
the model are significantly different from what we would have expected if the model was an 
accurate representation (Bollen & Long, 1993). However, when the sample of observations is 
even moderately significant, differences between the observed and the expected covariance 
matrices that are small enough to be considered as trivial can cause very significant chi-square 
statistics (Bollen, 1989; Bollen & Long, 1993; Kaplan, 2008; Kline, 2015).  
Hence other indices have been developed to assess the fit of a model. These fit indices use a 
variety of methods, such as the comparison against the independence model, assessing 
residuals and errors, and can be classified into two distinct types. One type is the Absolute fit 
indices, and the other is the incremental fit indices. The absolute fit indices are derived from 
the fit of the observed and expected covariance matrices and the ML function. Examples of 
absolute fit indices which are mainly used include the AGFI74, MC, Hoelter’s CN75, AIC, BIC, 
ECVI, RMR, SRMR, and RMSEA76 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Incremental fit indices compare a chi-square for the model tested with the chi-square from 
the so-called null model (also called a baseline or independence model). The null model 
specifies that all observed variables are uncorrelated (there are no latent variables). Most of 
                                                          
74 AGFI = Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index, MC=McDonald's Centrality Index; AIC = Akaike Information 
Criterion, BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion, ECVI = Expected cross validation index, SRMR = 
standardized root mean squared residual; RMR = root mean squared residual. 
75 Hoelter’s CN = Hoelter’s Critical N, is defined as the largest sample size for which one would accept the 
hypothesis for a model to be correct. Hoelter (1983) uses .05 level to be considered as significant in determining 
the critical N. 
76 The Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSE) is the square root of the variance of the residuals. It 
shows how closely the predicted values of the model are to the observed data points. In other words, this shows 
the absolute fit of the proposed model in relation to the data. Currently, the RMSEA is the most used measure of 
model fit and majority of papers using SEM, CFA or MIMIC models report it. The closer to 0.00 this ratio is the 
better and more significant is the model fit (Schneider, 2006, 2007; Dell’Anno, 2007; Vuletin, 2008; Abdih & 
Medina, 2013; Elshamy, 2015). MacCallum et al. (1996) have used 0.01, 0.05, and 0.08 to indicate excellent, 
good, and mediocre fit, respectively. 
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these incremental fit indices are computed by using ratios of the model chi-square and the 
null model chi-square and the degrees of freedom for the models and take values ranging 
between 0 and 1 approximately. Examples of such fit indices which are also used the most are 
the IFI, CFI, TLI, RNI and the NFI77 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
There has been much research regarding which fit indices to use and the suitable cut-off levels 
for each fit index which indicate a good fitting model. Hu & Bentler (1999) examine various 
cut offs for many of the indices highlighted above and concluded that although it is difficult 
to designate a specific cut-off value for each fit index because it does not work equally well 
with various conditions, a cut-off value close to 0.95 for the ML – based TLI, IFI, CFI, RNI, and 
Gamma Hat; a cut off value close to 0.90 for MC; a cut off value close to 0.08 for SRMR; and 
a cut off value close to 0.06 for RMSEA78 which result in lower Type II error rates. They also 
suggest that to minimise Type I and Type II errors, one should make use of a combination of 
one incremental fit index (typically the CFI is used, with a value of > 0.95, indicating a good 
model), alongside one of the absolute fit indexes such as the SRMR or the RMSEA, indicating 
a good fitted model of <0.08 or <0.06, respectively (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Further analysis regarding the model fit and the analysis of hypothesis for each variable 
contributing to the latent variable are the coefficients, their signs and their z scores or values 
as well as the p-values for those z-scores. High,  low or negative Z scores, accompanying small 
p-values, are usually found in the tails of a normal distribution (Gujarati, 2009). Thus, the 
                                                          
77 TLI =Tucker-Lewis Index; NFI = Non-normed Fit Index; IFI = Incremental Fit Index; RNI = Relative 
Noncentrality Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index 
78 Therefore, a model with RMSEA above 0.10 is mainly considered as a poor fit. The RMSEA reported above 
indicates a value greater than 0.10, and as such the overall model fit is poor. This is supported by the p close value 
which tests the correctness of RMSEA. Other measures of goodness of model fit, are also large as seen above, 
such as the chi-square, AIC, BIC, CFI, TLI and the SRMR. However, this can be justified by a small sample of 
data. In order to increase the number of cases, this research will be considering adding more countries to this 
research. 
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higher the z scores in absolute values, the better as we can accept the hypothesis that a 
variable predicts the latent variable, or the latent variable effects the indicator variables. 
Coefficients on the other hand matter in terms of analysing the impact of variables on the 
latent variable and their sign matters in accordance with the hypothesis mentioned in section 
5.13 below.  The path coefficients presented above indicate the impact of each of the causes 
and indicators to the latent variable and the direction of it. 
R-squared is also measured in testing the model fit. R-squared measures statistically how 
close the data is to the fitted regression line. When running multiple regression (such as SEM) 
it is also called the coefficient of determination (CD), or the coefficient of multiple 
determination. However, this percentage can be increased by simply adding more predictors 
or variables as causes and indicators (Hair et al., 2016). Table 5.11.1 below includes the good 
fitting values and the acceptable values for some of the most commonly used fit indices for 
SEM models. 
Table 5.11. 1 - Selected Goodness of Fit indices for model assessment (Source: Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Bollen & Long, 1993) 
Index Type Index Name Good Fitting Acceptable Value 
Incremental Fit Indices 
CFI79 ≥ 0.97 ≥ 0.90 
TLI80 ≥ 0.97 ≥ 0.90 
Absolute Fit Indices 
RMSEA81 ≤ 0.05 ≤ 0.08 
SRMR ≤ 0.05 ≤ 0.08 
MC ≥ 0.90 ≥ 0.90 
R-squared CD ≥ 0.90 ≥ 0.90 
                                                          
79 Also known as Noncentrality-based Indices 
80 Also known as Relative Fit Indices 
81 Also known as Noncentrality-based Indices 
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5.12. Running robust analysis for SEM 
Before conducting the MIMIC regression, we must test the panel data for normality (Hassan 
and Schneider, 2016a, 2016b; Aydin, 2017). Normality82 is considered as a potential problem 
by some since it is an essential assumption required to perform SEM analysis (Byrne, 2010). 
In order to test for normality and subsequently for stationarity in variables, we must conduct 
unit root tests83 (Breusch, 2005a, 2006; Dell’Anno & Schneider, 2003). Majority of social 
sciences data often have a non-normal distribution (Barnes et al., 2001) and one must be able 
to account for such non-normality. Bollen (1989; p. 108), Marsh et al. (2004; p. 275-300) and 
Diamantopoulos et al. (2000; p. 57) suggest that the ML estimator used in SEM “is considered 
relatively robust to violations of normality assumptions”. Furthermore, the Monte-Carlo 
experiments by Reinartz et al. (2009) could not find any significant differences in the results 
produced by SEM analysis using the ML methodology with different size samples which had 
different kurtosis and skewness levels. 
Additionally, two additional checks for the panel data must be performed. Firstly, before 
performing any MIMIC or SEM analysis, assumptions of multivariate normality must be 
considered. Secondly, SEM is based on the covariance matrix, and covariance can be less 
stable for small samples (Aydin, 2017, p.19), and therefore the sample size can strongly 
influence the chi-square statistic, and as such we must use robust regression analysis for the 
                                                          
82 For data to meet the condition of Normality, its distribution must be normally distributed with a mean value of 
zero, a standard deviation of 1 and a symmetric bell-shaped curve. To check for normality, one could check for 
the skewness and kurtosis in variables. For skewness, the value must be between -1 and +1 for a normal 
distribution, whereas for kurtosis; the value must be between a range of ±3 for a normal distribution. Values for 
skewness and kurtosis are provided in appendix   
83 In the Results and Analysis chapter, the results of the two most commonly used panel data unit root tests will 
be displayed and analysed. 
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MIMIC model. Such checks and analysis can be performed using STATA 14 software. STATA 
14 can accommodate any violations regarding sample size and normality in variables.  
To relax the assumption of multivariate normality, STATA 14 SEM module allows for the use 
of the Satorra-Bentler option in order to improve the chi-square statistic of the goodness of 
fit in case of non-normal and non-stationary variables (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). This option 
is used along with the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation and has been applied in several 
other studies such as Dell’Anno (2007), Dell’Anno et al. (2007), Hassan and Schneider (2016b), 
and Aydin (2017). 
The likelihood-ratio test comparing the estimated model to the saturated model is derived 
under the assumption that the observed variables (which in this case are the variables used 
for the causes and the indicators) in the MIMIC model are normally distributed (Satorra & 
Bentler, 1994). If they are not normally distributed, then the likelihood-ratio test is not 
appropriate. Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-squared is robust with variables which are not 
normally distributed. This also means that other goodness of fit statistics (such as the RMSEA, 
CFI and TLI) will also be robust to non-normality in variables because the same adjustment 
that provides the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-squared test also derive the other goodness-of-
fit statistics. 
A furtherrobust regression is to check for heteroscedasticity of the errors. STATA 14 provides 
the option of computing the Huber-White robust estimates of the standard errors. The 
variance-covariance estimation obtained using the Huber-White robust test is valid if the 
errors are independently distributed. It is not required that the errors follow a normal 
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distribution, nor is it required that they are identically distributed from one observation to 
the next84. 
In order to control for small samples when running SEM or MIMIC regressions, one can use 
Swain scaling factor (Antonakis & Bastardoz, 2013). This option is also available in STATA 14 
SEM module, and it is used to correct for the chi-square statistic in small samples and complex 
models. Such option was used by Johnson et al. (1997) and Hassan & Schneider (2016a, 
2016b). Swain corrects the chi-square “likelihood ratio test of fit for SEM models with or 
without latent variables” (Herzog et al., 2007; 363-365). “The chi-square statistic is 
asymptotically correct; but it does not behave as expected with small samples and when the 
model is complex” (Herzog et al., 2007; 363-378). In reaching an improved “approximation for 
the distribution of the chi-square statistic, Swain (1975) developed a scaling factor, which 
converges to 1 asymptotically, and is multiplied with the chi-square statistic” (Herzog et al., 
2007; 363-378). Such correction is a “closer approximations of the chi-square distribution, 
resulting in more appropriate Type 1 reject error rates” (Antonakis & Bastardoz, 2013; p. 141). 
5.13. Fixing a reference variable 
In the MIMIC regression estimation for the model, an indicator variable needs to be fixed and 
used as a reference variable (Dell’Anno et al., 2007). This is required in order to set unit of 
measurement for the informal economy, as it is an unobserved or latent variable. Dell’Anno 
(2007) and Hassan & Schneider (2016a, 2016b) use either GDP per capita or GDP growth as 
their reference variable by fixing the value of it to -1. According to Dell’Anno (2003, 2007), 
the choice for the value of the reference variable is limited “between two alternatives (+1 or 
                                                          
84 STATA 14 Manual, available from https://www.stata.com/manuals14/semintro8.pdf84, last accessed 
13.12.2017 
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-1) because, by using a unitary base for normalisation, the estimated coefficients are more 
easily comparable” (Dell’Anno, 2007; p.262).  Dell’Anno (2003, 2007) and Hassan & Schneider 
(2016a, 2016b) use a strategy called reductio ad absurdum to determine the sign of the value 
based on the theoretical assumptions regarding the relationship between the exogenous 
variables and the latent variable, which is the informal economy. 
According to Dell’Anno (2007, p.260), in the MIMIC model… 
“…the vector of structural coefficients is proportional to the coefficient of scale, when 
the sign of λ1is changed, the structural parameters λq of the causes change from 
positive to negative (and vice versa) keeping the same absolute values” (Dell’Anno, 
2007; p.260).  
Based on this… 
“…if the signs of the coefficients from the regression linking the latent variable with its 
causes are different from known theories and empirical studies in one case (e.g., λ1= 
+1) ...then the hypothesis supporting the opposite sign for the relationships between 
shadow economy and reference variable should be accepted as more rational” 
(Dell’Anno, 2007, p.260). 
The existing literature currently does not give a definitive view regarding the sign of the 
relationship between the formal and the informal economy (Dell’Anno, 2007). For example, 
different empirical studies tend to provide contrasting answers to whether an economic 
downturn in the formal or official economy (which could lead to a rise in the rate of 
unemployment) is going to drive more people to enter the informal economy, or whether the 
reduction in GDP during an economic downturn would reduce the demand for goods and 
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services produced in the informal economy. Adam & Ginsburgh (1985) for Belgium, Giles et 
al. (2002) for Canada, Schneider et al. (2003) for Asian countries, find a positive relationship 
between the informal economy and the formal economy, while on the other hand, Loayza 
(1996) for 14 Latin America countries, Kaufmann & Kaliberda (1996) for Transition countries, 
Eilat & Zinnes (2000) for transition countries, Schneider & Enste (2000) for 76 Countries, 
Dell’Anno (2003; 2007) for Italy and Spain, France and Greece, respectively, find a negative 
relationship. Furthermore, Schneider (2005) estimation and analysis shows a negative 
relationship for transition and developing countries but a positive relationship in developed 
countries. 
5.14. Potential Endogeneity Problem 
 
There are endogeneity concerns regarding the use of GDP or related variables as cause and 
indicators in the MIMIC model. Surprisingly, the endogeneity problem is not addressed in 
majority of the existing literature which makes use of GDP, GDP per capita or GDP growth in 
their model. One exception is the study by Medina & Schneider (2018) which make use of the 
Night Lights intensity approach suggested by Henderson et al. (2012). This approach uses data 
on light intensity from outer space as a proxy of economic growth of countries, instead of 
GDP related variables. However, such data for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula does not 
exist for the time period of this research. Furthermore, this method seems to neglect the fact 
that some economic activity does take place in the absence of additional light, especially in 
rural areas. Countries of the Balkan Peninsula are more dependent on rural economic 
activities, such as agriculture, when compared to other European countries, for example, and 
as such this approach could underestimate the level of the informal economy in the country. 
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Another methodology suggested by Medina & Schneider (2018) is the Predictive Mean 
Matching procedure. This methodology treats the informal economy as missing, and then 
using some available estimates of the informal economy from surveys for some countries, 
computes the missing values for the rest of sample. The immediate problem with this is the 
lack of survey data for the countries in question for the time period of this research, and that 
the nature of institutional, political, economic and social differences in these countries could 
potentially result in under or over computation of missing values for the informal economy. 
 
One could also exclude the use of GDP related variables as causes and indicators completely 
from the MIMIC model and test the robustness of the model results. However, it has to be 
noted here that the characteristics of the countries chosen is a major factor when dealing 
with the endogeneity problem. Countries of the Balkan Peninsula are faced with a large 
informal economy. Previous studies indicate that the informal economy in the countries part 
of this research is on average over 30 percent of GDP. The size of the informal economy 
directly impacts the level of GDP, rather than GDP having an impact in the level of informal 
economy. Exogenous causal factors such as the rule of law, burden of government 
regulations, level of agriculture and people’s attitude towards their institutions and 
government are much greater causes than the level of GDP growth. GDP growth or related 
variables could potentially play only a marginal role in causing the informal economy; rather 
they are reflections of large informal economy. 
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5.15. Excepted results and hypothesis for each variable 
Expected results for each variable to be used in the MIMIC regressions have been provided 
below, along with the expected sign for the causality in coefficients in relation to the literature 
review discussed in section 2.4, 3.5 and 5.6. 
Table 5.15. 1 - Expected results and hypothesis for each variable 
Definition and expected sign Hypothesis85 
Business Freedom index 
 
Expected Sign Negative 
Hypothesis 1: The higher is the index of business 
freedom, the lower would the size of the informal 
economy be, ceteris paribus. 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 
 
Expected Sign Positive 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of taxation in a 
country, the higher the size of the informal economy, 
ceteris paribus. 
Government spending Index 
 
Expected sign Positive 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the government spending or 
expenditure, the higher the size of the government 
and the size of the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Government Effectiveness Index  
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of democratic 
institutions, the smaller the size of the informal 
economy is, ceteris paribus. 
Rule of Law Index  
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 5: The better the quality of democratic 
institutions, the smaller the size of the informal 
economy is, ceteris paribus. 
Control of Corruption  
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the control for corruption is 
in a country, the lower will corruption be and as such 
the lower the size of the informal economy. Several 
studies, discussed in the literature review, have 
indicated that there is a positive relationship between 
the corruption level and the size of economic 
informality. Therefore, the lower the corruption level is 
in a country and the greater the government integrity, 
the smaller the size of the informal economy, ceteris 
paribus. 
Government Integrity index 
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 7: The lack of government integrity caused 
by practices of systemic corruption of government 
institutions such as bribery, extortion, nepotism, 
cronyism, patronage, embezzlement, and graft86, 
reduces economic vitality by increasing costs and 
shifting resources into unproductive activities, and 
                                                          
85 Definition and explanation of the variables has been used exactly as indicated by the respective sources of it. 
For HFD, explanation of variables is taken from http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology. For WBDI 
variables have been defined and explained using https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators, and for WGI variables are explained using http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. 
86 Ibid 
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increases economic informality, ceteris paribus. The 
higher this index is, the lower the size of the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
Unemployment Rate  
 
Expected sign Positive 
Hypothesis 8: The higher the unemployment, the 
larger the size of the informal economy is, ceteris 
paribus. 
Employment to Population Ratio 
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 9: The higher the employment to 
population ratio is, the lower the size of the informal 
economy is, ceteris paribus. 
Monetary Freedom Index 
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 10: The more stable and less volatile are 
prices, coupled with minimum government 
intervention in a free market system, the smaller will 
be the size of the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Financial Freedom Index 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 11: The higher the financial freedom index, 
the lower the size of the informal economy is expected 
to be, ceteris paribus. 
Agriculture, value added 
(percentage of GDP)  
Expected sign Positive 
Hypothesis 12: The more dominant the agriculture 
sector, the larger the size of the informal economy is, 
ceteris paribus. 
Degree of Urbanisation 
 
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 13: The higher the size of the urban 
population relative to rural population, the smaller the 
size of the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
 
Expected sign Positive 
Hypothesis 14: The more stable and less volatile prices 
are, the smaller will be the size of the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
GDP per Capita, PPP87  
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 15: The larger the size of the informal 
economy, the lower the GDP is, ceteris paribus. 
Labour Force Participation ratio  
Expected sign Negative 
Hypothesis 16: the more significant the informal 
economy, the lower total employment is, ceteris 
paribus. 
Money and quasi money (M2) 
growth rate  
Expected sign Positive 
Hypothesis 17: The larger the size of the informal 
economy, the larger the size of M2 is, ceteris paribus 
Electric power consumption 
(kWh per capita)  
Expected sign Positive 
Hypothesis 18: The larger the size of the informal 
economy, the higher the electric consumption per 
capita, ceteris paribus 
 
5.16. Ethical considerations 
The data to be used in this research will be of secondary nature and as such this research does 
not involve human participation via surveys, interviews or questionnaires. The data used in 
                                                          
87 Based on Purchasing Power Parity 
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this research is public data accessible to all and that the research draws upon adequate record 
keeping, proper storage of data in line with confidentiality, statute, and University policy. All 
references will be made to highlight where the data came from. The research has been carried 
out rigorously and professionally, and due credit has been attributed to all parties involved. 
Proper acknowledgement has been given to the authorship of data and ideas by referencing 
all literature used. There are no financial and professional conflicts of interest by engaging in 
this research. Furthermore, in line with University regulation, proper consideration has been 
given to all ethical issues, and appropriate approval sought and received from all relevant 
stakeholders. In general, all the procedures regarding ethical issues of the university have 
been followed in accordance with the Ethical Procedures, Good Research Practice & Research 
Misconduct. 
5.17. Conclusion 
Measuring the size of the informal economy can be a challenging task, and at the same time 
can produce different estimates depending on the causes and indicators used in the MIMIC 
model. The results tend to vary based on the adoption of the method for measuring the 
informal economy. This methodology is based on the use of the MIMIC model, which is a 
special case of SEM, to measure the size and development of the informal economy in the 
countries of the Balkan Peninsula.  The methodology does provide some contribution to the 
existing literature in that it uses well-justified enforcement variables as the leading causes of 
informality for this region. This methodology also shows ways to overcome some of the 
problems with the panel data samples. Finally, this methodology will be applied for the first 
time for the ten Balkan countries. 
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Chapter 6: Results and Analysis 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the estimation results of the size and development of the informal 
economy for ten Balkan countries and provides analysis on the size and the development of 
the informal economy in these countries. It will also evaluate the primary drivers of economic 
informality in these countries, which will then be used to justify a number of policy 
recommendations. The chapter will begin by providing some descriptive statistics for the main 
variables used in the model, and other statistical tests to ensure that the data is reliable for 
regression. The model results along with the use of the benchmarking procedure will be 
provided in this chapter, as well as estimation results on the size of the informal economy 
from 1996 to 2014 for the ten Balkan countries.  
6.2. Summary of data collection 
The dataset is comprised of 10 panels (countries) and 19 periods (years). Therefore, in total, 
there are 190 observations. Countries parts of this investigation are the Balkan Peninsula 
countries (Albania, Greece, Slovenia, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, and FYR Macedonia) and the period of study is from 1996 to 2014.  
Determining sample size requirements for SEM (and for MIMIC) is a challenge. Flexibility is a 
key advantage of SEM, allowing for the examination of complex relations, and the use of 
different types of data. SEM also allows forcomparisons across other alternative models (Wolf 
et al., 201388). But this very flexibility of SEM makes it challenging to develop generalised 
                                                          
88 Available online at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4334479/ (last accessed on 21.12.2018) 
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requirements and guidelines with regards to the sample size (MacCallum et al., 1996). Despite 
this, various rules-of-thumb have been developed, such as Boomsma (1985), proposing a 
minimum sample size of at least 100 or 200 observations ; Bentler & Chou (1987) and Bollen 
(1989) arguing that a sample size of 5 or 10 observations per estimated parameter should be 
the minimum norm; or the proposed minimum sample size requirement by Bollen (1989) 
indicating that the sample size for SEM analysis should ecompass at least 10 cases per 
variable. These minimum requirement rules or proposals, however, are not specific to the 
model one applies which could potentially result in either overestimation or underestimation 
of sample size requirements. It is demonstrated that: 
“….model characteristics such as the level of communality across the variables, sample 
size, and degree of factor determinacy all affect the accuracy of the parameter 
estimates and model fit statistics, which raises doubts about applying sample size 
rules-of-thumb to a specific SEM” (Wolf et al., 201389; Online; MacCallum et al., 1996; 
p.130-149).  
In light of the above, the number of observations in this study comply with the studies 
referenced above. 
In ensuring robustness, this study has used the Swain scaling factor option in STATA as 
explained and discussed in section 5.12 in the methodology chapter. Furthermore, in order 
to relax the assumption of multivariate normality, this study has made use of the Satorra-
Bentler option in STATA 14 SEM module, which improves the chi-square statistic of the 
goodness of fit in case of non-normal variables (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). 
                                                          
89 Available online at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4334479/ (last accessed on 21.12.2018) 
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6.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.3.1 below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression 
estimation as causes and indicators of the latent variable. Different MIMIC model 
specifications have been generated and have made use of the variables below. A total number 
of observations for this study was 190, where the number of countries was 10 (i.e. N=10) and 
the number of time periods was 19 (i.e. T=19). The choice of period coverage was constrained 
by the availability and completeness of data, as well as the interest in researching these ten 
Balkan countries.  
The table below shows a significant deviation from the mean for GDP per capita and Electricity 
Consumption, which can be explained due to differences among countries used in the data 
sample (inclusion Balkan countries). Inflation and M2 money growth variables also show 
relatively high standard deviation, and again the differences can be justified with the inclusion 
of different Balkan countries within the same sample.  
It is also interesting to note from these descriptive statistics the difference between the 
maximum and minimum values for Business Freedom Index, Monetary Freedom Index, 
Government Effectiveness Index and Financial Freedom Index. These indexes measure the 
level of economic freedom in 186 countries worldwide provided by the Heritage Foundation. 
The maximum and minimum value differences are also partly due to the inclusion of transition 
and EU countries of the Balkan Peninsula into one sample. The index of Economic freedom 
has improved for most of the Balkan countries, as it has been discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
Appendix 6.3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample for each country from 
1996 to 2014. 
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Apart from simple descriptive statistics provided below, this thesis has also performed other 
analysis on the data, such as tests of multicollinearity and unit root tests.   
Table 6.3. 1 - Descriptive Statistics for all variables  
Variable Description90 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Business Freedom Index 190 63.53 11.09 40.00 85.40 -0.08 2.50 
Monetary Freedom Index 190 67.01 19.86 0.00 90.70 -1.74 5.59 
Degree of Urbanisation 190 57.18 10.69 39.16 77.68 0.12 2.22 
Government Spending Index 190 52.35 18.04 0.00 89.20 -0.54 2.87 
Government Effectiveness Index 190 -0.01 0.57 -1.26 1.19 0.15 2.17 
Agriculture Sector Dominance 190 10.54 6.66 1.89 37.48 1.17 4.36 
Unemployment Rate 190 15.33 8.69 4.40 37.30 0.95 2.75 
Control of Corruption 190 -0.16 0.53 -1.12 1.32 0.76 3.40 
Government Integrity Index 190 35.58 13.64 10.00 76.80 0.16 3.26 
Financial Freedom Index 190 52.84 13.19 10.00 78.57 -0.53 3.21 
Rule of Law Index 190 -0.10 0.59 -1.34 1.22 0.33 2.73 
Taxation Revenues (% of GDP) 190 18.59 5.20 0.23 35.76 -2.03 9.09 
Inflation (GDP deflator) 190 16.62 72.06 -17.06 958.65 11.93 155.50 
Employment to Population Ratio 190 45.57 7.16 29.60 62.70 -0.20 2.53 
GDP per Capita (PPP) 190 14925.40 7069.26 3481.71 32073.96 0.70 2.54 
Electricity Consumption 190 3497.20 1478.28 680.69 7137.82 0.46 2.65 
Ratio of M1 over M2 190 0.43 0.16 0.11 0.88 0.08 2.79 
Labour Force Participation Rate 190 62.51 5.84 49.20 71.90 -0.79 2.77 
M2 money growth rate 190 23.24 34.53 -14.56 351.45 5.45 46.32 
 
In appendix 6.3.2, histograms for all the variables have been provided. These histograms 
summarise the data graphically for the density from a normal and kernel distribution 
perspective. Most of the variables have a relatively normal distribution, such as that of 
Business Freedom Index, Government Effectiveness Index, Tax Revenue (as a percentage of 
GDP), Employment to population ratio, and the M1 over M2 ratio. A right-skewed distribution 
can be found in the Agriculture Sector Dominance variable, the Unemployment rate, GDP per 
capita and the M2 money growth, while a left-skewed distribution is found in Monetary 
                                                          
90 Full description of each variable has been provided in section 5.7 of chapter five. 
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Freedom Index and the Government Spending index. A double-peaked or bimodal 
distribution is found in the Degree of Urbanisation variable, Control of Corruption, Rule of 
Law Index, and the labour force participation ratio. For non-normal distribution in some 
variables, all MIMIC regressions for all the specifications shown in section 6.4 below have 
made use of Satorra-Bentler option as well as the Robust option in STATA (discussed in section 
5.12 of the methodology chapter).  
6.3.1. Multicollinearity 
Collinearity is a term that refers to two explanatory variables being perfectly (or close to 
perfect) linear combinations of each other91. Thus, two variables can be described as perfectly 
collinear if the correlation statistic is exactly 1 or -1 (Gujarati, 2009). Close to these ranges, 
the two variables can be classified as near perfect linear relationship and collinear. When we 
include more than two explanatory variables and they tend to have features described above, 
then that is referred to as multicollinearity. If the level of multicollinearity increases between 
variables used in the same sample, the coefficient estimates from a regression or SEM analysis 
could become unbalanced with potentially inflated coefficients of the standard errors 
(Gujarati, 2009). Therefore, detecting multicollinearity in variables is essential.  
Appendix 6.3.3 shows the correlation matrix corresponding to variance matrix for the 
variables used in the MIMIC specifications. According to the results, there does not seem to 
be a significant problem of multicollinearity. The results indicate a significant positive 
correlation between the Rule of Law Index and Control of Corruption, as well as Government 
Effectiveness Index. There is a significant negative correlation between the rate of 
                                                          
91 Conversely, if there is no relationship between two or more variables, they are classified as orthogonal. 
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unemployment and the employment to population ratio. Variables with significant 
correlations have not been used in the same regression. 
A further check for multicollinearity has been performed in STATA using the “_rmcoll” 
command. This command will omit or remove any variables due to 
collinearity/multicollinearity. When this command was applied to all the MIMIC 
specifications, no variable was removed or omitted, indicating that there is no 
multicollinearity on the used variables. 
6.3.2. Unit root tests 
Unit root for panel data analysis has been conducted in STATA and eViews in order to check 
for stationarity of the data and to check whether the assumption about multi-variate 
normality is not violated. Helberger and Knepel (1988) claim that MIMIC estimations can 
result in unbalanced coefficients being estimated concerning any changes to the size of a 
sample and the use of alternative specifications of the MIMIC model. However, if data are 
stationary and normally distributed then the instability disappears asymptotically (Dell’Anno, 
2003). 
The stationarity of a series strongly influences its behaviour and properties. Further to this in 
case of spurious regression, “…if two variables are trending over time, regression of one on 
the other could have a high R2 even if the two are completely unrelated” (Brooks, 2014; p.354). 
In cases where the variables used in the regression models (and this includes SEM analysis) 
are non-stationary, “…then it can be proved that the standard assumptions for asymptotic 
analysis will not be valid” (Brooks, 2014; p.354). This means that “…the usual “t-ratios” will 
not follow a t-distribution, so we cannot validly undertake hypothesis tests about the 
regression parameters” (Brooks, 2014; p.354-355). Several macroeconomic and ﬁnancial data 
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in the form of time series tend to exhibit some trending movement or non-stationarity in their 
mean. For instance, security prices, macroeconomic indicators and aggregates such as the 
real GDP, as well as exchange rates are some examples of variables which exhibit trends in 
their behaviour. Thus, it is important to undertake such unit root tests for this dataset, as this 
dataset encompasses some macroeconomic variables in it, such as the GDP growth, 
unemployment figures, inflation, taxation and money circulation. Having said this, for SEM 
regressions, such tests are not a pre-requisite and are not initial assumptions made about 
data (Ciraki, 2007; Kline, 2015). 
STATA92 implements a number of tests for unit roots or stationarity in panel datasets such as 
the Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), Harris and Tzavalis (1999), Breitung and Das (2005), Im–Pesaran–
Shin (2003), and Fisher-type tests (Choi, 2001), which have as the null hypothesis that all the 
panels contain a unit root. The Hadri (2000) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, on the other hand, 
has the null hypothesis that all the panels are (trend) stationary. eViews also performs some 
well-known unit root tests for panel data, such as the Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) and Maddala 
& Wu (1999). 
These tests make different asymptotic assumptions about the number of panels and time 
periods in each panel. Most of the tests assume that the panel dataset is balanced, except for 
the Im–Pesaran–Shin and Fisher-type tests which can allow unbalanced panels to be tested. 
Each of the tests above has their advantages and disadvantages as described in Tzavalis 
(2002), Hall and Mairesse (2002) and the papers highlighted above, as well as detailed 
discussion provided by Baltagi (2008, p.6), Hsiao (2003) and Arellano (2003). 
                                                          
92 As per STATA’s website available at: https://www.stata.com/features/overview/panel-data-unit-root-tests/ 
Last accessed on 23.12.2018) 
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The test by Levin–Lin–Chu (2002) performs well when the number of panels lies between 10 
and 250 and when the number of periods lies between 5 and 250. If the number of periods is 
minimal, the test will be undersized and will have low statistical power. The dataset for this 
study has ten panels and 19 periods (i.e. N=10 and T=19) (Hsiao, 2003; Arellano, 2003). It is 
also important to mention that this test depends on the independence assumption across 
cross-sections and it is not applicable if the cross-sectional correlation is present.  
The Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) test tends to perform better than Levin-Lin-Chu test with small 
samples according to Monto Carlo simulations (Hsiao, 2003; Arellano, 2003). However, if the 
number of panels is very large or small relative to the number of periods, then both Im-
Pesaran-Shin and Levin-Lin-Chu tests show size distortions, implying that the null is rejected 
too often. This is not the case for this sample as N is 10 and T is 19. Therefore, this study has 
made use of the Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) test.  
Similarly, this study has also run the first-generation test by Maddala and Wu (1999). Maddala 
and Wu (1999) proposed the use of the Fisher test which is mainly based on combining the p-
values of the test-statistic for a unit root in each of the cross-sectional units. The main 
advantage of this test is that it does not require a balanced panel and that T can differ over 
cross-sections (Hoang and McNown, 2006).  
The results provided in Appendix 6.3.4 show the test statistics for the unit root using the 
following two tests: Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999). The results from 
the Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) indicate that most of the variables used do not contain unit root 
and that the panels are stationary. There are some variables however that do contain a unit 
root, but not for their first differences or when data is converted in growth rates. Maddala 
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and Wu (1999) test come to a similar conclusion as the test by Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) with 
regards to the data sample used in this study. This study has applied the Satorra & Bentler, 
(1994) option from STATA to accommodate for those variables which are non-stationary as 
discussed in section 5.12 of the methodology chapter. 
6.4. Running the model and analysis 
SEM analysis have been conducted using equation (5.5) and (5.6) outlined in chapter five. 
These analyses have been performed using STATA 14 package, in which SEM is an integrated 
option. Table 6.4.1 below shows the selected MIMIC specifications for the benchmarking 
procedure, to convert the MIMIC model indexes into absolute value for the size of the 
informal economy for the ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula. These three MIMIC 
specifications were chosen for the benchmarking procedure as they are associated with the 
best model fit statistics as shown in section 6.5 of this chapter. 
MIMIC specification 1, uses six causes and two indicators in the model analysis. The six causes 
used for this specification are the Business Freedom Index, Degree of Urbanisation, 
Government Effectiveness Index, Monetary Freedom Index, Government Spending Index and 
Financial Freedom Index. The two indicators used in the analysis are the GDP per capita and 
the Electric Power consumption. The reference indicator variable which has been constrained 
to -1 is the GDP per capita, in line with the justification provided in section 5.13 of the 
methodology chapter. 
MIMIC specification 2 is also a 6-1-2 model, which makes use of six causes and two indicators 
in the SEM analysis. The six causes used for this specification similar to MIMIC Specification 1 
except the use of Control of Corruption variable instead of the Financial Freedom Index. 
MIMIC specification 3, similar to other two specifications, also uses six causes and two 
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indicators in the model analysis. Instead of the Control of Corruption or the Financial Freedom 
Index, this specification makes use of the Employment to Population Ratio, for the reasons 
provided in section 5.6 of the methodology chapter.  
All the MIMIC regressions have been run using the robust options available for SEM. Those 
robust model analyses have been discussed in section 5.12, of the methodology chapter. In 
order to relax the assumption of multivariate normality, this study makes use of the Satorra-
Bentler option to improve the chi-square statistic of the goodness of fit in case of non-normal 
and non-stationary variables (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). This option was crucial here because 
histograms and the panel unit root tests reveal that some variables are not normally 
distributed and are non-stationary. The regressions are also robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Furthermore, to control for small samples when running SEM or MIMIC models, this study 
has made use of the Swain scaling factor (Antonakis & Bastardoz, 2013). 
Table 6.4. 1 - Selected MIMIC Specifications for benchmarking procedure 
Selected MIMIC Specifications for benchmarking procedure 
MIMIC (6-1-2) MIMIC (6-1-2) MIMIC (6-1-2) 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables 
- - Employment to Population 
ratio - - 
Business Freedom Index Business Freedom Index Business Freedom Index 
Degree of Urbanisation Degree of Urbanisation Degree of Urbanisation 
Government Effectiveness 
Index 
Government Effectiveness 
Index 
Government Effectiveness 
Index 
Monetary Freedom Index Monetary Freedom Index Monetary Freedom Index 
Government Spending Index Government Spending Index Government Spending Index 
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Financial Freedom Index Control of Corruption 
- 
- 
Indicator variables Indicator variables Indicator variables 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(constrained) 
Electric Power Consumption Electric Power Consumption Electric Power Consumption 
The analyses for the MIMIC specification have generated path coefficients which indicate the 
impact of each of the causes and indicators of the latent variable and the direction of it. The 
use of these variables for the MIMIC model analysis is supported by literature (Schneider, 
2006, 2007a; Dell’Anno, 2007; Vuletin, 2008; Schneider et al., 2010; Abdih & Medina, 2013; 
Hassan & Schneider, 2016a, 2016b; Bitzenis et al., 12016; Medina & Schneider, 2017; and 
many others discussed in the literature review chapter). The use of these variables in the 
MIMIC model analysis, justified in the methodology chapter93, is also supported by the 
statistics they produce and by the chi-square and the model fit statistics. Tables 6.4.2 and 
6.4.3 below show all MIMIC specifications that have been run for analysis. All MIMIC 
specifications below show significant coefficients with correct signs on the direction of the 
causality of each variable. Model fit statistics for each of the MIMIC specifications have been 
provided in section 6.5 of this chapter. 
                                                          
93 A justification for the use of variables for MIMIC specifications has been provided in section 5.6. of the 
methodology chapter. A discussion of previous studies that have made use of similar variables as causes and 
indicators has been listed in Appendix 3.5.1 and discussed in some detail in section 3.5 of the literature review 
chapter. 
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Table 6.4. 2 - All MIMIC Specifications with best Model fit statistics. 
MIMIC Specifications with best Model fit statistics 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 Specification 7 Specification 8 
Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables Causal variables 
- - 
Employment to 
Population ratio 
- - - Rule of Law Index 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Tax Revenue (% of 
GDP) 
Inflation, GDP 
Deflator 
Tax Revenue (% of 
GDP) 
- - 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
- 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Integrity Index 
Government 
Integrity Index 
Government 
Integrity Index 
Financial Freedom 
Index 
Control of 
Corruption 
- - - - - Rule of Law Index 
Indicator variables Indicator variables Indicator variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
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Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
M2 Money 
growth 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
 
Table 6.4. 3 - Regression results for all MIMIC specifications. 
 Model Specifications 
(Balkan countries, 190 
observations) 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 Specification 7 Specification 8 
 6-1-2^ 6-1-2^ 6-1-2^ 4-1-2 5-1-2 5-1-2 5-1-2 4-1-2 
C
au
sa
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Business Freedom Index 
-0.106*** -0.088*** -0.066*** -0.115*** -0.118*** -0.132*** -0.098*** -0.091*** 
(-4.86) (-3.69) (-2.900) (-6.33) (-5.19) (-5.68) (-4.46) (-4.29) 
Monetary Freedom Index 
-0.039*** -0.017* -0.037*** - - - - - 
(-3.94) (-1.77) (-3.210) - - - - - 
Degree of Urbanisation 
-0.061** -0.063** -0.086*** - -0.051** - - - 
(-2.48) (-2.43) (-2.980) - (-1.99) - - - 
Government Spending 
Index 
0.052*** 0.044*** 0.077*** - 0.053*** - - - 
(5.59) (3.81) (6.500) - (5.66) - - - 
Government 
Effectiveness Index 
-0.914*** -0.789*** -0.817*** -0.665*** -0.938*** -0.665*** -0.536*** -0.461*** 
-22.960 (-12.57) (-16.070) (-14.86) (-22.09) (-13.54) (-11.58) (-11.13) 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
- - - 0.349*** - 0.364*** 0.267*** 0.295*** 
- - - (12.62) - (9.98) (8.40) (8.58) 
Control of Corruption 
- -0.175** - - - - - - 
- (-2.38) - - - - - - 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
(annual %)  
- - - - 0.003*** - - - 
- - - - (3.28) - - - 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
- - - 0.130*** - 0.136*** - - 
- - - (3.47) - (3.57) - - 
- - -0.164*** - - - - - 
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Employment to 
population ratio 
- - (-5.140) - - - - - 
Financial Freedom Index 
0.09194 - - - - - - - 
(5.59) - - - - - - - 
Unemployment Rate 
- - - - - - - 0.0916*** 
- - - - - - - (4.91) 
Government Integrity 
Index 
- - - - - -0.0213 -0.0465** -0.0348** 
- - - - - (1.13) (2.41) (1.72) 
Rule of Law Index 
      -0.355*** -0.326*** 
      (-4.02) (-3.65) 
In
d
ic
at
o
r 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
GDP per capita, PPP 
-1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
- - - - - - - - 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
-0.164*** -0.164*** -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.162*** - -0.159*** -0.154*** 
(-15.47) (-14.42) (-14.86) (-14.93) (-15.11) - (-13.85) (-13.63) 
M2 money growth (%) 
- - - - - 1.354*** - - 
- - - - - (3.61) - - 
Labour Force 
Participation Ratio 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
                                                          
94 The sign of the coefficient is not in line with hypothesis.  
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The results from the above regressions indicate that the coefficients of variables used in the 
model presented in the methodology chapter for all MIMIC specifications are almost all 
statistically significant at 1 percent, 5 percent or the 10 percent levels. This is shown in table 
6.4.3 above. This table shows that there is a significant negative relationship between 
Business Freedom Index, Monetary Freedom Index, Degree of Urbanisation, Government 
Effectiveness Index, Employment to Population Ratio, Control of Corruption, Government 
Integrity and the Rule of Law index with the latent variable (i.e. the informal economy). There 
is also a positive relationship between Government Spending Index, Tax revenues, 
Unemployment Rate, Agriculture Sector Dominance and the level of inflation.   
However, the Financial Freedom Index shows a positive relationship with the informal 
economy, which is not in line with expectations. The coefficient of this variable is significant 
but not its causality. This index measures the extent of the regulatory burden and government 
intervention in the financial system with a scale of 0 to 100, where a score of 0 indicates a 
high level of government intervention and regulation, and 100 indicates low level or negligible 
government interference. Therefore, in line with theory, one would expect that there would 
be a negative relationship between this index and the size of the informal economy. 
An impact of the informal economy is argued to be reflected in the Electric power 
consumption (Kaufmann & Kaliberda, 1996; Schneider & Enste, 2000; Aldersdale et al., 2006; 
Arby et al., 2012).  The hypothesis is that, the larger the size of the informal economy, the 
higher the electric consumption per capita, ceteris paribus. Assuming the unitary elasticity, 
the growth in electricity consumption is equal to the growth in the total real GDP (Schneider 
& Enste, 2000; Arby et al., 2012). Contrary to Arby et al. (2012) and this hypothesis, the results 
indicate a negative relationship between the Electric Power consumption and the size of the 
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informal economy for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. An explanation for this is that 
people, who are involved in the informal economic activities, tend to be mainly involved in 
low skilled and low technologically intensive economic activities, requiring minimum if not 
zero amount of electricity for their activities. Individuals and businesses that require a high 
source of electricity for their economic activities tend to operate within the rules and 
regulations. Since individuals and businesses tend to operate hidden from authorities, high 
use of energy and electricity would send signals to authorities who would then be able to 
detect those involved in the informal economy. This is also supported by the fact that the 
results indicate a significant positive relationship between the size of the agriculture sector 
and the level of the informal economy. Majority of agriculture activities do not need as much 
electricity as other sectors do. Instead, they depend on other sources of energy such as petrol 
and gas. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant relationship between the degree of 
urbanisation and the size of the informal economy, indicating that people living in urban areas 
are engaged in other economic activities than agriculture and those activities tend to be more 
in the formal rather than informal economy. Therefore, the use of the Dominance of the 
Agriculture sector variable and the Degree of Urbanisation variable can be used as proxies for 
one another. 
The results indicated in Table 6.4.3 support the causality between money in circulation and 
the level of the informal economy. The relationship between M2 money growth and the 
informal economy is positive. The higher the size of the informal economy, the higher will the 
need for liquidity or currency be, ceteris paribus, as individuals or businesses involved in 
informal economic activities prefer payments for transactions in cash or the most liquid 
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payment forms. This hypothesis is supported by literature discussed in the literature review 
chapter and the results presented in the table above. 
The relationship between GDP per capita and informal economy is negative. Following the 
work by Dell’Anno (2003, 2007) and Hassan & Schneider (2016a, 2016b), GDP per capita 
variable has been set as the reference indicator variable and restricted to -1 in this analysis as 
per the explanation in section 5.13 of the methodology chapter. A graphical and mathematical 
presentation of the above selected three MIMIC specifications for the benchmarking 
procedure can be presented as follows: 
MIMIC Specification 1: 6-1-2 MIMIC Model  
Figure 6.4. 1 - Graphical presentation of the MIMIC Spec 1 (a 6-1-2 MIMIC Model) 
 
A mathematical presentation of this MIMIC model specification can be expressed as per 
below, where only the Structural Equation part of the model is used to calculate the MIMIC 
model index. The MIMIC model index then is converted into absolute values for the informal 
economy using the benchmarking procedure and an initial external value for the size of the 
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informal economy. This study has made use of the Schneider et al. (2010) and Buehn and 
Schneider (2012) (equation 5.26) initial external value for the benchmarking or calibration 
procedure for the year 1999 as discussed in detail in section 5.10 of the methodology chapter. 
6-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝑀𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐶 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = [−0.106𝑖𝑡,−0.039𝑖𝑡,−0.061𝑖𝑡,0.052𝑖𝑡,−0.914𝑖𝑡]
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
MIMIC Specification 2: 6-1-2 MIMIC Model  
Figure 6.4. 2 - Graphical presentation of the MIMIC Spec 2 (a 6-1-2 MIMIC Model) 
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A mathematical presentation of this MIMIC model specification is expressed as follows: 
6-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝑀𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐶 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = [−0.088𝑖𝑡, −0.017𝑖𝑡, −0.063𝑖𝑡, 0.044𝑖𝑡, −0.789𝑖𝑡, −0.175𝑖𝑡]
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
MIMIC Specification 3: 6-1-2 MIMIC Model 
Figure 6.4. 3 - Graphical presentation of the MIMIC Spec 3 (a 6-1-2 MIMIC Model) 
 
A mathematical presentation of this MIMIC model specification is expressed as follows: 
6-1-2 MIMIC Model - Part 1: The Structural Equation model: 
𝑀𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐶 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = [−0.066
𝑖𝑡
, −0.037
𝑖𝑡
, −0.086
𝑖𝑡
, 0.077
𝑖𝑡
, −0.817
𝑖𝑡
, −0.164
𝑖𝑡
]
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜]
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6.5. Model fit statistics and evaluation of results 
Full set of model fit statistics (discussed in section 5.11 of the methodology chapter) for all 
MIMIC specifications have been presented in table 6.5.3 below, while selected model fit 
statistics for MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3, have been presented in table 6.5.1 below. These two 
tables provide the most popular and reported indices in the literature. A justification for not 
providing other model fit indices can be found in table 6.5.2 below. 
The model fit statistics for all MIMIC specifications are highly significant and within the 
acceptable values as discussed in section 5.11 of the methodology chapter. The rationale 
behind the chosen three MIMIC specifications for the benchmarking procedure in converting 
the MIMIC model indexes into absolute values for the informal economy has been done in 
accordance with these statistics. The model fit statistics for MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3, are slightly 
better than the model fit statistics for the other MIMIC specifications.  
The value of RMSEA for MIMIC Spec 1 is 0.04, for MIMIC Spec 2 is 0.06 and for MIMIC Spec 3 
is 0.06, indicating a good model fit for each of the specifications (MacCallum et al., 1996). 
Similarly, a value less than 0.08 for SRMR is considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA 
is among the most reported in the literature, and its correctness is measured by the p-close 
(Kenny, 2015)95. The p-close for MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3, indicate that the models’ RMSEA is 
correct and that the fit of the model is right. A further parameter indicating good model fit in 
                                                          
95 (Kenny, 2015, Available online at http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm). This measure is “…one-sided test of the 
null hypothesis that the RMSEA equals .05, which is called a close-fitting model. The alternative, one-sided 
hypothesis is that the RMSEA is greater than 0.05.’ Therefore, “…. if the p is greater than .05 (i.e., not 
statistically significant), then it is concluded that the fit of the model is ‘close’.  If the p is less than .05, it is 
concluded that the model’s fit is worse than close fitting (i.e., the RMSEA is greater than 0.05)” (Kenny, 2015, 
Available online at http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm). 
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the MIMIC specifications is the R-squared or the CD. This value shows that the model explains 
over 90 percent of the data around its mean.  
Table 6.5. 1 - Selected Satorra-Bentler Model Fit Statistics for MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3. 
Index Type Index 
Name 
MIMIC Spec 1 
value96 
MIMIC Spec 2 
value 
MIMIC Spec 3 
value 
Acceptable 
Value 
Incremental Fit 
Indices 
CFI97 1.00 0.99 0.99 ≥ 0.90 
TLI 0.99 0.98 0.98 ≥ 0.90 
Absolute Fit 
Indices 
RMSEA 0.04** 0.06* 0.06* ≤ 0.08 
SRMR 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** ≤ 0.08 
MC 0.97 0.96 0.96 ≥ 0.90 
R-squared 
CD 0.94 0.92 0.92 ≥ 0.90 
 
Table 6.5. 2 - Reasons for not using other model fit parameters 
Model Fit Index 
Name 
Explanation Reference 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) One major disadvantage of this model fit index is that it cannot 
be low, when more parameters are added to the model.  This is 
because the more parameters are added to the model, the 
greater will the index be.  Therefore this index is not 
recommended. 
Kenny (2015) 
The Goodness of Fit 
Index (GFI) 
This measure is affected by the size of the sample. The current 
consensus is not to use this measure. This is only available in 
LISREL software package. 
Sharma et al. 
(2005); Kenny 
(2015) 
Adjusted Goodness of 
Fit Index (AGFI) 
This measure is affected by the size of the sample. The current 
consensus is not to use this measure. This is only available in 
LISREL software package. 
Sharma et al. 
(2005); Kenny 
(2015) 
Hoelter’s CN The use of Hoelter’s CN is only recommended to be used when N 
> 200 and the chi-square is statistically significant.  
Hu and Bentler 
(1998) 
                                                          
96 Model Fit Statistics presented in this table are those using the Satorra & Bentler option. Full set of Model Fit 
statistics has been provided in Table 6.5.2 below. 
97 CFI and RMSEA are also known as Noncentrality-based Indices, TLI is also known as a Relative Fit Index 
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Table 6.5. 3 - Full set of model fit statistics for all MIMIC specifications shown in table 6.4.2.  
Model Fit Statistics 
(Balkan countries, 190 observations) 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6 Specification 7 Specification 8 
5-1-2^ 6-1-2^ 6-1-2^ 4-1-2 5-1-2 4-1-2 5-1-2 6-1-2 
M
o
d
e
l F
it
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
Chi2 6.41 7.76 7.51 4.57 6.72 9.10 12.74 25.96 
p > chi2 0.27 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Swain corrected Chi2 6.28 7.60 7.35 4.49 6.58 8.93 12.50 25.40 
p > chi2 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Satorra-Bentler Chi2 6.71 8.83 8.33 5.29 5.96 7.81 15.35 31.47 
p > chi2 0.24 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.31 0.10 0.00 0.00 
RMSEA 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04** 0.08* 0.11 0.15 
pclose 0.51 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.48 0.18 0.06 0.00 
Satorra-Bentler 
RMSEA 
0.04** 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.03** 0.07* 0.12 0.17 
CFI 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 
Satorra-Bentler CFI 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 
TLI 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.90 
Satorra-Bentler TLI 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.89 
SRMR 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.03** 
CD 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.92 
R_square 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.92 
mc 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.92 
mc_square 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.92 
Number of observations 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 
^ Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
• Values presented in parentheses are the absolute z values. Values without any types of brackets are coefficients 
• *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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6.6. Robust analysis and discussion of the results 
Conducting robust analysis with MIMIC is challenging as the estimation results are quite often 
not robust (Schneider, 2015; Medina & Schneider, 2017). There are not many tests that are 
available for robust analysis other than robust standards errors estimates from statistical 
packages (Schneider, 2015). However, robust tests and analysis have been completed from 
different perspectives, and they relate to the use of the MIMIC specifications outlined above. 
First, robust tests and analysis investigated whether the changes in the indicators used in each 
of the MIMIC specifications for regression would generate any changes to the coefficients’ 
statistical significance of the variables used as causes of the informal economy and whether 
there would be any changes in the causality of these coefficients. Second, the analysis wanted 
to understand whether the model specifications are robust when we change the number of 
indicators for regression and whether such changes would affect the statistical significance 
and causality of the coefficients on the variables used as causes and indicators in the MIMIC 
model. Third, the robust tests and analysis applied the same MIMIC specifications to another 
data sample to understand their robustness with different samples and different countries or 
a larger sample. Fourth, we can apply the robust command98 in STATA which computes the 
Huber-White robust estimates of the standard errors. Similar robust tests have been applied 
by Schneider (2015), Hassan & Schneider (2016a, 2016b), and Medina & Schneider (2017). 
The robustness of the MIMIC specifications used can also be analysed using the model fit 
statistics discussed in the Methodology chapter. There are a number of model fit statistics 
that provide information on how accurately is predicted that the observed covariance matrix 
for the variables in the MIMIC model matches that which we would expect if the model was 
                                                          
98 vce(robust) option, available at https://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtvce_options.pdf (last accessed on 
20.09.2017) 
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an accurate representation of the data. Such model fits statistics are the absolute fit indices, 
the chi-square and incremental fit indices, which will be analysed and discussed concerning 
each of the MIMIC specifications. From the MIMIC specifications above, the model fit 
statistics indicate that the three best specifications are MIMIC specification 1, 2 and 3. For 
this thesis, the robust tests and analysis will be performed for the first three MIMIC 
specifications presented in the tables above. 
6.6.1. MIMIC Specification 1 
Table 6.6.1.1 shows that this model specification (MIMIC Specification 1) made up of six 
causes is robust when changing the indicators, as well as changing the number of indicators 
applied in the MIMIC regression analysis. Furthermore, the model seems to be robust when 
changing one of the causes or replacing one of the causes used in the regression. It is evident 
from the regression results that even when we allow for a change in the indicators, the results 
indicate significant coefficients for all causes and indicators in this specification. For example, 
MIMIC specification 1 A, 1 B and 1 C generate significant coefficients and correct causality for 
all the causes and indicators applied in this MIMIC specification, for the situation with two 
indicators (GDP per capita with Electricity consumption, and GDP per capita with Labour force 
participation ratio) and for the situation with three indicators (GDP per capita with Electricity 
consumption and Labour force participation ratio), respectively. Equally, the model is robust 
in statistical significance and causality of causes and indicators when we change one of the 
causes, which is the change from Financial Freedom Index to the Unemployment Rate. 
Regression results are presented in the table below. However, there are some changes to the 
model fit statistics as highlighted and discussed below. 
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Table 6.6.1. 1 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 1 – Changing causes and indicators used in the 
MIMIC regression 
MIMIC Specification 1 and robust analysis  
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 1, 
A 
Specification 1, 
B 
Specification 1, 
C 
Specification 1, 
D 
Specification 1, 
E 
Specification 1, 
F 
6-1-299 6-1-2 6-1-3 6-1-3 6-1-2 6-1-2 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
- - - 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Government 
Effectiveness  
Government 
Effectiveness  
Government 
Effectiveness  
Government 
Effectiveness  
Government 
Effectiveness  
Government 
Effectiveness  
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Financial 
Freedom Index 
Financial 
Freedom Index 
Financial 
Freedom Index 
- - - 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables100 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
- - 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
- - 
                                                          
99 Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, 
such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
100 We tried to use monetary aggregates, such as the M1 over M2 ratio (which represents the liquid currency in 
circulation), as well as M2 growth rate or the M2 as a percentage of GDP, but this indicator does not return to be 
significant at any of the 1 percent, 5 percent or the 10 percent levels, in the MIMIC regression analysis. Same 
holds for MIMIC specification 2 and 3, discussed and presented below. 
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Table 6.6.1. 2 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 1 – Regression results 
 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
 Specification 1, A Specification 1, B Specification 1, C Specification 1, D Specification 1, E Specification 1, F 
 6-1-2
101 6-1-2 6-1-3 6-1-3 6-1-2 6-1-2 
C
au
sa
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Business Freedom 
Index 
-0.106*** -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.079*** 
(-4.86) (-5.35) (-5.29) (-3.69) (-3.82) (-3.53) 
Monetary Freedom 
Index 
-0.039*** -0.0351*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.041*** 
(-3.94) (-3.18) (-3.92) (-3.33) (-3.34) (-3.32) 
Degree of Urbanisation 
-0.061** -0.0575** -0.054** -0.058** -0.060** -0.064** 
(-2.48) (-2.27) (-2.29) (-2.10) (-2.07) (-2.27) 
Government Spending 
Index 
0.052*** 0.0440 0.0482*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 
(5.59) (4.83) (5.31) (5.73) (5.51) (5.93) 
Government 
Effectiveness Index 
-0.914*** -0.917*** -0.918*** -0.801*** -0.781*** -0.795*** 
-22.960 (-23.05) (-22.59) (-15.29) (-14.60) (-14.94) 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Control of Corruption 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
(annual %)  
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Employment to 
population ratio 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
                                                          
101 Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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Financial Freedom 
Index 
0.091102 0.090103 0.092104 - - - 
(5.59) (5.92) (5.62) - - - 
Unemployment Rate 
- - - 0.146*** 0.165*** 0.148*** 
- - - (6.13) (6.54) (5.92) 
Government Integrity 
Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Rule of Law Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
In
d
ic
at
o
r 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
GDP per capita, PPP 
-1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
- - - - - - 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
-0.164*** - -0.165*** -0.158*** - -0.156*** 
(-15.47) - (-15.70) (-14.75) - (-14.32) 
M2 money growth (%) 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Labour Force 
Participation Ratio 
- -0.378*** -0.390*** -0.384*** -0.382*** - 
- (-6.99) (-7.54) (-7.49) (-7.14) - 
 
The table below shows the model fit statistics for the above MIMIC regression results – MIMIC Specification 1. 
 
 
                                                          
102 The sign of the coefficient is not in line with hypothesis.  
103 Same as previous footnote 
104 Same as previous footnote 
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Table 6.6.1. 3 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 1 – Model fit statistics 
Model Fit Statistics 
(Balkan countries, 190 observations) 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 1, A Specification 1, B Specification 1, C Specification 1, D Specification 1, E Specification 1, F 
6-1-2105 6-1-2 6-1-3 6-1-3 6-1-2 6-1-2 
Chi2 6.41 19.76 58.90 84.22 20.43 22.00 
p > chi2 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Swain corrected Chi2 6.28 19.33 57.54 82.25 19.99 21.52 
p > chi2 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Satorra-Bentler Chi2 6.71 18.52 58.95 97.75 21.31 25.11 
p > chi2 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RMSEA 0.04** 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.13 
Satorra-Bentler RMSEA 0.04** 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.15 
CFI 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.97 
Satorra-Bentler CFI 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.96 
TLI 0.99 0.91 0.86 0.78 0.90 0.91 
Satorra-Bentler TLI 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.79 0.91 0.91 
SRMR 0.02** 0.04** 0.05** 0.06* 0.04** 0.04** 
CD 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.90 
R_square 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.90 
mc 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.90 
mc_square 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.90 
Number of observations 190 190 190 190 190 190 
^ Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
• Values presented in parentheses are the absolute z values.  
• Values without any types of brackets are coefficients 
• *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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6.6.2. MIMIC Specification 2 
Table 6.6.2.1 below shows MIMIC Specification 2 which is also made up of six causes. The 
regressions results indicate that this specification is also robust when changing the variables 
used as indicators or their number applied in the MIMIC regression analysis. This model 
specification is also robust when changing one of the causes used in the regression. The 
regression results show that even when we allow for a change in the indicators, the 
coefficients for all causes and indicators in this specification are still significant. For example, 
MIMIC specification 2 A, 2 B and 2 C generate significant coefficients and correct causality for 
all the causes and indicators applied in this MIMIC specification, for the situation with two 
indicators (GDP per capita with Electricity consumption, and GDP per capita with Labour force 
participation ratio) and for the situation with three indicators (GDP per capita with Electricity 
consumption and Labour force participation ratio), respectively. Equally, the model is robust 
in statistical significance and causality of causes and indicators when we change casual 
variables or add additional ones. In this specification, the Employment to Population Ratio 
has been switched with the Unemployment rate to test for robustness indicated in section 
5.6 of the methodology chapter106. However, model fit statistics change as we include 
additional indicators, as illustrated and discussed below in table 6.6.2.3. 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 While for the Unemployment rate the relationship with the informal economy is positive, it is expected that 
the relationship between the employment to population ratio and the informal economy is negative (Schneider & 
Enste, 2000). Using one or the other variable can be justified on the basis of ensuring robustness. 
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Table 6.6.2. 1 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 2 – Changing causes and variables for MIMIC 
regression 
MIMIC Specification 2 and robust analysis  
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 2, 
A 
Specification 2, B 
Specification 2, 
C 
Specification 2, 
D107 
Specification 2, 
E* 
Specification 2, 
F* 
6-1-2108 6-1-2 6-1-3 7-1-3 7-1-2 7-1-2 
Causal variables Causal variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
- - - 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Control of 
Corruption 
Control of 
Corruption 
Control of 
Corruption 
Control of 
Corruption 
Control of 
Corruption 
Control of 
Corruption 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
- - 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
- - 
                                                          
107 This model specification is robust with or without Monetary Freedom Index. The results generated are in line 
with theory in terms of causality of each of the causes and indicators as well as statistical significance of the 
coefficients at the 1 percent, 5 percent or the 10 percent levels. 
108 Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, 
such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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Table 6.6.2. 2 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 2 – Regression results 
 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
 
Specification 2, A Specification 2, B Specification 2, C 
Specification 2, 
D109 
Specification 2, E Specification 2, F 
 6-1-2
110 6-1-2 6-1-3 7-1-3 7-1-2 7-1-2 
C
au
sa
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Business Freedom 
Index 
-0.088*** -0.095*** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.074*** 
(-3.69) (-4.13) (-3.96) (-3.42) (-3.51) (-3.25) 
Monetary Freedom 
Index 
-0.017* -0.014* -0.016** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.042*** 
(-1.77) (-1.31) (-1.68) (-3.39) (-3.35) (-3.40) 
Degree of Urbanisation 
-0.063** -0.060** -0.053** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.082*** 
(-2.43) (-2.25) (-2.11) (-2.66) (-2.61) (-2.84) 
Government Spending 
Index 
0.044*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 
(3.81) (3.46) (3.58) (4.82) (4.84) (4.98) 
Government 
Effectiveness Index 
-0.789*** -0.819*** -0.817*** -0.673*** -0.667*** -0.655*** 
(-12.57) (-12.82) (-12.97) (-9.64) (-9.03) (-9.15) 
Agriculture Sector 
Dominance 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Control of Corruption 
-0.175** -1.401** -1.462** -1.517** -1.356** -1.695** 
(-2.38) (-1.86) (-1.99) (-2.08) (-1.77) (-2.23) 
Inflation, GDP deflator 
(annual %)  
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Employment to 
population ratio 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
                                                          
109 This model specification is robust with or without Monetary Freedom Index. The results generated are in line with theory in terms of causality of each of the causes and 
indicators as well as statistical significance of the coefficients at the 1 percent, 5 percent or the 10 percent levels. 
110 Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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Financial Freedom 
Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Unemployment Rate 
- - - 0.147*** 0.165*** 0.146*** 
- - - (6.11) (6.48) (5.90) 
Government Integrity 
Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Rule of Law Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
In
d
ic
at
o
r 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
GDP per capita, PPP 
-1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
- - - - - - 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
-0.164*** - -0.164*** -0.159*** - -0.157*** 
(-14.42) - (-14.75) (-14.57) - (-14.23) 
M2 money growth (%) 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Labour Force 
Participation Ratio 
- -0.359*** -0.385*** -0.379*** -0.370*** - 
- (-6.40) (-7.26) (-7.40) (-6.90) - 
 
The table below shows the model fit statistics for the above MIMIC regression results – MIMIC Specification 2. 
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Table 6.6.2. 3 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 2 – Model fit statistics 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 2, A Specification 2, B Specification 2, C Specification 2, D Specification 2, E Specification 2, F 
6-1-2111 6-1-2 6-1-3 7-1-3 7-1-2 7-1-2 
Chi2 7.76 32.95 85.20 110.20 33.94 23.65 
p > chi2 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Swain corrected Chi2 7.60 32.23 83.22 107.36 33.12 23.08 
p > chi2 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Satorra-Bentler Chi2 8.83 33.07 95.14 128.55 36.81 27.59 
p > chi2 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RMSEA 0.05** 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.12 
Satorra-Bentler RMSEA 0.06* 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.14 
CFI 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.85 0.96 0.97 
Satorra-Bentler CFI 0.99 0.94 0.87 0.84 0.94 0.96 
TLI 0.99 0.82 0.78 0.74 0.84 0.91 
Satorra-Bentler TLI 0.98 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.84 0.90 
SRMR 0.02** 0.04** 0.05** 0.06* 0.04** 0.03** 
CD 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 
R_square 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 
mc 0.96 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 
mc_square 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 
Number of observations 190 190 190 190 190 190 
^ Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
• Values presented in parentheses are the absolute z values.  
• Values without any types of brackets are coefficients 
• *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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6.6.3. MIMIC specification 3 
For MIMIC specification 3, the robust test analyses indicate that the specification is also 
robust when applying different indicators and causes, or when changing the number of causes 
and indicators used in the MIMIC regression. In the analysis below, we switched the use of 
Degree of Urbanisation with the size of the Agriculture sector. The degree of urbanisation and 
the size of the agriculture sector in a country can be negatively related. As such, one could 
use one or the other as a proxy. This was the case in the work done by Hassan and Schneider 
(2016a, 2016b), Alm and Embaye (2013), Vuletin (2008) and Elshamy (2015). The hypothesis, 
on the other hand, can differ. One would expect a positive relationship between the size of 
the agriculture sector and the informal economy, and a negative relationship between the 
degree of urbanisation and the size of the informal economy, ceteris paribus (Hassan and 
Schneider, 2016a, 2016b; Alm and Embaye, 2013). The coefficients are all significant (as 
indicated in the table below) and at the same time, their causality is in line with the hypothesis 
raised above. 
Table 6.6.3. 1 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 3 – Changing causes and variables for MIMIC 
regression 
MIMIC Specification 3 and robust analysis 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 3, A 
Specification 3, 
B 
Specification 3, 
C 
Specification 3, 
D 
Specification 3, 
E 
Specification 3, 
F 
6-1-2112 6-1-2 6-1-3 6-1-3 6-1-2 6-1-2 
Causal variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Causal 
variables 
Employment to 
Population ratio 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Business Freedom 
Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Agriculture 
Sector 
Dominance 
Agriculture 
Sector 
Dominance 
Agriculture 
Sector 
Dominance 
                                                          
112 Model specification to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, 
such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
 
Monetary 
Freedom Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Government 
Spending Index 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
Indicator 
variables 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP 
(constrained) 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
- - 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Ratio 
- - 
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Table 6.6.3. 2 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 3 – Regression results 
 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
 Specification 3, A Specification 3, B Specification 3, C Specification 3, D Specification 3, E Specification 3, F 
 6-1-2
113 6-1-2 6-1-3 6-1-3 6-1-2 6-1-2 
C
au
sa
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Business Freedom Index 
-0.066*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.102*** 
(-2.900) (-3.82) (-3.69) (-5.58) (-5.61) (-5.51) 
Monetary Freedom Index 
-0.037*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.022** -0.023** -0.021** 
(-3.210) (-3.34) (-3.33) (-2.36) (-2.34) (-2.27) 
Degree of Urbanisation 
-0.086*** -0.060** -0.058** - - - 
(-2.980) (-2.07) (-2.10) - - - 
Government Spending Index 
0.077*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
(6.500) (5.51) (5.73) (2.95) (2.90) (2.98) 
Government Effectiveness Index 
-0.817*** -0.781*** -0.801*** -0.610*** -0.592*** -0.605*** 
(-16.070) (-14.60) (-15.29) (-13.43) (-12.12) (-13.28) 
Agriculture Sector Dominance 
- - - 0.306*** 0.314*** 0.317*** 
- - - (9.62) (9.37) (9.98) 
Control of Corruption 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual 
%)  
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Employment to population ratio 
-0.164*** - - - - - 
(-5.140) - - - - - 
Financial Freedom Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
                                                          
113 Model specification to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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Unemployment Rate 
- 0.165*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.156*** 0.139*** 
- (6.54) (6.13) (7.32) (7.68) (7.06) 
Government Integrity Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Rule of Law Index 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
In
d
ic
at
o
r 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
GDP per capita, PPP 
-1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
- - - - - - 
Electric Power Consumption 
-0.161*** - -0.158*** -0.158*** - -0.158*** 
(-14.86) - (-14.75) (-14.44) - (-14.27) 
M2 money growth (%) 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
Labour Force Participation Ratio 
- -0.382*** -0.384*** -0.369*** -0.350*** - 
- (-7.14) (-7.49) (-7.21) (-6.39) - 
 
The table below shows the model fit statistics for the above MIMIC regression results – MIMIC Specification 3. 
Table 6.6.3. 3 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Spec 3 – Model fit statistics 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 2, A Specification 2, B Specification 2, C Specification 2, D Specification 2, E Specification 2, F 
6-1-2114 6-1-2 6-1-3 7-1-3 7-1-2 7-1-2 
Chi2 7.51 20.43 84.22 99.69 27.24 20.55 
p > chi2 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Swain corrected Chi2 7.35 19.99 82.26 97.37 26.66 20.10 
p > chi2 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Satorra-Bentler Chi2 8.33 21.31 95.75 103.98 26.31 23.12 
p > chi2 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RMSEA 0.05** 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.13 
Satorra-Bentler RMSEA 0.06* 0.13 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.14 
CFI 1.00 0.96 0.88 0.87 0.95 0.97 
Satorra-Bentler CFI 0.99 0.96 0.88 0.87 0.96 0.97 
TLI 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.77 0.87 0.93 
Satorra-Bentler TLI 0.98 0.91 0.78 0.77 0.89 0.92 
SRMR 0.03** 0.04** 0.06* 0.07* 0.05** 0.04** 
CD 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.93 
R_square 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.93 
mc 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.93 
mc_square 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.93 
Number of observations 190 190 190 190 190 190 
^ Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
• Values presented in parentheses are the absolute z values.  
• Values without any types of brackets are coefficients 
• *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
 237 
 
6.6.4. MIMIC specifications using Europe data sample 
For this analysis, this study makes use of another data sample comprised of all continental 
Europe’s countries. This Europe Data sample is made up of 760 observations, where N is 40 
and T is 19, which is larger than the Balkan dataset. This sample is made up of 40 continental 
Europe countries (including Balkan countries). In this section, this study uses the same 
specifications as in MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3 (referred to table 6.4.1 above). The results provided 
below show similar causality for most of the variables as in the Balkan dataset. Two things to 
be noted from these results are that the Business Freedom Index is no longer statistically 
significant in the models. Government Effectiveness is also not statistically significant for 
MIMIC Spec 2. Furthermore, the causality between Government Spending index and the 
latent variable is negative. It is expected that this variable has a positive relationship with the 
informal economy as discussed in the methodology chapter. However, it is important to 
mention here that the models of MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3 converge with other datasets and 
hence provide evidence that the models used for the Balkan countries converge with other 
datasets. The model fit statistics, on the other hand, are not what would constitute a good 
model fit. However, the SRMR is statistically significant and in line with accepted values. 
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Table 6.6.4. 1 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Specifications using another data sample – Regression 
Results 
 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
 
Specification 1, 
Europe Dataset 
Specification 2, 
Europe Dataset 
Specification 3, 
Europe Dataset 
 6-1-2
115 6-1-2 6-1-2 
C
au
sa
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Business Freedom Index 
-0.052 -0.011 -0.015 
(-1.62) (-0.38) (-0.49) 
Monetary Freedom Index 
-0.046*** -0.040*** -0.054*** 
(-2.81) (-2.74) (-3.02) 
Degree of Urbanisation 
-0.295*** -0.311*** -0.278*** 
(-8.62) (-10.18) (-6.94) 
Government Spending Index 
-0.072*** -0.096*** -0.042** 
(-3.59) (-4.82) (-1.93) 
Government Effectiveness Index 
-1.205*** -0.099 -1.028*** 
(-18.89) (-0.95) (-14.17) 
Agriculture Sector Dominance 
- - - 
- - - 
Control of Corruption 
- -0.992*** - 
- (-9.16) - 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual 
%)  
- - - 
- - - 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
- - - 
- - - 
Employment to population ratio 
- - -0.208*** 
- - (-4.08) 
Financial Freedom Index 
0.080*** - - 
(3.24) - - 
Unemployment Rate 
- - - 
- - - 
Government Integrity Index 
- - - 
- - - 
Rule of Law Index 
- - - 
- - - 
In
d
ic
at
o
r 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
GDP per capita, PPP 
-1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
- - - 
Electric Power Consumption 
-0.280*** -0.287*** -0.285*** 
(-15.12) (-14.03) (-13.48) 
M2 money growth (%) 
- - - 
- - - 
Labour Force Participation Ratio 
- - - 
- - - 
                                                          
115 Model specification to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, 
such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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The table below shows the model fit statistics for the above three MIMIC specifications. 
Table 6.6.4. 2 - Robust Checks for MIMIC Specifications using another data sample – Model fit 
statistics 
 
MIMIC MIMIC MIMIC 
Specification 1, 
Europe Dataset 
Specification 2, 
Europe Dataset 
Specification 3, 
Europe Dataset 
6-1-2116 6-1-2 6-1-2 
Chi2 91.80 72.20 125.92 
p > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Swain corrected Chi2 91.31 71.81 125.24 
p > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Satorra-Bentler Chi2 92.75 74.20 104.12 
p > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RMSEA 0.15 0.13 0.18 
Satorra-Bentler RMSEA 0.15 0.13 0.16 
CFI 0.93 0.95 0.90 
Satorra-Bentler CFI 0.93 0.95 0.91 
TLI 0.83 0.87 0.76 
Satorra-Bentler TLI 0.82 0.86 0.77 
SRMR 0.04** 0.03** 0.04** 
CD 0.85 0.91 0.86 
R_square 0.85 0.91 0.86 
mc 0.85 0.91 0.86 
mc_square 0.85 0.91 0.86 
Number of observations 760 760 760 
^ Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most 
significant, such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
• Values presented in parentheses are the absolute z values.  
• Values without any types of brackets are coefficients 
• *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
 
6.7. The Benchmarking procedure 
When it comes to the use of the benchmarking procedure to convert the MIMIC model index 
into absolute values for the informal economy, there does not seem to be any clear consensus 
in the literature as to which of the benchmarking procedures outlined and discussed in section 
                                                          
116 Models specifications to be used for calibration procedure since their model fit statistics are most significant, 
such as the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI and Chi-squared 
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5.10 of the methodology chapter to use (Buehn & Schneider, 2012). However, the most widely 
used method is the benchmarking procedure proposed by Buehn & Schneider (2012) 
following the work by Schneider et al. (2010). Later Hassan & Schneider (2016a, 2016b), 
Medina & Schneider (2017) and Aydin (2017) also confirm the use of the benchmarking model 
outlined in equation (5.26) in section 5.10 of the methodology chapter, like the one that is 
most widely used in the literature because it overcomes the criticism by Breusch (2005a) in 
assigning a monetary value to the latent variable from the reference indicator. 
For the benchmarking procedure as per equation (5.26), this study has made use of the 
external results estimated from Schneider et al. (2010) and later confirmed by Buehn and 
Schneider (2012). This study has used the earliest available external value for the informal 
economy from these two studies. Their earliest available estimated figure of the informal 
economy is for 1999. However, these two studies do not provide estimates for the informal 
economy in Serbia. As such, this study has made use of the Schneider et al. (2013) estimates 
as an external value to convert the MIMIC model index into absolute values for the size of the 
informal economy. 
6.8. Estimation results for the size of the informal economy 
 
The results reveal that the size of the informal economy in the ten countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula has followed a declining trend from 1996 to 2014. Figures 6.8.1, 6.8.3 and 6.8.5 
show the development of the informal economy over the same period (1996 to 2014) in the 
ten Balkan countries for the three chosen MIMIC specifications.  
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As it can be seen from figure 6.8.1, 6.8.3 and 6.8.5 below117, the size of the informal economy 
for each country has been declining over the years, as the countries of the Balkan Peninsula 
have undergone significant reforms from a political, social, judicial and economic perspective. 
Such reforms have been partly financed and influenced by the EU and the European 
Commission as well as the IMF.  Countries such as Albania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia 
& Herzegovina are either potential candidate or candidate countries to join the EU. Albania, 
FYR Macedonia and Serbia are candidate countries to join the EU, while Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a potential country for EU membership (European Commission118, 2017). 
According to the Treaty on the European Union, countries wishing to join the European Union 
must meet specific criteria. The whole process for EU membership takes years as countries 
try to reform their democracies in line with the EU. All countries must invest heavily in 
ensuring stable institutions which guarantee democratic institutions promoting and securing 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, as well as ensuring a well-
functioning rule of law119. Countries that aspire to integrate and join the EU must also have a 
functioning market economy and be able to cope with competition from the rest of the EU120. 
Countries should also have the ability to effectively implement all the obligations of EU 
membership, which include adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary 
union. In this process, Balkan countries not already part of the EU, have made significant 
progress in their reforms. Such reforms, discussed in chapter four as well, have led to a falling 
economic informality in the region. 
                                                          
117 Alternatively, the size of the informal economy has been illustrated in graphs for each country separately in 
section 6.10. 
118 Available from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/western-balkans-
enlargement_en.pdf (last accessed on 24.11.2017) 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
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Countries which are already members of the EU have also made significant progress with their 
reforms. This progress is reflected in all the variables used in the MIMIC specifications. 
Business Freedom Index, which essentially measures the ease of doing business and the 
regulatory burden in a country, as well as most other variables that have improved in all the 
countries of the Balkan Peninsula, have influenced the size of the informal economy. Data 
from World Bank’s Doing Business reports indicate a significant improvement over the years 
for all the Balkan countries. Such reforms will have an impact on the level of informality in the 
Balkan countries. This impact is therefore reflected in the results. 
However, the financial crisis of 2008 has had an impact on the overall economy in the Balkan 
countries as well, particularly in Greece. A review of macroeconomic indicators and economic 
developments in the ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula has been provided in chapter four. 
The financial crisis led to an increased unemployment rate in almost all countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula, as well an overall economic downturn, which affected the speed and the 
implementation of some of the ongoing reforms in these countries (European Commission 
Occasional paper 46, 2009; Radulescu, 2012; Panagiotou, 2012; Jeleva, 2012; Murgasova et 
al., 2015). Again, this is reflected in the MIMIC specifications and the results. Even though the 
results reveal a declining trend in the size of the informal economy, the decline in these Balkan 
countries is not very significant.  
Results from the MIMIC Spec 1 and MIMIC Spec 2 reveal that the informal economy in Balkan 
countries is just over 30 percent of GDP. MIMIC Spec 2 indicates that the size of the informal 
economy in these countries is around 32 percent on average. Full results have been provided 
in Appendix 6.8.1. Whereas, the impact of the informal economy on the formal economy, 
regarding the potential government revenues, have been provided in Appendix 6.8.5. 
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Table 6.8. 1 - Descriptive statistics for the size of the informal economy for each MIMIC 
specification. 
Model Specifications Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 190 30.3 5.4 19.6 47.1 
MIMIC Spec 2 190 30.7 5.5 20.4 50.2 
MIMIC Spec 3 190 32.3 4.4 24.0 49.4 
 
Figure 6.8. 1 - Development on the size of the informal economy for Balkan countries, using MIMIC 
spec 1121 
 
MIMIC Spec 1 results, presented in figure 6.8.2 below, show that the informal economy in 
Greece, Slovenia and Romania is amongst the lowest in the region, with values of around 27 
percent, 25 percent, and 26 percent of GDP on average, respectively. On the other hand, the 
size of the informal economy on average in FYR Macedonia is amongst the highest in the 
region, with a value of 38 percent of GDP. The informal economy in Albania, Bosnia and 
                                                          
121 Where B and H stand for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Herzegovina, Turkey, Croatia and Serbia are above 30 percent of GDP. The informal economy 
in Bulgaria, as per MIMIC Spec 1 results, is just under 30 percent, at a value of 29 percent on 
average. 
Figure 6.8. 2 - Average size of the informal economy in ten Balkan countries between 1996 and 
2014. 
 
MIMIC Spec 2 results also indicate a declining trend, albeit small, in the size of the informal 
economy in the ten Balkan countries. Figure 6.8.3 shows the development of the size of the 
informal economy over the period of study.  
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Figure 6.8. 3 - Development on the size of the informal economy for Balkan countries, using MIMIC 
spec 2 
 
The size of the informal economy in the Balkan countries estimated using MIMIC Spec 2 
generates similar average results to MIMIC Spec 1. The estimation using this specification 
shows that the informal economy is lowest in Greece and Slovenia, with values of 27 percent 
and 25 percent of GDP, respectively. The highest size of the informal economy on average 
terms between 1996 and 2014 is found in FYR Macedonia and Albania, with values of 38 
percent and around 33 percent of GDP, respectively. The estimations indicate that the size of 
the informal economy on average fluctuates between 28 percent and 32 percent of GDP in 
countries of Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Averages 
from the estimates using MIMIC Spec 2 have been presented in the figure below.  
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Figure 6.8. 4 - Average size of the informal economy in ten Balkan countries between 1996 and 
2014. 
 
MIMIC Spec 3 estimates, presented in the following graphs (figure 6.8.5 and 6.8.6) indicate a 
slightly higher informal economy in the ten Balkan countries, albeit they too indicate a 
declining trend in the size of the informal economy.  The results show that the size of the 
informal economy on average as a percentage of GDP is around 39 percent in FYR Macedonia, 
35 percent in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 34 percent in Albania, 33 percent in Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey and Croatia, about 31 percent in Serbia, 27 percent in Greece and 26 percent in 
Slovenia. 
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Figure 6.8. 5 - Development on the size of the informal economy for Balkan countries, using MIMIC 
spec 3 
 
Figure 6.8. 6 - Average size of the informal economy in ten Balkan countries between 1996 and 
2014. 
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The table below shows the average values from the estimates of the three MIMIC 
specifications. The informal economy ranges between 25 to 30 percent of GDP in Slovenia, 
Greece and Romania; ranges between 30 to 35 percent of GDP in Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Turkey, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; and above 35 percent of GDP in FYR Macedonia. 
Three and five-year averages from the three MIMIC specifications indicate that the highest 
size of the informal economy can be found in FYR Macedonia.  
Table 6.8. 2 - Average size of the informal economy in Balkan countries from three MIMIC 
specifications 
Country Average Three year Average Five year Average 
Albania 33.0 27.4 28.6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 33.3 30.4 30.2 
Bulgaria 31.5 27.5 27.2 
Croatia 31.9 31.0 31.2 
Greece 26.9 24.4 24.7 
Macedonia, FYR 38.4 33.2 35.0 
Romania 28.7 23.8 23.9 
Serbia 29.7 23.8 23.9 
Slovenia 25.0 23.1 23.7 
Turkey 32.1 28.0 29.3 
Country Average Range 
Slovenia 25 25-30% 
Greece 27 25-30% 
Romania 29 25-30% 
Serbia 30 30-35% 
Bulgaria 32 30-35% 
Croatia 32 30-35% 
Turkey 32 30-35% 
Albania 33 30-35% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 33 30-35% 
Macedonia, FYR 38 >35% 
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Figure 6.8. 7 - Map of the Balkan countries and the range of the average size of the informal 
economy. 
 
6.9. Confirmation of hypotheses 
In this section, we confirm whether the hypothesis for each variable used is confirmed using 
the MIMIC methodology and the estimation results. This section will also provide the 
correlation analysis between the estimated size of the informal economy and the primary 
drivers of economic informality in the Balkan countries. 
Table 6.9. 1 - Confirmation of the hypothesis 
Definition and 
expected sign 
Hypothesis Confirmation of results 
Business Freedom 
index 
Expected Sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 1: The higher is the index of 
business freedom, the lower would the size 
of the informal economy be, ceteris 
paribus. 
Confirmed from all MIMIC 
Specifications 
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Tax Revenue (% of 
GDP) 
Expected Sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of 
taxation in a country, the higher the size of 
the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 4 
and 6 
Government 
spending Index 
Expected sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the government 
spending or expenditure, the higher the 
size of the government and the size of the 
informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 
1, 2, 3 and 5 
Government 
Effectiveness Index  
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 4: The better the quality of 
democratic institutions, the smaller the 
size of the informal economy is, ceteris 
paribus. 
Confirmed from all MIMIC 
Specifications 
Rule of Law Index  
 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 5: The better the quality of 
democratic institutions, the smaller the 
size of the informal economy is, ceteris 
paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 8 
Control of 
Corruption  
 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the control for 
corruption is in a country, the lower will 
corruption be and as such the lower the 
size of the informal economy. Several 
studies, discussed in the literature review, 
have indicated that there is a positive 
relationship between the corruption level 
and the size of economic informality. 
Therefore, the lower the corruption level is 
in a country and the greater the 
government integrity, the smaller the size 
of the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 2 
Government 
Integrity index 
 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 7: The lack of government 
integrity caused by practices of systemic 
corruption of government institutions such 
as bribery, extortion, nepotism, cronyism, 
patronage, embezzlement, and graft, 
reduces economic vitality by increasing 
costs and shifting resources into 
unproductive activities, and increases 
economic informality, ceteris paribus. The 
higher this index is, the lower the size of 
the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 
6, 7 and 8 
Unemployment Rate  
Expected sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 8: The higher the 
unemployment, the larger the size of the 
informal economy is, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 3 
and 8 
Employment to 
Population Ratio 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 9: The higher the employment 
to population ratio is, the lower the size of 
the informal economy is, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 3 
Monetary Freedom 
Index 
 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 10: The more stable and less 
volatile are prices, and the less state 
intervention in a free market system, the 
smaller will be the size of the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 
1, 2 and 3 
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Financial Freedom 
Index 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 11: The higher the financial 
freedom index, the lower the size of the 
informal economy is expected to be, 
ceteris paribus. 
Not confirmed. The casual 
sign is different from 
expectations. 
Agriculture, value 
added (percentage 
of GDP)  
Expected sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 12: The more dominant the 
agriculture sector, the larger the size of the 
informal economy is, ceteris paribus. 
 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 
4, 6, 7 and 8 
Degree of 
Urbanisation 
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 13: The higher the size of the 
urban population relative to rural 
population, the smaller the size of the 
informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 
1, 2, 3 and 5 
 
Inflation, GDP 
deflator 
 
Expected sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 14: The more stable and less 
volatile prices are, and the less state 
intervention in a free market system, the 
smaller will be the size of the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 5 
GDP per Capita, 
PPP122  
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 15: The larger the size of the 
informal economy, the lower the GDP is, 
ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by all MIMIC 
Specifications 
 
Used as reference indicator 
Labour Force 
Participation ratio  
Expected sign 
Negative 
Hypothesis 16: the more extensive the 
informal economy, the lower total 
employment is, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed by all robust 
MIMIC Specifications 
Money and quasi 
money (M2) growth 
rate  
Expected sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 17: The larger the size of the 
informal economy, the larger the money 
held by the public is, ceteris paribus 
Confirmed by MIMIC Spec 6 
Electric power 
consumption (kWh 
per capita)  
Expected sign 
Positive 
Hypothesis 18: The larger the size of the 
informal economy, the higher the electric 
consumption per capita, ceteris paribus 
Unconfirmed. The casual 
sign of the coefficient is 
negative. 
 
Table 6.9.2 below shows the correlation matrix between the size of the informal economy 
and other variables. Theory suggests that there should be a correlation between the size of 
the informal economy and the variables used as causes and indicators in the MIMIC model 
regressions. The table below shows that there is a correlation between the estimations from 
                                                          
122 Based on Purchasing Power Parity 
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the three MIMIC specifications. In line with theory discussed in previous chapters, there is a 
correlation between the size of the informal economy and the regulatory burden as measured 
by the Business Freedom Index. There is a negative correlation between the freedom from 
the high regulation intensity in a country and the level of the informal economy. High 
regulation and bureaucracies tend to create additional costs and transactions costs to operate 
formally, so individuals and business might prefer to deal informally. There is also a negative 
correlation between the Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, and the level of corruption 
measured by either the Government Integrity index or the Control of Corruption index. The 
correlations between all other variables show correct causality in relation to their impact on 
the size of the informal economy. 
Table 6.9. 2 - Correlation matrix between the size of the informal economy and other variables 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1.0000     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9483 1.0000   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8558 0.8831 1.0000 
Business Freedom Index -0.6120 -0.5761 -0.5740 
Government Integrity -0.3808 -0.3650 -0.4256 
Government Effectiveness -0.4700 -0.4553 -0.6194 
Government Spending Index 0.1898 0.2862 0.3384 
Unemployment Rate 0.5242 0.4133 0.5528 
Employment to Population Rate -0.4058 -0.3248 -0.4806 
Control of Corruption -0.4829 -0.4892 -0.5852 
Size of Agriculture sector 0.4604 0.4310 0.4456 
Degree of Urbanisation -0.1867 -0.0805 -0.2258 
Labour Force Participation Ratio -0.2827 -0.2680 -0.4250 
Regulatory Quality -0.5645 -0.4796 -0.5601 
Rule of Law -0.5350 -0.5172 -0.6336 
Monetary Freedom Index -0.2793 -0.2365 -0.1977 
M2 Growth 0.2470 0.2577 0.1818 
Tax Revenue 0.1301 0.1250 0.2135 
Level of Exports -0.3353 -0.3011 -0.2918 
Inflation 0.1003 0.1197 0.0702 
Electric Power Consumption -0.4454 -0.4813 -0.6225 
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GDP per Capita -0.6046 -0.5850 -0.7242 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1.0000     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9483 1.0000   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8558 0.8831 1.0000 
State Fragility Index 0.4890 0.4973 0.5344 
Political Stability Index -0.4620 -0.4455 -0.5169 
Banking Crisis -0.1739 -0.1793 -0.0997 
Institutionalised Democracy -0.1803 -0.1193 -0.2541 
Voice and Accountability -0.5142 -0.4805 -0.5910 
Overall Economic Freedom -0.3807 -0.3172 -0.2527 
 
It is important to note from these tables the relationship of the estimates from three MIMIC 
specifications and other variables not used in the MIMIC regressions. Variables such as the 
State fragility index and Institutionalised Democracy index (from Polity IV project) indicate 
that there is some correlation between them and the estimates of the informal economy. 
While there is a positive correlation between State fragility index and the size of the informal 
economy, there is a negative correlation between the institutionalised democracy index and 
the size of the informal economy. Furthermore, there is also a negative relationship between 
the Political stability index, Voice and accountability and Banking crisis (from World Bank 
Governance Indicators data) and the size of the informal economy. Uncertainty surrounding 
the security and potential political fragility, as well as unstable government institutions can 
impact the economic development of a country, the well-functioning of the rule of law, which 
can potentially affect the size and development of the informal economic activities 
(Teobaldelli & Schneider, 2012). Teobaldelli & Schneider (2012) have found that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between direct democracy and the size of the 
informal economy.  
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The financial crisis, and in particular banking crisis, can affect the wellbeing of the official or 
the formal economy directly, but they can also affect adversely to some degree those involved 
in the informal economy. As a consequence of the financial crisis, it is expected that the level 
of unemployment will increase as jobs are lost in the formal economy, and at the same time, 
the informal employment will increase as there will be new entrants into the informal 
economy for various economic, survival and social reasons. It is assumed that the informal 
economy can act as a refuge in coping with the economic crisis which affects the formal 
economy directly (Cunningham and Maloney, 2000). Finnegan and Singh’s (2004) agree with 
such conclusions. At times of crisis, they argue that people turned to their informal networks 
of family and friends for support. Hence, the size of the informal economy proliferated as 
people were forced to enter the informal economy in these countries for survival reasons.  
The study by Colombo et al. (2016) also investigate how banking crisis in a country can impact 
the level of informal economy. Using a large sample of countries for their empirical analysis, 
the authors find that the informal sector is a powerful buffer, which tends to expand during 
banking crises, thereby absorbing considerable amount of the fall in the official economic 
output (Colombo et al. 2016). However, the results of the correlation above indicate that 
there is a negative relationship between banking crisis and the level of economic informality, 
albeit there is not a significant correlation. This is also supported by the literature. During an 
economic or financial crisis, informal workers are often the first to lose their jobs as 
businesses tend to make redundancies amongst their informally employed workforce before 
making any other redundancies to other workers who are more formally employed (Jutting 
and Laiglesia, 2009). 
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Likewise, during the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent economic recession that 
followed, in some Latin American countries, workers with irregular or atypical contracts were 
the first ones to be made redundant (Jutting and Laiglesia, 2009). Furthermore, a study by 
Horn (2011: p.3) suggests that informal economy: 
“should not be viewed as a ‘cushion’ for retrenched formal workers during crises’ but, 
rather……’the impacts of global economic trends and events since the beginning of the 
crisis on the informal workers and enterprises … need to be understood and addressed’ 
(Horn, 2011: p.3). 
 
6.10. Country-specific analysis 
Albania 
The informal economy in Albania, according to the estimates of this study, followed an 
increasing trend from 1997 to 2006, and then a declining trend between 2007 and 2014. There 
was a slight increase in the informal economy in Albania between 2008 and 2009, indicating 
the potential impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Over the period of this study, Albania 
experienced an informal economy between a minimum of 24.9 and a maximum of 38.2 
percent of GDP as per MIMIC Spec 2 estimation results presented below. On average, the size 
of the informal economy in Albania ranges between 32 and almost 34 percent of GDP. 
Albania experienced significant isolation from a totalitarian regime until 1992 (Schautzer, 
2005). There were severe transitioning problems after 1992, which culminated in 1997, with 
a severe financial, political and social crisis. There was a significant mistrust in governmental 
institutions from the people who took to the streets protesting, which then turned into 
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violent riots. There was a total collapse of the institutions which required UN intervention to 
stabilise the country over the following years (Schautzer, 2005; Anastasakis, 2013).  
Such mistrust from people in their government and the failing of the government to be 
effective in the circular flow of the economy, and in ensuring a well-functioning rule of law in 
Albania could potentially be the cause of the increasing trend of the informal economy in the 
country between 1997 and 2006. Since then, Albania has been working towards fulfilling all 
the criteria in becoming a candidate EU country, to start the negotiation process for full EU 
membership. In this process, significant reforms discussed in chapter four have taken place. 
All these developments have been reflected in the variables used in the MIMIC regressions. 
It is important to note here that there have been significant improvements in the Government 
Effectiveness (World Bank, 2017123), Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, and Business 
Freedom index for Albania. These indexes indicate the reforms that were carried out in 
Albania over the years. 
The results from the three MIMIC specifications (shown below) are not very different 
between them. Level of informality is high in all three specifications reaching levels of above 
30 percent of GDP. MIMIC Spec 3 produces a slightly higher average estimate than the other 
two specifications, and this is mostly down to the fact that MIMIC Spec 3 captures in its causal 
variables the level of unemployment. The level of unemployment is high in Albania, and 
theoretically this is positively correlated with informality. This is therefore supported by the 
empirical estimates of this study. 
 
                                                          
123 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/albania/overview (last accessed on 22.11.2017) 
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Figure 6.10. 1 - The development of the informal economy in Albania with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Albania: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 32.44 3.33 26.4 35.9 
MIMIC Spec 2 32.86 4.64 24.9 38.2 
MIMIC Spec 3 33.57 1.67 30.4 35.8 
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The development of the size of the informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina has followed 
a declining trend from 2008 onwards. However, from 1996 to 2000 there was a significant 
increase of the informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the estimation 
results from the three MIMIC specifications. The fluctuation of the informal economy has 
been presented in the below statistics indicating the minimum and maximum values as well 
as averages for each of the three MIMIC specifications. The average size of the informal 
economy according to these results ranges between 32 and just over 35 percent of GDP. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina came out of a terrible war in late 1995. The war started in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1992 when they declared independence from Yugoslavia. Before this, there 
was political and economic chaos, leading to a brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Croatia. The economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war has been 
characterised by many mutually conflicting goals between the different ethnicities in the 
country who share the power in a complex arrangement of political framework and system 
of government (Zupcevic & Causevic, 2009). There are currently two entities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within this 
system there is the constant backdrop of different aspirations: for example, Republika Srpska 
seeks greater autonomy, Croats seek a third entity, and the Bosniaks hoping for a more 
centrally governed country (Nardelli et al. 2014).  This complicated government system and 
differing aspirations have severely affected economic growth and the labour market 
equilibrium in the country (Zupcevic & Causevic, 2009).  
This complicated government system creates additional bureaucracies and regulation, 
making it harder and more expensive for companies or individuals to operate freely in the 
official or formal economy. This means that they can turn to informal economic activities to 
avoid such regulation burden. This potentially explains why the size of the informal economy 
in the country has increased significantly from 1996 to 2001.  The low level of informal 
economy in 1996 before it started to increase indicates that the disastrous war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina affected not only the formal economy but the informal one too.  
From 2008 onwards, the level of informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina has followed a 
declining trend. The country has been working hard to implement reforms to join the EU. As 
discussed in detail in chapter four, these reforms are reflected in the variables used in the 
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MIMIC regressions, such as that of Control of Corruption Index, Business Freedom Index and 
Government effectiveness index, which indicate significant improvements in the country.  
This explains why the size of the informal economy has started to decline over the years after 
2001. 
However, the size of the informal economy can be considered as high according to the results 
from the MIMIC specifications. Such levels of economic informality can be explained by the 
ongoing existence of barriers which tend to prolong economic development in the country 
such as inefficient administration and regulation burden, political instability and complexity 
leading to popular mistrust, corruption, government instability and ineffectiveness, and fiscal 
burden. Despite this, the entities that constitute Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a joint 
program of structural reforms known as the reform agenda, which is partly influenced by the 
EU (World Bank, 2017124). 
There is no significant variance between the results or estimates provided by the three MIMIC 
models for Bosnia and Herzegovina. MIMIC Spec 3 for Bosnia and Herzegovina too produces 
a slightly higher average estimate than the other two specifications, and this is mostly down 
to the fact that MIMIC Spec 3 captures in its causal variables the level of unemployment. The 
level of unemployment is still high in this country, driving people to work informally.  
 
 
 
                                                          
124 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bosniaandherzegovina/overview (last accessed on 
20.11.2017) 
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Figure 6.10. 2 - The development of the informal economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 
estimates from three MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
B and H: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 32.57 3.82 25.2 41.2 
MIMIC Spec 2 31.98 5.24 23.4 45.8 
MIMIC Spec 3 35.28 3.47 29.3 43.3 
 
 
Bulgaria 
According to estimates from the MIMIC specifications, the informal economy in Bulgaria has 
declined significantly from 2002 onwards. Before 2002, there was an expanding informal 
economy in the country as indicated in the results in Appendix 6.8.1 and illustrated in the 
figure below. On average the size of the informal economy in Bulgaria circulates between 29.3 
to almost 33 percent of GDP. The results from the three MIMIC specifications do not vary 
significantly between them. 
Bulgaria, along with other EU member states from the Balkan Peninsula, has undergone a 
significant transformation and structural reforms over the past three decades and in 
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particular from 2000 onwards. Such reforms and transformation secured Bulgaria’s 
membership in the EU on the 1st of January 2007 (World Bank, 2017125). 
The country has managed to speed up the process of transition from a highly centralised, 
planned economic system to an open, market-based economy. B&H is an upper-middle-
income economy according to World Bank. However, after many years of reasonably high 
economic growth and job creation, Bulgaria was affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The level 
of GDP and incomes decreased in Bulgaria in 2009, causing the unemployment rate to 
increase. However, Bulgaria was able to recover relatively quickly, and the current trends in 
the Bulgarian labour market show a growing number of employed and a decreasing 
unemployment rate (Mitra & Pauvelle, 2012).  
Bulgaria has restructured and reformed the active labour market activities over the years 
from 2001 onwards, as well as reforming the regulation and taxation burden in the country. 
Reforms have also taken place in the employment laws (Loukanova & Tzanov, 2017). Such 
reforms are reflected in the data used for the MIMIC specifications as well, and discussed in 
detail in chapter four.  The Bulgarian economy has been growing for four consecutive years 
after 2012 as indicated in section 4.4 of chapter four. Furthermore, the number of employed 
over 15 years of age began to increase in 2012 and passed over the 3 million thresholds after 
2014 (Loukanova & Tzanov, 2017). Since joining EU, Bulgaria has seen significant numbers of 
citizens emigrate from the country to other EU countries for employment opportunities. All 
these factors can explain and justify the lower size of the informal economy in Bulgaria after 
2001. 
                                                          
125 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bulgaria/overview (last accessed on 22.11.2017) 
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Although the size of the informal economy has shown a declining trend over the years in 
Bulgaria according to the results from the MIMIC Specifications, its size is still large compared 
with other EU members from the Balkan peninsula and the rest of the union. Such large size 
of the informal economy can potentially be explained by the problems related to poverty and 
social inclusions in a country (Milanovic, 1999). The overall scope of poverty is estimated to 
be over 20 percent of the population in Bulgaria (Loukanova & Tzanov, 2017). The risks of 
poverty and social exclusion in Bulgaria are considerably higher than in the other EU 
countries. 
Figure 6.10. 3 - The development of the informal economy in Bulgaria with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Bulgaria: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 29.37 5.89 23.5 41.2 
MIMIC Spec 2 32.29 4.52 26.3 41.2 
MIMIC Spec 3 32.97 3.92 28.7 42.7 
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Croatia 
The informal economy in Croatia has fluctuated between 29 percent and 37 percent of GDP. 
The development of the informal economy in Croatia followed a declining trend from 1996 to 
2009, and then a slightly increasing trend from 2010 onwards, as per the results of the MIMIC 
specifications, presented in the figure below. World Bank classifies Croatia as an upper 
middle-income country. The average size of the informal economy in Croatia ranges between 
32 and 33 percent of GDP, as indicated by the results of this study. There is no significant 
difference in the estimates provided by the three MIMIC specifications. 
Before 1997, Croatia’s economy suffered a great deal from the war after their declaration of 
independence from Yugoslavia. The war that started in 1992 dragged for over three years. 
However, after the war, Croatia’s economy grew significantly over the years preceding the 
global financial crisis of 2008. This growth was driven by a boom in domestic consumption 
and investment which were predominantly financed by foreign capital. This economic growth 
could potentially explain the declining trend of the informal economy in the country from 
1997 onwards.  
Like many other countries in Europe, Croatia too was affected by the financial crisis of 2008. 
According to World Bank data, between 2009 and 2010, the GDP in Croatia contracted by 
about 7 percent, and then a further contraction of 0.7 percent in 2011 (World Bank, 2017126). 
Such economic downturn had other consequences such as rising unemployment and low 
productivity, which made a recovery challenging in the country.  This also affected the 
development and structural reforms that were taking place in Croatia over the years, 
                                                          
126 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/croatia/overview (last accessed on 22.11.2017) 
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especially after the war. Such effects are reflected in the data used in the regressions for the 
MIMIC specifications, which then affected the estimates of the informal economy. The 
estimates of the size of the informal economy show that there was an increasing trend of the 
informal economy in Croatia from 2009 onwards.  
Croatia is an EU member since July 2013. In order to join the EU, Croatia had to undergo 
significant reforms in the rule of law, democratic accountability and had to show significant 
results in the fight against corruption with particular emphasis on the fight against high-level 
political corruption (Elbasani & Sabic, 2017). These reforms and the wide-ranging legal and 
institutional anti-corruption framework have significantly improved the public trust in the 
government institutions in the country. Other reforms in favour of competition and market-
oriented economy have developed, such as tax reforms and the creation of a more favourable 
environment for doing business. Such reforms are also reflected in the data used in the MIMIC 
specifications and the estimates on the size of the informal economy illustrated in the figure 
below. 
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Figure 6.10. 4 - The development of the informal economy in Croatia with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Croatia: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 31.80 2.38 29.60 36.80 
MIMIC Spec 2 31.37 2.78 28.90 37.40 
MIMIC Spec 3 32.66 1.87 30.00 35.60 
 
 
Greece 
Greece’s informal economy had followed a declining trend throughout the years, except 
2008, when the size of the informal economy increased slightly, as indicated by the estimates 
of this study. The size of the informal economy in Greece has been and still is considered to 
be high in relation to other developed OECD and EU countries. Greece’s informal economy, 
according to the results from MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3, ranges between 26 and 27 percent of 
GDP. Three MIMIC Specifications produce relative similar results, with no significant 
differences between them on average terms. 
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As a high-income country and highly integrated with the rest of the EU and the world, Greece 
was severely affected by the global financial crisis of 2008. Recession in the country resulted 
in rising unemployment rate and falling aggregate demand. This exacerbated the sovereign 
debt crisis in the country, and after six years of externally-supervised adjustment and financial 
support, the economy of Greece shows little sign of improvements, according to the data 
from World Bank127. Such, recovery was not easy for Greece, as they had to implement a 
number of measures to reduce sovereign debt. Measures such as increasing the rate of 
taxation on income and the reduction of public workers’ salaries, can lead to an increase in 
the size of the informal economy (Bizenis et al., 2016).  Other government policies such as 
severe austerity measures can also encourage people to enter the informal economy. 
The results presented in the figure below, indicate a slightly increasing trend of the informal 
economy in Greece after 2008. The estimates using MIMIC Spec 3, show that the size of the 
informal economy has started to pick up from 2008 onwards. There was a rise in the number 
of people employed in the informal economy, and this can lead to an overall increase in the 
size of the informal economy in the country (Bizenis et al., 2016). Bitzenis et al. (2016) criticise 
the lack of adequate policies for tax collection, tax auditing and tax enforcement in Greece 
for high levels of the informal economy relative to other EU and OECD countries. They argue 
that policy enforcement has to be strict since tax enforcement, effective auditing and tax 
collection, are negatively correlated with the size of the informal economy and can improve 
the tax morale and public trust in governmental institutions.  
 
                                                          
127 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/greece/overview (last accessed on 21.11.2017) 
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Figure 6.10. 5 - The development of the informal economy in Greece with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Greece: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 26.81 1.74 23.80 28.70 
MIMIC Spec 2 26.97 1.78 23.80 28.50 
MIMIC Spec 3 27.01 1.19 25.00 28.50 
 
 
FYR Macedonia 
The size of the informal economy in FYR Macedonia remained higher than all other countries 
part of this study throughout the period of this study. The results from the three MIMIC 
specifications reveal that there was a significant increase in the size of the informal economy 
between 1996 to a peak in 2003, as illustrated in the figure below. The average size of the 
informal economy in this country ranges between 38 and 39 percent of GDP, according to 
results of this study. 
Since 2003, the informal economy in FYR Macedonia has started to decline, albeit there was 
a slight increase in 2009. The peak in the size of the informal economy in FYR Macedonia from 
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2000 to 2003 could be explained by severe ethnic tensions in the country between a sizeable 
ethnic Albanians and majority Macedonians, which resulted in ethnic conflict with severe 
casualties. The uncertainty created as a result of the conflict and the tensions that followed 
until the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, affected the macroeconomic developments 
in the country significantly (Reka, 2011). Such effects could have potentially fuelled the 
increase in the size of the informal economy in the country, due to popular mistrust in the 
government institutions, predominately by the Albanian community.   
Since then, however, FYR Macedonia is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the 
World Bank and a country which has made significant progress in reforming its economy over 
the past decade. The country experienced good economic growth from 2002 to 2008 
according to section 4.4 of chapter four. The growth of GDP from 2002 to 2008 with an 
average of 4.3 percent, can potentially explain the declining trend of the informal economy 
in the country over these same years, as illustrated in the figure below (World Bank, 2017128). 
However, since 2009, the annual growth rate of GDP has decreased by just over 2 percent 
every year, which could potentially explain the increased size of the informal economy in 
2009.  
Since 2009, the estimates from the MIMIC specifications show that the size of the informal 
economy in FYR Macedonia has been declining. The main reform agenda concerning the 
government of FYR Macedonia is working towards implementing all the reforms for the EU 
membership. FYR Macedonia became an EU candidate country in 2005 and since 2009 the 
European Commission (EC hereafter) has recommended opening accession negotiations. The 
EC provides funding and has an active program of assistance to FYR Macedonia, influencing 
                                                          
128 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/macedonia/overview, (last accessed on 19.11.2017) 
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and helping with significant reforms in the country. Such reforms are reflected in the variables 
and data used in MIMIC specifications and hence have been reflected in the results on the 
size of the informal economy shown below. The results from the three MIMIC specifications 
show very similar results for FYR Macedonia, indicating similar influence from all causal 
variables. 
The economic growth from 2002 to 2008, did not translate into significant poverty reduction 
in FYR Macedonia. However, the poverty levels have declined slightly in recent years (World 
Bank, 2016129). This could potentially explain the declining trend of the informal economy in 
recent years. Even though there is a declining trend in the size of the informal economy in 
FYR Macedonia, its size remains high according to these estimates. FYR Macedonia’s informal 
economy is found to be the highest amongst the other Balkan countries. For this, we can 
blame the prolonged political uncertainties in the country that to date are present. Such 
political uncertainties can potentially affect investment decisions and slow economic activity 
as well as create widespread mistrust in the governmental institutions, forcing people to 
enter the informal economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129 Available from http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/698951475670457231/Macedonia-Snapshot-
Oct2016FINAL.pdf (Last accessed on 19.11.2017) 
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Figure 6.10. 6 - The development of the informal economy in FYR Macedonia with estimates from 
three MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
FYR Macedonia: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 38.22 3.66 32.40 47.10 
MIMIC Spec 2 38.13 4.65 31.30 50.20 
MIMIC Spec 3 38.83 3.20 35.00 49.40 
 
 
Romania 
Romania’s informal economy has declined significantly over the years. This significant decline 
in the size of the informal economy in Romania was more significant momentum from 2004 
onwards, as shown in the figure from the estimates of the MIMIC specifications. MIMIC Spec 
3 estimates, however, indicate a much lower reduction in this declining trend in the informal 
economy in Romania. MIMIC Spec 3 results are in line with other studies discussed in section 
6.12.  
Romania, just like other East and Central European countries, started a slow and lengthy 
process of transition and democratisation after the collapse of communism. During this 
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transition period, Romania’s economic and employment structure shifted from one based on 
industry and agriculture towards one relying more on services. In the process of significant 
social, judicial and economic reforms Romania was allowed to join the EU in 2007. Romania’s 
focus in the fight against corruption was also significant over the years, receiving strong public 
support. The data from World Bank shows that Romania has enjoyed gradual but continuous 
growth in most of their macroeconomic indicators in recent years (World Bank, 2017130). This 
has been mainly driven by the level of investments and exports mainly to the EU (World Bank, 
2017131). This explains the declining trend of the informal economy in Romania over the years. 
Despite this, the size of the informal economy in Romania is still considered to be high. The 
results presented below in the figure reveal that on average, the informal economy in 
Romania ranges from almost 26 percent to almost 33 percent of GDP. Such figures can be 
explained by the fact that, according to World Bank data, Romania has one of the highest 
poverty rates in the EU.  
It is important to note here the difference in the size of the informal economy varying in the 
three MIMIC specifications presented below. MIMIC Spec 1 produces an average of 25.92 
percent for the size of the informal economy, which is in line with MIMIC Spec 2 average 
estimate of 27.74 percent. However, both MIMIC Spec 1 and Spec 2 vary quite significantly 
with the average estimate produced by MIMIC Spec 3.  MIMIC Spec 3 has an average estimate 
for the size of the informal economy of almost 33 percent of GDP as shown below in figure 
6.10.7. MIMIC Spec 3 uses same causal variables as MIMIC Spec 1 and 2, with the exception 
of a proxy for unemployment. MIMIC Spec 3 makes use of the employment to population 
                                                          
130 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/romania (Last accessed on 20.11.2017) 
131 Ibid. 
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ratio to capture the effect of unemployment in the country. This signifies the importance of 
level of unemployment in forcing people to work in the informal sector. 
Figure 6.10. 7 - The development of the informal economy in Romania with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Romania: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 25.92 6.03 19.60 38.70 
MIMIC Spec 2 27.74 5.31 21.60 35.90 
MIMIC Spec 3 32.60 2.49 29.00 36.50 
 
 
Serbia 
The informal economy in Serbia also followed a significant decline from 2006 onwards, as 
shown in the figure below. The results show that there was, however, a significant increase 
in the size of the informal economy between 1996 and 2000. Results of this study indicate 
that the size of the informal economy in Serbia ranges between 28 percent and 31 percent of 
GDP. 
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Serbia is classified as a middle-income country from the World Bank. It is also a candidate for 
EU membership. The early 1990s, as well as late 1990s, found Serbia involved in several wars 
in the region, as former republics and federative provinces in Yugoslavia declared 
independence. There were several economic sanctions placed on Serbia for waging these 
wars. Political, social and economic instability during the 1990s could potentially explain the 
relatively large and increasing size of the informal economy in Serbia until 2000 (World Bank, 
2017132). The basis for social and economic reforms as well as effective governance and other 
structural reforms for changing Serbia’s path towards EU integration, were laid with the 
ousting of the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000. 
From 2001 onwards, Serbia has made considerable progress on various economic and social 
reforms, despite political instability. Such reforms have been one of the main reasons that in 
June 2013 the European Council endorsed the Council of Minister's conclusions and 
recommendations to open accession negotiations with Serbia for EU membership.  
Furthermore, the social and economic reforms have resulted in relatively more democracy, 
thus improving further the capacity of the country to steadily work towards EU integrations 
and further reforms (World Bank, 2017133). Such developments are reflected in the data used 
for regressions in the MIMIC models. Such developments in Serbia are also reflected in the 
results of the informal economy, whose estimates have been generated using the MIMIC 
specifications. 
Serbia’s informal economy estimated using MIMIC Spec 2 varies with the estimates produced 
from MIMIC Spec 1 and 3. MIMIC Spec 2 uses Corruption as one of the causal variables of 
                                                          
132 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/serbia/overview (last accessed 20.11.2017) 
133 Ibid. 
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informality. Other two specifications do not use this variable. The level of corruption is quite 
high in Serbia and other Western Balkan countries. Indeed, one of the most important criteria 
for Serbia’s EU integration is the fight against corruption. These results indicate that 
corruption is a key driver of informality in Serbia and tends to be more so in those countries 
where the level of corruption is high. 
Figure 6.10. 8 - The development of the informal economy in Serbia with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Serbia: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 30.00 5.21 23.10 36.60 
MIMIC Spec 2 28.22 5.69 20.40 36.90 
MIMIC Spec 3 30.83 3.27 26.30 34.80 
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Slovenia 
Slovenia’s informal economy has remained lower than the rest of the other 9 Balkan countries 
in these estimates provided by the three MIMIC specifications. Overall the estimates reveal a 
declining trend in the size of the informal economy in Slovenia. On average terms, the size of 
the informal economy in Slovenia ranges between 24 and 26 percent of GDP, as per the results 
of this study. There is no significant difference in the estimates produced from three MIMIC 
specifications. 
Slovenia formally declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. The country approved new 
constitution introducing a parliamentary political system.  Before independence, membership 
in the EU was one of the main aims politically and economically for Slovenia, encouraging the 
government to focus on reforms which would make their aspirations towards EU membership 
a reality (Verbic et al., 2016). Slovenia joined EU in 2004 and became a full member of OECD 
in 2010. In these processes, Slovenia had undergone several social, judicial and economic 
reforms in line with the criteria of EU and OCED membership. Such reforms are reflected in 
the data used to estimate the size of the informal economy in the country.  
The slight increase in the informal economy between 2008 and 2010 signifies the potential 
impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 for Slovenia (World Bank, 2017134). A reduction in 
GDP growth and rising unemployment as well as rising government debt adversely affected 
and exacerbated the impact of the financial crisis in the country (Verbic et al., 2016). The size 
of the informal economy is still considered as high in comparison with other EU and OECD 
countries. According to Heritage Foundation, one reason for this could be that institutional 
                                                          
134 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/slovenia/overview (last accessed on 22.11.2017) 
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weaknesses continue to have a negative impact on the long-term economic development. 
Particularly, the Heritage Foundation has noticed instances where there are still some political 
interferences in the judicial system, and this coupled with higher level of corruption in 
comparison to other EU members continue to be disruptive to the overal judicial system in 
Slovenia. 
Figure 6.10. 9 - The development of the informal economy in Slovenia with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Slovenia: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 24.68 1.86 21.90 27.80 
MIMIC Spec 2 24.71 1.66 22.00 27.30 
MIMIC Spec 3 25.73 1.05 24.00 27.30 
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Turkey 
The size of the informal economy in Turkey reached more than 38 percent in 2000 according 
to the estimates provided from MIMIC Spec 2. Turkey’s size of the informal economy has 
followed more of a bumpy ride from 1996 to 2011. Since then its size has declined, as 
indicated by the results from the estimates generated using the three MIMIC specifications.  
Turkey’s economic performance since 2000 has been very significant with macroeconomic 
and fiscal stability. This steady economic progress was translated into increased employment 
and incomes. World Bank now classifies Turkey as an upper middle-income country (World 
Bank, 2017135). This economic performance explains the declining trend of the informal 
economy in the estimates presented in the figure below. Improvements in the government 
effectiveness and the rule of law indexes as well as reforms in the business environment can 
also lead to a reduction of the informal economy over the years. However, the size of the 
informal economy in Turkey is still high. Turkey’s informal economy ranges between just 
under 31 and over 33 percent of GDP, as per the results of this study. This is blamed mainly 
on the geopolitical climate in the country which prolongs the momentum of reforms and 
economic development in Turkey.  
MIMIC Spec 2 and 3 produce a slightly higher informal economy results than MIMIC Spec 1. 
MIMIC Spec 2 uses Corruption as one of the causal variables, while other MIMIC Specifications 
do not. MIMIC Spec 3 uses a proxy for unemployment, while other specifications do not. In 
both cases therefore we can indirectly see the impact of corruption and unemployment on 
the level of informality for Turkey. 
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Figure 6.10. 10 - The development of the informal economy in Turkey with estimates from three 
MIMIC models and their descriptive statistics. 
 
Turkey: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 30.94 3.68 26.20 36.80 
MIMIC Spec 2 32.24 3.11 27.90 37.50 
MIMIC Spec 3 33.23 2.44 29.10 38.30 
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6.11. Impact of informality on Government Revenues 
 
The size of the informal economy has an impact on the level of the tax revenues that a 
government can collect and then spend on the provision of public goods, services and 
infrastructure. Tanzi (1983), Giles (1999), and Faal (2003) conduct some estimates for the size 
of lost tax revenues for governments in various countries based on their estimates of the size 
of the informal economy, by assuming that the informal economic activities would have been 
taxed at the same rates as the official economic activities. Based on this approach, this thesis 
presents the impact of the level of informal economy on tax revenues.  
This approach has used tax revenues (as percentage of GDP)136 to derive a value that 
governments part of this research loose in tax revenues as a result of the informal economy. 
It has first calculated the level of current government revenues based on this tax rate and 
then calculated the level of the informal economy using the average percentage of GDP rate 
from the three MIMIC specifications. It then derived the potential government revenues by 
adding the lost revenues as a result of informality and the current level of government 
revenues based on the tax rate. Appendix 6.12.5 shows the results of the impact of informal 
economy on the level of government revenues. 
The first part on the graphs shows the different between lost government revenues (in 
yellow) and the current government revenues (in blue). The line in the first part of the graph 
(orange) shows the level of lost revenues as percentage of current government revenues 
based on the tax rate. Government revenues from taxation for all countries of the Balkan 
                                                          
136 Tax Revenue as a percentage of GDP has been taken from World Bank Development Indicators database. 
This variable has been used as a proxy for the true level of tax rate in the Balkan economies. 
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Peninsula have been increasing as illustrated in the graph. While the value of the lost 
government revenues from taxation as a result of informality has also increased in absolute 
values, the percentage of lost revenues is falling for all the countries part of this research, as 
a direct result of slight falling levels in the size of the informal economy.  
Part two on each of the graphs in Figures 6.11.1 to 6.11.10 shows the tax revenues gap for all 
the countries part of this research. The tax revenues gap is the difference between the 
Potential Tax revenues as percentage of GDP and the Current Tax revenues as percentage of 
GDP. It must be noted that the size of the tax revenues gap is gradually reducing in all the 
countries, as the level of informal economy is also slightly declining on average terms from 
1996 to 2014. 
Nevertheless, the size of lost government revenues from taxation is significant. On average 
just over six percent137 of GDP in government revenues from taxation is being lost due to 
informality. During the period of 1996 to 2014, Albania’s tax revenues gap was approximately 
7% on average; Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tax revenues gap was 7.17% on average; Bulgaria’s 
tax revenues gap was about 5.88%; Croatia’s tax revenues gap was 6.61% for the period; 
Greece’s tax revenues gap was 5.63% on average over the period, FYR Macedonia’s tax 
revenues gap was almost 7.35% on average; Romania’s tax revenues gap was just over 4.9% 
on average; Serbia’s tax revenues gap was 5.7% on average; Slovenia’s tax revenues gap was 
4.92% on average; and Turkey’s tax revenues gap was 5.55% on average. 
 
                                                          
137 The 6.07% of GDP in government tax revenues being lost as a result of informality was calculated by taking 
the different between the potential tax revenues (as % of GDP) and subtracting it from current tax revenues (as 
% of GDP) for each country and for each year and then taking the overall average. Alternatively, this the 
average of Lost Government Tax Revenues as a % of GDP for the 10 Balkan countries part of this research. The 
range is between 4.91% and 7.34% of GDP on average in government tax revenues being lost as a result of 
informality for the period from 1996 to 2014. 
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Figure 6.11. 1 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Albania 
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Figure 6.11. 2 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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Figure 6.11. 3 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Bulgaria 
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Figure 6.11. 4 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Croatia 
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Figure 6.11. 5 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Greece 
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Figure 6.11. 6 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – FYR Macedonia 
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Figure 6.11. 7 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Romania 
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Figure 6.11. 8 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Serbia 
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Figure 6.11. 9 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Slovenia 
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Figure 6.11. 10 – Impact of informality on Government Revenues – Turkey 
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6.12. Comparative analysis 
This section presents and analyses the estimated results from the three MIMIC specifications 
and the empirical studies by Schneider (2007b, 2009), Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn and 
Schneider (2012), Schneider et al. (2013), Alm and Embaye (2013), Boka and Torluccio (2013), 
Hassan and Schneider (2016a) and Bitzenis et al. (2016). This section also provides 
comparative analysis on the mean values from the empirical studies indicated above, and 
detailed analysis on the descriptive statistics between the studies mentioned above and the 
MIMIC specifications are provided in Appendix 6.12.1. It must be noted that the studies 
included here for comparative reasons do not account for the full timeframe of this thesis, 
however, currently, there are no studies that investigate the size of the informal economy 
from 1996 to 2014 for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. 
It is also important to note that, there is a strong correlation between the MIMIC 
specifications used to estimate the size of the informal economy for the countries of Balkan 
Peninsula. Correlations are shown in appendix 6.12.2. Similarly, as shown in Appendix 6.12.3 
there is also a significant correlation between the MIMIC specifications and the empirical 
studies of Schneider (2007b, 2009), Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn and Schneider (2012), 
Schneider et al. (2013), Alm and Embaye (2013), Hassan and Schneider (2016a) and Bitzenis 
et al. (2016). This indicates that the development of the informal economy in these countries 
is similar in all three MIMIC specifications.  
Before the comparative analysis are presented in the following pages for each country, it is 
important to discuss the differences in the methodologies applied by each of the studies 
above and the MIMIC Specifications used in the calibration procedure in this study. Such 
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methodological differences can account for the differing results across difference studies 
when compare with the MIMIC specifications of this study. 
Table below highlights the differences in the use of causes and indicators in the above-
mentioned studies and the three MIMIC specifications used for calibration procedure in this 
country to derive the values for the size of the informal economy as percentage of GDP.  
Table 6.12. 1 – Use of variables by studies used for comparative analysis 
Causal Variables M
IM
IC
 S
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e
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1
*
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*
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 &
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ch
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id
e
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(2
0
1
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a)
 
B
it
ze
n
is
 e
t 
al
. (
2
0
1
6
) 
Business Freedom Index √ √ √  √ √    √ √ 
Regulation Burden    √      √  
Degree of Urbanisation √ √ √     √    
Rule of Law Index       √ √   √ 
Size of the Government     √ √      
Size of the Agriculture sector          √  
Quality of Institutions    √      √  
Government Effectiveness Index √ √ √  √ √  √    
Tax Rate     √  √ √  √  
Direct and Indirect taxes    √ √ √     √ 
Marginal income tax burden       √     
Personal Income and Payroll Tax           √ 
Tax Morality    √       √ 
Regulatory quality     √  √ √    
Monetary Freedom Index √ √ √         
Inflation Rate     √   √    
Government Spending Index √ √ √         
Unemployment Rate    √  √ √    √ 
Financial Freedom Index √           
Employment to population ratio   √         
Self-employment rate       √   √ √ 
Control of Corruption Index  √     √     
Fiscal freedom index     √ √ √     
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Economic freedom index     √     √  
Interest Rate        √    
Education level           √ 
Average Working time per week    √        
GDP Growth rate           √ 
Sub-national government employment      √      
Indicator Variables 
           
Real GDP         √ √  
GDP per capita, PPP (constrained) √ √ √ √  √ √ √   √ 
GDP per capita growth rate     √       
Cash in circulation       √     
Currency in circulation    √ √ √    √ √ 
Change in currency in circulation per capita    √   √     
Electric Power Consumption √ √ √      √   
M1/M2 rate     √       
Currency Ratio to M2        √    
Labour Force Participation Ratio     √ √    √ √ 
GDP Growth rate    √     √   
Employment Rate       √     
Growth rate of the labour force      √       
* MIMIC Specifications are robust to using more than two indicators. They are also robust to using other causal 
variables. 
** Alm and Embaye (2013) use the CDA model to measure the size of the informal economy. 
*** Boka and Torluccio (2013) use the Physical Input Model to measure the size of the informal economy in 
Albania only. 
 
 
The table above shows that most of the studies used for comparisons in this thesis uses the 
rate of taxation (direct or indirect) or other taxation variables as main causal determinant of 
informality. Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, discusses and justifies reasons why the MIMIC 
specifications of this study have not made use of the tax rates in the model. Any differences 
provided in the estimates of the MIMIC specifications and other studies are mainly due to the 
theoretical and empirical model applied with respect to the use of the causal and indicator 
variables. Even though some differences can be seen in the estimates provided by the three 
MIMIC specifications and the other studies (namely the study by Hassan & Schneider (2016a)), 
these differences are not more than +/- 5 percent for majority of countries, with some 
exceptions as illustrated and discussed in the following pages.   
 294 
 
Figure 6.12. 11 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Albania 
  
This figure shows the development of the informal economy for Albania from 1996 to 2014. There is the very negligible difference between the estimates of 
the MIMIC specifications and other empirical studies. The estimates using the MIMIC specifications as well as the studies indicated above show on average 
a declining trend in the size of the informal economy from 2006 onwards. However, the estimates from Hassan and Schneider (2016a) show an increasing 
trend in the size of the informal economy from 2006 onwards. The mean comparisons between the MIMIC specifications of this study and the other studies 
indicate that the informal economy in Albania is between 32 to 40 percent. 
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Figure 6.12. 12 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – B&H 
  
The estimates of the size of the informal economy using the three MIMIC specifications show more fluctuating results than the empirical studies.  The results 
from the MIMIC specifications indicate an increase in the size of the informal economy in Bosnia & Herzegovina between 1999 and 2001. Hassan and 
Schneider (2016a) on the other hand estimate that the size of the informal economy for Bosnia and Herzegovina rises between 2008 and 2011, and then 
starts to decrease. On average terms, both the estimates from the MIMIC specifications and the studies shown in the figure show a declining trend in the 
size of the informal economy for this country. The mean comparisons show a relatively similar size of the informal economy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which tends to fluctuate between 32 to 38 percent of GDP. 
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Figure 6.12. 13 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Bulgaria
  
The size and development of the informal economy across the studies highlighted in the figure above follow a relatively similar trend, with the exception of 
the estimates from Alm & Embaye (2013) who for 1997 provide a value for the size of the informal economy in the region of 58 percent of GDP for Bulgaria 
followed by an immediate and significant decrease the following year. They do not explain this surge and fluctuation. The estimates using the MIMIC 
specifications tend to be in line with the empirical studies as shown in the graphs above, indicating a declining trend in the size of the informal economy for 
Bulgaria over the years. According to the mean of each of the estimates, including the MIMIC specifications of this study, the informal economy in Bulgaria 
fluctuated between 28 to 37 percent in the years the studies were conducted.  
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Figure 6.12. 14 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Croatia 
  
The size and development of the informal economy in Croatia has followed a relatively similar trend, according to the results from the MIMIC specifications, 
but also the estimates from other sources and studies, as indicated in the graphs above. One exception here is the study by Hassan & Schneider (2016a) who 
show a significantly lower informal economy relative to GDP between 2001 and 2008. Conversely, the estimates from Schneider (2009) indicate an increase 
in the size of the informal economy for Croatia between roughly the same years. The estimates from the MIMIC specifications are in line with the other 
studies which tend to follow a less fluctuating movement in the size of the informal economy for Croatia. Mean comparisons show that the size of the 
informal economy in Croatia was between 28 and 36 percent of GDP in the time frame of each study. 
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Figure 6.12. 15 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Greece
  
The study by Alm and Embaye (2013) shows a much lower size of the informal economy for Greece between 1996 and 2006 than all the other studies 
including the MIMIC specifications. It is also important to note from the graphs that Hassan & Schneider (2016a) show a higher size of the informal economy 
compared to other studies between 2007 and 2012. According to their estimates, the informal economy in Greece increased from 28.7 percent in 2006 to 
almost 46 percent in 2012. This is a significant increase for an EU country such as Greece. This increase could be attributed to the sovereign debt crisis that 
Greece has been facing, but such an impact on the increase needs to be empirically proved. The MIMIC specifications are in line with other studies and that 
the mean comparisons indicate that the size of the informal economy in Greece from 1996 to 2014 was between 22 to 32 percent. 
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Figure 6.12. 16 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – FYR Macedonia
  
The results from the MIMIC specifications as well as other studies shown in the figure above, show relatively considerable fluctuations in the size of the 
informal economy for FYR Macedonia. The mean comparisons between different studies and the MIMIC specifications show that the informal economy in 
FYR Macedonia fluctuated between 34 to 38 percent of GDP for the period of their study. It has been confirmed by the other studies that the size of the 
informal economy in FYR Macedonia is amongst the highest in the Balkan region. The study from Hassan & Schneider (2016a) shows a lower informal economy 
than the MIMIC specifications of this study between 2004 and 2012. Overall the estimates indicate a declining trend in the size of the informal economy in 
FYR Macedonia over the years during their study timeframe. 
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Figure 6.12. 17 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Romania
  
The estimates for the size of the informal economy for Romania using the three MIMIC specifications show some differing results between 1996 and 2014. 
MIMIC Spec 1 and MIMIC Spec 2, show that the declining trend in the size of the informal economy for Romania is higher, while MIMIC Spec 3 estimates 
provide a more reasonable and comparable trend of the size and development of the informal economy between 1996 and 2014. MIMIC Spec 3 tended to 
be in line with the other studies indicated in the Literature Review chapter and illustrated in the figure above. Mean comparisons show that the size of the 
informal economy in the EU member has fluctuated between 26 to 37 percent for the years of the studies. 
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Figure 6.12. 18 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Serbia
  
The informal economy in Serbia can be considered as of significant size according to the results from a number of studies. Its size fluctuates between 27 and 
almost 40 percent of GDP according to different studies discussed in the Literature Review chapter and illustrated above in figure 6.12.8. MIMIC Spec 3 offer 
estimates which are more in line with the other studies, shown graphically above. It has to be noted that the number of studies which have attempted to 
estimate the size of the informal economy in Serbia is deficient. The only comprehensive study that has concentrated on estimating and analysing the size 
of economic informality in Serbia is that of Schneider et al. (2013). The estimates from this study are relatively in line with the estimates provided from MIMIC 
Spec 3. From a general point of view, the size of the informal economy in Serbia has followed a declining trend as well. 
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Figure 6.12. 19 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Slovenia
  
The informal economy in Slovenia is the lowest among the other Balkan countries according to the results from the MIMIC specifications and the other 
studies which have attempted to estimate the size of the informal economy in this country. MIMIC Spec 3, offers estimates which are in line and comparable 
to the other empirical studies such as that of Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn and Schneider (2012), and Schneider et al. (2013). Hassan and Schneider (2016a) 
on the other hand, show that the size of the informal economy has increased rather than decreased between 2008 and 2012. The study by Bitzenis et al. 
(2016) show estimates which are relatively in line with MIMIC Specifications, and in particular with MIMIC Spec 3. The size of the informal economy has 
fluctuated between 24 and 28 percent of GDP in Slovenia over the period of the studies indicated above. 
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Figure 6.12. 20 - Comparisons on the size of the informal economy between MIMIC specifications of this study and other empirical studies – Turkey
  
Turkey’s informal economy relative to GDP has fluctuated on average between 29 to 37 percent as illustrated in the graphs above. All studies shown in the 
figure and discussed in detail in the Literature Review chapter show a declining trend in the size of the informal economy in Turkey. All MIMIC specifications 
seem to be in line with other studies except estimates provided by Hassan & Schneider (2016a), who indicate an increasing informal economy between 2006 
and 2009, and between 2011 and 2012. The studies of Buehn & Schneider (2012) and Bitzenis et al. (2016) show a similar trend in the size of the informal 
economy to the MIMIC Specifications, in particular, MIMIC Spec 1 and 2.  
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6.13. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the estimates and discussions of the results for the size and 
development of the informal economy in ten Balkan countries from 1996 to 2014. The 
estimates calibrated from the chosen MIMIC specifications with best model fit statistics 
indicate that the size of the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries has followed a 
declining trend over the years. Several causes remain as the key determinants of economic 
informality in the region such as the regulatory burden, the effectiveness of governments in 
enforcing tax collection and tax enforcement and controlling the development of the informal 
economy, as well as the overall economic wellbeing. The different hypothesis set out in the 
methodology chapter, have been almost all confirmed with these results, indicating that the 
estimates are reliable and in line with theory. The estimates are also very comparable with 
the estimates from other empirical studies.  
The estimates of this study indicate that the size of the informal economy in the ten Balkan 
countries on average ranges as follows: Albania - between 32 and almost 34 percent of GDP; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - between 32 and just over 35 percent of GDP; Bulgaria - between 
29.3 to almost 33 percent of GDP; Croatia - between 32 and 33 percent of GDP; Greece - 
between 26 and 27 percent of GDP; FYR Macedonia - between 38 and 39 percent of GDP; 
Romania - from almost 26 percent to almost 33 percent of GDP; Serbia - between 28 percent 
and 31 percent of GDP; Slovenia - between 24 and 26 percent of GDP; and in Turkey - between 
just under 31 and over 33 percent of GDP.  
The estimated results have been compared with some previous studies in section 6.12. 
Generally, results presented here tend to follow a similar trend to other studies, with few 
differences, such as the cases of Greece, Turkey and Slovenia which tend to show some 
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differences with other studies.  On the other hand, the cases of Romania, Croatia and Serbia 
show substantial differences across MIMIC models.  
The results presented and discussed in detal above are significant in that they show estimates 
of the scale of the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries. The impact of such 
informality is significant in terms of government revenues in these countries too, which in 
turn could affect the level of governments’ provision of public goods and services. The results 
also revealed that the size of the informal economy in these countries increased slightly 
between 2008 and 2010. This could potentially indicate the impact of the financial crisis in 
the formal economy, forcing people to enter the informal economy. However, in order to 
understand the direct impact of financial crisis in the size of the informal economy a model 
needs to apply a structural break. Having said this, it is very challenging to apply a structural 
brake in MIMIC models and to date this has not been attempted. A further structural break 
could have been applied to the data by distinguishing countries at different stages of EU 
integrations, for example. Such analyses leave room for future research. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Discussions 
7.1. A review of main findings and conclusions 
At the outset of this study, the aim was to understand the development of the size of the 
informal economy for the ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula. In particular, the study 
intended to investigate and answer a number of research questions. The study intended to 
estimate the size of the informal economy in the ten Balkan countries, and understand its 
primary drivers contributing to a large size of the informal economy relative to formal GDP, 
and be able to provide some analysis as well as comparisons with other estimates on the 
changes in the size of the informal economy since 1996 to 2014 in the ten Balkan countries. 
This research used the MIMIC model to estimate the size and analyse the development of the 
informal economy in the ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula from 1996 to 2014. The results 
indicate that the informal economy in the Balkan countries has on average terms followed a 
declining trend over the years. One would expect such a declining trend since the region has 
gone through a significant transition phase and has progressed regarding reforms influenced 
by the European Union policies on enlargement. Index indicators on the rule of law and 
general government effectiveness have all improved for almost all countries part of this 
research, and this has influenced growth in the formal economy and at the same time a 
decrease in the size of the informal economy. 
The informal economy in the ten Balkan countries started from a yearly average size of around 
31 percent in 1996 and dropped to around 26 percent in 2014. However, the overall average 
size of the informal economy in the Balkan region remains high to just over 30 percent. 
Countries, where the overall average size of the informal economy is found to be the highest 
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as a proportion to their GDP, are FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Turkey 
with 38.4 percent, 33.3 percent, 33.0 percent, and 32.1 percent, respectively. Countries with 
the lowest informal economy are Slovenia and Greece, with 25 percent and 26.9 percent, 
respectively. The average size of the informal economy in Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia approximates to under or slightly over 30 percent. 
These results highlight that the size of the informal economy on average terms seems to be 
comparable with existing estimates for these countries, such as the recent work by Schneider 
et al. (2013), Alm & Embaye (2013), Hassan & Schneider (2016a) and Bitzenis et al. (2016), or 
earlier work by Schneider (2007b, 2009), Schneider et al. (2010), and other research done by 
various other authors discussed in detail in the literature review and the results and analysis 
chapters. 
The results reveal that the main driving factors of the informal economy in the countries of 
the Balkan Peninsula are the regulation burden, level of corruption, the dominance of the 
agriculture sector, degree of urbanisation, macroeconomic developments and the size of the 
government. The level of taxation in these countries does not seem to be very significant as 
most of these countries have had low direct and indirect taxation rates. The most important 
issue in most of these countries is the trust of the public in the government and its institutions. 
Improvements in the rule of law, which involve a fight against corruption with emphasis fight 
against high-level corruption, government effectiveness, judiciary and regulatory quality, are 
the most important determinants of economic informality in these countries. 
The impact of reduced informality could be directly and indirectly reflected in the government 
revenues and public services (Schneider et al., 2010). Reduced Informality could potentially 
lead to higher government revenues in a country (more in Section 6.11, Appendix 6.12.5). 
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Higher government revenues and the provision of quality public goods and services in a 
country are positively correlated. Higher government revenues in the countries of the Balkan 
Peninsula could also mean that they can progress further with their reforms and economic 
developments.  
The main rationale behind this study was the lack of research in measuring the size of the 
informal economy in this region. Studies that have attempted to measure the size of the 
informal economy in this region have done without particularly focusing on the Balkan 
countries, or they have used other methodologies for measuring the size of the informal 
economy. Often the existing literature does not compare results and offer analysis on results 
focusing mainly on the Balkan countries. Therefore, this research has offered a number of 
contributions from a conceptual or theoretical one to a methodological and empirical 
contribution.  
The conceptual or theoretical contribution has been offered by clearly analysing and 
reviewing the existing literature on the informal economy with emphasis on the ten Balkan 
countries part of this research, from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Theories 
regarding the informal economy have been discussed in detail and empirical studies which 
have estimated the size of the informal economy in Balkan countries over the years has been 
analysed and compared with each other and with the estimates of this research. The 
methodological and empirical contribution of this research has been achieved by using a 
MIMIC model which is made up of mainly enforcement causes, to measure the size of the 
informal economy.  Estimates were provided for the three MIMIC specifications used in the 
benchmarking procedure with the best model fit statistics. 
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Many studies have argued that countries tend to use mainly punitive and enforcement 
measures to combat the high level of informal economy (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Frey & 
Schneider, 2000; la Porta & Schleifer, 2014). High economic growth and development tend to 
have an inverse relationship with the size of the informal economy, and many developed 
countries with substantial growth are minimal and can be controlled through a combination 
of punitive measures and incentives to enter a growing formal economy with many 
opportunities. Majority of Balkan countries, however, are relatively small economies and 
therefore the size of their formal economy might not be an option in controlling the level of 
economic informality. This study expected that the use of mainly enforcement causes in the 
MIMIC regression was important in estimating and explaining the size and development of 
the informal economy. Their hypotheses138 raised in the methodology chapter in light of the 
developments in the Balkan countries have been tested, and almost all confirmed in this 
study. 
The Balkan region has undergone significant changes in the last couple of decades. In most of 
the Balkan countries part of this research, transformations in their political and economic 
systems have all happened in the last two decades. The transformation from socialism or 
communism to democracy and the market economy in some countries (mainly from the 
former republics of Yugoslavia, and Albania) was challenging and was not overcome without 
the explosion of violence and social unrest. Therefore, it was interesting to see the 
development of the informal economy in the last two decades. 
Majority of the estimates provided in this study, also directly or indirectly indicate the impact 
of the financial crisis of 2008. The momentum on the declining trend in the size of the informal 
                                                          
138 Hypothesis for each variable used as causes and indicators in the MIMIC model and different specifications 
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economy for the region was slowed down during the years immediately after the financial 
crisis of 2008. The financial crisis of 2008 slowed down economic growth and development in 
almost all countries of the Balkan Peninsula. Such impact was also reflected in higher 
unemployment rates. The level of unemployment in a country is positively related to the level 
of the informal economy, as indicated by the causality in MIMIC regressions of this study. 
In conclusion, this study has provided estimates on the size of the informal economy for ten 
Balkan countries, using a MIMIC model comprised of mainly enforcement causal variables. It 
has shown that the size of the informal economy over the years has been declining on average 
terms, which could be explained by economic, political and social developments in these 
countries. However, having said this, the size of the informal economy in these countries is 
still high averaging just over 30 percent of GDP. The governments in these ten countries are, 
therefore, still faced with a challenge on how to reduce such level of economic informality. 
This study has aimed to provide some policy recommendations on reducing the level of the 
informal economy. 
7.2. Policy Recommendations 
The estimates about the size of the informal economy provided in the previous chapter 
indicate that the level of informal economy in the ten countries of the Balkan Peninsula is 
declining, albeit the estimates still reveal that its size is still significant. It is also evident from 
data that the ten countries part of this research has undergone significant reforms in their 
economies, political and judiciary systems. Majority of these reforms have been influenced 
by the EU and the integration processes. However, Balkan countries should continue to work 
on reforms to encourage a transition of a relatively large informal economy into the formal 
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economy. There could be several avenues for government to consider in tackling the large 
size of the informal economy. 
Fight against corruption 
The level of corruption in Balkan countries is of significant size. Corruption tends to be 
positively correlated with the level of informal economy (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 
2007a; Buehn & Schneider 2012; Aydin, 2017; Medina & Schneider, 2017). Governments in 
the Balkan countries should focus on tackling high-level corruption, which could act as a signal 
to all that no one is above the law. Majority of these high-profile corruption cases (e.g. in 
Serbia, Croatia, Albania, and FYR Macedonia) involve highly ranked current or past 
government officials.  
The inability of the judicial system to finalise convictions on these cases causes mistrust and 
discontent among the people, often resulting in protests and riots (Buscaglia 2003, 2008; 
European Commission Report, 2012139; Mehmetaj, 2014; Areizaga, 2017). In tackling 
corruption, full judiciary independence should be given to combat any corruptive practices 
which could influence existing and new participants in the informal economy. The results also 
indicate that the higher the level of corruption in a country is, the higher the size of the 
informal economy is expected to be, ceteris paribus. Therefore, a reduction in the level of 
corruption will have a direct impact on the size of the informal economy. 
 
 
                                                          
139 Available from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/evaluation/2012_final_report_lot_2.pdf, last accessed 
on 12.11.2017) 
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Strengthening the rule of law  
The rule of law is linked with the fight against corruption, ensuring that all those who do not 
comply with a country’s laws will face the consequences. A well-functioning rule of law could 
ensure that there are no new entrants into the informal economy. The effective rule of law, 
which ensures the protection of property rights and the enforceability of contracts, increases 
the benefits to participants to remain in the formal economy and at the same time can 
increase the costs of informality (Hassan and Schneider, 2016b). 
Strengthening tax enforcement, tax auditing and control  
Countries that experience high levels of unemployment should strengthen tax enforcement 
and increase the number of audits and control measures (Bitzenis et al. 2016). Strong and 
effective tax enforcement increase the opportunity cost of operating in the informal economy 
and will influence participants to shift from informal to formal economic activities. Policy 
enforcement has to be strict since tax enforcement measures are negatively correlated with 
the size of the informal economy (Buehn and Schneider 2012).  
According to Alm and Torgler (2011), tax enforcement policies should be followed by a tax 
administration that works towards promoting trust and simultaneously discouraging 
corruption. Efficient tax administration could improve the attitudes of citizens towards paying 
their taxes, reflecting the popular trust in public institutions a fair and equal tax regime 
(Ritsatos, 2014). Improvements in tax administration and enforcement policies could 
potentially improve individuals’ tax morality because according to Frey and Torgler, (2007) 
and Bizenis et al. (2016), the apparent tax evasion of others is positively linked with an 
individual’s tax morality. Furthermore, the policies adopted by some Balkan countries (and 
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other countries worldwide) for implementing tax amnesties and debt settlements is likely to 
encourage individuals not to pay taxes when due, hoping for an amnesty or debt settlement. 
This is also likely to exacerbate the negative perception that some individuals might adopt 
regarding the unfairness of the tax system if the government amnesty does not benefit them.  
Reduction in the size of the government 
The size of government indicating the extent to which countries rely on the political process 
to allocate resources and provide public goods and services is an essential determinant in 
reducing the level of economic informality in a country (Medina & Schneider, 2017).  
Government interference in fairly allocating the public resources is likely to affect the tax 
morale as well as the perception of individuals’ trust in government institutions. This could 
potentially lead to popular mistrust and encourage people to engage in informal economic 
activities. Governments of the ten Balkan countries should consider reducing the size of their 
government and decentralising much of their power to local authorities.  
Reduction in regulation burden 
Despite the improvements in the ease of doing business, there are still administrative 
bureaucracies in most of the Balkan countries (Schneider et al. 2013, Krstic & Sanfey, 2011). 
Such bureaucracies can potentially lead to increased labour costs in the formal economy, 
which are usually shifted to the employees, providing another incentive for people to work in 
the informal economy (Schneider & Enste, 2000). Governments should, therefore, work 
towards reducing the density of regulations and improving the enforcement of regulations, 
as opposed to increasing the number of regulations.  
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A better system in place to control the production of agricultural products 
Since the size of the agriculture sector is relatively large in almost all Balkan countries when 
compared to the EU or other developed countries, the governments of these countries should 
have a better system in place to control the production of agricultural products. Farmers and 
those involved with the production of agricultural products should be incentivised in 
reporting all their production. Help and support should be given to those that are unable to 
compete with imported agricultural products. All those involved in the production of 
agricultural products should be equipped with fiscal recorders, and a dedicated team within 
the tax administration should be activated in supporting all those that operate formally rather 
than informally. This is likely to create incentives for those involved in the informal economy 
to enter the formal economy. 
Active Labour market policies (ALMPs) 
Countries with high unemployment levels must spend more in active labour market policies 
and programmes to help those unemployed find work. Most Balkan countries lack effective 
ALMPs to combat unemployment levels, and as such this could encourage people to enter 
informal economy because they cannot find opportunities in the formal economy. These ten 
Balkan countries should provide efficient and effective public employment services, where 
those that are unemployed can improve their job search efforts from the information about 
open vacancies provided by job centres, and the help and advice that they could get from 
these centres will encourage them to search for employment in the formal rather than 
informal economy.  
 315 
 
Low skilled labour tends to be mainly engaged in the informal economy as suggested by 
theory (Dell’Anno, 2007; Buehn & Schneider, 2012). The government provided training 
schemes such as classes and apprenticeships can potentially help the unemployed improve 
their vocational skills and increase their employability in higher paid jobs, which in turn raise 
standards and encourage formal employment. Governments should also try to provide 
employment subsidies which could potentially create jobs in the formal economy for the 
unemployed. 
Less punitive measures but more active and effective measures 
As discussed previously in other chapters, most countries attempt to control the size of the 
informal economy through punitive measures such as punishments and prosecution. These 
may not be the most appropriate measures to control informal economic activities (Frey & 
Schneider, 2000). These punitive measures alone might not be sufficient. These must be 
coupled with adequate tax enforcement and auditing policies discussed above. Some 
countries try to use education to educate people not to engage in the informal economy, 
highlighting the punitive measures involved (la Porta & Schleifer, 2014). Education and 
informative campaigns about tax enforcement policies are likely to deter people from 
entering the informal economy. 
These policy recommendations should be accompanied by clear strategies and measures to 
be successful. Successful policy for formalisation of the informal economy should entail the 
implementation and application of measures and policies that should discourage new 
participants entering  into the informal economy and to design policies that attempt to 
formalise the economic activities of the existing participants. Alongside such policies, 
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countries should create favourable conditions to achieve and maintain economic growth 
through macroeconomic stability and reforms. 
7.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
This study has added to the literature of informal economy, by estimating the size and 
development of the informal economy in ten Balkan countries. It has analysed the existing 
literature on the informal economy, reviewed the theories available and evaluated the 
leading causes of informal economy for the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. The research 
has shown some fluctuations in the trend of the informal economy.  
Further research may be required to understand these fluctuations by applying different 
structural brakes. For example, the size of the informal economy in almost all countries part 
of this research has increased slightly between 2008 and 2010. Future research may need to 
investigate the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Eurozone debt 
crisis on the level of the informal economy.  
The level of immigration in a country and its relationship with the level of the informal 
economy is also an interesting area for future research. There does not seem to be significant 
research on this area in the existing literature. Studies such as that of Bohn & Owens (2009) 
and Bosh & Farre (2013) indicate a highly positive relationship between the level of 
immigration in a country and the size of the informal economy, in particular, the level of 
informal employment. The level of immigration could be used as a cause of informal economy 
in the MIMIC regression. It has not been used in this case, as immigration is not very common 
in the countries of Balkan Peninsula; rather it is emigration a more common factor. However, 
one could investigate this relationship for highly developed countries or a more substantial 
sample which includes countries worldwide. 
 317 
 
This study has provided measures on the size of the informal economy for ten Balkan 
countries excluding Kosovo and Montenegro. Future research should also investigate and 
measure the size and development of the informal economy in Kosovo and Montenegro, 
using a MIMIC model. These two countries are characterised by a high degree of corruption, 
which could potentially have the highest level of economic informality in the region. Due to 
data unavailability and a significant percentage of missing data, these two countries were 
excluded from this research.  
Further research may involve a survey to understand the main drivers of economic 
informality. Using Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Explanatory Factor Analysis one could 
determine all the potential factors and sub-factors influencing individuals in different 
countries to undertake informal economic activities. This research would not be concerned 
with the size of the informal economy, but instead, it would be concerned with the main 
drivers of informality. 
Following the work of Elgin and Oztunali (2014) on the application of environmental Kuznets 
curve to the informal economy for Turkey for the period of 1950 to 2009, one could expand 
on this analysis to include more countries in the sample, in order to understand the 
relationship and the impact of the informal economy to the formal economy at different 
stages of a country’s economic development. Nikopour et al. (2008) and Elgin & Oztunali 
(2014) indicate that the level of the informal economy in a country has a positive effect on 
the formal economy in the first stages of the development and has a negative impact on 
economic growth on later stages of development. Such conclusion should be tested further. 
The question of how much of informal economy ends up being spent in the formal economy 
is also an interesting topic for future research. 
 318 
 
References and Bibliography 
Abdih, M. Y., and Medina, L. (2013). Measuring the Informal Economy in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia (No. 13-137). International Monetary Fund. 
Abed, M.G.T., and Gupta, M.S. (2002). Governance, corruption, and economic 
performance. International Monetary Fund. 
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A., (2002). The political economy of the Kuznets curve. 
Review of development economics, 6(2), pp.183-203. 
Adam, M.C. and Ginsburgh, V., (1985). The effects of irregular markets on macroeconomic 
policy: some estimates for Belgium. European Economic Review, 29(1), pp.15-33. 
Agbi, S., (2014). The virtuous and the variance of the various approaches for measuring 
shadow economy around the world-implications for policymakers. European Journal of 
Business and Innovation Research, 2(6), pp.40-55. 
Ahumada, H., Alvaredo, F., Canavese, A., and Canavese, P. (2004). The Demand for Currency 
Approach and the Size of the Shadow Economy: A Critical Assessment. Delta Ecole. Normale 
Superieure, Paris, Discussion Paper.  
Ahmed, Q.M. and Hussain, M.H., (2006). Estimating the black economy through monetary 
approach: a case study of Pakistan. Economic Issues. Vol. 13, Part 1. 
Aigner, D., Schneider, F., and G., Damayanti (1988). Me and my Shadow: Estimating the Size 
of the US Hidden Economy from Time Series Data. In: Dynamic econometric modelling, ed. 
by W.A. Barnett and E.R. Berndt and H. White, pp. 224–243, Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge 
University Press.  
Alderslade, J., Talmage, J., and Freeman, Y. (2006). Measuring the Informal Economy: One 
Neighborhood at a Time. The Brooking Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, Discussion 
Paper. Washington D.C., September 2006. Available at: 
https://www.brookings.edu/metro/umi/pubs/20060905_informaleconomy.pdf (Last 
accessed: 22.04.2017) 
Alesina, Alberto, (1999), Too Large and Too Small Governments, in Vito Tanzi, Ke-young 
Chu, and Sanjeev Gupta, ed., Economic Policy and Equity (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund).  
Alm, J. and Embaye, A., (2013). Using dynamic panel methods to estimate shadow 
economies around the world, 1984–2006. Public Finance Review, 41(5), pp.510-543. 
 319 
 
Anastasakis, O., (2013). Post-1989 political change in the Balkan states: the legacy of the 
early illiberal transition years. Perceptions, 18(2), pp.91. 
Andrei, T., Iacob, A.I., Profiroiu, A. and Dananaum, F., (2011). Some Comments Concerning 
Informal Economy, Unemployment and Inflation Rates–Romania’s Case. Economic 
Computation and Economic Cybernetics Studies and Research, ASE Publishing, 45(3), 
pp.127-142. 
Andrei, T., Ştefănescu, D., and Oancea, B. (2010). Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the 
Informal Economy. Case Study at the Level of Romania. Theoretical and Applied Economics, 
7(7), 15. 
Andrews, D., Sánchez, A.C. and Johansson, A., (2011). Towards a better understanding of 
the informal economy. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/18151973 
Antonakis, J. and Bastardoz, N., (2013). Swain: Stata module to correct the SEM chi-square 
overidentification test in small sample sizes or complex models. Statistical Software 
Components. 
Arby, Muhammad Farooq, Muhammad Jahanzeb Malik, and Muhammad Nadim Hanif. 
(2012). The size of the informal economy in Pakistan. Finance Research, Vol1 No2, April 
2012, ISSN: 2165-8226   
Areizaga, L., S. (2017). Albania´s Progress on Rule of Law, Democracy and Fundamental 
rights - A Comparison between the EU and Council of Europe’ Monitoring Instruments. 
Albania Law Journal (1), February 2017 
Arellano, M., (2003). Panel data econometrics. Oxford university press. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O., (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), pp.29-51. 
Árvai, Z., Driessen, K. and Ötker, I., (2009). Regional financial interlinkages and financial 
contagion Within Europe. International Monetary Fund. 
Asiedu, E. and Stengos, T., (2014). An empirical estimation of the underground economy in 
Ghana. Economics Research International, Volume 2014 (2014), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/891237 
Asea, P. K. (1996), The informal sector: Baby or bath water? A comment. In Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (Vol. 45, pp. 163-171). North-Holland. 
Aydin, N. (2017). Analyzing the Shadow Economy of Selected Transition Economies by a 
Mimic Model, in Zortuk, M., (2017). Applied Economics for Development. Vernon Press. 
 320 
 
Azuma, Y., and Grossman, H. I. (2002). A theory of the informal sector (No. w8823). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Baltagi, B., (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. John Wiley & Sons. 4th Edition. 
Bajada, C., 1999. Estimates of the underground economy in Australia. Economic Record, 
75(4), pp.369-384. 
Bajada, C. and Schneider, F., (2005). Size, Causes and Consequences of the Underground 
Economy: An International Perspective. Aldershot (GB): Ashgate Publishing Company.  
Bajada, C. and Schneider, F., (2009). Unemployment and the Shadow Economy in the OECD. 
Revue économique, 60(5), pp.1033-1067. 
Balfour, R. and Stratulat, C., (2011). The democratic transformation of the Balkans. EPC 
Issue Paper, 66. 
Baliu, Q., Kamenica, A., Pfau-Effinger, B., Salvini, A., Stribu, E., Roch, S., and Sisevic, B. 
(2011). A comparative overview of informal employment in Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Moldova and Montenegro. ILO, 13, 3. 
Barbosa, E., Pereira, S. and Brandão, E., (2013). The Shadow Economy in Portugal: An 
Analysis Using the MIMIC Model. School of Economics and Management Working Papers, 
University of Porto, (514). 
Barnes, J., Cote, J., Cudeck, R. and Malthouse, E. (2001). Checking Assumptions of Normality 
before Conducting Factor Analyses. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 10(1/2), pp. 79-81. 
Bartlett, W., (2009). Economic development in the European super-periphery: Evidence 
from the Western Balkans. Economic annals, 54(181), pp.21-44. 
Bartlett, W. and Monastiriotis, V., (2010). South Eastern Europe after the economic crisis: 
a new dawn or back to business as usual? LSE Research on South Eastern Europe. 
Bartlett, W. and Prica, I., (2013). The deepening crisis in the European super-periphery. 
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15(4), pp.367-382. 
Bartlett, W. and Uvalic, M., (2013). Social consequences of the global economic crisis in 
South East Europe. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, LSEE-
Research on South Eastern Europe. 
Becker, K. F. (2004). The informal economy: fact-finding study. Sida. 
Belev, B. (2003). The Informal Economy in the EU Accession Countries: Size, Scope, Trends 
and Challenges to the Process of EU Enlargement. Centre for Study of Democracy, Sofia.  
 321 
 
 
Bejakovic, P., (2004). The informal economy in Croatia and economic development. South 
East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs, 3, pp.69-78.  
Bentler, P.M., & Chou, C.-P. (1987). Practical issues in structural modelling. Sociological 
Methods & Research, 16, pp. 78-117. 
Bhattacharya, P.C., (2011). The informal sector, income inequality and economic 
development. Economic Modelling, 28(3), pp.820-830. 
Bhattacharyya, D.K. (1999). On the Economic Rationale of Estimating the Hidden Economy. 
Economic Journal, 109(456): F348-359. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v109y1999i456pf348-59.html  
Biau, J., (2011). Engine for growth or drag on productivity? The informal sector and 
domestic investment in developing countries. Georgetown University. 
Bitzenis, A., Vlachos, V. and Schneider, F., (2016). An exploration of the Greek shadow 
economy: can its transfer into the official economy provide economic relief amid the crisis? 
Journal of Economic Issues, 50(1), pp.165-196. 
Blades, D. (1982). The Hidden Economy and the National Accounts. OECD, Occasional 
Studies.  
Blades, D., Ferreira, F. H., and Lugo, M. A. (2011). The informal economy in developing 
countries: an introduction. Review of Income and Wealth, 57(s1), S1-S7. 
Blau, P.M. and Scott, W.R., 1962. Formal organizations: A comparative approach. Stanford 
University Press. 
Blunch, N.H., (2015). Bound to lose, bound to win? The financial crisis and the informal-
formal sector earnings gap in Serbia.  Journal of Labour and Development, 4(1), p.13. 
Bogdanov, L., and Stanchev, K. (2010). The grey economy in Bulgaria: situation as of 2010]. 
Sofia: Institute for Market Economics. 
Bohn, S. and Owens, E.G., 2009. Immigration and the Informal Economy. Available online 
at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.492.7248&rep=rep1&type=pd
f (Last accessed on 28.12.2017) 
Boka, Merita and Torluccio, Giuseppe (2008), The Informal Economy in Albania: Genesis 
and Development, Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, MCSER Publishing, Rome-
Italy, E-ISSN 2281-4612 ISSN 2281-3993, Vol 2 No 8 October 2008. 
 322 
 
Bollen, K.A., (1989). A new incremental fit index for general structural equation models. 
Sociological Methods & Research, 17(3), pp.303-316. 
Bollen, K.A., Long, JS (1993). Testing structural equation models. A Sage Focus Edition. 
Bosch, M. and Farré, L., (2013). Immigration and the informal labour market. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 7843, available from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2374624 (Last accessed on 
28.12.2017) 
Bovi, M., and Dell’Anno, R. (2010). The changing nature of the OECD shadow economy. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 20(1), 19-48. 
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E., and Collier, D. (2008). The Oxford handbook of 
political methodology (Vol. 10). Oxford University Press. 
Breitung, J. and Das, S., (2005). Panel unit root tests under cross‐sectional dependence. 
Statistica Neerlandica, 59(4), pp.414-433. 
Breitung, J. and Pesaran, M.H., (2008). Unit roots and cointegration in panels. In The 
econometrics of panel data (pp. 279-322). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Breusch, Trevor (2005a). Estimating the Underground Economy using MIMIC Models. 
EconWPA, Econometrics 0507003. http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpem/0507003.html  
Breusch, Trevor, (2005b). Fragility of Tanzi’s method of estimating the underground 
economy. The Australian National University, mimeo. 
Breusch, Trevor, (2005c). The Canadian Underground Economy: An Examination of Giles 
and Tedds. Canadian Tax Journal, 53(2):367-391.  
Breusch, Trevor, (2006) Size, Causes and Consequences of the Underground Economy: An 
International Perspective. Economic Record, Vol. 82(259), December. 492-494. 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2011). Business research strategies, Business research methods, 
OUP Oxford; 3rd edition, ISBN: 0199583404 
Boomsma, A., (1985). Non-convergence, improper solutions, and starting values in LISREL 
maximum likelihood estimation. Psychometrika, 50(2), pp.229-242. 
Buehn, A., and Schneider, F. (2007). Shadow economies and corruption all over the world: 
Revised estimates for 120 countries. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-
Journal, 1(9), 1-66. 
 323 
 
Buehn, A., and Schneider, F. (2009). Corruption and the Shadow Economy: A Structural 
Equation Model Approach. Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), IZA Discussion Papers 
4182. http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp4182.html  
Buehn, A., Karmann, A., and F., Schneider (2009). Shadow Economy and Do-it-yourself 
Activities: The German Case. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 165(4):701-
722.  
Buehn, A. and Schneider, F., (2011). A preliminary attempt to estimate the financial flows 
of transnational crime using the MIMIC method. Research Handbook on Money Laundering, 
pp.172-189. 
Buehn, A. and Schneider, F., (2012). Shadow economies around the world: novel insights, 
accepted knowledge, and new estimates. International Tax and Public Finance, 19(1), 
pp.139-171. 
Burgess, R., and Körner, K. (2012). Western Balkans: Bumps on the road to EU accession. 
Deutsche Bank Research–Emerging Markets, August. 
Buscaglia, E., (2003). Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector. 
Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 3, Nos. 1/2, December 2003. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=931046  
Buscaglia, E., (2008). The paradox of expected punishment: legal and economic factors 
determining success and failure in the fight against organised crime. Review of Law & 
Economics, 4(1), pp.290-317. 
Byrne, B.M. (1998). Structural Equation Modelling with LISREL, PRELIS and SIMPLIS: Basic 
Concepts, Applications and Programming. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Cagan, P. (1958). The Demand for Currency Relative to the Total Money Supply. Journal of 
Political Economy, 66(3):302-328.  
Carlin, W. and Soskice, D.W., (2015). Macroeconomics: Institutions, instability, and the 
financial system. Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780199655793. 
Cassar, A., (2001). An index of the underground economy in Malta. Bank of Valletta Review, 
23(2), pp.44-62. 
Chaudhuri, K., Schneider, F. and Chattopadhyay, S., (2006). The size and development of 
the shadow economy: An empirical investigation from states of India. Journal of 
Development Economics, 80(2), pp.428-443. 
Charmes, J. (2012), The Informal Economy Worldwide: Trends and Characteristics, The 
Journal of Applied Economic Research, May 2012, 6: 103-132 
 324 
 
Chen, Martha (2004). Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy 
and the Formal Regulatory Environment. In: Paper presented at the EGDI-WIDR Conference 
‘unleashing human potential: linking the informal and formal sectors, Helsinki, Finland. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp46_2007.pdf (Accessed: 
30.06.2017). 
Chen, Martha (2007), Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy 
and the Formal Regulatory Environment, DESA Working Paper No. 46 
ST/ESA/2007/DWP/46, July 2007. 
Chen, Martha (2012), The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies, WIEGO 
Working Paper No. 1, ISBN: ISBN 978-92-95095-41-0 
Choi, I., (2001). Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of international money and Finance, 
20(2), pp.249-272. 
Choi, J., and Thum, M. (2005). Corruption and the Shadow Economy. International 
Economic Review, 12(4):308-342.  
Ciraki, D., (2007). Dynamic structural equation models: estimation and interference. 
London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom). 
Claessens, S. and Kose, M.M.A., (2013). Financial crises explanations, types, and 
implications (No. 13-28). International Monetary Fund. 
Cling, J.P., Razafindrakoto, M. and Roubaud, F., (2010). Assessing the potential impact of 
the global crisis on the labour market and the informal sector in Vietnam. Journal of 
Economics and Development, 38, pp.16-25. 
Colombo, E., Onnis, L., and Tirelli, P. (2016). Shadow economies at times of banking crises: 
Empirics and theory. Journal of Banking and Finance, 62, 180-190. 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., and Roubini, N. (1999). What caused the Asian currency and 
financial crisis? Japan and the world economy, 11(3), 305-373. 
Cunningham, W. and Maloney, W.F., (2000). Measuring vulnerability: who suffered in the 
1995 Mexican crisis? World Bank, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00895A/WEB/PDF/VULNER-2.PDF (Last 
accessed: 05.06.2017) 
De Soto, H. (1989). The other path: The invisible revolution in the third world. 
Development Southern Africa, Volume 6, 1989 - Issue 3, pp. 390-392 
De Soto, H. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else. Basic Books. ISBN: 0-552-99923-7.  
 325 
 
Del´Anno, R., and Schneider, F.G. (2006). Estimating the Underground Economy by Using 
MIMIC Models: A Response to T. Breusch´s Critique. Department of Economics, Johannes 
Kepler University Linz, Austria, Economics working papers 2006-07.  
Del’Anno, R., and Schneider, F. (2009). A Complex Approach to Estimate the Shadow 
Economy: The Structural Equation Modelling. In: Coping with the Complexity of Economics, 
ed. by Marzia Faggini and Thomas Lux, pp. 110–130, Heidelberg: Springer Publ. Comp.  
Del'Anno, R. (2003). Estimating the Shadow Economy in Italy: A Structural Equation 
Approach. School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus, Economics Working 
Papers 2003-7. http://ideas.repec.org/p/aah/aarhec/2003-7.html  
Dell’Anno, R. and Piirisild, M., (2004). Estimate of non-observed economy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. USAID paper presented in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available from 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG958.pdf (Last accessed on 17.09.2017 
Dell’Anno, R. (2009). Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness. The Journal 
of Socio-Economics, 38(6), pp.988-997. 
Dell’Anno, R., (2010). Institutions and human development in the Latin American informal 
economy. Constitutional Political Economy, 21(3), pp.207-230. 
Dell’Anno, R., and Schneider, F. (2003), The Shadow Economy of Italy and other OECD 
Countries: What do we know? Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, XXI (2-3), pp. 97-
120. 
Dell’Anno, R., Gómez-Antonio, M., and Pardo, A. (2007). The shadow economy in three 
Mediterranean countries: France, Spain and Greece. A MIMIC approach. Empirical 
Economics, 33(1), 51-84. 
Dell'Anno, R. (2007). The shadow economy in Portugal: an analysis with the MIMIC 
approach. Journal of Applied Economics, 10(2), 253. 
Dell'Anno, R., and Halicioglu, F. (2010). An ARDL model of unrecorded and recorded 
economies in Turkey. Journal of Economic Studies, 37(6), 627-646. 
Diamantopoulos, A., Siguaw, J. & Siguaw, J. A. (2000). Introducing LISREL: A guide for the 
uninitiated, Sage Publications. 
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2003). The new 
comparative economics. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 595-619. 
Dreher, A., and Schneider, F. (2010). Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical 
analysis. Public Choice, 144(1-2), 215-238. 
 326 
 
Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C., and McCorriston, S. (2009). How do institutions affect 
corruption and the shadow economy? International Tax and Public Finance, 16(6), 773-796. 
Drukker, D.M., (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. Stata 
Journal, 3(2), pp.168-177. 
Dzhekova, R., Franic, J., Mishkov, L., and Williams, C. C. (2014). Tackling the Undeclared 
Economy in FYR Macedonia: a baseline assessment. Available at SSRN 2479905. 
Echazu, L., and Bose, P. (2008). Corruption, Centralization, and the Shadow Economy. 
Southern Economic Journal, 75(2):524-537.  
Eichengreen, B and R. Porter (1987) “The Anatomy of Financial Crises" in Richard Portes 
and Alexander Swoboda, eds. Threats to International Financial Stability, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1987, pp. 10-58. 
Elbasani, A. and Šabić, S.Š., (2017). The rule of law, corruption and democratic 
accountability in the course of EU enlargement. Journal of European Public Policy, pp.1-19. 
Elgin, C. and Öztunali, O., (2014a). Institutions, informal economy, and economic 
development. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 50(4), pp.145-162. 
Elgin, C. and Öztunali, O., (2014b). Environmental Kuznets curve for the informal sector of 
Turkey (1950-2009). Panoeconomicus, 61(4), p.471. 
Elshamy, H.M., (2015). Measuring the Informal Economy in Egypt. In conference 
proceedings IRC-2014 (p. 167). 
Enste, D. H. (2010). Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-
countries. Constitutional Political Economy, 21(3), 231-248. 
Farrell, D. (2004). The hidden dangers of the informal economy. McKinsey Quarterly, 26-37. 
Feige, E. (1989a) The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Feige, E. (1989b). The UK´s Unobserved Economy: A Preliminary Assessment. Journal of 
Economic Affairs 1, pp. 205-212. 
Feige, E. (1990). Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: The new 
institutional economics approach. World development, 18(7), pp.989-1002. 
Feige, E. (1994). The underground economy and the currency enigma. Public Finance, 49 
(Supplement), pp.119-36. 
 327 
 
Feige, E. (1996) Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency and the Underground Economy in S. 
Pozo (ed. 1996) Exploring the Underground Economy, W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 5-62.  
Feige, E. (1997). Underground activity and institutional change: Productive, protective and 
predatory behaviour in transition economies. Transforming post-communist political 
economies, 21, 34. 
Feige, E. (2003) The Dynamics of Currency Substitution, Asset Substitution and de facto 
Dollarization and Euroization in Transition Countries, Comparative Economic Studies 45,3 
September 358-383 
Feige, E. (2005a). A Re-Examination of the 'Underground Economy' in the United States; A 
Comment on Tanzi. EconWPA, Macroeconomics.  
Feige, E. (2005b). Overseas Holdings of U.S. Currency and The Underground Economy. 
EconWPA, Macroeconomics. http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpma/0501022.html  
Feige, E.L. ed., (2007). The underground economies: Tax evasion and information 
distortion. Cambridge University Press. 
Feige, E.L. and Ott, K., (1999). Underground Economies in Transition: Unrecorded Activity, 
Tax Evasion, Corruption, and Organized Crime. Ashgate Publishing. 
Feld, L., and Larsen, C. (2005). Black Activities in Germany in 2001 and 2004: A Comparison 
Based on Survey Data. The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, Copenhagen (DK).  
Feld, L.P. and Schneider, F., (2010). Survey on the shadow economy and undeclared 
earnings in OECD countries. German Economic Review, 11(2), pp.109-149. 
Feld, L.P., and Frey, B.S. (2002). Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated. Economics 
of Governance, 3(2):87-99. http://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ecogov/v3y2002i2p87-99.html  
Finnegan, G., and Singh, A. (2004). Role of the informal sector in coping with economic crisis 
in Thailand and Zambia (No. 365701). International Labour Organization. 
Flaming, D., Hayolamak, B., and Jossart, P. (2005). Hopeful Workers, Marginal Jobs: LA’s 
Off-The-Books Labour Force. Economic Roundtable, Los Angeles, CA.  
Fleming, M.H., Roman, J. and Farrell, G., (2000). The shadow economy. Journal of 
International Affairs, pp.387-409. 
Fornell, C. and Larcker, D.F., (1981). Structural equation models with unobservable 
variables and measurement error: Algebra and statistics. Journal of Marketing Research, 
pp.382-388. 
 328 
 
Frederic S. Mishkin (2015), The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets (11th 
Edition) (The Pearson Series in Economics), Pearson; 11 edition (January 6, 2015) 
French, R., Balaita, M., and Ticsa, M. (1999). Estimating the size and policy implications of 
the underground economy in Romania. US Department of the Treasury, Office of Technical 
Assistance. 
Frey, B. (1997). Not just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. 
Cheltonham (UK): Edward Elgar.  
Frey, B. and Pommerehne, W. W. (1984). The Hidden Economy: State and Prospects for 
Measurement. Review of Income and Wealth, 30(1), pp. 1-23. 
Frey, B.S. and Schneider, F., 2000. Informal and underground economy. Working Paper (No. 
0004), Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz. 
Frey, B.S. and Torgler, B., (2007). Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 35(1), pp.136-159. 
Frey, B. and Weck-Hanneman, H. (1984), The Hidden Economy as ‘Unobserved Variable’, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 26, pp. 33–53. 
Frey, B., (1989). How large (or small) should the underground economy be? In E.L. Feige 
(Ed.), The underground economy: Tax evasion and information distortion, 111-129. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Frey, B., and Weck, H. (1983a). Estimating the Shadow Economy: A ‘Naive’ Approach. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 34:23-44.  
Frey, B., and Weck, H. (1983b). Bureaucracy and the Shadow Economy: A Macro-Approach. 
In: Anatomy of Government Deficiencies, ed. by Horst Hanusch, pp. 89–109, Springer.  
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (2000). Dodging the 
Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries. Journal of Public 
Economics, 76(3):459-493.  
Galli, R., and Kucera, D. (2003). Informal employment in Latin America: Movements over 
business cycles and the effects of worker rights. International Institute for Labour Studies. 
Garcia, G. (1978). The Currency Ratio and the Subterranean Economy. Financial Analysts 
Journal, 69(1):64-66.  
Garvanlieva, V., Andonov, V. and Nikolov, M., (2012). Shadow Economy of Macedonia. CEA 
Journal of Economics, 7(2). 
 329 
 
Geertz, C., 1978. The bazaar economy: Information and search in peasant marketing. The 
American Economic Review, 68(2), pp.28-32. 
Gerxhani, K. (2004a). Tax evasion in transition: Outcome of an institutional clash? Testing 
Feige’s conjecture in Albania, European Economic Review 48 (4): 729-745 
Gerxhani, K. (2004b). The informal sector in developed and less developed countries: a 
literature survey. Public choice, 120(3-4), pp.267-300. 
Geshkov, M., (2014). The Effect of the World Economic Crisis on the Countries of the Balkan 
Region. Economic Alternatives, (1), pp.108-125. 
Gibson, B. and Kelley, B., (1994). A classical theory of the informal sector. The Manchester 
School, 62(1), pp.81-96. 
Giles, David, E.A. (1997a). Causality between the Measured and Underground Economies 
in New Zealand. Applied Economics Letters, 4(1):63-67. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apeclt/v4y1997i1p63-67.html  
Giles, David, E.A. (1997b). Testing for Asymmetry in the Measured and Underground 
Business Cycles in New Zealand. The Economic Record, 73(222):225-32.  
Giles, David, E.A. (1999a). Measuring the Hidden Economy: Implications for Econometric 
Modelling. The Economic Journal, 109(456): 370–380. 
Giles, David, E.A. (1999b): Modelling the Hidden Economy in the Tax-Gap in New Zealand. 
Empirical Economics 24(4): 621–640. 
Giles, David, E.A. (1999c). The Rise and Fall of the New Zealand Underground Economy: Are 
the Reasons Symmetric? Applied Economic Letters 6: 185–189. 
Giles, David, E.A., Tedds, Lindsay, M. and Werkneh, Gugsa (2002): The Canadian 
underground and measured economies, Applied Economics, 34/4, pp.2347-2352. 
Gillman, M. and Cziráky, D., (2004). Inflation and endogenous growth in underground 
economies (No. 050). The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. 
Glenny, M., (2000). The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, war and the great powers. Granta 
Books. 
Goldberger, A. S. (1972), Structural Equation Methods in the Social Sciences, Econometrica, 
40, pp. 979-1001. 
Goldstein, Itay and Razin, Assaf, (2015). Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises, 
Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, Now publishers, vol. 10(2), pages 113-180, 30 
 330 
 
Greener, S. (2008). Business research methods. BookBoon. Available from 
www.bookboon.com/en   
Gujarati, D.N., 2009. Basic econometrics. 5th Edition. Tata McGraw-Hill Education. ISBN 10: 
0071276254 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R., (2002). Does corruption affect income 
inequality and poverty? Economics of governance, 3(1), pp.23-45. 
Hadri, K., (2000). Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data. The Econometrics 
Journal, 3(2), pp.148-161. 
Hair Jr, J. F., Hult, G. T. M., Ringle, C., and Sarstedt, M. (2016). A primer on partial least 
squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM). Sage Publications. 
Hall, B. and Mairesse, J., (2002). Testing for unit roots in panel data: an exploration using 
real and simulated data. Identification and Inference for Econometric Models. Essays in 
Honour of Thomas Rothenberg, pp.451-475. 
Harding, P., and Jenkins, R. (1989). The myth of the hidden economy: towards a new 
understanding of the informal economic activity. Open University Press. 
Harris, R.D. and Tzavalis, E., (1999). Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels where the 
time dimension is fixed. Journal of Econometrics, 91(2), pp.201-226. 
Hart, Heith. (1970). “Small Scale Entrepreneurs in Ghana and Development Planning”. 
Journal of Development Studies 6, pp. 104-120. 
Hart, Heith. (1973). “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana”. 
Journal of Modern African Studies 11, pp. 61-89.  
Hart, K., (2008a). Informal Economy, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Eds. Steven 
N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. 
Hart, K., (2008b). Between bureaucracy and the people: a political history of informality 
(No. 2008: 27). DIIS Working paper. 
Hassan, Mai and Schneider, Friedrich, (2016a) Size and development of the shadow 
economies of 157 worldwide countries: Updated and new measures from 1999 to 2013. 
Journal of Global Economics, 4(218), p.2. 
Hassan, Mai and Schneider, Friedrich, (2016b) Modelling the Egyptian Shadow Economy: A 
MIMIC model and A Currency Demand approach. Journal of Economics and Political 
Economy, 3(2), p.309. 
 331 
 
Hauser, R.M. and Goldberger, A.S., (1971). The treatment of unobservable variables in path 
analysis. Sociological methodology, 3, pp.81-117. 
Helberger, C., and Knepel, H. (1988). How Big is the Shadow Economy? A Re-analysis of the 
Unobserved-variable Approach of B.S. Frey and H. Weck-Hannemann. European Economic 
Review, 32(4):965-976.  
Hernandez, M.A., 2009. Estimating the Size of the Hidden Economy in Peru: A Currency 
Demand Approach. Revista de Ciencias Empresariales Y Economia, (8), pp. 85-104. 
Herwartz, H., Schneider, F., and Tafenau, E. (2009). One share fits it all? Regional variation 
in the shadow economy in the EU regions. Discussion paper, Universities of Linz and Kiel. 
Heintz, J. and Pollin, R., (2003). Informalisation, economic growth and the challenge of 
creating viable labour standards in developing countries. PERI Working Paper No. 60. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=427683 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.427683  
Hindriks, J., Keen, M., and Muthoo, A. (1999). Corruption, Extortion and Evasion. Journal of 
Public Economics, 74(3):395-430. http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v74y1999i3p395-
430.html  
Hirschheim, R., (1985). Information systems epistemology: An historical perspective. 
Research methods in information systems, pp.13-35. 
Hoang, N.T. and McNown, R.F., (2006). Panel data unit roots tests using various estimation 
methods. University of Colorado Bulletin, 6, pp.33-66. 
Hoelter, J.W., (1983). The analysis of covariance structures: Goodness-of-fit indices. 
Sociological Methods & Research, 11(3), pp.325-344. 
Horn, A., (2011). Who’s out there? A profile of informal traders in four South African city 
central business districts. Town and Regional Planning, 59, pp.1-6. 
Hsiao, C., (2003). Analysis of panel data, second. Cambridge University Press.  
Kose, MA, ES Prasad and ME Terrones (2003), Financial Integration and Macroeconomic 
Volatility, IMF Staff Papers, 50, pp.119-142. 
Hu, L.T. and Bentler, P.M., (1998). Fit indices in covariance structure modelling: Sensitivity 
to under parameterised model misspecification. Psychological Methods, 3(4), p.424. 
Hu, L.T. and Bentler, P.M., (1999). Cut-off criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural equation modelling: a 
multidisciplinary journal, 6(1), pp.1-55. 
 332 
 
Ihrig, J., and Moe, K. S. (2004). Lurking in the shadows: the informal sector and government 
policy. Journal of Development Economics, 73(2), 541-557. 
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H. and Shin, Y., (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. 
Journal of Econometrics, 115(1), pp.53-74. 
International Labour Organisation (1972). Employment, income and equality: A strategy for 
increasing productivity in Kenya. Geneva: ILO. 
Isachsen, A.J., and Strom, S. (1985). The Size and Growth of the Hidden Economy in Norway. 
Review of Income and Wealth, 31(1):21-38. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/revinw/v31y1985i1p21-38.html  
Ishengoma, E., and Kappel, R. (2006). Formalisation of informal enterprises: economic 
growth and poverty. Eschborn: Economic Reform and Private Sector Development Section, 
GTZ. 
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann and A. Shleifer, (1997), “The Unofficial Economy in Transition,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, Washington D.C. Johnson, S. 
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1998). Regulatory Discretion and the 
Unofficial Economy. American Economic Review, 88(2):387-92.  
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., McMillan, J., and Woodruff, C. (2000). Why do firms hide? Bribes 
and unofficial activity after communism. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 495-520. 
Jöreskog, K. (1970). A general method for estimating a linear structural equation system. 
ETS Research Bulletin Series, 1970(2), i-41. 
Jöreskog, K., and A.S. Goldberger (1975), “Estimation of a model with multiple indicators 
and multiple causes of a single latent variable”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 70, pp. 631-639. 
Jütting, J. and J. de Laiglesia (2009), Is Informal Normal? Towards More and Better Jobs in 
Developing Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Kaplan, D., (2008). Structural equation modelling: Foundations and extensions. Advanced 
Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences series. Sage Publications. Volume 10.  
Kaufmann, D., and Kaliberda, A. (1996). Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the 
Dynamics of Post Socialist Economies: A framework of Analyses and Evidence. In: Economic 
Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. by B. Kaminski, M.E. Sharpe, pp.81-
120. London.  
Kanbur, Ravi, (2009). Conceptualising Informality: Regulation and Enforcement. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4186. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1412264 
 333 
 
Kazemier, B. (2003). The Underground Economy: A Survey of Methods and Estimates. 
Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg, Netherlands, IZA Discussion Paper. 
Kazemier, B. (2005). Monitoring the Underground Labour Market: What Surveys Can Do. 
Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg, Netherlands, IZA Discussion Paper.  
Keefer, P. and Knack, S., (1997). Why don't poor countries catch up? A cross‐national test 
of an institutional explanation. Economic Inquiry, 35(3), pp.590-602. 
Kenny, D.A., (2015). Measuring model fit. Available at: http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm 
(Last accessed 10.06.2017) 
Kindleberger, C. P., and Aliber, R. Z. (2005). Manias, panics, and crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises, Seventh Edition. Palgrave Macmillan UK, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-137-52574-
1 
Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B., and Schneider, F. (2003). Everyday Representations of Tax 
Avoidance, Tax Evasion, and Tax Flight: Do Legal Differences Matter? Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 24(4):535-553.  
Kline, R.B., (2015). Principles and practice of structural equation modelling. Guilford Press 
publications. ISBN: 9781462523344 
Klarić, V., 2011. Estimating the size of non-observed economy in Croatia using the MIMIC 
approach. Financial theory and practice, 35(1), pp.59-90.  
Klovland, J.T. (1984). Tax Evasion and the Demand for Currency in Norway and Sweden. Is 
There a Hidden Relationship? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 86(4):423-39.  
Kobrak, C., and Wilkins, M. (2011). The ‘2008 Crisis’ in an economic history perspective: 
Looking at the twentieth century. Business History, 53(2), 175-192. 
Kostovicova, D. and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V.  (2006). Europeanizing the Balkans: rethinking the 
post-communist and post-conflict transition. Ethnopolitics, 5(3), pp.223-241. 
Krstić, B., and Stanišić, T. (2013). The influence of knowledge economy development on the 
competitiveness of south-eastern Europe countries. Industrija, 41(2), 151-167. 
Krstić, G. and Sanfey, P., (2011). Earnings inequality and the informal economy. Economics 
of transition, 19(1), pp.179-199. 
Kuznets, S., (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. The American economic 
review, 45(1), pp.1-28. 
La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A., (2014). Informality and development. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28(3), pp.109-126. 
 334 
 
Lackó, M. (1996). Hidden economy in East-European countries in international comparison. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Luxemburg. 
Lackó, M. (1998). The hidden economies of Visegrad countries in international comparison: 
A household electricity approach, In: Halpern, L. and Wyplosz, Ch. (eds.), Hungary: Towards 
a market economy, Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge University Press, p.128-152. 
Lacko, M. (1999a) Electricity Intensity and the Unrecorded Economy in Post-Socialist 
Countries in Feige and Ott (eds.) Underground Economies in Transition, Ashgate, 
Brookfield, USA 141-165.  
Lackó, M. (1999b). Do power consumption data tell the story? Electricity intensity and 
hidden economy in post-socialist countries. Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. 
Lackó, M. (2000). Hidden Economy - an Unknown Quantity? Comparative Analysis of 
Hidden Economies in Transition Countries, 1989-95. The Economics of Transition, 8(1):117-
149. http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/etrans/v8y2000i1p117-149.html  
Levin, A., Lin, C.F. and Chu, C.S.J., (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-
sample properties. Journal of econometrics, 108(1), pp.1-24. 
Levy, S. (2007). Can social programs reduce productivity and growth? A hypothesis for 
Mexico. In Global Development Network Conference. January (Vol. 12). 
Levy, S. (2010). Good intentions, bad outcomes: Social policy, informality, and economic 
growth in Mexico. Brookings Institution Press. E-ISBN-13: 9780815701637 
Lewis, A. (1979). An empirical assessment of tax mentality. Public Finance, 34(2), 245-57. 
Lippert, O., and Walker, M. (1997). The Underground Economy: Global Evidence of its Size 
and Impact. Vancouver, B.C.: The Frazer Institute.  
Llorca, M., and Redžepagić, S. (2009). Impacts of Global Recession in Western Balkan 
Countries a Comparison with the EU New Member States. Institute of Economic Sciences 
Book Chapters, 1, 9-16. 
Loayza, N.V. (1996). The Economics of the Informal Sector: a Simple Model and Some 
Empirical Evidence from Latin America. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy, 45(1):129-162. http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/crcspp/v45y1996ip129-162.html  
Loayza, N.V, and Rigolini, J. (2006). Informality trends and cycles. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, (4078). 
Losby, J. L., Else, J. F., Kingslow, M. E., Edgcomb, E. L., Malm, E. T., and Kao, V. (2002). 
Informal economy literature review. ISED Consulting and Research. 
 335 
 
Loukanova, P. & Tzanov, V. (2017). Bulgaria: Recent development in employment and 
social affairs. European Parliament, EMPL Committee, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607358/IPOL_IDA(2017)607
358_EN.pdf (last accessed on 22.12.2017) 
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., and Sugawara, H. M. (1996). Power analysis and 
determination of sample size for covariance structure modelling. Psychological Methods, 1, 
130-149. 
Macias, J. B., and Cazzavillan, G. (2009). The dynamics of parallel economies. Measuring the 
informal sector in Mexico. Research in Economics, 63(3), 189-199. 
Macias, J. B., and Cazzavillan, G. (2010). Modelling the informal economy in Mexico. A 
structural equation approach. The Journal of Developing Areas, 44(1), pp.345-365. 
Madžarević-Šujster, S., 2002. An estimate of tax evasion in Croatia. Institute of Public 
Finance, Croatia, Occasional Paper, No.13. Financijska teorija i praksa, 26(1), 2002, pp.117-
145. Available at http://www.ijf.hr/financijska_praksa/PDF-2002/madzarevic-sujster.pdf. 
Maddala, G.S. and Wu, S., (1999). A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data 
and a new simple test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 61(S1), pp.631-652. 
Manolas, G., Rontos, K., Sfakianakis, G., and Vavouras, I. (2013). The determinants of the 
shadow economy: the case of Greece. International Journal of Criminology and Sociological 
Theory, 6(1). 
Marcelli, E. (2004). Unauthorized Mexican Immigration, Day Labour and other Lower-wage 
Informal Employment in California. Regional Studies, 38(1):1-13.  
Massenot, B. and Straub, S., (2011). Informal sector and economic growth: the supply of 
credit channel. TSE Working Paper, 11. Available from http://publications.ut-
capitole.fr/3608/1/massenot_straub.pdf (Last accessed 16.04.2017) 
Marsh HW, Wen Z, Hau KT (2004). Structural equation models of latent interactions: 
Evaluation of alternative estimation strategies and indicator construction. Psychological 
Methods. 2004;9(3):275–300 
 Medina, L. and Schneider, F., (2017). Shadow Economies around the World: New Results 
for 158 Countries over 1991-2015. Available from 
http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/2017/JointPaper_Leandro
Medina_158countries.pdf (last accessed on 20.12.2017) 
Mehmetaj, J., (2014). The impact of the political culture in political system and the rule of 
law: Albania Case. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 10(10). 
 336 
 
Mehrotra, S. (2009). The impact of the economic crisis on the informal sector and poverty 
in East Asia. Global Social Policy, 9(1 suppl), pp. 101-118. 
Mirus, R. and Smith, R.S., (1997). Self-employment, tax evasion, and the underground 
economy: Micro-based estimates for Canada. International Tax Program, Harvard Law 
School. 
Micevska, Maja (2004), Unemployment and Labour Market Rigidities in Southeast Europe, 
The Balkan Observatory, Working Papers 049, June 2004. 
Milanovic, B., (1999). Explaining the increase in inequality during transition. Economics of 
transition, 7(2), pp.299-341. 
Milosevic, M. and Muk, S. (2016). Back to Basics: Re-affirming the rule of law in the Western 
Balkan. Institute Alternativa, December 2016 
Misati, R.N., 2010. The role of the informal sector in investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
International Entrepreneurship And Management Journal, 6(2), pp.221-230. 
Müftüler‐Bac, M., (1998). The never‐ending story: Turkey and the European Union. Middle 
Eastern Studies, 34(4), pp.240-258. 
Müftüler-Baç, M., (2011). Turkish foreign policy, its domestic determinants and the role of 
the European Union. South European Society and Politics, 16(2), pp.279-291. 
Murphy, R. (2012), Closing the European Tax Gap: a report for Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. Downham Market: Tax 
Research LLP. 
Nardelli, A., Dzidic, D. and Jukic, E., (2014). Bosnia and Herzegovina: the world’s most 
complicated system of government? The Guardian, Wednesday 8th Oct 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-
elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government (last accessed on 
22.12.2017) 
Naylor, R. T. (2002). Wages of Crime: Black Markets. Illegal Finance and the Underground 
Economy. 
Neck, R., Schneider, F. and Hofreither, M.F., 1989. The consequences of progressive income 
taxation for the shadow economy: some theoretical considerations. In The political 
economy of progressive taxation (pp. 149-176). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Nikopour, H., Shah Habibullah, M. and Schneider, F., (2008). The shadow economy 
Kuznets’s curve panel data analysis. Available at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12956 
(last accessed: 13.07.2017) 
 337 
 
Nchor, D. and Adamec, V., 2015. Unofficial Economy Estimation by the MIMIC Model: The 
Case of Kenya, Namibia, Ghana and Nigeria. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae 
Mendelianae Brunensis, 63, p.222. 
Nhavira, J.D.G., 2016. Measuring the Shadow Economy In Tanzania. The Science Probe, Vol. 
4 No. 1 (May 2016) Page No-4 1-53. 
Novkovska, B. (2008). Measuring non-standard and informal employment in the Republic 
of Macedonia. In workshop Measurement Informal Employment in Developed Countries 
WIEGO, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Vol. 31). 
Nastav, B. and Bojnec, Š., (2005), November. Shadow economy in Slovenia. In Proceedings 
of the 6th International Conference of the Faculty of Management. Available from 
http://www.fm.upr.si/zalozba/isbn/961-6573-03-9/nastav.pdf (Last accessed: 30.11.2017) 
OECD (2009). Is informal normal? Towards more and better jobs in developing countries 
(pp. 17-26). Paris, OECD Publications, ISBN: 978-92-64-05923-8 
OECD, (2002), Measuring the Non-Observed Economy: A Handbook. OECD Publications 
Service, Paris, France. 
Olters, J. P. (2003). Albania's informal economy: an impediment to economic development. 
International Monetary Fund. 
Oviedo, A. M., Thomas, M. R., and Karakurum-zdemir, K. (2009). Economic Informality: 
Causes, Costs, and Policies A Literature Survey (Vol. 167). World Bank Publications. 
Parlevliet, J., J. Jütting and T. Xenogiani (2008), Informal Employment: Can We Tame the 
Beast? OECD Development Centre Policy Insights, No. 56, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Pedersen, S. (2003). The Shadow Economy in Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia: A 
Measurement Based on Questionnaire Service. The Rockwell Foundation Research Unit, 
Copenhagen, Study 10.  
Penev, Slvaica (2012), Economic and European perspectives of western Balkan countries, 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), ISBN 978-86-89465-00-6 
Perry, G. (2007). Informality: Exit and exclusion. World Bank Publications. 
Pichler, F. and Wallace, C., (2007). Patterns of formal and informal social capital in Europe. 
European sociological review, 23(4), pp.423-435. 
Pickhardt, M., and Sardà-Pons, J. (2006). Size and Scope of the Underground Economy in 
Germany. Applied Economics, 38(14):1707-1713. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/applec/v38y2006i14p1707-1713.html  
 338 
 
Pigott, T. D. (2001). A review of methods for missing data. Educational research and 
evaluation, 7(4), 353-383. 
Pommerehne, W. W., and Schneider, F. (1985). The decline of productivity growth and the 
rise of the shadow economy in the US (Vol. 9). CESifo Working Paper 85. 
Portes, A. and Haller, W., (2010). The Informal Economy. The handbook of economic 
sociology, pp.403. 
Portes, A., Castells, M., and Benton, L. (1989). World underneath: The origins, dynamics, 
and effects of the informal economy. The informal economy: Studies in advanced and less 
developed countries. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Pouvelle, M.C. and Mitra, M.P., (2012). Productivity Growth and Structural Reform in 
Bulgaria: Restarting the Convergence Engine (No. 12-131). International Monetary Fund. 
Rankin, J., (2015). IMF steps up Greek Bailout Criticism over Debt Relief Package'. The 
Guardian 
Rauch, J. E. (1991). Modelling the informal sector formally. Journal of Development 
Economics, 35(1), 33-47. 
Reinhart, C. M., and Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This time is different: eight centuries of financial 
folly. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691152646 
Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S., (2013). Banking crises: an equal opportunity menace. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(11), pp.4557-4573. 
Reinartz, W., Haenlein, M. & Henseler, J. (2009). An empirical comparison of the efficacy of 
covariance-based and variance-based SEM. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 
26, pp. 332-344. 
Reka, B., (2011). Ten Years from the Ohrid Framework Agreement: Is Macedonia 
Functioning as a Multi-ethnic State? South East European University. 
Ritsatos, Titos (2014) "Tax evasion and compliance; from the neoclassical paradigm to 
behavioural economics, a review", Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 10 (2), 
pp.244-262, https://doi.org/10.1108/JAOC-07-2012-0059 
Rogoff, K. (1998). Blessing or Curse? Foreign and Underground Demand for Euro Notes. 
Economic Policy, 13(26):261-303. http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecpoli/v13y1998i26p261-
303.html  
Rosas, G., Corbanese, V., O’Higgins, N., Roland, D., and Tanovic, L. (2009). Employment 
Policy Review: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Council of Europe. 
 339 
 
Sadiku, M., Sadiku, L. and Berisha, N., (2014). The Financial Crisis in Greece and Its Impacts 
on Western Balkan Countries. In Economic Crisis in Europe and the Balkans (pp. 27-38). 
Springer International Publishing. 
Saraç, M., and Başar, R. (2014). The Effect of Informal Economy on the European Debt 
Crisis. Available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.864.1189&rep=rep1&type=pd
f (Last accessed on 07.11.2017) 
Satorra, A., & Bentler, P. M. (1994). Corrections to test statistics and standard errors in 
covariance structure analysis. In A. von Eye & C. C. Clogg (Eds.), Latent variables analysis: 
Applications for developmental research (pp. 399-419). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2012), Research methods for business students, 
Financial Times/ Prentice Hall; 6 edition, ISBN-13: 978-0273750758 
Schautzer, A., (2005). Albania: Country Profile and Recent Economic Developments1. Focus, 
1, p.05. 
Schneider, F. (1986). Estimating the Size of the Danish Shadow Economy Using the Currency 
Demand Approach: An Attempt. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 88(4):643-68. 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/scandj/v88y1986i4p643-68.html  
Schneider, F., (1994a). Can the Shadow Economy be Reduced through Major Tax Reforms? 
An Empirical Investigation for Austria. Supplement to Public Finance/ Finances Publiques, 
49:137-152.  
Schneider, F., (1994b). Measuring the size and development of the shadow economy. Can 
the causes be found, and the obstacles overcome? In Essays on economic psychology (pp. 
193-212). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Schneider, F., (1997) The shadow economies of Western Europe, Journal of the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 17/3, pp. 42-48. 
Schneider, F., (1998). Further empirical results of the size of the shadow economy of 17 
OECD-countries over time. In Paper to be presented at the 54. Congress of the IIPF Cordova, 
Argentina and discussion paper, Department of Economics, University of Linz, Linz, Austria. 
Schneider, F., (2000). The increase of the size of the shadow economy of 18 OECD countries: 
some preliminary explanations. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 306 
Schneider, F., (2002), Size and measurement of the informal economy in 110 countries 
around the world, Rapid Response Unit, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 340 
 
Schneider, F., (2003a). The Shadow Economy. In: Encyclopaedia of Public Choice, ed. by C.K. 
Rowley and F. Schneider, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Schneider, F., (2003b). The size and development of the shadow economies and shadow 
economy labour force of 22 transition and 21 OECD countries: what do we really know? The 
Informal Economy in the EU Access Countries: Size, Scope, Trends and Challenges to the 
Process of EU Enlargement, Centre for Study of Democracy, pp.23-61. 
Schneider, F., (2005) Shadow Economies around the World: What do we really know? 
European Journal of Political Economy, 21/3, pp. 598-642. 
Schneider, F., (2006). Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do we 
really know? CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1806. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=938369 
Schneider, F., (2007a). Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: What Do We 
Really Know? Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 5, pp. 
1-29, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1719953 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2007-5  
Schneider, F., (2010). The influence of public institutions on the shadow economy: An 
empirical investigation for OECD countries. Review of Law and Economics, 6(3), pp.441-468. 
Schneider, F., (2013). The Shadow Economy in Europe, 2013, ATKearney, available on 
http://www.protisiviekonomiji.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/si/projekti/2013/siva_ekonomija/
The_Shadow_Economy_in_Europe_2013.pdf, (accessed on 11.12.2016). 
Schneider, F., (2014). The shadow economy and shadow labour force: a survey of recent 
developments. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8278 
Schneider, F., (2015). Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European and 5 
Other OECD Countries from 2003 to 2014: Different Developments? Journal of Self-
Governance and Management Economics, 3(4). 
Schneider, F., and Bajada, C. (2003). The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies 
in the Asia-Pacific. Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, 
Economics working papers 2003-01. http://ideas.repec.org/p/jku/econwp/2003_01.html  
Schneider, F., and Buehn, A. (2003).  Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the 
World: Revised Estimates for 120 Countries. Version 2—October 27, 2009. Economics, The 
Open-Access, Open-Assessment e-Journal. Vol. 1, 2007-9, July 24, 2007, Available at: 
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2007-9 (last accessed on 
22.12.2018). 
  
 341 
 
Schneider, F., and Dell'Anno, R. (2003). The Shadow Economy of Italy and other OECD 
Countries: What do we know? Journal of public finance and public choice, 21(2), 97-120. 
Schneider, F., and Enste, D. (2000). Shadow Economies: Size, causes, and consequences, 
The Journal of Economic Literature, 38/1, pp. 77-114.  
Schneider, F., and Enste, D. (2002). The Shadow Economy: Theoretical Approaches, 
Empirical Studies, and Political Implications, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.  
Schneider, F., and Enste, D. (2013). The shadow economy: An international survey. Second 
Edition. Cambridge University Press. 
Schneider, F., and Hametner, B. (2014). The shadow economy in Colombia: size and effects 
on economic growth. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 20(2), pp.293-325. 
Schneider, F., and Neck, R. (1993). The development of the shadow economy under 
changing tax systems and structures: some theoretical and empirical results for Austria. 
Public Finance Analysis, 344-369. 
Schneider, F., and Savasan, F. (2007). DYMIMIC estimates of the size of shadow economies 
of Turkey and of her neighbouring countries. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 9(5), 126-143. 
Schneider, F. and Buehn, A., (2016). Estimating the size of the shadow economy: Methods, 
problems and open questions. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9820 (Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2750303, accessed 12.08.2017) 
Schneider, F., Andreas Buehn, Claudio E. Montenegro (2010), New Estimates for the 
Shadow Economies all over the World, International Economic Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, 443–
461, December 2010, 
Schneider, F., Chaudhuri, K., and Chatterjee, S. (2003). The Size and Development of the 
Indian Shadow Economy and a Comparison with other 18 Asian Countries: An Empirical 
Investigation. Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, 
Economics working papers 2003-02. http://ideas.repec.org/p/jku/econwp/2003_02.html  
Schneider, F., Hofreither, M.F., and Neck, R. (1989). The Consequences of a Changing 
Shadow Economy for the Official Economy: Some Empirical Results for Austria. In: Boes, D. 
and B. Felderer (eds.), The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation, pp. 181–211, 
Heidelberg: Springer Publishing Company.  
Schneider, F., Krstić, G., Arandarenko, M., Arsić, M., Radulović, B., Ranđelović, S. and 
Janković, I., (2013). The shadow economy in Serbia: new findings and recommendations. 
Foundation for Advancement of Economics and USAID Study, Belgrade. 
 342 
 
Shaikh, A. (1978). An introduction to the history of crisis theories. US capitalism in crisis, 
pp.219-241. 
Sharma, S., Mukherjee, S., Kumar, A. and Dillon, W.R., (2005). A simulation study to 
investigate the use of cut-off values for assessing model fit in covariance structure models. 
Journal of Business Research, 58(7), pp.935-943. 
Smithies, E. (1984). The black economy in England since 1914. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. 
Smith, P. M. (1994). Assessing the Size of the Underground Economy: The Statistics Canada 
Perspectives. Canadian Economic Observer, Catalogue and dash; at 3.18. 
Smith, R.S., (2002). The underground economy: guidance for policymakers. Canadian tax 
journal, 50(5), pp.1655-1661. 
Stamatović, M., and Zakić, N. (2010). Effects of the global economic crisis on small and 
medium enterprises in Serbia. Serbian Journal of Management, 5(1), pp. 151-162. 
STATA, (2017), STATA 14 User Manual, available from 
https://www.stata.com/manuals14/semintro8.pdf140, last accessed 13.12.2017 
Štiks, I. and Horvat, S., (2014). The new Balkan revolts. From protests to plenums, and 
beyond. Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons, pp.83-88. 
Swain, A.J., (1975). A class of factor analysis estimation procedures with common 
asymptotic sampling properties. Psychometrika, 40(3), pp.315-335. 
Tahmasebi, Mostafa (2015). The estimate of the underground economy: the contributions 
of the fuzzy modelling. Economies and finances. Université Grenoble Alpes. Available online 
at: https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01419582/document (last accessed on 22.12.2018) 
Tanzi, Vito, (1982). A Second (and more Sceptical) Look at the Underground Economy in the 
United States. In: The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad, ed. by Tanzi, 
V. (ed.). Lexington (Mass.): Lexington, chap. A Second (and more Sceptical) Look at the 
Underground Economy in the United States, pp. 38-56.  
Tanzi, Vito, (1983). The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates, 
1930–1980. IMF-Staff Papers, 30(2):283-305.  
Tanzi, Vito, (1980). The Underground Economy in the United States: Estimates and 
Implications. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, pp.427-453  
                                                          
140 Also available from https://www.stata.com/bookstore/structural-equation-modeling-reference-manual/ , last 
accessed on 13.12.2017 
 343 
 
Tanzi, Vito, (1999): Uses and abuses of estimates of the underground economy, The 
Economic Journal 109/456, pp.338-340. 
Tanzi, Vito, and Tsibouris, G. (2000) Fiscal reform over ten years of transition, International 
Monetary Fund, W.P. WP/00/113, Washington 
Teobaldelli, D. (2011). Federalism and the shadow economy. Public Choice, 146(3-4), 269-
289. 
Teobaldelli, D., and Schneider, F. (2012). Beyond the veil of ignorance: The influence of 
direct democracy on the shadow economy. CESifo Working Paper MO3749, University of 
Munich, Munich. 
Teqja, E., (2008). Western Balkans: Between the Fulfillment Of Criteria And The Diversity Of 
Problems. The Long Way of Albania. Communities, 4. 
Thomas, J., (1992). Informal Economic Activity. In: LSE, Handbooks in Economics, London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
Thomas, J., (1999). Quantifying the black economy: measurement without theory yet 
again? The Economic Journal, 109(456), pp.381-389. 
Torgler, B. and Schneider, F. (2005). Attitudes Towards Paying Taxes in Austria: An Empirical 
Analysis. Empirica, 32(2):231-250. http://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/empiri/v32y2005i2p231-
250.html  
Torgler, B. and Schneider, F., (2007). Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and 
institutional quality: a panel analysis. IZA Discussion Papers, IZA DP No. 2563 
Tzavalis, E., (2002). Structural breaks and unit root tests for short panels. Queen Mary 
University of London, unpublished. Available at: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.9982&rep=rep1&type=pd
f (Last accessed: 09.10.2017) 
Verbic, M., Srakar, A., Majcen, B. and Cok, M., (2016). Slovenian public finances through the 
financial crisis. Teorija in praksa, 53(1), p.203. 
Vuletin, G. J. (2008). Measuring the informal economy in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(No. 8-102). International Monetary Fund. ISBN/ISSN: 9781451869637/1018-5941 
Vo, D.H. and Ly, T.H., (2014). Measuring the shadow economy in the ASEAN nations: The 
MIMIC approach. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(10), p.139. 
Wallace, C., Haerpfer, C., and Latcheva, R. (2004), The Informal Economy in East-Central 
Europe 1991-1998, (64), Sociological Series. Available at: http://nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-220648 (last accessed: 02.06.2016) 
 344 
 
Watson, M. W., and Engle, R. F. (1983). Alternative algorithms for the estimation of dynamic 
factor, mimic and varying coefficient regression models. Journal of Econometrics, 23(3), 
385-400. 
Williams, C.C. and Windebank, J., (1995). Black market work in the European Community: 
Peripheral work for peripheral localities? International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 19(1), pp.23-39. 
Williams, C. C., Dzhekova, R., Baric, M., Franic, J., and Mishkov, L. (2014). Assessing the 
cross-national transferability of policy measures for tackling undeclared work. Available at 
SSRN 2501688. 
Williams, C., and Martinez, A. (2014). Is the informal economy an incubator for new 
enterprise creation? A gender perspective. International Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Behaviour and Research, 20(1), 4-19. 
Williams, C.C. (2005). The undeclared sector, self-employment and public policy. 
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, 11(4), pp.244-257. 
Williams, C.C. (2014). Out of the shadows: a classification of economies by the size and 
character of their informal sector. Work, employment and society, 28(5), pp.735-753. 
Williams, C.C. and Lansky, M.A., (2013). Informal employment in developed and developing 
economies: Perspectives and policy responses. International Labour Review, 152(3-4), 
pp.355-380. 
Williams, C.C. and Renooy, P., (2008). Measures to tackle undeclared work in the European 
Union. Eurofound. 
Wincoop, Van. E. (2011). International contagion through leveraged financial institutions 
(No. w17686). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Wolf, E.J., Harrington, K.M., Clark, S.L. and Miller, M.W., 2013. Sample size requirements 
for structural equation models: An evaluation of power, bias, and solution propriety. 
Educational and psychological measurement, 73(6), pp.913-934. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey, M. (2009). Introductory Econometrics: A modern approach. South-
Western Cengage Learning. 5th Edition, ISBN-13: 978-1-111-53104-1 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2001. Applications of generalized method of moments estimation. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), pp.87-100. 
Yin, J. and Jiangsu, Z., 2009. Econometric model of underground economy scale estimation. 
International Journal of Nonlinear Science, 7(1), pp.125-128. 
 345 
 
Zilberfarb, B.-Z. (1986). Estimates of the Underground Economy in the United States, 1930–
80. IMF-Staff Papers, 33(4):790-798.  
Zupcevic, M. and Causevic, F., (2009). Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Philip Oxhorn 
Part 1: Case Studies, p.10. (Also available online from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/Resources/BosniaFinal.pdf, Last 
accessed: 23.10.2017) 
 346 
 
Appendix 
Note: Appendixes have been organised following the order of the chapters and the order of 
sections and subsections used within the chapters of this thesis. 
Appendix 2.2. 1 - Advantages and Disadvantages of the informal economy from three main 
perspectives  
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Economic • Informal sector activities may 
help in maintaining the 
competitiveness and flexibility 
of production; 
• Harding and Jenkins (1989) 
suggest that the informal sector 
activities/enterprises may bring 
growth if supported and 
encouraged 
• this sector puts downward 
pressure on wages in the formal 
labour market 
• it offers lower prices for goods 
and services; 
• it generates substantial 
personal income 
• the informal sector is 
characterised by very low costs 
of labour 
• the low labour costs combined 
with the advantage of not 
bearing any bureaucratic cost 
are thought to contribute to 
higher productivity of capital in 
this sector 
• the evidence from some 
transition countries indicates 
that the particularly large 
decline of the official GDP that 
these countries experienced 
(especially in the beginning) was 
alleviated through the rapid 
growth of the informal sector 
• Contrary to Harding and Jenkins 
(1989), la Portes et al. (1989) claim 
that despite various advantages, no 
development strategy and growth is 
expected from the informal sector;  
• The informal sector causes 
distortions in some main economic 
indicators such as the 
unemployment rate16, inflation 
rate17 and growth rate. 
• The operation of informal sector 
activities (tax evasion) causes 
financial losses in the State revenues 
and, ceteris paribus, generates 
budget deficits;  
• therefore, it will cause a further 
increase in the tax rates;  
• its existence induces an unfair 
competition for those involved in 
the national and international 
formal sector19; 
• if the informal sector is quite 
widespread in a country, it may 
increase the technological gap 
between this country and the other 
industrialised ones; 
• work in the informal sector is often 
characterised by low productivity 
and low incomes;  
• According to Frey (1989), the 
informal sector is negatively related 
to the provision of public goods due 
to the falling State revenues. 
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Social • informal sector activities 
provide families with 
employment, enables them to 
meet their basic needs, and 
increase their well-being;  
• it offers freedom and 
opportunities for initiative and 
creativity 
• It is a better alternative, even 
though poorly paid and 
unprotected, than being 
dependent on state benefits, or 
starving. 
• Participants of the informal sector 
are worse off than those of the 
formal sector regarding their 
working conditions and because of 
the exclusion from any social benefit 
and security;  
• citizens will be provided with false 
information due to the incorrect 
measurement of GNP; 
• Participants in the informal sector 
have an unfair advantage (no taxes 
or social security contributions) 
compared to participants in the 
formal sector. 
Political • The existence of the informal 
sector can be used as a safety 
valve for public dissatisfaction 
and social tensions;  
• Informal sector activities are 
often tolerated or even 
encouraged to promote political 
patronage. 
• Due to the fact that informal 
economic activities are often not 
included in measuring the GNP, the 
available statistics will provide a 
misleading view of the state of the 
economy to policy-makers; 
• Their operation will increase 
corruption and political lobbying 
with negative consequences. 
 
Appendix 3.4. 1 - Software and Data 
Software 
STATA will be the main software to be used in this study; however, MS Excel will also be 
employed for transforming raw data into panel data. eViews was used for Unit Root tests in 
panel data. 
Data sources 
The following resources for collecting data have been used:  
• The Statistics webpage of the European Central Bank:  
http://www.ecb.int/stats/html/index.en.html 
• Eurostat which contains the economic data of all the members of the European 
Community: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/  
• The European Central Bank data: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/  
• The World Bank, Data 
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o Data: http://data.worldbank.org/ and http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
o World Development Indicators 
o International Comparison Programme database 
o Worldwide Governance Indicators 
o National Accounts Data 
o World Bank Policy Research Working Papers 
• The International Monetary Fund, Data and Statistics 
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm  
• The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics.shtml 
• Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom: http://www.heritage.org/index/  
• National Statistics offices and Central Banks of the Balkan countries part of this study 
o National Bank of Albania: 
https://bankofalbania.org/web/Statistics_Entry_230_2.php  
o National Bank of Bulgaria: http://www.bnb.bg/Statistics/index.htm  
o National Bank of Croatia: http://hnbnetra.hnb.hr/statistika/estatistika.htm  
o National Bank of FYR Macedonia: http://nbrm.mk/default-
en.asp?ItemID=C1F5F4BCC020BE44A9C3824FA3046096  
o National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
http://www.cbbh.ba/index.php?id=29&lang=en  
o National Bank of Greece: www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/default.aspx  
o National Bank of Turkey: 
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/S
TATISTICS  
o National Bank of Montenegro: http://www.cb-
mn.org/eng/index.php?mn1=statistics  
o National Bank of Kosovo: http://bqk-kos.org/index.php?m=t&id=47   
o National Bank of Serbia: http://www.nbs.rs/internet/english/80/index.html  
o National Bank of Romania: http://www.bnro.ro/Statistics-3229.aspx  
• OECD Data: https://data.oecd.org/  
o National Accounts Data Files 
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o Governance Indicators 
o Employment Outlook 
• International Labour Organisation database: http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-
databases/lang--en/index.htm  
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Appendix 3.5. 1 - Table with previous research and methodologies applied 
 
The table below shows selected literature which has estimated the size and development of the informal economy empirically in various 
countries using Direct, Indirect or Model approaches. These studies are from the year 2000 onwards only. Earlier literature has been referred to 
and discussed in the literature review chapter. From the table below, it is evident that the three most used methods are the MIMIC, CDA and 
the Physical Input method (which is also known as the electricity consumption method). 
Authors Method Data Variables used Countries 
Schneider (2000) CDA Panel Data Currency demand per capita, ratio of cash holdings 
to checkable deposits, real GDP per capita, interest 
rates, exchange rates, net tax rate on income, net 
tax rate on consumption, total tax revenues in 
percentage of GDP, unemployment rate, real 
expenditures for public employees as percentage 
of GDP 
OECD countries 
Schneider and 
Enste (2000) 
Physical Input 
Method, 
CDA, 
MIMIC 
 
Panel Data Causes: taxation burden, regulation burden, per 
capita household electricity consumption, per 
capita real consumption of households, the real 
price of consumption of 1 kwh of residential 
electricity in US dollars, the relative frequency of 
months with the need to heat houses in country, 
the ratio of energy sources other than electricity to 
all energy sources in household energy 
consumption; the per capita output of the hidden 
economy; the ratio of the sum of paid personal 
Various countries 
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income, corporate profit, and taxes on goods and 
services to GDP; ratio of public social welfare 
expenditures to GDP; and is the sum of the 
numbers of dependants over 14 years and of 
inactive earners, both per 100 active earners. 
Indicators: Monetary aggregates, GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, Labour force 
Ogunc and Yilmaz 
(2000) 
National Accounts 
discrepancies 
method  
 
Employment method  
 
CDA 
Time series GDP by expenditure approach, GDP by production 
approach  
 
Labour force, employment, population, ratio of 
labour force relative to population, employment to 
population ratio  
 
Currency ratio, currency in circulation, Total 
deposits, GNP, income velocity of money 
Turkey 
Kyle et al. (2001) Electricity 
consumption 
approach 
Time series Total electricity consumption for a year, GDP Bulgaria 
Schneider (2002) CDA 
 
MIMIC 
Panel Data Causes: Business regulations, unemployment rate, 
transfers and subsidies, government consumption, 
fiscal freedom, government effectiveness, the rule 
of law, Freedom from corruption 
Indicators: Labour Force participation rate, GDP 
growth, Ratio of M0 to M1, Real GDP per capita 
OECD and Transition 
countries 
Dell’Anno (2003) MIMIC Time series Causes: Government employment relative to the 
labour force, Tax burden, Subsidies relative to the 
GDP, Social benefits paid by the government as a 
ratio to GDP, self-employment as a ratio of GDP, 
Unemployment rate 
Italy 
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Indicators: Index of Real GDP, Labour force 
participation ratio 
Schneider (2004) MIMIC Panel data Causes: direct and indirect taxation, burden of 
state regulation, unemployment rate, GDP per 
capita 
Indicators: Employment rate, GDP growth, change 
of currency per capita 
10 East European 
countries 
Krakowski (2005) Various Direct and 
Indirect approaches 
Time Series 
Panel Data 
GDP per capita, Tax indicators, Cost of starting a 
business, Socio-cultural indicators, Governance 
indicators, Labour regulation indicators. 
109 worldwide 
countries, South 
American countries 
Chaudhuri et al. 
(2006) 
MIMIC Time series Causes: Tax burden in the form or direct and 
indirect taxes, social security contributions, proxy 
for regulation burden, governance indicators, 
unemployment rate 
Indicators: Currency ratio, GDP growth rate, labour 
force participation ratio 
India 
Nastav and Bojnec 
(2005) 
Discrepancy between 
the Official and 
Actual Labour Force  
Time series Employment rate from official records, 
employment rate from the Labour Force Survey, 
Unemployment rate from the Labour Force Survey, 
Unemployment rate from official records. 
Slovenia 
Dell’Anno and 
Schneider (2006) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Size of the government, share of direct 
taxation, Fiscal freedom, business freedom, 
unemployment, government effectiveness, sub-
national government employment 
Indicators: Currency in circulation, GDP per capita, 
labour force participation ratio 
Various countries 
Schneider (2007a) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Direct taxation, indirect taxation, 
regulation burden index, unemployment quota, 
quality of institutions, tax morality, average 
working time per week 
96 developing 
countries, 25 central 
and east European 
countries, 25 highly 
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Indicators: GDP per capita, Employment rate, 
annual rate of GDP, change of local currency per 
capita,  
developed OECD 
countries 
Schneider (2007a) MIMIC Panel data Causes: Direct taxation, indirect taxation, 
regulation burden index, unemployment quota, 
quality of institutions, tax morality, average 
working time per week 
Indicators: GDP per capita, Employment rate, 
annual rate of GDP, change of local currency per 
capita, 
Middle and South 
American countries 
Dell’Anno (2007) MIMIC Time Series Causes: Government employment relative to the 
labour force, Tax burden, Subsidies relative to the 
GDP, Social benefits paid by the government as a 
ratio to GDP, self-employment as a ratio of GDP, 
Unemployment rate 
Indicators: Index of Real GDP, Labour force 
participation ratio 
Portugal 
Schneider and 
Savasan (2007) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Share of direct and indirect taxes, share of 
social security payments, customs duties, burden 
of state regulation, employment in state 
institutions relative to the overall employment, 
unemployment rate, GDP per capita 
Indicators: Employment rate, annual rate of GDP, 
changes in the local currency per capita 
Turkey and seven 
neighbouring 
countries 
Schneider (2007c) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: share of direct and indirect taxation, share 
of social security contributions, stage regulation 
burden, quality of state institutions, tax morale, 
GDP per capita, unemployment rate 
145 countries 
worldwide 
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Indicators: Employment rate, average working time 
per week, Annual rate of GDP, change of local 
currency per capita 
Dell’Anno et al. 
(2007) 
MIMIC Time series Causes: Tax burden in the form or direct and 
indirect taxes, social security contributions, proxy 
for regulation burden, self-employment rate, 
unemployment rate 
Indicators: Currency ratio, GDP growth rate, labour 
force participation ratio 
France, Spain and 
Greece 
Alanon and Antonio 
(2007) 
MIMIC Time series Causes: tax burden, the degree of regulation, unit 
labour costs, Unemployment rate, Ease of doing 
business. 
Indicators: GDP per capita, Currency in Circulation, 
Labour Force participation ratio. 
Spain 
Ahmed and Hussain 
(2008) 
CDA Time series Currency ratio in circulation to money supply M2, 
overall tax to GDP ratio, average rate of return on 
deposits, a tax reform dummy 
Pakistan 
Vuletin (2008) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Labour rigidity index, Tax burden, 
Importance of agriculture, inflation, Strength of 
enforcement system 
Indicators: Workers contribution to social security, 
degree of unionisation, gross enrolment ratio for 
secondary school 
South America and 
Caribbean countries 
Dell’Anno and 
Schneider (2008) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Size of the government, share of direct 
taxation, Fiscal freedom, business freedom, 
unemployment, government effectiveness, sub-
national government employment 
Indicators: Currency in circulation, GDP per capita, 
labour force participation ratio 
151 countries 
worldwide 
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Buehn and 
Schneider (2009) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Business regulations, unemployment rate, 
transfers and subsidies, government consumption, 
fiscal freedom, government effectiveness, the rule 
of law, bureaucracy costs, Freedom from 
corruption, school enrolment 
Indicators: Labour Force participation rate, GDP 
growth, Ratio of M0 to M1, Real GDP per capita, 
Bribes, Judicial independence 
51 worldwide 
countries 
Ahumada et al. 
(2004) 
CDA Time series 
Panel Data 
Real level of cash holdings, deposit and real 
interest rates, Real GDP 
Various countries 
Schneider (2009) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Direct and Indirect taxation, state 
regulation burden, GDP per capita, unemployment 
rate 
Indicators: GDP growth, employment to population 
ratio, change in currency in circulation per capita 
25 central and 
eastern European 
countries 
Hernandez (2009) CDA Time series Interest rates, inflation rate, Real GDP, Currency in 
circulation relative to M2, tax rate 
Peru 
Yin and Jiangsu 
(2009) 
CDA Time series Currency in circulation, Money supply M2, tax rate, 
deposit annual average interest rate, national per 
capita net income, national per capita consumption 
level 
China 
Schneider, Buehn 
and Montenegro 
(2010) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Size of government, total tax burden, 
direct taxation, indirect taxation, fiscal freedom 
index, business freedom index, economic freedom 
index, unemployment rate, GDP per capita, 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, 
openness, inflation rate 
Indicators: GDP per capita growth rate, GDP per 
capita, Labour force participation ratio, growth rate 
of labour force, currency 
Various 
specifications for 98 
developing countries, 
88 developing 
countries, 21 
transition countries, 
25 high-income 
OECD countries, 151 
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countries worldwide, 
120 countries. 
Andrei et al. (2010) CDA Time series Cash outside the banking system, total government 
expenses, Real GDP, short-term interest rate, 
inflation rate as per CPI, taxes on products 
Romania 
Feld and Schneider 
(2010) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Share of direct and indirect taxation, tax 
morale, state regulation burden, governance 
indicators, unemployment rate 
Indicators: Currency ratio to M2, GDP per capita 
growth rate, labour force participation ratio, 
employment ratio 
OECD countries 
Klaric (2011) MIMIC Time series Causes: Unemployment Rate, Direct taxes, Indirect 
taxes, Social security contributions 
Indicators: GDP growth, M1 
Croatia 
Abdih and Medina 
(2013) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Tax burden, labour rigidity index, 
institutional quality, regulatory burden in financial 
and product markets, control of corruption, the 
rule of law, government effectiveness,  
Indicators: Self-employment, M0 over M1, GDP per 
capita 
The Caucasus and 
Central Asian 
countries 
Buehn and 
Schneider (2012) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Size of the government, share of direct 
taxation, Fiscal freedom, business freedom, 
unemployment, government effectiveness, sub-
national government employment 
Indicators: Currency in circulation, GDP per capita, 
labour force participation ratio 
Various 
specifications for 88 
developing countries, 
21 transition 
countries, 25 high-
income OECD 
countries, 151 
countries worldwide, 
120 countries 
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Garvanlieva et al. 
(2012) 
Electricity 
consumption 
method 
Time series Annual growth rate of GDP, annual growth rate of 
electric power consumption, output elasticity of 
electricity consumption 
FYR Macedonia 
Arby et al. (2012) CDA  Time series Tax to GDP ratio, currency in circulation to M2 
ratio, financial development indicator, market 
interest rate, level of higher education 
Pakistan 
Arby et al. (2012) Electricity 
Consumption 
Approach 
Time series Electricity consumption, GDP growth, Real GDP Pakistan 
Arby et al. (2012) MIMIC Time series Causes: Tax to GDP ratio, M2 to GDP ratio, regime 
durability 
Indicators: currency in circulation as a ratio to M2, 
electricity consumption 
Pakistan 
Boka and Torluccio 
(2013) 
National Accounts 
discrepancies 
method 
Time series GDP by expenditure approach, GDP by production 
approach 
Albania 
Boka and Torluccio 
(2013) 
Physical Input 
method 
Time series GDP growth rate, Electricity consumption changes Albania 
Gunes et al. (2013) Monetary approach 
 
The Discrepancy 
between National 
Expenditure and 
Income Statistics 
Time series Expenditure of durable and non-durable goods, 
aggregate demand, total expenditures 
Turkey 
Barbosa et al. 
(2013) 
MIMIC Time series Causes: Government employment relative to the 
labour force, tax burden as percentage of GDP, 
subsidies as percentage to GDP, social benefits paid 
by the government relative to GDP, self-
Portugal 
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employment as percentage of labour force, 
unemployment rate 
Indicators: Index of real GDP, Labour force 
participation ratio 
Schneider (2013) CDA Time series Currency demand per capita, ratio of cash holdings 
to checkable deposits, real GDP per capita, interest 
rates, exchange rates, net tax rate on income, net 
tax rate on consumption, total tax revenues in 
percentage of GDP, unemployment rate, real 
expenditures for public employees as percentage 
of GDP, new laws enforced per year 
Colombia 
Schneider and 
Hemetner (2013) 
CDA Time series Currency demand per capita, ratio of cash holdings 
to checkable deposits, real GDP per capita, interest 
rates, exchange rates, net tax rate on income, net 
tax rate on consumption, total tax revenues in 
percentage of GDP, unemployment rate, real 
expenditures for public employees as percentage 
of GDP, new laws enforced per year 
Colombia 
Schneider et al. 
(2013) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Direct and indirect taxation, marginal 
income tax burden, effective income tax rate, 
regulatory effectiveness index, the rule of law 
index, corruption index, self-employment, 
unemployment rate 
Indicators: Cash per capita growth rate, 
employment rate, GDP per capita 
Serbia and ten other 
countries 
Alm and Embaye 
(2013) 
CDA Panel Data Currency ratio to M2, Tax rate, enforcement 
variable (the rule of law, regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness), Per capita Income, 
inflation rate, interest rate, degree of urbanisation 
111 countries 
worldwide 
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Alexandru (2013) Simple Currency 
Ratio Method 
Time series Actual currency stock, demand on deposits in 
observed and unobserved sector, observed 
income, ratio of currency to demand deposits on 
observed and unobserved sectors, income velocity 
in observed and unobserved sectors 
Romania 
Vo and Ly (2014) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Tax Rate, Fiscal freedom index, business 
freedom index, labour freedom index, government 
spending index, unemployment rate 
Indicators: Ratio of M0 to M1, Labour market 
index, Tax revenue, GDP per capita 
South East Asian 
countries 
Trebicka (2014) MIMIC Time series Causes: Government employment relative to the 
labour force, Tax burden, Subsidies relative to the 
GDP, Social benefits paid by the government as a 
ratio to GDP, self-employment as a ratio of GDP, 
Unemployment rate 
Indicators: Index of Real GDP, Labour force 
participation ratio 
Albania 
Asiedu and Stengos 
(2014) 
CDA Time series Ratio of currency in circulation to M2, Weighted 
average tax rate, proportion of wages and salaries 
to national income, average rate of return on 
deposits, income per capita 
Ghana 
Gamal and Dahalan 
(2015)  
CDA Time series Ratio of currency in circulation to M2, indirect and 
direct tax rate, proportion of wages and salaries to 
national income, average rate of return on 
deposits, income per capita, real interest rate 
UAE, 
Saudi Arabia 
Nchor and Adamec 
(2015) 
MIMIC Time series Causes: Size of the government, share of direct 
taxation, business regulation, total tax rate, 
unemployment rate, GDP per capita, quality of 
public administration 
Kenya, Namibia, 
Ghana and Nigeria 
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Indicators: Cash held by the public, GDP per capita 
growth rate, labour force participation ratio 
Elshamy (2015) MIMIC Time series Causes: average of corporate and personal 
marginal income tax rate, importance of 
agriculture sector to GDP, inflation rate 
Indicators: gross enrolment ratio for secondary 
school, labour force contribution to social security 
system 
Egypt 
Schneider (2015) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Business regulations, unemployment rate, 
transfers and subsidies, government consumption 
Indicators: GDP growth, labour force participation 
ratio, Ratio of M0 to M1 
OECD countries 
Osmani (2015) Survey Method 
 
Questionnaires 
 
Panel Data 
Causes: Direct and Indirect taxation rate, results 
from the survey,  
Indicators: unclear from his methodology 
5 South East 
European countries 
Hassan and 
Schneider (2016a) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Tax burden, regulation burden, 
Unemployment rate, self-employment rate, 
economic freedom index, business freedom index 
Indicators: GDP growth, currency in circulation, 
labour force participation ratio 
157 countries 
worldwide 
Hassan and 
Schneider (2016b) 
MIMIC Time Series Causes: Tax burden, Institutional quality, 
Agriculture dominance, unemployment, self-
employment 
Indicators: real GDP, total employment, money in 
circulation 
Egypt 
Hassan and 
Schneider (2016b) 
CDA Time Series Tax burden, interest rates, public employment, real 
currency outside bank, real income, self-
employment 
Egypt 
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Schneider and 
Buehn (2016) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Direct taxation, indirect taxation, 
regulation burden index, unemployment quota, 
quality of institutions, tax morality, 
Indicators: GDP per capita, Employment rate, 
annual rate of GDP, change of local currency per 
capita 
Various countries, 
OECD countries 
Nhavira (2016) CDA Time series Currency holdings ratio, Real GDP per capita 
growth rate, Government expenditure as 
percentage of GDP, Real interest rate, Deposit 
interest rate, ratio of M1 to M2 
Tanzania 
Gamal and Dahalan 
(2016) 
CDA Time series Ratio of currency in circulation to M2, indirect and 
direct tax rate, proportion of wages and salaries to 
national income, average rate of return on 
deposits, income per capita, real interest rate 
UAE, 
Saudi Arabia 
Bitzenis et al. 
(2016). 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Personal Income Tax, Payroll Taxes, 
Indirect Taxes, Tax morale, Unemployment Rate, 
Business Freedom Index, Self-employment rate, 
the rule of law index, GDP growth, education 
Indicators: GDP per capita, Currency in circulation, 
Labour force participation ratio 
Various European 
countries and non-
European countries 
 
Total of 36 countries 
Medina and 
Schneider (2017) 
(working paper) 
MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Tax burden, Regulatory Burden, Self-
employment rate, unemployment rate, economic 
freedom index, business freedom index 
Indicators: GDP growth, currency in circulation, 
Labour force participation rate.  
158 countries 
worldwide 
Aydin (2017, p.19) MIMIC Panel Data Causes: Size of government, total tax rate, business 
regulation, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, 
and quality of public administration  
Indicators: Labour force participation rate, GDP per 
capita growth rate, Cash rate held by the public 
Seven Transition 
countries 
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Appendix 5.2. 1 – Introducing Research philosophies 
Research philosophy is a belief about the way in which data about a phenomenon should be 
gathered, analysed and then used. The purpose of science, then, is the process of 
transforming things believed into things known: doxa to episteme (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
There are known to be three major ways of thinking about research philosophy: 
epistemology, ontology, and axiology (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Saunders et al., 2012). 
Epistemology is mainly concerned with what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of 
study. Under epistemology, there are two major research philosophies - the positivist 
(sometimes called scientific) and interpretivist (also known as anti-positivist), (Bryman & Bell 
2007; Greener, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012). Sometimes, research takes a middle approach 
known as pragmatism where both philosophy perspectives are considered. Positivists believe 
that reality is stable and can be observed and described from an objective viewpoint, i.e. 
without interfering with the phenomena being studied. This philosophy of research usually 
involves empirical testing. An interpretivist researcher, on the other hand, aims to see the 
world through the eyes of the people being studied, allowing them multiple perspectives of 
reality rather than one reality of positivism (Greener, 2008). 
Ontology, on the other hand, is concerned with the nature of reality. This raises questions of 
the assumptions that the researchers have about the way the world operates. The first aspect 
of ontology is objectivism, which tries to portray the position that social entities exist in reality 
external to social actors concerned with their existence, while the second aspect is 
subjectivism which states that social phenomena are created from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of those social actors concerned with their existence (Bryman & Bell 2007; 
Greener, 2008; Saunders et al., 2012). The ontology of a positivist philosophy is objectivism, 
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while the ontology of the interpretivist philosophy is subjectivism. The pragmatist philosophy 
considers research both from an objective and subjective perspective.  
Finally, the axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies judgments about value. The 
axiology of positivist philosophy in research is value-free, unaffected by the researcher's 
values to the research. The interpretivist philosophy, on the other hand, can be biased as it is 
based on the values and perceptions one gives to the research and the results produced 
(Greener, 2008). Therefore, this will entail ethical issues being considered when undertaking 
this kind of research since results are interpreted and affected by personal values.  
The relationship between the research philosophy chosen and the research approach can be 
explained regarding deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive approach begins the 
research by looking at the theory, highlighting the main hypothesis relating to the theory, and 
then proceeding to empirically test the theory using a quantitative research strategy 
(Greener, 2008). The inductive approach, on the other hand, starts by looking at the focus of 
the research, and thorough investigations by various research methods aim to generate 
theory from the research. The deductive approach is mainly used by the positivist philosophy, 
while the inductive research is used by the interpretivist philosophy (Bryman & Bell 2007; 
Saunders et al., 2012). 
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Appendix 5.4. 1 – Countries part of this research 
 
The following countries will be part of this research: Albania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria  
Countries entirely within the Balkan Peninsula: 
 Albania: 27,390km2 (>99% of total land) 
 Bulgaria: 108,400km2 (>99%) 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 51,180km2 (>99%) 
 Macedonia: 25,430km2 (>99%) 
Countries mostly or partially Balkan states: 
 Croatia (south mainland): 30,000km2 (54%) 
 Greece (mainland): 104,470km2(80%) 
 Serbia (south part excl. Vojvodina and North Belgrade): 55,000km2 (69%) 
 Slovenia (southwest part): 10,000km2 (50%) 
 Romania (Dobruja 's mainland): 12,000km2 (5%) 
 Turkey (European part): 23,000km2 (3%)Map of countries part of this research 
Map of the region: 
 
The Balkan states according to Encyclopaedia Britannica 
     The Balkan Peninsula by the Danube–Sava–Soča border 
     Political communities which are usually included in the Balkans 
     Political communities which are usually not included in the Balkans 
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Appendix 6.3. 1 - Descriptive Statistics for each country separately 
A
LB
A
N
IA
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 66.0 8.7 54.3 81.0 
monefreeindex 19 74.7 11.6 42.6 86.0 
urban 19 47.1 5.6 39.5 56.4 
govspend 19 70.7 6.3 51.0 76.0 
goveffec 19 -0.5 0.2 -0.8 -0.1 
govintegrity 19 21.4 9.5 10.0 34.0 
agricultvat 19 24.2 4.9 19.4 37.5 
unempilo 19 14.5 2.4 12.4 22.7 
cofc 19 -0.8 0.2 -1.1 -0.5 
finfreeindex 19 54.2 17.1 30.0 70.0 
ruleoflaw 19 -0.8 0.3 -1.2 -0.4 
taxrev 19 21.3 3.3 12.8 24.5 
infgdpdef 19 5.6 9.1 0.2 41.3 
empratio 19 50.3 2.9 46.3 54.5 
gdppercap 19 6627.3 2872.0 2837.4 11307.6 
electric 19 1698.3 847.5 680.7 4569.6 
lfpr 19 65.1 2.1 62.6 68.2 
m2growth 19 13.9 10.0 2.3 43.8 
O
SN
IA
 A
N
D
 H
ER
ZE
G
O
V
IN
A
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 50.8 10.3 40.0 73.3 
monefreeindex 19 67.3 27.4 0.0 86.1 
urban 19 39.3 0.1 39.2 39.6 
govspend 19 25.0 15.9 0.0 52.0 
goveffec 19 -0.8 0.2 -1.3 -0.4 
govintegrity 19 24.7 12.5 10.0 52.8 
agricultvat 19 11.6 5.1 7.2 25.2 
unempilo 19 26.9 1.9 23.9 31.8 
cofc 19 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 
finfreeindex 19 48.9 19.4 10.0 70.0 
ruleoflaw 19 -0.5 0.2 -0.7 -0.2 
taxrev 19 21.5 1.9 19.0 25.5 
infgdpdef 19 3.8 8.5 -17.1 28.8 
empratio 19 32.9 1.2 29.6 34.7 
gdppercap 19 6685.7 2587.7 2332.7 10472.7 
electric 19 2417.5 698.4 1112.7 3784.7 
lfpr 19 52.5 1.3 50.9 54.5 
m2growth 19 17.2 16.9 2.1 77.8 
B
U
LG
A
R
IA
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 63.5 9.4 55.0 77.8 
monefreeindex 19 58.8 28.7 0.0 83.1 
urban 19 70.6 1.8 68.0 73.6 
govspend 19 53.5 9.3 30.6 67.3 
goveffec 19 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.2 
govintegrity 19 35.5 4.3 29.0 41.0 
agricultvat 19 9.5 4.8 4.8 22.6 
unempilo 19 12.1 3.7 5.6 19.9 
cofc 19 -0.2 0.2 -0.8 0.1 
finfreeindex 19 57.4 7.3 50.0 70.0 
ruleoflaw 19 -0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.1 
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taxrev 19 18.8 2.1 16.0 22.1 
infgdpdef 19 61.4 218.5 -0.7 958.7 
empratio 19 46.0 2.9 41.3 52.0 
gdppercap 19 10826.1 4286.5 5624.8 17406.1 
electric 19 4190.7 413.8 3539.3 4863.7 
lfpr 19 65.0 2.3 61.3 68.4 
m2growth 19 39.1 80.1 1.1 351.5 
C
R
O
A
TI
A
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 57.5 3.7 54.2 65.2 
monefreeindex 19 68.6 24.7 0.0 81.4 
urban 19 56.6 1.1 55.0 58.7 
govspend 19 36.9 10.4 22.9 50.5 
goveffec 19 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.7 
govintegrity 19 40.0 6.7 27.0 50.0 
agricultvat 19 5.5 0.9 4.3 7.0 
unempilo 19 13.1 3.2 8.4 20.5 
cofc 19 -0.1 0.3 -0.8 0.3 
finfreeindex 19 57.4 7.3 50.0 70.0 
ruleoflaw 19 0.0 0.2 -0.6 0.3 
taxrev 19 20.6 1.7 18.5 25.0 
infgdpdef 19 3.6 2.1 0.0 8.3 
empratio 19 46.0 2.3 42.2 49.5 
gdppercap 19 15490.8 4774.2 8795.5 22002.5 
electric 19 3303.9 490.5 2438.8 3900.6 
lfpr 19 64.4 0.6 63.4 65.4 
m2growth 19 13.6 16.7 -14.6 49.2 
G
R
EE
C
E 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 72.4 3.3 69.7 78.7 
monefreeindex 19 76.1 3.5 67.9 80.6 
urban 19 74.6 1.8 72.2 77.7 
govspend 19 46.4 13.0 16.2 57.8 
goveffec 19 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.8 
govintegrity 19 43.7 5.9 33.2 54.0 
agricultvat 19 4.8 1.4 3.1 7.3 
unempilo 19 12.9 6.1 7.7 27.2 
cofc 19 0.3 0.4 -0.3 1.1 
finfreeindex 19 45.8 10.7 30.0 60.0 
ruleoflaw 19 0.7 0.2 0.3 1.0 
taxrev 19 10.4 11.0 0.2 24.5 
infgdpdef 19 2.7 2.5 -2.4 7.6 
empratio 19 46.0 3.2 38.7 49.3 
gdppercap 19 24160.9 4603.2 16130.1 30856.0 
electric 19 4951.0 622.3 3832.7 5805.2 
lfpr 19 65.9 2.2 61.9 68.3 
m2growth 19 6.7 9.0 -13.5 18.2 
M
A
C
ED
O
N
IA
, F
Y
R
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 63.8 8.9 54.4 81.0 
monefreeindex 19 82.4 4.4 77.2 90.7 
urban 19 57.8 0.8 57.0 59.4 
govspend 19 61.5 8.9 48.1 85.7 
goveffec 19 -0.3 0.3 -0.8 0.2 
govintegrity 19 41.1 14.9 23.0 76.8 
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agricultvat 19 12.0 1.1 10.3 13.4 
unempilo 19 33.2 2.7 27.9 37.3 
cofc 19 -0.4 0.3 -1.0 0.1 
finfreeindex 19 67.4 6.9 60.0 78.6 
ruleoflaw 19 -0.4 0.2 -0.7 0.0 
taxrev 19 20.6 4.4 16.4 35.8 
infgdpdef 19 3.3 3.1 -0.2 13.8 
empratio 19 36.2 2.0 32.4 39.9 
gdppercap 19 8490.1 2873.4 4907.0 13477.0 
electric 19 3314.2 350.0 2783.1 3895.2 
lfpr 19 62.1 1.7 59.1 64.6 
m2growth 19 16.5 16.0 -8.1 67.9 
R
O
M
A
N
IA
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 63.4 9.1 55.0 74.9 
monefreeindex 19 57.1 18.9 11.9 77.1 
urban 19 53.5 0.5 52.8 54.4 
govspend 19 65.4 6.3 55.1 79.7 
goveffec 19 -0.3 0.2 -0.6 0.0 
govintegrity 19 33.2 5.6 26.0 50.0 
agricultvat 19 10.5 4.6 5.3 18.7 
unempilo 19 6.8 0.7 5.5 8.1 
cofc 19 -0.3 0.2 -0.7 -0.1 
finfreeindex 19 48.4 6.9 30.0 60.0 
ruleoflaw 19 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.2 
taxrev 19 17.2 0.7 15.9 18.0 
infgdpdef 19 26.1 31.2 1.7 135.4 
empratio 19 55.0 4.2 51.1 62.7 
gdppercap 19 11647.1 5622.5 5576.1 20797.0 
electric 19 2409.2 392.6 1935.6 3755.5 
lfpr 19 65.9 3.3 62.4 71.8 
m2growth 19 31.0 28.0 2.8 113.4 
SE
R
B
IA
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 52.6 7.7 40.0 65.7 
monefreeindex 19 56.6 10.1 34.2 68.0 
urban 19 54.2 1.1 52.1 55.5 
govspend 19 61.0 15.7 38.6 89.2 
goveffec 19 -0.4 0.4 -0.9 0.1 
govintegrity 19 22.7 9.4 10.0 35.0 
agricultvat 19 14.0 4.7 9.0 21.3 
unempilo 19 17.2 4.0 12.6 23.9 
cofc 19 -0.6 0.4 -1.1 -0.2 
finfreeindex 19 38.9 9.1 30.0 50.0 
ruleoflaw 19 -0.8 0.4 -1.3 -0.2 
taxrev 19 18.3 3.9 7.0 22.8 
infgdpdef 19 23.8 27.9 2.7 89.2 
empratio 19 44.7 2.9 39.8 47.8 
gdppercap 19 9150.5 3221.8 5087.5 13806.0 
electric 19 4290.8 203.3 3921.9 4797.3 
lfpr 19 62.6 1.2 60.5 64.2 
m2growth 19 35.4 36.7 4.6 160.8 
SL
O
V
EN
IA
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 78.7 6.6 70.0 85.4 
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monefreeindex 19 75.4 6.1 60.5 81.7 
urban 19 50.4 0.4 49.7 50.8 
govspend 19 37.2 7.2 22.3 47.1 
goveffec 19 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.2 
govintegrity 19 57.1 8.8 30.0 67.0 
agricultvat 19 2.7 0.7 1.9 4.1 
unempilo 19 6.9 1.5 4.4 10.2 
cofc 19 0.9 0.2 0.7 1.3 
finfreeindex 19 54.2 8.4 50.0 70.0 
ruleoflaw 19 1.0 0.1 0.9 1.2 
taxrev 19 19.2 1.6 16.4 21.6 
infgdpdef 19 4.3 3.4 -1.0 11.4 
empratio 19 54.4 1.5 51.8 56.9 
gdppercap 19 23387.2 5580.6 14272.7 31022.2 
electric 19 6326.7 623.1 5365.5 7137.8 
lfpr 19 69.6 1.8 67.0 71.9 
m2growth 19 17.5 13.7 -1.2 35.6 
TU
R
K
EY
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
bfindex 19 66.7 7.3 55.0 85.0 
monefreeindex 19 53.2 18.1 28.9 73.3 
urban 19 67.8 3.3 62.7 72.9 
govspend 19 65.8 11.1 45.0 83.6 
goveffec 19 0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.4 
govintegrity 19 36.4 8.0 10.0 46.0 
agricultvat 19 10.7 2.5 8.0 17.4 
unempilo 19 9.4 2.0 6.5 14.0 
cofc 19 -0.2 0.3 -0.7 0.2 
finfreeindex 19 55.8 10.7 30.0 70.0 
ruleoflaw 19 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.2 
taxrev 19 18.0 2.1 15.0 21.4 
infgdpdef 19 31.7 36.1 5.3 138.0 
empratio 19 44.1 2.8 40.9 49.5 
gdppercap 19 12769.1 4153.9 8014.5 19653.6 
electric 19 2069.7 508.4 1327.7 2902.6 
lfpr 19 52.0 2.1 49.2 55.7 
m2growth 19 41.4 36.7 10.4 116.5 
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Appendix 6.3. 2 - Histograms for all the variables 
Histograms for each of the variables used have been presented below which summarize the data graphically for the density from a normal and kernel 
distribution perspective.  
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Appendix 6.3. 3 - Correlation Matrix 
  bfindex monefreeindex urban agricultvat govspend goveffec cofc govintegrity infgdpdef 
bfindex 1.00000                 
monefreeindex 0.30670 1.00000               
urban 0.30220 -0.00780 1.00000             
agricultvat -0.28790 -0.30400 -0.37140 1.00000           
govspend 0.08620 -0.08100 0.21370 0.39440 1.00000         
goveffec 0.54430 0.27030 0.48910 -0.73030 -0.18280 1.00000       
cofc 0.46170 0.25810 0.20600 -0.71240 -0.34130 0.83670 1.00000     
govintegrity 0.58000 0.28430 0.31830 -0.61300 -0.18650 0.66220 0.61670 1.00000   
infgdpdef -0.09290 -0.25200 0.07890 0.21320 0.01310 -0.10820 -0.13340 -0.09880 1.00000 
taxrev -0.13250 0.04330 -0.33410 0.12190 -0.08450 -0.28550 -0.28250 -0.12150 -0.06780 
empratio 0.38190 -0.15390 0.07400 -0.01220 0.28230 0.35690 0.24060 0.18570 0.08170 
finfreeindex 0.22760 0.37810 0.13280 -0.19650 0.00860 0.14670 0.05040 0.33170 -0.04610 
unempilo -0.33670 0.20800 -0.26090 0.20670 -0.17870 -0.46710 -0.35160 -0.20560 -0.09140 
0
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D
e
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ruleoflaw 0.58000 0.22370 0.38150 -0.76050 -0.31420 0.88040 0.90440 0.73620 -0.09900 
gdppercap 0.58310 0.29680 0.45810 -0.77530 -0.22920 0.89760 0.78670 0.65220 -0.12870 
electric 0.40660 0.27980 0.29110 -0.64410 -0.28060 0.69450 0.66360 0.54330 -0.04360 
m2growth -0.19830 -0.45660 0.01850 0.29070 0.08480 -0.21450 -0.21600 -0.21810 0.83050 
lfpr 0.38880 0.14310 0.10470 -0.14670 0.06620 0.41070 0.25770 0.28660 0.00630 
m1overm2 -0.10380 0.20130 -0.12170 0.09070 0.03680 -0.11760 -0.05590 -0.16750 -0.01690 
  taxrev empratio finfreeindex unempilo ruleoflaw gdppercap electric m2growth lfpr 
taxrev 1.00000                 
empratio -0.17610 1.00000               
finfreeindex 0.27470 -0.16450 1.00000             
unempilo 0.25800 -0.85460 0.18130 1.00000           
ruleoflaw -0.31750 0.31260 0.13750 -0.42850 1.00000         
gdppercap -0.32090 0.38760 0.02990 -0.50330 0.89290 1.00000       
electric -0.16940 0.20910 0.00710 -0.19530 0.64180 0.71230 1.00000     
m2growth -0.04790 0.12510 -0.09330 -0.12840 -0.19500 -0.24420 -0.14320 1.00000   
lfpr -0.08520 0.69430 -0.01750 -0.35390 0.30980 0.42180 0.53370 -0.06400 1.00000 
m1overm2 -0.05960 -0.14030 -0.12640 0.29670 -0.15450 -0.04690 0.35510 -0.09830 0.23180 
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Appendix 6.3. 4 - Panel Unit root tests 
 Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test 
 Ho: All panels contain unit roots Ho: All panels contain unit roots 
 Ha: Some panels are stationary Ha: Some panels are stationary 
 AR parameter: Panel-specific AR parameter: Panel-specific 
 Panel means:  Included sequentially Panel means:  Included sequentially 
 Time trend:   Not included Time trend:   Included 
 ADF regressions: No lags included Number of panels  =     10 
 Number of panels  =     10 Number of periods =     19 
 Number of periods =     19 Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity 
 Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity   
 Fixed-N exact critical values Fixed-N exact critical values 
 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
 -2.21 -1.99 -1.89 -2.84 -2.63 -2.52 
             
   Statistic p-value   Statistic p-value 
unempilo 
t-bar -1.554   t-bar -1.863   
t-tilde-bar -1.327   t-tilde-bar -1.637   
Z-t-tilde-bar 0.243 0.596 Z-t-tilde-bar -1.036 0.150 
agricult 
t-bar -2.655   t-bar -2.495   
t-tilde-bar -2.027   t-tilde-bar -1.913   
Z-t-tilde-bar -2.649 0.004 Z-t-tilde-bar -2.177 0.015 
bfindex 
t-bar -1.490   t-bar -2.349   
t-tilde-bar -1.373   t-tilde-bar -1.936   
Z-t-tilde-bar 0.054 0.521 Z-t-tilde-bar -2.273 0.012 
urban 
t-bar 3.433   t-bar -0.246   
t-tilde-bar 1.067   t-tilde-bar -0.678   
Z-t-tilde-bar 10.129 1.000 Z-t-tilde-bar 2.921 0.998 
goveffec 
t-bar -1.104   t-bar -2.630   
t-tilde-bar -1.064   t-tilde-bar -2.239   
Z-t-tilde-bar 1.329 0.908 Z-t-tilde-bar -3.524 0.000 
govspend 
t-bar -2.275   t-bar -2.702   
t-tilde-bar -1.824   t-tilde-bar -2.185   
Z-t-tilde-bar -1.808 0.035 Z-t-tilde-bar -3.300 0.001 
govintegrity 
t-bar -2.684   t-bar -3.383   
t-tilde-bar -2.068   t-tilde-bar -2.357   
Z-t-tilde-bar -2.817 0.002 Z-t-tilde-bar -4.011 0.000 
ruleoflaw 
t-bar -1.090   t-bar -2.562   
t-tilde-bar -0.992   t-tilde-bar -2.035   
Z-t-tilde-bar 1.625 0.948 Z-t-tilde-bar -2.681 0.004 
gdppercapppp 
t-bar -1.074   t-bar -1.487   
t-tilde-bar -0.892   t-tilde-bar -1.330   
Z-t-tilde-bar 2.039 0.979 Z-t-tilde-bar 0.229 0.590 
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electric 
t-bar -0.725   t-bar -0.812   
t-tilde-bar -0.697   t-tilde-bar -0.818   
Z-t-tilde-bar 2.845 0.998 Z-t-tilde-bar 2.346 0.991 
lfpr 
t-bar -1.188   t-bar -1.472   
t-tilde-bar -1.142   t-tilde-bar -1.346   
Z-t-tilde-bar 1.006 0.843 Z-t-tilde-bar 0.163 0.565 
infgdpdef 
t-bar -4.233   t-bar -5.000   
t-tilde-bar -2.362   t-tilde-bar -2.827   
Z-t-tilde-bar -4.032 0.000 Z-t-tilde-bar -5.949 0.000 
m2growth 
t-bar -2.835   t-bar -3.691   
t-tilde-bar -2.262   t-tilde-bar -2.708   
Z-t-tilde-bar -3.619 0.000 Z-t-tilde-bar -5.461 0.000 
monefreeindex 
t-bar -2.210   t-bar -2.221   
t-tilde-bar -1.885   t-tilde-bar -1.860   
Z-t-tilde-bar -2.061 0.020 Z-t-tilde-bar -1.959 0.025 
finfreeindex 
t-bar -1.507   t-bar -2.080   
t-tilde-bar -1.407   t-tilde-bar -1.899   
Z-t-tilde-bar -0.089 0.464 Z-t-tilde-bar -2.118 0.017 
cofc 
t-bar -1.649   t-bar -2.570   
t-tilde-bar -1.465   t-tilde-bar -2.093   
Z-t-tilde-bar -0.329 0.371 Z-t-tilde-bar -2.921 0.002 
empratio 
t-bar -1.152   t-bar -1.682   
t-tilde-bar -1.077   t-tilde-bar -1.449   
Z-t-tilde-bar 1.273 0.899 Z-t-tilde-bar -0.260 0.397 
taxrev 
t-bar -1.297   t-bar -1.333   
t-tilde-bar -1.132   t-tilde-bar -1.335   
Z-t-tilde-bar 1.049 0.853 Z-t-tilde-bar 0.209 0.583 
 
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests Number of panels =     10     
Ho: All panels contain unit roots Number of periods =     19    
Ha: At least one panel is stationary Asymptotics: T -> Infinity    
AR parameter: Panel-specific ADF regressions: 0 lags    
Panel means:  Included       
Drift term:   Not included  Time trend Without Time Trend 
      Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
unempilo 
Inverse normal Z 1.326 0.908 -0.220 0.413 
Inverse logit t(54) L* 1.291 0.899 -0.426 0.336 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.032 0.487 1.791 0.037 
agricult 
Inverse normal Z -1.370 0.085 -4.079 0.000 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -1.396 0.084 -6.205 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 2.466 0.007 9.575 0.000 
bfindex 
Inverse normal Z -0.640 0.261 0.211 0.584 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -0.877 0.192 0.107 0.542 
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Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 1.181 0.119 -0.101 0.540 
urban 
Inverse normal Z -3.101 0.001 0.510 0.695 
Inverse logit t(39) L* -3.643 0.000 -0.996 0.163 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 4.746 0.000 5.169 0.000 
goveffec 
Inverse normal Z -1.872 0.031 1.687 0.954 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -1.965 0.027 1.582 0.940 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 2.053 0.020 -1.601 0.945 
govspend 
Inverse normal Z -2.126 0.017 -2.929 0.002 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -2.388 0.010 -3.546 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 3.302 0.001 5.915 0.000 
govintegrity 
Inverse normal Z -4.693 0.000 -4.371 0.000 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -6.629 0.000 -5.782 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 10.597 0.000 9.097 0.000 
ruleoflaw 
Inverse normal Z -1.550 0.061 1.561 0.941 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -1.755 0.043 1.575 0.939 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 2.186 0.014 -0.704 0.759 
gdppercapppp 
Inverse normal Z 2.804 0.998 1.598 0.945 
Inverse logit t(54) L* 2.927 0.998 1.196 0.882 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm -1.875 0.970 0.769 0.221 
electric 
Inverse normal Z 1.942 0.974 2.759 0.997 
Inverse logit t(44) L* 2.118 0.980 2.929 0.998 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm -1.553 0.940 -1.890 0.971 
lfpr 
Inverse normal Z 2.894 0.998 1.344 0.911 
Inverse logit t(54) L* 2.944 0.998 1.308 0.902 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm -2.059 0.980 -1.464 0.928 
infgdpdef 
Inverse normal Z -8.267 0.000 -6.699 0.000 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -13.420 0.000 -11.633 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 21.425 0.000 18.703 0.000 
m2growth 
Inverse normal Z -6.086 0.000 -4.982 0.000 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -7.545 0.000 -5.877 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 11.137 0.000 8.318 0.000 
monefreeindex 
Inverse normal Z -0.157 0.438 -2.578 0.005 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -0.226 0.411 -2.861 0.003 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.560 0.288 3.740 0.000 
finfreeindex 
Inverse normal Z 0.477 0.683 0.112 0.545 
Inverse logit t(54) L* 0.399 0.654 0.144 0.557 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm -0.836 0.798 -0.419 0.662 
cofc 
Inverse normal Z -1.540 0.062 -0.408 0.342 
Inverse logit t(54) L* -1.952 0.028 -0.673 0.252 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 2.672 0.004 1.108 0.134 
empratio 
Inverse normal Z 2.101 0.982 1.385 0.917 
Inverse logit t(54) L* 1.847 0.965 1.383 0.914 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.112 0.455 -1.002 0.842 
taxrev Inverse normal Z -1.556 0.060 0.711 0.761 
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Inverse logit t(44) L* -1.524 0.067 0.686 0.752 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 0.641 0.261 0.571 0.284 
 
Appendix 6.7. 1 - MIMIC Model Indexes for three chosen specifications 
MIMIC Model Index MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
Country Year ῆt ῆt ῆt 
Albania 1996 -12.616013 -6.286784 -13.835908 
Albania 1997 -13.593237 -6.316756 -14.099137 
Albania 1998 -13.622609 -6.213743 -13.662907 
Albania 1999 -12.473446 -5.776858 -12.756928 
Albania 2000 -12.447158 -5.706199 -12.822123 
Albania 2001 -13.738768 -6.216203 -12.734435 
Albania 2002 -12.948089 -5.485062 -13.666297 
Albania 2003 -12.771972 -5.397199 -13.396815 
Albania 2004 -12.396763 -5.426110 -13.119652 
Albania 2005 -12.818349 -5.490036 -13.236003 
Albania 2006 -12.574186 -5.399183 -12.925297 
Albania 2007 -13.919590 -6.353938 -13.379235 
Albania 2008 -12.682398 -5.694848 -12.793068 
Albania 2009 -14.550132 -6.862271 -13.571357 
Albania 2010 -14.781263 -7.039709 -13.731541 
Albania 2011 -15.231282 -7.318193 -14.308409 
Albania 2012 -16.792873 -8.236255 -14.971406 
Albania 2013 -16.867958 -8.259089 -14.586742 
Albania 2014 -16.784082 -8.299106 -14.707750 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996 -17.901315 -8.544255 -14.707791 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 -15.453251 -7.149306 -13.440745 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 -13.005208 -5.754370 -12.468590 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1999 -13.147694 -5.834613 -12.585035 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000 -10.949510 -4.368497 -9.975456 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 -11.380628 -4.908583 -10.670199 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 -12.562139 -5.622772 -12.117228 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 -13.850273 -6.512715 -13.430077 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 -13.341143 -6.083826 -12.380342 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005 -13.019978 -5.786833 -12.048853 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 -14.016136 -6.197746 -10.935982 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 -13.526535 -5.922158 -10.846222 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 -13.519353 -6.148563 -11.411226 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 -14.732475 -6.806181 -12.369103 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 -15.189096 -7.228094 -12.797447 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 -15.782907 -7.439121 -13.268344 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 -15.231357 -7.226115 -13.131532 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013 -14.825836 -7.043347 -12.906634 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 -15.034670 -7.111625 -12.934488 
Bulgaria 1996 -13.166498 -7.881564 -15.618235 
Bulgaria 1997 -13.249074 -7.789264 -15.243099 
Bulgaria 1998 -11.689630 -7.178746 -13.965045 
Bulgaria 1999 -11.975986 -7.389966 -13.977091 
Bulgaria 2000 -11.558774 -7.136213 -13.153319 
Bulgaria 2001 -10.842722 -6.689349 -12.208846 
Bulgaria 2002 -15.825221 -8.440310 -15.650388 
Bulgaria 2003 -15.434960 -8.133101 -15.352218 
Bulgaria 2004 -15.095444 -7.927043 -15.152113 
Bulgaria 2005 -16.183567 -8.504371 -16.252488 
Bulgaria 2006 -18.477825 -9.821608 -17.739086 
Bulgaria 2007 -17.577397 -9.368056 -17.348651 
Bulgaria 2008 -17.235735 -9.213872 -17.599167 
Bulgaria 2009 -17.957327 -9.722254 -17.667403 
Bulgaria 2010 -19.040706 -10.486121 -18.179363 
Bulgaria 2011 -18.543482 -9.996356 -17.314053 
Bulgaria 2012 -18.828218 -10.163956 -17.872592 
Bulgaria 2013 -18.134480 -9.667519 -16.892548 
Bulgaria 2014 -18.141585 -9.630182 -17.002240 
Croatia 1996 -14.473217 -7.243183 -15.395089 
Croatia 1997 -14.037949 -7.154143 -15.132788 
Croatia 1998 -14.332074 -7.546973 -15.621668 
Croatia 1999 -15.280259 -7.925434 -15.942447 
Croatia 2000 -15.001270 -7.887861 -15.429538 
Croatia 2001 -15.693291 -8.337423 -15.691713 
Croatia 2002 -16.590223 -8.849306 -16.914549 
Croatia 2003 -16.439291 -8.727798 -16.819993 
Croatia 2004 -17.139521 -9.122149 -17.648595 
Croatia 2005 -17.083459 -9.019755 -17.554579 
Croatia 2006 -17.277099 -9.178712 -17.885416 
Croatia 2007 -16.953986 -9.007455 -17.810368 
Croatia 2008 -17.420682 -9.281941 -17.974642 
Croatia 2009 -17.452230 -9.281980 -17.744395 
Croatia 2010 -16.470400 -8.735818 -16.268772 
Croatia 2011 -16.985261 -8.934399 -16.120331 
Croatia 2012 -17.416650 -9.185646 -16.418063 
Croatia 2013 -17.100773 -9.019967 -15.980270 
Croatia 2014 -16.921535 -8.999028 -16.093859 
Greece 1996 -18.147969 -10.331830 -17.809702 
Greece 1997 -18.033705 -10.242086 -17.555850 
Greece 1998 -18.237095 -10.390848 -17.749127 
Greece 1999 -18.173009 -10.231339 -17.524156 
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Greece 2000 -18.353640 -10.262150 -17.694131 
Greece 2001 -18.623046 -10.341790 -17.814656 
Greece 2002 -18.728193 -10.392464 -17.977609 
Greece 2003 -18.997027 -10.573810 -18.418629 
Greece 2004 -18.865564 -10.539074 -18.294149 
Greece 2005 -18.725628 -10.402565 -18.193436 
Greece 2006 -19.285891 -10.703800 -18.598084 
Greece 2007 -18.702735 -10.333034 -18.384043 
Greece 2008 -18.567202 -10.216003 -18.191772 
Greece 2009 -20.657329 -11.474204 -19.591540 
Greece 2010 -20.639834 -11.477852 -19.552809 
Greece 2011 -21.170039 -11.737280 -19.621259 
Greece 2012 -21.672388 -12.268255 -20.004481 
Greece 2013 -21.425475 -12.137839 -19.312494 
Greece 2014 -21.784403 -12.271621 -19.804650 
Macedonia, FYR 1996 -16.938142 -8.375444 -14.241111 
Macedonia, FYR 1997 -16.377572 -8.069055 -13.648481 
Macedonia, FYR 1998 -15.817700 -7.763288 -13.367957 
Macedonia, FYR 1999 -15.189619 -7.365325 -13.082695 
Macedonia, FYR 2000 -14.561508 -6.967347 -12.666359 
Macedonia, FYR 2001 -14.108188 -6.722729 -12.577160 
Macedonia, FYR 2002 -13.654854 -6.478105 -12.193073 
Macedonia, FYR 2003 -12.564838 -5.720324 -10.328756 
Macedonia, FYR 2004 -15.380451 -7.583319 -13.205024 
Macedonia, FYR 2005 -15.394436 -7.453862 -13.205233 
Macedonia, FYR 2006 -14.682087 -6.930544 -12.468876 
Macedonia, FYR 2007 -15.769541 -7.535194 -13.241476 
Macedonia, FYR 2008 -16.248135 -8.031184 -13.617539 
Macedonia, FYR 2009 -14.921198 -7.251268 -13.051757 
Macedonia, FYR 2010 -15.414056 -7.683898 -13.203403 
Macedonia, FYR 2011 -15.819790 -7.782460 -13.505895 
Macedonia, FYR 2012 -18.301258 -9.181986 -14.504139 
Macedonia, FYR 2013 -17.903955 -8.997134 -14.407146 
Macedonia, FYR 2014 -18.029707 -9.152828 -14.593792 
Romania 1996 -8.363908 -5.103014 -13.122996 
Romania 1997 -10.291847 -5.453558 -14.457501 
Romania 1998 -11.283833 -5.637914 -14.829351 
Romania 1999 -9.428967 -5.251671 -13.831422 
Romania 2000 -10.437895 -5.604971 -14.267696 
Romania 2001 -9.664635 -5.021861 -13.029151 
Romania 2002 -11.505016 -6.106234 -13.889169 
Romania 2003 -11.562749 -6.016211 -13.770275 
Romania 2004 -11.275425 -5.670859 -12.981684 
Romania 2005 -12.027773 -5.967714 -13.386350 
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Romania 2006 -15.367232 -7.817724 -15.029902 
Romania 2007 -15.175156 -7.582580 -14.901625 
Romania 2008 -15.656795 -7.792393 -15.170140 
Romania 2009 -15.873227 -7.828017 -15.188906 
Romania 2010 -16.154343 -8.138998 -15.871166 
Romania 2011 -16.267471 -8.176726 -15.945463 
Romania 2012 -16.206653 -8.149079 -16.177351 
Romania 2013 -15.959663 -8.056837 -15.854398 
Romania 2014 -16.486760 -8.346055 -16.342798 
Serbia 1996 -13.697698 -6.485496 -13.477155 
Serbia 1997 -12.726067 -6.011377 -12.911601 
Serbia 1998 -11.754428 -5.537257 -12.411571 
Serbia 1999 -10.754969 -5.036400 -11.866566 
Serbia 2000 -9.755525 -4.535552 -11.436242 
Serbia 2001 -9.843316 -4.663853 -11.548146 
Serbia 2002 -9.929615 -4.790898 -11.576973 
Serbia 2003 -10.010203 -4.970287 -11.582775 
Serbia 2004 -10.097875 -5.078236 -11.416650 
Serbia 2005 -10.185664 -5.205734 -11.331955 
Serbia 2006 -10.271963 -5.331901 -11.459075 
Serbia 2007 -11.547088 -5.958598 -12.670049 
Serbia 2008 -12.846268 -6.631946 -13.984855 
Serbia 2009 -14.240804 -7.389431 -14.545818 
Serbia 2010 -14.906210 -7.834236 -14.687821 
Serbia 2011 -14.963667 -7.817754 -14.380332 
Serbia 2012 -14.899755 -7.732115 -14.436503 
Serbia 2013 -15.216186 -7.992077 -14.689839 
Serbia 2014 -15.460259 -8.177076 -14.992072 
Slovenia 1996 -17.171554 -9.771457 -18.109599 
Slovenia 1997 -17.288159 -9.722613 -18.209260 
Slovenia 1998 -17.504849 -9.711243 -18.331924 
Slovenia 1999 -17.515753 -9.588155 -18.049337 
Slovenia 2000 -17.774070 -9.669741 -18.233688 
Slovenia 2001 -19.551246 -10.612560 -18.678254 
Slovenia 2002 -19.844586 -10.875329 -19.007713 
Slovenia 2003 -20.408968 -11.166563 -19.250541 
Slovenia 2004 -20.367034 -11.119845 -19.608562 
Slovenia 2005 -20.143126 -10.877221 -19.247728 
Slovenia 2006 -18.936646 -10.163750 -18.870792 
Slovenia 2007 -19.243786 -10.465498 -19.811253 
Slovenia 2008 -19.510113 -10.658808 -19.931330 
Slovenia 2009 -20.651689 -11.315914 -20.007622 
Slovenia 2010 -19.655370 -10.690584 -18.958636 
Slovenia 2011 -20.329064 -10.985299 -19.229864 
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Slovenia 2012 -20.946784 -11.394920 -20.055768 
Slovenia 2013 -21.218270 -11.544536 -20.267868 
Slovenia 2014 -21.813073 -11.913105 -20.552559 
Turkey 1996 -15.752618 -9.324670 -15.800163 
Turkey 1997 -13.154387 -7.717252 -14.196323 
Turkey 1998 -12.788588 -7.353839 -13.704251 
Turkey 1999 -13.700642 -8.026090 -14.653517 
Turkey 2000 -12.159303 -7.077512 -12.499746 
Turkey 2001 -13.194480 -7.593628 -13.298903 
Turkey 2002 -12.239591 -6.991160 -13.427306 
Turkey 2003 -13.346658 -7.756005 -14.411839 
Turkey 2004 -12.838948 -7.338882 -13.500711 
Turkey 2005 -13.715347 -7.740215 -14.163038 
Turkey 2006 -15.449630 -8.403761 -14.348422 
Turkey 2007 -16.489642 -8.970269 -15.185865 
Turkey 2008 -16.296987 -8.807575 -14.882445 
Turkey 2009 -15.618803 -8.341797 -13.818119 
Turkey 2010 -15.475022 -8.300538 -14.110344 
Turkey 2011 -15.678490 -8.378922 -14.543827 
Turkey 2012 -17.118536 -9.417786 -16.483279 
Turkey 2013 -16.988281 -9.267306 -16.177138 
Turkey 2014 -16.907236 -9.232836 -16.176858 
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Appendix 6.8. 1 - Size of the informal economy in ten Balkan countries using MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3 (in % of GDP) 
MIMIC Spec 1 
Year/Country Albania B and H Bulgaria Croatia Greece FYRoM Romania Serbia Slovenia Turkey 
1996      35.3       25.2        33.9      35.7      28.5      35.0         38.7      26.1        27.8      28.4  
1997      32.8       29.2        33.7      36.8      28.7      36.2         31.4      28.1        27.7      34.1  
1998      32.7       34.7        38.2      36.0      28.4      37.5         28.7      30.4        27.3      35.0  
1999      35.7       34.3        37.3      33.8      28.5      39.0         34.3      33.2        27.3      32.7  
2000      35.8       41.2        38.6      34.4      28.2      40.7         31.0      36.6        26.9      36.8  
2001      32.4       39.6        41.2      32.9      27.8      42.0         33.5      36.3        24.5      34.0  
2002      34.4       35.9        28.2      31.1      27.7      43.4         28.1      36.0        24.1      36.6  
2003      34.9       32.6        28.9      31.4      27.3      47.1         28.0      35.7        23.4      33.6  
2004      35.9       33.8        29.6      30.1      27.5      38.5         28.7      35.4        23.5      34.9  
2005      34.7       34.6        27.6      30.2      27.7      38.5         26.9      35.1        23.7      32.7  
2006      35.4       32.2        24.2      29.9      26.9      40.3         21.0      34.8        25.3      29.0  
2007      32.0       33.3        25.4      30.5      27.7      37.6         21.3      30.9        24.8      27.2  
2008      35.1       33.4        25.9      29.6      27.9      36.5         20.7      27.8        24.5      27.5  
2009      30.6       30.6        24.9      29.6      25.1      39.7         20.4      25.1        23.2      28.7  
2010      30.1       29.7        23.5      31.4      25.1      38.4         20.0      24.0        24.3      29.0  
2011      29.2       28.6        24.1      30.4      24.5      37.4         19.9      23.9        23.5      28.6  
2012      26.5       29.6        23.7      29.7      23.9      32.4         20.0      24.0        22.8      26.2  
2013      26.4       30.4        24.6      30.2      24.2      33.1         20.3      23.5        22.5      26.4  
2014      26.5       30.0        24.6      30.5      23.8      32.9         19.6      23.1        21.9      26.5  
Average      32.4       32.6        29.4      31.8      26.8      38.2         25.9      30.0        24.7      30.9  
Three-year Average      26.5       30.0        24.3      30.1      23.9      32.8         19.9      23.5        22.4      26.3  
Five-year Average      27.8       29.7        24.1      30.4      24.3      34.8         19.9      23.7        23.0      27.3  
           
Min      26.4       25.2        23.5      29.6      23.8      32.4         19.6      23.1        21.9      26.2  
Max      35.9       41.2        41.2      36.8      28.7      47.1         38.7      36.6        27.8      36.8  
S.D        3.3         3.8          5.9         2.4         1.7         3.7           6.0         5.2           1.9         3.7  
 
 
 383 
 
MIMIC Spec 2 
Year/Country Albania B and H Bulgaria Croatia Greece FYRoM Romania Serbia Slovenia Turkey 
1996      32.8       23.4        35.0      37.0      28.2      34.3         35.3      25.8        26.8      28.1  
1997      32.6       28.0        35.4      37.4      28.5      35.6         33.0      27.8        26.9      34.0  
1998      33.2       34.8        38.4      35.5      28.1      37.0         32.0      30.2        27.0      35.7  
1999      35.7       34.3        37.3      33.8      28.5      39.0         34.3      33.2        27.3      32.7  
2000      36.1       45.8        38.6      34.0      28.4      41.2         32.1      36.9        27.1      37.1  
2001      33.2       40.8        41.2      32.1      28.2      42.7         35.9      35.9        24.7      34.6  
2002      37.6       35.6        32.7      30.3      28.1      44.3         29.5      34.9        24.1      37.5  
2003      38.2       30.7        33.9      30.7      27.6      50.2         29.9      33.6        23.4      33.8  
2004      38.0       32.9        34.8      29.4      27.7      37.9         31.8      32.9        23.5      35.8  
2005      37.6       34.6        32.4      29.7      28.0      38.5         30.2      32.1        24.1      33.9  
2006      38.2       32.3        28.1      29.2      27.2      41.4         23.0      31.4        25.8      31.2  
2007      32.5       33.8        29.4      29.7      28.2      38.1         23.8      28.1        25.0      29.3  
2008      36.2       32.5        29.9      28.9      28.5      35.8         23.1      25.2        24.6      29.8  
2009      30.1       29.4        28.4      28.9      25.4      39.6         23.0      22.6        23.1      31.5  
2010      29.3       27.7        26.3      30.7      25.4      37.4         22.1      21.3        24.5      31.6  
2011      28.2       26.9        27.6      30.0      24.8      36.9         22.0      21.4        23.8      31.3  
2012      25.0       27.7        27.1      29.2      23.8      31.3         22.1      21.6        23.0      27.9  
2013      25.0       28.4        28.5      29.7      24.0      31.9         22.4      20.9        22.7      28.3  
2014      24.9       28.1        28.6      29.8      23.8      31.4         21.6      20.4        22.0      28.4  
Average      32.9       32.0        32.3      31.4      27.0      38.1         27.7      28.2        24.7      32.2  
Three-year Average      25.0       28.1        28.1      29.5      23.9      31.5         22.0      21.0        22.5      28.2  
Five-year Average      26.5       27.8        27.6      29.9      24.4      33.8         22.0      21.1        23.2      29.5  
           
Min      24.9       23.4        26.3      28.9      23.8      31.3         21.6      20.4        22.0      27.9  
Max      38.2       45.8        41.2      37.4      28.5      50.2         35.9      36.9        27.3      37.5  
S.D        4.6         5.2          4.5         2.8         1.8         4.7           5.3         5.7           1.7         3.1  
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MIMIC Spec 3 
Year/Country Albania B and H Bulgaria Croatia Greece FYRoM Romania Serbia Slovenia Turkey 
1996      32.9       29.3        33.4      35.0      28.0      35.8         36.2      29.2        27.2      30.3  
1997      32.3       32.1        34.2      35.6      28.4      37.4         32.8      30.5        27.1      33.8  
1998      33.3       34.6        37.3      34.5      28.1      38.2         32.0      31.7        26.9      35.0  
1999      35.7       34.3        37.3      33.8      28.5      39.0         34.3      33.2        27.3      32.7  
2000      35.5       43.3        39.6      34.9      28.2      40.3         33.3      34.4        27.0      38.3  
2001      35.8       40.5        42.7      34.3      28.0      40.6         36.4      34.1        26.4      36.0  
2002      33.3       35.6        33.3      31.9      27.8      41.8         34.2      34.0        25.9      35.7  
2003      34.0       32.1        34.0      32.0      27.1      49.4         34.5      34.0        25.6      33.2  
2004      34.7       34.9        34.4      30.5      27.3      38.6         36.5      34.5        25.1      35.5  
2005      34.4       35.8        32.1      30.7      27.5      38.6         35.4      34.8        25.6      33.8  
2006      35.2       39.5        29.4      30.1      26.9      40.9         31.6      34.4        26.1      33.4  
2007      34.0       39.8        30.1      30.3      27.2      38.5         31.8      31.1        24.9      31.6  
2008      35.6       37.8        29.6      30.0      27.5      37.5         31.3      28.2        24.7      32.2  
2009      33.6       34.9        29.5      30.4      25.5      39.1         31.2      27.1        24.6      34.7  
2010      33.2       33.7        28.7      33.1      25.5      38.6         29.9      26.8        26.0      34.0  
2011      31.8       32.5        30.1      33.4      25.5      37.8         29.8      27.4        25.6      32.9  
2012      30.4       32.9        29.2      32.8      25.0      35.2         29.3      27.3        24.6      29.1  
2013      31.2       33.4        30.9      33.7      25.9      35.4         29.9      26.8        24.3      29.6  
2014      31.0       33.4        30.7      33.5      25.2      35.0         29.0      26.3        24.0      29.6  
Average      33.6       35.3        33.0      32.7      27.0      38.8         32.6      30.8        25.7      33.2  
Three-year Average      30.9       33.2        30.2      33.3      25.3      35.2         29.4      26.8        24.3      29.4  
Five-year Average      31.5       33.2        29.9      33.3      25.4      36.4         29.6      26.9        24.9      31.0  
           
Min      30.4       29.3        28.7      30.0      25.0      35.0         29.0      26.3        24.0      29.1  
Max      35.8       43.3        42.7      35.6      28.5      49.4         36.5      34.8        27.3      38.3  
S.D        1.7         3.5          3.9         1.9         1.2         3.2           2.5         3.3           1.1         2.4  
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Appendix 6.8. 2 - Map of Balkan countries in Europe and the level of the informal economy. 
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Appendix 6.8. 3 - Comparing the Size of the informal economy from MIMIC Spec 1, 2 and 3 (in % of 
GDP) 
Country Year MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 Average St.Dev. Var. 
Albania 1996 35.3 32.8 32.9 33.7 1.4 2.0 
Albania 1997 32.8 32.6 32.3 32.6 0.3 0.1 
Albania 1998 32.7 33.2 33.3 33.1 0.3 0.1 
Albania 1999 35.7 35.7 35.7 35.7 0.0 0.0 
Albania 2000 35.8 36.1 35.5 35.8 0.3 0.1 
Albania 2001 32.4 33.2 35.8 33.8 1.8 3.2 
Albania 2002 34.4 37.6 33.3 35.1 2.2 5.0 
Albania 2003 34.9 38.2 34 35.7 2.2 4.9 
Albania 2004 35.9 38 34.7 36.2 1.7 2.8 
Albania 2005 34.7 37.6 34.4 35.6 1.8 3.1 
Albania 2006 35.4 38.2 35.2 36.3 1.7 2.8 
Albania 2007 32 32.5 34 32.8 1.0 1.1 
Albania 2008 35.1 36.2 35.6 35.6 0.6 0.3 
Albania 2009 30.6 30.1 33.6 31.4 1.9 3.6 
Albania 2010 30.1 29.3 33.2 30.9 2.1 4.2 
Albania 2011 29.2 28.2 31.8 29.7 1.9 3.5 
Albania 2012 26.5 25 30.4 27.3 2.8 7.8 
Albania 2013 26.4 25 31.2 27.5 3.3 10.6 
Albania 2014 26.5 24.9 31 27.5 3.2 10.0 
B and H141 1996 25.2 23.4 29.3 26 3.0 9.1 
B and H 1997 29.2 28 32.1 29.8 2.1 4.4 
B and H 1998 34.7 34.8 34.6 34.7 0.1 0.0 
B and H 1999 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.3 0.0 0.0 
B and H 2000 41.2 45.8 43.3 43.4 2.3 5.3 
B and H 2001 39.6 40.8 40.5 40.3 0.6 0.4 
B and H 2002 35.9 35.6 35.6 35.7 0.2 0.0 
B and H 2003 32.6 30.7 32.1 31.8 1.0 1.0 
B and H 2004 33.8 32.9 34.9 33.9 1.0 1.0 
B and H 2005 34.6 34.6 35.8 35 0.7 0.5 
B and H 2006 32.2 32.3 39.5 34.7 4.2 17.5 
B and H 2007 33.3 33.8 39.8 35.6 3.6 13.1 
B and H 2008 33.4 32.5 37.8 34.6 2.8 8.0 
B and H 2009 30.6 29.4 34.9 31.6 2.9 8.4 
B and H 2010 29.7 27.7 33.7 30.4 3.1 9.3 
B and H 2011 28.6 26.9 32.5 29.3 2.9 8.2 
B and H 2012 29.6 27.7 32.9 30.1 2.6 6.9 
B and H 2013 30.4 28.4 33.4 30.7 2.5 6.3 
B and H 2014 30 28.1 33.4 30.5 2.7 7.2 
Bulgaria 1996 33.9 35 33.4 34.1 0.8 0.7 
Bulgaria 1997 33.7 35.4 34.2 34.4 0.9 0.8 
Bulgaria 1998 38.2 38.4 37.3 38 0.6 0.3 
Bulgaria 1999 37.3 37.3 37.3 37.3 0.0 0.0 
Bulgaria 2000 38.6 38.6 39.6 38.9 0.6 0.3 
Bulgaria 2001 41.2 41.2 42.7 41.7 0.9 0.8 
                                                          
141 B and H = Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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Bulgaria 2002 28.2 32.7 33.3 31.4 2.8 7.8 
Bulgaria 2003 28.9 33.9 34 32.3 2.9 8.5 
Bulgaria 2004 29.6 34.8 34.4 32.9 2.9 8.4 
Bulgaria 2005 27.6 32.4 32.1 30.7 2.7 7.2 
Bulgaria 2006 24.2 28.1 29.4 27.2 2.7 7.3 
Bulgaria 2007 25.4 29.4 30.1 28.3 2.5 6.4 
Bulgaria 2008 25.9 29.9 29.6 28.5 2.2 5.0 
Bulgaria 2009 24.9 28.4 29.5 27.6 2.4 5.8 
Bulgaria 2010 23.5 26.3 28.7 26.2 2.6 6.8 
Bulgaria 2011 24.1 27.6 30.1 27.3 3.0 9.1 
Bulgaria 2012 23.7 27.1 29.2 26.7 2.8 7.7 
Bulgaria 2013 24.6 28.5 30.9 28 3.2 10.1 
Bulgaria 2014 24.6 28.6 30.7 28 3.1 9.6 
Croatia 1996 35.7 37 35 35.9 1.0 1.0 
Croatia 1997 36.8 37.4 35.6 36.6 0.9 0.8 
Croatia 1998 36 35.5 34.5 35.3 0.8 0.6 
Croatia 1999 33.8 33.8 33.8 33.8 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 2000 34.4 34 34.9 34.4 0.5 0.2 
Croatia 2001 32.9 32.1 34.3 33.1 1.1 1.2 
Croatia 2002 31.1 30.3 31.9 31.1 0.8 0.6 
Croatia 2003 31.4 30.7 32 31.4 0.7 0.4 
Croatia 2004 30.1 29.4 30.5 30 0.6 0.3 
Croatia 2005 30.2 29.7 30.7 30.2 0.5 0.3 
Croatia 2006 29.9 29.2 30.1 29.7 0.5 0.2 
Croatia 2007 30.5 29.7 30.3 30.2 0.4 0.2 
Croatia 2008 29.6 28.9 30 29.5 0.6 0.3 
Croatia 2009 29.6 28.9 30.4 29.6 0.8 0.6 
Croatia 2010 31.4 30.7 33.1 31.7 1.2 1.5 
Croatia 2011 30.4 30 33.4 31.3 1.9 3.5 
Croatia 2012 29.7 29.2 32.8 30.6 2.0 3.8 
Croatia 2013 30.2 29.7 33.7 31.2 2.2 4.8 
Croatia 2014 30.5 29.8 33.5 31.3 2.0 3.9 
Greece 1996 28.5 28.2 28 28.2 0.3 0.1 
Greece 1997 28.7 28.5 28.4 28.5 0.2 0.0 
Greece 1998 28.4 28.1 28.1 28.2 0.2 0.0 
Greece 1999 28.5 28.5 28.5 28.5 0.0 0.0 
Greece 2000 28.2 28.4 28.2 28.3 0.1 0.0 
Greece 2001 27.8 28.2 28 28 0.2 0.0 
Greece 2002 27.7 28.1 27.8 27.9 0.2 0.0 
Greece 2003 27.3 27.6 27.1 27.3 0.3 0.1 
Greece 2004 27.5 27.7 27.3 27.5 0.2 0.0 
Greece 2005 27.7 28 27.5 27.7 0.3 0.1 
Greece 2006 26.9 27.2 26.9 27 0.2 0.0 
Greece 2007 27.7 28.2 27.2 27.7 0.5 0.3 
Greece 2008 27.9 28.5 27.5 28 0.5 0.3 
Greece 2009 25.1 25.4 25.5 25.3 0.2 0.0 
Greece 2010 25.1 25.4 25.5 25.3 0.2 0.0 
Greece 2011 24.5 24.8 25.5 24.9 0.5 0.3 
Greece 2012 23.9 23.8 25 24.2 0.7 0.4 
Greece 2013 24.2 24 25.9 24.7 1.0 1.1 
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Greece 2014 23.8 23.8 25.2 24.3 0.8 0.7 
Macedonia, FYR 1996 35 34.3 35.8 35 0.8 0.6 
Macedonia, FYR 1997 36.2 35.6 37.4 36.4 0.9 0.8 
Macedonia, FYR 1998 37.5 37 38.2 37.6 0.6 0.4 
Macedonia, FYR 1999 39 39 39 39 0.0 0.0 
Macedonia, FYR 2000 40.7 41.2 40.3 40.7 0.5 0.2 
Macedonia, FYR 2001 42 42.7 40.6 41.8 1.1 1.1 
Macedonia, FYR 2002 43.4 44.3 41.8 43.2 1.3 1.6 
Macedonia, FYR 2003 47.1 50.2 49.4 48.9 1.6 2.6 
Macedonia, FYR 2004 38.5 37.9 38.6 38.3 0.4 0.1 
Macedonia, FYR 2005 38.5 38.5 38.6 38.5 0.1 0.0 
Macedonia, FYR 2006 40.3 41.4 40.9 40.9 0.6 0.3 
Macedonia, FYR 2007 37.6 38.1 38.5 38.1 0.5 0.2 
Macedonia, FYR 2008 36.5 35.8 37.5 36.6 0.9 0.7 
Macedonia, FYR 2009 39.7 39.6 39.1 39.5 0.3 0.1 
Macedonia, FYR 2010 38.4 37.4 38.6 38.1 0.6 0.4 
Macedonia, FYR 2011 37.4 36.9 37.8 37.4 0.5 0.2 
Macedonia, FYR 2012 32.4 31.3 35.2 33 2.0 4.0 
Macedonia, FYR 2013 33.1 31.9 35.4 33.5 1.8 3.2 
Macedonia, FYR 2014 32.9 31.4 35 33.1 1.8 3.3 
Romania 1996 38.7 35.3 36.2 36.7 1.8 3.1 
Romania 1997 31.4 33 32.8 32.4 0.9 0.8 
Romania 1998 28.7 32 32 30.9 1.9 3.6 
Romania 1999 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.3 0.0 0.0 
Romania 2000 31 32.1 33.3 32.1 1.2 1.3 
Romania 2001 33.5 35.9 36.4 35.3 1.6 2.4 
Romania 2002 28.1 29.5 34.2 30.6 3.2 10.2 
Romania 2003 28 29.9 34.5 30.8 3.3 11.2 
Romania 2004 28.7 31.8 36.5 32.3 3.9 15.4 
Romania 2005 26.9 30.2 35.4 30.8 4.3 18.4 
Romania 2006 21 23 31.6 25.2 5.6 31.7 
Romania 2007 21.3 23.8 31.8 25.6 5.5 30.1 
Romania 2008 20.7 23.1 31.3 25 5.6 30.9 
Romania 2009 20.4 23 31.2 24.9 5.6 31.8 
Romania 2010 20 22.1 29.9 24 5.2 27.2 
Romania 2011 19.9 22 29.8 23.9 5.2 27.2 
Romania 2012 20 22.1 29.3 23.8 4.9 23.8 
Romania 2013 20.3 22.4 29.9 24.2 5.0 25.5 
Romania 2014 19.6 21.6 29 23.4 5.0 24.5 
Serbia 1996 26.1 25.8 29.2 27 1.9 3.5 
Serbia 1997 28.1 27.8 30.5 28.8 1.5 2.2 
Serbia 1998 30.4 30.2 31.7 30.8 0.8 0.7 
Serbia 1999 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 0.0 0.0 
Serbia 2000 36.6 36.9 34.4 36 1.4 1.9 
Serbia 2001 36.3 35.9 34.1 35.4 1.2 1.4 
Serbia 2002 36 34.9 34 35 1.0 1.0 
Serbia 2003 35.7 33.6 34 34.4 1.1 1.2 
Serbia 2004 35.4 32.9 34.5 34.3 1.3 1.6 
Serbia 2005 35.1 32.1 34.8 34 1.7 2.7 
Serbia 2006 34.8 31.4 34.4 33.5 1.9 3.5 
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Serbia 2007 30.9 28.1 31.1 30 1.7 2.8 
Serbia 2008 27.8 25.2 28.2 27.1 1.6 2.7 
Serbia 2009 25.1 22.6 27.1 24.9 2.3 5.1 
Serbia 2010 24 21.3 26.8 24 2.8 7.6 
Serbia 2011 23.9 21.4 27.4 24.2 3.0 9.1 
Serbia 2012 24 21.6 27.3 24.3 2.9 8.2 
Serbia 2013 23.5 20.9 26.8 23.7 3.0 8.7 
Serbia 2014 23.1 20.4 26.3 23.3 3.0 8.7 
Slovenia 1996 27.8 26.8 27.2 27.3 0.5 0.3 
Slovenia 1997 27.7 26.9 27.1 27.2 0.4 0.2 
Slovenia 1998 27.3 27 26.9 27.1 0.2 0.0 
Slovenia 1999 27.3 27.3 27.3 27.3 0.0 0.0 
Slovenia 2000 26.9 27.1 27 27 0.1 0.0 
Slovenia 2001 24.5 24.7 26.4 25.2 1.0 1.1 
Slovenia 2002 24.1 24.1 25.9 24.7 1.0 1.1 
Slovenia 2003 23.4 23.4 25.6 24.1 1.3 1.6 
Slovenia 2004 23.5 23.5 25.1 24 0.9 0.9 
Slovenia 2005 23.7 24.1 25.6 24.5 1.0 1.0 
Slovenia 2006 25.3 25.8 26.1 25.7 0.4 0.2 
Slovenia 2007 24.8 25 24.9 24.9 0.1 0.0 
Slovenia 2008 24.5 24.6 24.7 24.6 0.1 0.0 
Slovenia 2009 23.2 23.1 24.6 23.6 0.8 0.7 
Slovenia 2010 24.3 24.5 26 24.9 0.9 0.9 
Slovenia 2011 23.5 23.8 25.6 24.3 1.1 1.3 
Slovenia 2012 22.8 23 24.6 23.5 1.0 1.0 
Slovenia 2013 22.5 22.7 24.3 23.2 1.0 1.0 
Slovenia 2014 21.9 22 24 22.6 1.2 1.4 
Turkey 1996 28.4 28.1 30.3 28.9 1.2 1.4 
Turkey 1997 34.1 34 33.8 34 0.2 0.0 
Turkey 1998 35 35.7 35 35.2 0.4 0.2 
Turkey 1999 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 0.0 0.0 
Turkey 2000 36.8 37.1 38.3 37.4 0.8 0.6 
Turkey 2001 34 34.6 36 34.9 1.0 1.1 
Turkey 2002 36.6 37.5 35.7 36.6 0.9 0.8 
Turkey 2003 33.6 33.8 33.2 33.5 0.3 0.1 
Turkey 2004 34.9 35.8 35.5 35.4 0.5 0.2 
Turkey 2005 32.7 33.9 33.8 33.5 0.7 0.4 
Turkey 2006 29 31.2 33.4 31.2 2.2 4.8 
Turkey 2007 27.2 29.3 31.6 29.4 2.2 4.8 
Turkey 2008 27.5 29.8 32.2 29.8 2.4 5.5 
Turkey 2009 28.7 31.5 34.7 31.6 3.0 9.0 
Turkey 2010 29 31.6 34 31.5 2.5 6.3 
Turkey 2011 28.6 31.3 32.9 30.9 2.2 4.7 
Turkey 2012 26.2 27.9 29.1 27.7 1.5 2.1 
Turkey 2013 26.4 28.3 29.6 28.1 1.6 2.6 
Turkey 2014 26.5 28.4 29.6 28.2 1.6 2.4 
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Appendix 6.8. 4 - Averages from the three MIMIC Specs 
 
MIMIC Model Specification 1  
Year/Country Average (%) 3 year Average (%) 5 year Average (%) 
Albania               32.45                     26.48                     27.76  
Bosnia and Herzegovina               32.57                     30.01                     29.66  
Bulgaria               29.38                     24.33                     24.11  
Croatia               31.81                     30.13                     30.43  
Greece               26.80                     23.95                     24.28  
Macedonia, FYR               38.21                     32.77                     34.84  
Romania               25.91                     19.95                     19.95  
Serbia               29.97                     23.51                     23.67  
Slovenia               24.69                     22.43                     23.03  
Turkey               30.93                     26.35                     27.31  
MIMIC Model Specification 2 
Year/Country Average (%) 
3 year Average 
(%) 5 year Average (%) 
Albania 32.86 24.95 26.47 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 31.99 28.08 27.77 
Bulgaria 32.29 28.09 27.62 
Croatia 31.36 29.54 29.86 
Greece 26.97 23.85 24.36 
Macedonia, FYR 38.14 31.53 33.78 
Romania 27.74 22.02 22.04 
Serbia 28.23 21.00 21.15 
Slovenia 24.69 22.54 23.19 
Turkey 32.24 28.20 29.51 
MIMIC Model Specification 3  
Year/Country Average (%) 
3 year Average 
(%) 5 year Average (%) 
Albania 33.58 30.87 31.52 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 35.29 33.23 33.19 
Bulgaria 32.97 30.23 29.90 
Croatia 32.66 33.34 33.31 
Greece 27.00 25.35 25.41 
Macedonia, FYR 38.83 35.18 36.40 
Romania 32.60 29.43 29.58 
Serbia 30.84 26.80 26.92 
Slovenia 25.73 24.29 24.89 
Turkey 33.23 29.44 31.04 
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Appendix 6.12. 1 - Mean comparisons with other empirical studies 
A
lb
an
ia
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 32.4 3.3 26.4 35.9 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 32.9 4.6 24.9 38.2 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 33.6 1.7 30.4 35.8 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 34.5 0.7 33.4 35.3 
Schneider, (2009) 7 35.5 1.2 33.4 37.0 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 34.3 0.9 32.9 35.7 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 34.3 0.9 32.9 35.7 
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 11 37.8 3.0 30.8 41.9 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 42.1 6.8 27.8 52.0 
Boka and Torluccio (2013) 18 36.0 4.2 28.2 42.0 
B
o
sn
ia
 &
 H
e
rz
eg
o
vi
n
a 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 32.6 3.8 25.2 41.2 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 32.0 5.2 23.4 45.8 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 35.3 3.5 29.3 43.3 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 35.5 1.0 34.1 36.7 
Schneider, (2009) 7 37.0 1.7 34.1 39.0 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 33.6 0.5 32.8 34.3 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 33.6 0.5 32.8 34.3 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 34.4 2.2 29.8 37.3 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 29.4 5.9 23.5 41.2 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 32.3 4.5 26.3 41.2 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 33.0 3.9 28.7 42.7 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 37.2 0.7 36.5 38.3 
Schneider, (2009) 7 37.0 1.7 34.1 39.0 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 35.3 1.6 32.7 37.3 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 35.3 1.6 32.7 37.3 
Schneider et al., (2013) 10 34.0 1.3 32.3 36.2 
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 11 35.7 7.7 31.0 58.1 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 34.0 3.4 30.5 42.9 
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 9 33.5 1.4 32.1 35.9 
C
ro
at
ia
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 31.8 2.4 29.6 36.8 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 31.4 2.8 28.9 37.4 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 32.7 1.9 30.0 35.6 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 34.4 0.7 33.4 35.4 
Schneider, (2009) 7 35.7 1.5 33.4 37.3 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 32.1 1.2 30.4 33.8 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 32.1 1.2 30.4 33.8 
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 8 31.0 2.2 29.5 36.0 
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Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 28.9 3.9 23.0 36.7 
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 9 30.7 1.1 29.5 32.3 
G
re
ec
e 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 26.8 1.7 23.8 28.7 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 27.0 1.8 23.8 28.5 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 27.0 1.2 25.0 28.5 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 27.8 1.0 26.3 28.7 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 27.5 0.9 26.4 28.7 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 27.5 0.9 26.4 28.7 
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 11 20.5 2.6 15.7 23.2 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 32.2 6.1 27.2 45.1 
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 9 26.0 1.6 24.3 28.2 
M
ac
e
d
o
n
ia
, F
Y
R
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 38.2 3.7 32.4 47.1 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 38.1 4.6 31.3 50.2 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 38.8 3.2 35.0 49.4 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 35.8 1.2 34.1 36.9 
Schneider, (2009) 7 36.9 1.8 34.1 39.0 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 37.6 1.5 34.9 39.1 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 37.6 1.5 34.9 39.1 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 34.3 4.8 29.5 43.3 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 25.9 6.0 19.6 38.7 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 27.7 5.3 21.6 35.9 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 32.6 2.5 29.0 36.5 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 35.9 1.1 34.4 37.4 
Schneider, (2009) 7 37.2 1.5 34.4 38.9 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 32.6 1.5 30.2 34.4 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 32.6 1.5 30.2 34.4 
Schneider et al., (2013) 10 31.3 1.5 29.5 33.4 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 32.6 2.3 29.8 36.1 
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 9 30.9 1.6 29.4 33.6 
Se
rb
ia
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 30.0 5.2 23.1 36.6 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 28.2 5.7 20.4 36.9 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 30.8 3.3 26.3 34.8 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 37.7 1.0 36.4 39.1 
Schneider, (2009) 7 39.7 2.2 36.4 42.1 
Schneider et al., (2013) 10 31.4 1.1 30.1 33.2 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 36.2 4.3 29.8 44.3 
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 24.7 1.9 21.9 27.8 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 24.7 1.7 22.0 27.3 
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MIMIC Spec 3 19 25.7 1.1 24.0 27.3 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 28.1 0.9 27.1 29.4 
Schneider, (2009) 7 28.0 1.1 26.4 29.4 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 26.2 0.8 24.7 27.3 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 26.2 0.8 24.7 27.3 
Schneider et al., (2013) 10 25.4 0.9 24.1 26.6 
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 8 29.0 0.7 27.7 29.7 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 27.5 1.5 25.2 30.0 
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 9 25.2 1.1 24.0 26.7 
Tu
rk
ey
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MIMIC Spec 1 19 30.9 3.7 26.2 36.8 
MIMIC Spec 2 19 32.2 3.1 27.9 37.5 
MIMIC Spec 3 19 33.2 2.4 29.1 38.3 
Schneider, (2007b) 5 33.3 0.8 32.1 34.3 
Schneider et al., (2010) 9 31.3 1.4 29.1 32.8 
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 9 31.3 1.4 29.1 32.8 
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 11 37.0 3.2 29.0 39.9 
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 15 37.3 4.2 29.5 43.3 
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 9 29.7 1.6 27.7 32.2 
 
Appendix 6.12. 2 - Correlation of estimates between three chosen MIMIC specifications 
Correlation between MIMIC Specifications for all countries (obs=190) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9483 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8558 0.8831 1 
Correlations for Albania between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9551 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8218 0.8104 1 
Correlations for Bosnia & Herzegovina between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9867 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8166 0.8538 1 
Correlations for Bulgaria between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9731 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.9545 0.9624 1 
 394 
 
Correlations for Croatia between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9903 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.7949 0.7936 1 
Correlations for Greece between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9881 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.9711 0.9444 1 
Correlations for FYR Macedonia between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9951 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.9475 0.9644 1 
Correlations for Romania between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9738 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8374 0.8715 1 
Correlations for Serbia between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9787 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.9828 0.9671 1 
Correlations for Slovenia between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9836 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8988 0.9009 1 
Correlations for Turkey between MIMIC Specifications (obs=19) 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9688 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8342 0.9095 1 
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Appendix 6.12. 3 - Correlation of estimates between the MIMIC specifications and other empirical studies 
 
MIMIC 
Spec 1 
MIMIC 
Spec 2 
MIMIC 
Spec 3 
Schneider, 
(2007b) 
Schneider, 
(2009) 
Schneider 
et al., 
(2010) 
Buehn & 
Schneider, 
(2012) 
Alm and 
Embaye, 
(2013) 
Schneider 
et al., 
(2013) 
Hassan & 
Schneider, 
(2016a) 
Bitzenis 
et al. 
(2016). 
 
 
MIMIC Spec 1 1.00                     
MIMIC Spec 2 1.00 1.00                   
MIMIC Spec 3 1.00 1.00 1.00                 
Schneider, (2007b) 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00               
Schneider, (2009) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00             
Schneider et al., (2010) 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00           
Buehn & Schneider, (2012) 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00         
Alm and Embaye, (2013) 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.89 1.00       
Schneider et al., (2013) 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00     
Hassan and Schneider, (2016) 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.81 0.97 1.00   
Bitzenis et al. (2016). 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.97 1.00 
 
Appendix 6.12. 4 - Correlation of estimates from the MIMIC specifications and other variables 
  MIMIC Spec 1 MIMIC Spec 2 MIMIC Spec 3 
MIMIC Spec 1 1     
MIMIC Spec 2 0.9483 1   
MIMIC Spec 3 0.8558 0.8831 1 
Business Freedom Index -0.612 -0.5761 -0.574 
Government Integrity -0.3808 -0.365 -0.4256 
Government Effectiveness -0.47 -0.4553 -0.6194 
Government Spending Index 0.1898 0.2862 0.3384 
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Unemployment Rate 0.5242 0.4133 0.5528 
Employment to Population Rate -0.4058 -0.3248 -0.4806 
Control of Corruption -0.4829 -0.4892 -0.5852 
Size of Agriculture sector 0.4604 0.431 0.4456 
Degree of Urbanisation -0.1867 -0.0805 -0.2258 
Labour Force Participation Ratio -0.2827 -0.268 -0.425 
Regulatory Quality -0.5645 -0.4796 -0.5601 
Rule of Law -0.535 -0.5172 -0.6336 
Political Stability Index -0.462 -0.4455 -0.5169 
Monetary Freedom Index -0.2793 -0.2365 -0.1977 
M2 Growth 0.247 0.2577 0.1818 
Tax Revenue 0.1301 0.125 0.2135 
Level of Exports -0.3353 -0.3011 -0.2918 
Inflation 0.1003 0.1197 0.0702 
Electric Power Consumption -0.4454 -0.4813 -0.6225 
GDP per Capita -0.6046 -0.585 -0.7242 
State Fragility Index 0.489 0.4973 0.5344 
Political Stability Index -0.462 -0.4455 -0.5169 
Banking Crisis -0.1739 -0.1793 -0.0997 
Institutionalised Democracy -0.1803 -0.1193 -0.2541 
Voice and Accountability -0.5142 -0.4805 -0.591 
Overall Economic Freedom -0.3807 -0.3172 -0.2527 
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Appendix 6.12. 5 – Impact of informal economy on the government revenues 
 
  GDP Tax Government Informal Size of Lost Potential Total Potential Tax 
  based on PPP Revenues Tax Economy Informal Government Government Revenues 
Country Year (current int. $) (% of GDP) Revenues (% of GDP) Economy Revenues Revenues (% of GDP) 
ALB 1996 9,850,039,915 12.81 1,261,790,113 33.67 3,316,508,439 424,844,731 1,686,634,844 17.12 
ALB 1997 8,932,819,723 13.76 1,229,155,994 32.57 2,909,419,384 400,336,107 1,629,492,101 18.24 
ALB 1998 10,039,363,360 18.86 1,893,423,930 33.07 3,320,017,463 626,155,294 2,519,579,223 25.10 
ALB 1999 11,473,507,534 18.84 2,161,608,819 35.70 4,096,042,190 771,694,349 2,933,303,168 25.57 
ALB 2000 12,438,082,811 20.77 2,583,389,800 35.80 4,452,833,646 924,853,548 3,508,243,348 28.21 
ALB 2001 13,659,433,660 20.28 2,770,133,146 33.80 4,616,888,577 936,305,003 3,706,438,150 27.13 
ALB 2002 14,506,505,449 21.12 3,063,773,951 35.10 5,091,783,413 1,075,384,657 4,139,158,608 28.53 
ALB 2003 15,546,952,059 21.45 3,334,821,217 35.70 5,550,261,885 1,190,531,174 4,525,352,391 29.11 
ALB 2004 16,723,679,412 22.50 3,762,827,868 36.20 6,053,971,947 1,362,143,688 5,124,971,556 30.65 
ALB 2005 17,896,842,537 22.86 4,091,218,204 35.57 6,365,906,890 1,455,246,315 5,546,464,519 30.99 
ALB 2006 19,854,814,601 23.55 4,675,808,838 36.27 7,201,341,256 1,695,915,866 6,371,724,704 32.09 
ALB 2007 21,650,252,013 23.63 5,115,954,551 32.83 7,107,777,736 1,679,567,879 6,795,522,430 31.39 
ALB 2008 24,251,466,868 24.47 5,934,333,943 35.63 8,640,797,645 2,114,403,184 8,048,737,126 33.19 
ALB 2009 25,832,022,152 23.68 6,117,022,846 31.43 8,119,004,562 1,922,580,280 8,039,603,126 31.12 
ALB 2010 28,100,696,752 23.28 6,541,842,204 30.87 8,674,685,087 2,019,466,688 8,561,308,892 30.47 
ALB 2011 29,655,482,843 23.37 6,930,486,340 29.73 8,816,575,049 2,060,433,589 8,990,919,929 30.32 
ALB 2012 30,530,519,326 22.57 6,890,738,212 27.30 8,334,831,776 1,881,171,532 8,771,909,744 28.73 
ALB 2013 30,643,070,633 22.21 6,805,825,988 27.53 8,436,037,345 1,873,643,894 8,679,469,882 28.32 
ALB 2014 32,720,135,193 24.09 7,882,280,568 27.47 8,988,221,137 2,165,262,472 10,047,543,040 30.71 
BIH 1996 8,888,899,060 25.48 2,264,713,702 25.97 2,308,447,086 588,146,149 2,852,859,851 32.09 
BIH 1997 12,150,205,641 24.86 3,020,055,114 29.77 3,617,116,219 899,070,407 3,919,125,522 32.26 
BIH 1998 14,198,068,429 24.23 3,440,759,903 34.70 4,926,729,745 1,193,943,686 4,634,703,589 32.64 
BIH 1999 15,799,217,627 23.61 3,730,511,266 34.30 5,419,131,646 1,279,565,364 5,010,076,630 31.71 
BIH 2000 17,047,462,281 22.99 3,919,211,578 43.43 7,403,712,869 1,702,113,588 5,621,325,167 32.97 
BIH 2001 17,883,753,581 22.37 4,000,238,001 40.30 7,207,152,693 1,612,095,914 5,612,333,915 31.38 
BIH 2002 19,310,551,062 21.75 4,199,272,434 35.70 6,893,866,729 1,499,140,259 5,698,412,693 29.51 
BIH 2003 20,213,831,698 21.12 4,269,969,808 31.80 6,427,998,480 1,357,850,399 5,627,820,207 27.84 
BIH 2004 22,093,035,682 20.50 4,529,514,176 33.87 7,482,911,186 1,534,146,451 6,063,660,627 27.45 
BIH 2005 24,402,765,425 19.88 4,851,269,766 35.00 8,540,967,899 1,697,944,418 6,549,214,185 26.84 
BIH 2006 27,908,070,415 21.69 6,053,260,473 34.67 9,675,728,013 2,098,665,406 8,151,925,879 29.21 
BIH 2007 30,795,338,339 21.40 6,590,202,404 35.63 10,972,379,050 2,348,089,117 8,938,291,521 29.02 
BIH 2008 33,876,565,225 20.31 6,880,330,397 34.57 11,711,128,598 2,378,530,218 9,258,860,615 27.33 
BIH 2009 33,746,612,805 18.96 6,398,357,788 31.63 10,674,053,630 2,023,800,568 8,422,158,356 24.96 
BIH 2010 34,678,810,241 19.70 6,831,725,618 30.37 10,531,954,670 2,074,795,070 8,906,520,688 25.68 
BIH 2011 36,495,497,235 20.32 7,415,885,038 29.33 10,704,129,339 2,175,079,082 9,590,964,120 26.28 
BIH 2012 37,103,872,110 20.50 7,606,293,783 30.07 11,157,134,343 2,287,212,540 9,893,506,323 26.66 
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BIH 2013 39,010,595,697 19.78 7,716,295,829 30.73 11,987,956,058 2,371,217,708 10,087,513,537 25.86 
BIH 2014 39,980,164,560 19.82 7,924,068,616 30.50 12,193,950,191 2,416,840,928 10,340,909,544 25.87 
BGR 1996 47,039,286,253 17.03 8,010,790,449 34.10 16,040,396,612 2,731,679,543 10,742,469,992 22.84 
BGR 1997 47,251,686,007 16.63 7,857,955,383 34.43 16,268,755,492 2,705,494,038 10,563,449,421 22.36 
BGR 1998 49,600,149,953 16.17 8,020,344,247 37.97 18,833,176,937 3,045,324,711 11,065,668,958 22.31 
BGR 1999 47,223,085,883 17.18 8,112,926,155 37.30 17,614,211,034 3,026,121,456 11,139,047,610 23.59 
BGR 2000 52,048,554,046 17.55 9,134,521,235 38.93 20,262,502,090 3,556,069,117 12,690,590,352 24.38 
BGR 2001 55,697,079,591 16.79 9,351,539,663 41.70 23,225,682,189 3,899,592,040 13,251,131,703 23.79 
BGR 2002 60,865,248,219 16.00 9,738,439,715 31.40 19,111,687,941 3,057,870,071 12,796,309,786 21.02 
BGR 2003 65,151,458,359 17.88 11,649,080,755 32.27 21,024,375,612 3,759,158,359 15,408,239,114 23.65 
BGR 2004 70,820,549,109 20.62 14,603,197,226 32.93 23,321,206,822 4,808,832,847 19,412,030,073 27.41 
BGR 2005 78,696,095,092 20.94 16,478,962,312 30.70 24,159,701,193 5,059,041,430 21,538,003,742 27.37 
BGR 2006 86,482,983,437 21.78 18,835,993,792 27.23 23,549,316,390 5,129,041,110 23,965,034,902 27.71 
BGR 2007 97,319,054,459 21.76 21,176,626,250 28.30 27,541,292,412 5,992,985,229 27,169,611,479 27.92 
BGR 2008 107,860,139,054 22.06 23,793,946,675 28.47 30,707,781,589 6,774,136,618 30,568,083,294 28.34 
BGR 2009 105,212,811,320 19.71 20,737,445,111 27.60 29,038,735,924 5,723,534,851 26,460,979,962 25.15 
BGR 2010 110,659,860,114 18.06 19,985,170,737 26.17 28,959,685,392 5,230,119,182 25,215,289,918 22.79 
BGR 2011 115,193,278,719 17.77 20,469,845,628 27.27 31,413,207,107 5,582,126,903 26,051,972,531 22.62 
BGR 2012 118,416,202,048 18.50 21,906,997,379 26.67 31,581,601,086 5,842,596,201 27,749,593,580 23.43 
BGR 2013 120,940,806,200 19.88 24,047,023,319 28.00 33,863,425,736 6,733,166,529 30,780,189,849 25.45 
BGR 2014 125,740,576,129 21.27 26,740,871,104 27.97 35,169,639,143 7,479,421,648 34,220,292,751 27.21 
HRV 1996 39,526,778,516 22.65 8,952,815,334 35.90 14,190,113,487 3,214,060,705 12,166,876,039 30.78 
HRV 1997 42,828,764,961 21.80 9,336,670,762 36.60 15,675,327,976 3,417,221,499 12,753,892,260 29.78 
HRV 1998 44,241,626,863 25.00 11,060,406,716 35.33 15,630,566,771 3,907,641,693 14,968,048,408 33.83 
HRV 1999 44,395,695,503 23.04 10,228,768,244 33.80 15,005,745,080 3,457,323,666 13,686,091,910 30.83 
HRV 2000 47,564,558,954 22.16 10,540,306,264 34.43 16,376,477,648 3,629,027,447 14,169,333,711 29.79 
HRV 2001 50,285,356,716 20.84 10,479,468,340 33.10 16,644,453,073 3,468,704,020 13,948,172,360 27.74 
HRV 2002 54,539,852,822 21.35 11,644,258,577 31.10 16,961,894,228 3,621,364,418 15,265,622,995 27.99 
HRV 2003 58,260,522,999 20.62 12,013,319,842 31.37 18,276,326,065 3,768,578,435 15,781,898,277 27.09 
HRV 2004 62,579,293,389 19.86 12,428,247,667 30.00 18,773,788,017 3,728,474,300 16,156,721,967 25.82 
HRV 2005 66,004,826,366 19.78 13,055,754,655 30.20 19,933,457,562 3,942,837,906 16,998,592,561 25.75 
HRV 2006 75,189,970,861 19.86 14,932,728,213 29.73 22,353,978,337 4,439,500,098 19,372,228,311 25.76 
HRV 2007 83,267,221,867 19.93 16,595,157,318 30.17 25,121,720,837 5,006,758,963 21,601,916,281 25.94 
HRV 2008 89,785,126,205 20.01 17,966,003,754 29.50 26,486,612,230 5,299,971,107 23,265,974,861 25.91 
HRV 2009 86,237,221,790 19.24 16,592,041,472 29.63 25,552,088,816 4,916,221,888 21,508,263,361 24.94 
HRV 2010 84,845,080,572 19.16 16,256,317,438 31.73 26,921,344,065 5,158,129,523 21,414,446,960 25.24 
HRV 2011 88,627,632,084 18.47 16,369,523,646 31.27 27,713,860,553 5,118,750,044 21,488,273,690 24.25 
HRV 2012 90,186,781,801 19.58 17,658,571,877 30.57 27,570,099,197 5,398,225,423 23,056,797,299 25.57 
HRV 2013 92,268,446,101 19.13 17,650,953,739 31.20 28,787,755,184 5,507,097,567 23,158,051,306 25.10 
HRV 2014 93,255,069,483 19.29 17,988,902,903 31.27 29,160,860,227 5,625,129,938 23,614,032,841 25.32 
GRC 1996 171,120,830,289 18.64 31,890,229,320 28.23 48,307,410,390 9,002,611,737 40,892,841,057 23.90 
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GRC 1997 182,757,003,454 19.52 35,677,642,605 28.53 52,140,573,085 10,178,831,435 45,856,474,041 25.09 
GRC 1998 193,131,757,855 20.53 39,646,245,833 28.20 54,463,155,715 11,180,241,325 50,826,487,158 26.32 
GRC 1999 198,711,870,544 21.43 42,590,007,129 28.50 56,632,883,105 12,138,152,032 54,728,159,161 27.54 
GRC 2000 210,755,176,396 22.47 47,357,787,871 28.27 59,580,488,367 13,388,046,631 60,745,834,502 28.82 
GRC 2001 228,231,416,082 20.94 47,786,575,490 28.00 63,904,796,503 13,380,241,137 61,166,816,628 26.80 
GRC 2002 246,559,427,996 21.27 52,435,490,756 27.87 68,716,112,582 14,613,771,274 67,049,262,030 27.19 
GRC 2003 260,839,187,353 19.71 51,405,343,776 27.33 71,287,349,904 14,049,080,454 65,454,424,230 25.09 
GRC 2004 278,865,832,297 19.13 53,360,224,341 27.50 76,688,103,882 14,674,061,694 68,034,286,035 24.40 
GRC 2005 281,028,288,405 20.33 57,123,231,252 27.73 77,929,144,375 15,840,272,026 72,963,503,278 25.96 
GRC 2006 314,476,206,162 19.98 62,829,832,442 27.00 84,908,575,664 16,964,054,759 79,793,887,202 25.37 
GRC 2007 323,504,148,095 20.24 65,486,435,310 27.70 89,610,649,022 18,139,742,581 83,626,177,891 25.85 
GRC 2008 341,817,992,912 20.21 69,093,764,964 27.97 95,606,492,617 19,325,526,060 88,419,291,024 25.87 
GRC 2009 337,613,679,843 19.78 66,765,401,496 25.33 85,517,545,104 16,911,676,199 83,677,077,695 24.78 
GRC 2010 313,653,326,969 20.21 63,401,888,041 25.33 79,448,387,721 16,059,698,241 79,461,586,282 25.33 
GRC 2011 290,296,713,795 22.07 64,079,319,875 24.93 72,370,970,749 15,974,974,445 80,054,294,320 27.58 
GRC 2012 279,267,183,855 23.60 65,917,100,822 24.23 67,666,438,648 15,971,713,529 81,888,814,351 29.32 
GRC 2013 286,427,292,633 23.74 67,997,323,677 24.70 70,747,541,280 16,795,338,948 84,792,662,625 29.60 
GRC 2014 288,147,021,055 24.38 70,254,357,034 24.27 69,933,282,010 17,050,732,452 87,305,089,486 30.30 
MKD 1996 9,609,420,521 23.02 2,212,088,604 35.03 3,366,180,008 774,894,638 2,986,983,242 31.08 
MKD 1997 9,914,628,240 22.51 2,231,782,817 36.40 3,608,924,679 812,368,945 3,044,151,762 30.70 
MKD 1998 10,387,304,852 22.00 2,285,207,068 37.57 3,902,510,433 858,552,295 3,143,759,363 30.27 
MKD 1999 10,977,905,353 21.49 2,359,151,860 39.00 4,281,383,088 920,069,226 3,279,221,086 29.87 
MKD 2000 12,457,849,682 20.98 2,613,656,863 40.73 5,074,082,175 1,064,542,440 3,678,199,304 29.53 
MKD 2001 12,344,255,335 20.47 2,526,869,067 41.77 5,156,195,454 1,055,473,209 3,582,342,276 29.02 
MKD 2002 12,919,271,008 19.96 2,578,686,493 43.17 5,577,249,294 1,113,218,959 3,691,905,452 28.58 
MKD 2003 13,351,874,808 19.45 2,596,939,650 48.90 6,529,066,781 1,269,903,489 3,866,843,139 28.96 
MKD 2004 14,574,499,050 18.94 2,760,410,120 38.33 5,586,405,486 1,058,065,199 3,818,475,319 26.20 
MKD 2005 15,987,086,813 18.43 2,945,636,517 38.53 6,159,824,549 1,134,953,750 4,080,590,267 25.52 
MKD 2006 17,721,804,605 18.08 3,204,573,971 40.87 7,242,901,542 1,309,709,382 4,514,283,353 25.47 
MKD 2007 19,083,218,989 19.07 3,640,091,623 38.07 7,264,981,469 1,385,782,881 5,025,874,504 26.34 
MKD 2008 21,537,236,737 18.52 3,989,546,126 36.60 7,882,628,646 1,460,173,882 5,449,720,008 25.30 
MKD 2009 22,605,639,278 17.13 3,872,250,673 39.47 8,922,445,823 1,528,377,341 5,400,628,013 23.89 
MKD 2010 23,390,230,361 16.87 3,944,924,399 38.13 8,918,694,837 1,504,199,673 5,449,124,072 23.30 
MKD 2011 24,064,082,357 17.00 4,090,810,018 37.37 8,992,747,577 1,528,735,704 5,619,545,721 23.35 
MKD 2012 24,558,825,220 16.42 4,031,736,483 32.97 8,097,044,675 1,329,263,519 5,361,000,002 21.83 
MKD 2013 26,293,430,873 15.67 4,119,906,641 33.47 8,800,411,313 1,378,932,753 5,498,839,394 20.91 
MKD 2014 27,973,163,086 16.24 4,541,522,389 33.10 9,259,116,982 1,503,243,911 6,044,766,300 21.61 
ROU 1996 130,661,914,104 16.00 20,907,501,988 36.73 47,992,121,050 7,679,325,480 28,586,827,468 21.88 
ROU 1997 126,320,875,404 16.91 21,361,711,657 32.40 40,927,963,631 6,921,194,577 28,282,906,234 22.39 
ROU 1998 125,502,401,719 17.62 22,109,676,449 30.90 38,780,242,131 6,831,890,023 28,941,566,472 23.06 
ROU 1999 126,569,797,535 16.95 21,451,166,294 34.30 43,413,440,555 7,357,750,039 28,808,916,333 22.76 
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ROU 2000 131,817,966,895 17.87 23,560,904,790 32.13 42,353,112,763 7,570,118,709 31,131,023,499 23.62 
ROU 2001 145,815,589,404 16.50 24,062,298,118 35.27 51,429,158,383 8,486,772,546 32,549,070,664 22.32 
ROU 2002 156,007,553,674 16.45 25,663,820,082 30.60 47,738,311,424 7,853,128,945 33,516,949,027 21.48 
ROU 2003 168,720,335,331 17.16 28,957,074,232 30.80 51,965,863,282 8,918,778,863 37,875,853,095 22.45 
ROU 2004 196,017,571,593 17.14 33,591,471,188 32.33 63,372,480,896 10,860,122,635 44,451,593,822 22.68 
ROU 2005 207,302,689,152 17.25 35,759,629,670 30.83 63,911,419,065 11,024,693,827 46,784,323,497 22.57 
ROU 2006 247,843,784,061 17.73 43,936,944,446 25.20 62,456,633,583 11,072,110,000 55,009,054,446 22.20 
ROU 2007 280,721,829,724 17.41 48,859,899,526 25.63 71,949,004,958 12,522,792,249 61,382,691,775 21.87 
ROU 2008 334,807,276,941 16.84 56,384,976,384 25.03 83,802,261,418 14,113,159,589 70,498,135,972 21.06 
ROU 2009 326,151,619,753 15.40 50,243,537,142 24.87 81,113,907,833 12,495,567,687 62,739,104,829 19.24 
ROU 2010 347,851,579,156 16.57 57,645,434,049 24.00 83,484,378,997 13,834,904,172 71,480,338,221 20.55 
ROU 2011 364,569,775,773 17.99 65,574,540,363 23.90 87,132,176,410 15,672,315,147 81,246,855,510 22.29 
ROU 2012 380,769,349,931 17.88 68,087,460,776 23.80 90,623,105,284 16,204,815,665 84,292,276,441 22.14 
ROU 2013 397,225,989,630 17.55 69,725,606,584 24.20 96,128,689,490 16,873,596,793 86,599,203,377 21.80 
ROU 2014 414,046,808,587 17.90 74,100,432,820 23.40 96,886,953,209 17,339,501,280 91,439,934,100 22.08 
SRB 1996 38,755,576,817 14.22 5,512,011,913 27.03 10,475,632,414 1,489,896,820 7,001,908,733 18.07 
SRB 1997 42,251,060,561 15.01 6,339,771,637 28.80 12,168,305,441 1,825,854,231 8,165,625,869 19.33 
SRB 1998 43,747,630,945 15.79 6,906,657,236 30.77 13,461,146,042 2,125,178,431 9,031,835,667 20.65 
SRB 1999 39,021,947,365 16.57 6,465,936,678 33.20 12,955,286,525 2,146,690,977 8,612,627,656 22.07 
SRB 2000 43,006,592,182 17.35 7,462,718,908 35.97 15,469,471,208 2,684,339,991 10,147,058,900 23.59 
SRB 2001 46,160,131,108 18.14 8,371,139,776 35.43 16,354,534,451 2,965,894,823 11,337,034,599 24.56 
SRB 2002 50,982,943,928 18.92 9,644,698,418 34.97 17,828,735,492 3,372,751,037 13,017,449,454 25.53 
SRB 2003 53,840,949,717 19.70 10,606,667,094 34.43 18,537,438,988 3,651,875,481 14,258,542,575 26.48 
SRB 2004 60,229,292,344 20.48 12,336,464,804 34.27 20,640,578,486 4,227,706,488 16,564,171,293 27.50 
SRB 2005 64,786,639,079 21.27 13,776,878,800 34.00 22,027,457,287 4,684,138,792 18,461,017,592 28.50 
SRB 2006 71,267,080,387 22.05 15,712,609,548 33.53 23,895,852,054 5,268,437,982 20,981,047,530 29.44 
SRB 2007 77,300,277,201 22.83 17,644,253,596 30.03 23,213,273,244 5,298,569,355 22,942,822,951 29.68 
SRB 2008 87,627,895,069 22.41 19,635,441,414 27.07 23,720,871,195 5,315,313,991 24,950,755,405 28.47 
SRB 2009 86,691,882,449 21.20 18,378,717,969 24.93 21,612,286,295 4,581,814,390 22,960,532,359 26.49 
SRB 2010 88,216,846,518 21.44 18,912,509,953 24.03 21,198,508,218 4,544,676,142 23,457,186,094 26.59 
SRB 2011 93,810,865,402 20.20 18,949,251,817 24.23 22,730,372,687 4,591,403,715 23,540,655,532 25.09 
SRB 2012 94,365,827,053 19.72 18,610,249,604 24.30 22,930,895,974 4,522,290,654 23,132,540,257 24.51 
SRB 2013 98,668,341,471 19.25 18,995,273,130 23.73 23,413,997,431 4,507,578,314 23,502,851,444 23.82 
SRB 2014 98,444,967,815 19.25 18,952,270,040 23.27 22,908,144,010 4,410,193,238 23,362,463,278 23.73 
SVN 1996 28,383,002,368 20.13 5,713,054,118 27.27 7,740,044,746 1,557,949,858 7,271,003,976 25.62 
SVN 1997 30,306,251,616 19.82 6,005,192,329 27.23 8,252,392,315 1,635,213,871 7,640,406,200 25.21 
SVN 1998 31,754,417,297 20.52 6,516,433,781 27.07 8,595,920,762 1,763,998,625 8,280,432,406 26.08 
SVN 1999 33,844,952,075 20.86 7,059,545,020 27.30 9,239,671,917 1,927,255,790 8,986,800,811 26.55 
SVN 2000 35,873,180,670 20.04 7,190,385,094 27.00 9,685,758,781 1,941,403,975 9,131,789,069 25.46 
SVN 2001 37,846,698,512 19.95 7,550,521,881 25.20 9,537,368,025 1,902,731,514 9,453,253,395 24.98 
SVN 2002 40,498,975,974 20.44 8,277,647,672 24.70 10,003,247,066 2,044,578,975 10,322,226,647 25.49 
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SVN 2003 42,174,601,093 20.62 8,697,210,488 24.13 10,176,731,244 2,098,636,891 10,795,847,378 25.60 
SVN 2004 45,517,750,685 20.60 9,377,142,021 24.03 10,937,915,490 2,253,327,228 11,630,469,248 25.55 
SVN 2005 47,901,860,736 21.07 10,091,581,371 24.47 11,721,585,322 2,469,409,962 12,560,991,333 26.22 
SVN 2006 51,733,016,594 20.84 10,779,894,289 25.73 13,310,905,170 2,773,666,801 13,553,561,090 26.20 
SVN 2007 55,689,655,161 20.03 11,154,392,346 24.90 13,866,724,135 2,777,443,694 13,931,836,041 25.02 
SVN 2008 59,879,849,603 19.39 11,613,650,600 24.60 14,730,443,002 2,856,958,048 14,470,608,647 24.17 
SVN 2009 56,099,203,174 18.04 10,121,026,923 23.63 13,256,241,710 2,391,598,662 12,512,625,585 22.30 
SVN 2010 56,936,222,201 18.11 10,312,760,711 24.93 14,194,200,195 2,570,971,245 12,883,731,956 22.63 
SVN 2011 59,131,529,881 17.92 10,594,962,899 24.30 14,368,961,761 2,574,575,984 13,169,538,883 22.27 
SVN 2012 59,332,421,600 17.96 10,653,177,540 23.47 13,925,319,350 2,500,300,769 13,153,478,309 22.17 
SVN 2013 60,889,413,841 18.01 10,963,827,703 23.17 14,108,077,187 2,540,318,879 13,504,146,582 22.18 
SVN 2014 63,967,064,472 18.18 11,628,057,810 22.63 14,475,746,690 2,631,429,482 14,259,487,292 22.29 
TUR 1996 476,473,573,525 15.20 72,423,983,176 28.93 137,843,804,821 20,952,258,333 93,376,241,509 19.60 
TUR 1997 520,409,370,150 19.05 99,137,985,014 33.97 176,783,063,040 33,677,173,509 132,815,158,523 25.52 
TUR 1998 544,189,350,800 15.03 81,791,659,425 35.23 191,717,908,287 28,815,201,616 110,606,861,041 20.33 
TUR 1999 532,389,563,026 15.38 81,876,190,898 32.70 174,091,387,110 26,773,514,424 108,649,705,321 20.41 
TUR 2000 591,388,539,360 15.73 93,013,589,471 37.40 221,179,313,721 34,787,082,462 127,800,671,933 21.61 
TUR 2001 580,324,299,429 16.08 93,298,737,619 34.87 202,359,083,211 32,533,269,808 125,832,007,427 21.68 
TUR 2002 592,770,396,160 16.43 97,368,465,273 36.60 216,953,964,995 35,636,858,290 133,005,323,563 22.44 
TUR 2003 616,729,512,196 16.78 103,456,375,671 33.53 206,789,405,439 34,688,922,762 138,145,298,433 22.40 
TUR 2004 705,551,346,211 17.12 120,818,612,525 35.40 249,765,176,559 42,769,788,834 163,588,401,359 23.19 
TUR 2005 777,546,447,173 17.47 135,860,690,715 33.47 260,244,795,869 45,472,573,182 181,333,263,897 23.32 
TUR 2006 900,493,098,629 17.82 160,485,880,038 31.20 280,953,846,772 50,071,594,572 210,557,474,609 23.38 
TUR 2007 989,102,724,091 18.17 179,729,855,994 29.37 290,499,470,065 52,786,658,706 232,516,514,700 23.51 
TUR 2008 1,080,201,656,894 17.70 191,155,987,611 29.83 322,224,154,251 57,021,831,104 248,177,818,715 22.98 
TUR 2009 1,054,276,201,165 18.26 192,525,150,715 31.63 333,467,562,428 60,895,705,171 253,420,855,886 24.04 
TUR 2010 1,196,158,257,013 19.41 232,118,930,937 31.53 377,148,698,436 73,187,098,924 305,306,029,861 25.52 
TUR 2011 1,343,143,703,632 18.74 251,760,011,639 30.93 415,434,347,533 77,869,371,600 329,629,383,239 24.54 
TUR 2012 1,389,214,250,835 18.39 255,514,821,168 27.73 385,229,111,757 70,854,259,910 326,369,081,078 23.49 
TUR 2013 1,465,678,167,670 18.53 271,617,834,526 28.10 411,855,565,115 76,324,611,502 347,942,446,028 23.74 
TUR 2014 1,523,622,436,760 18.07 275,315,857,730 28.17 429,204,440,435 77,556,477,122 352,872,334,852 23.16 
 
